Churchill's Secret War

by Denniston, Robin

  Coming to more specific events, what if Hitler had decided on Operation ‘Marita’, to invade Turkey and attack Egypt via Syria in 1940? All diplomats knew that the Luftwaffe could have destroyed Istanbul in fifteen minutes, the Wehrmacht would have marched through Anatolia at 30 miles a day, according to a War Office appreciation – a two-month job. There would have been casualties, but 60 per cent of the one million strong Turkish army would have been bypassed in Thrace, leaving the rest to defend their homeland against the so far all-conquering Germans. Ankara would have been blitzed and the Turkish government forced to retire to Erzerum or Kars. It could only have happened in 1940 and would have involved Hitler’s early cancellation of ‘Sealion’ and a massive redeployment of Panzer army groups right across Europe from west to east. And even given these drawbacks Germany would almost certainly be putting her Soviet ally under intolerable pressure to defend her own southern borders. But at the time Hitler was being strongly advised by his successful generals to do just this, and the British knew it. The immediate gains would be the Persian oilfields and the cutting off of Britain from the Australasian Commonwealth, India and the Far East. Would that have been sufficient for Hitler? By 1941 he had decided not, particularly when he had every expectation that a successful combined operation against a weakened Britain would produce at worst a negotiated peace on French lines and at best German sovereignty of Europe. In 1940 Hitler did not overplay the hand his armies had dealt him with the conquest of Norway, the Low Countries, France, Greece and Yugoslavia. By the end of 1941 his supremacy over world affairs lapsed when he declared war on the Soviet Union and the USA.

  In that mega game plan Britain was a minor player and Turkey even smaller. The war was to be won and lost by two factors. One was the tooling up of a vast North American war machine, able to supply its allies as well as itself, able to destroy Japan, able eventually (with Britain) to invade the German heartland and link with the Russians west of Berlin. The other, centred on the Battle of Stalingrad and the world’s greatest tank battle on the Kersh peninsula, was the annihilation of German military supremacy by Soviet citizens defending their own country and dying in millions for it.

  So ‘what if?’ yields little in considering Churchill’s unavailing determination to play and win the Turkey hand in 1941–43. What if he had succeeded in persuading the Turkish leadership to abandon its policy of neutrality? Here counterfactual history itself encounters bedrock. It would not, could not, have happened. The reasons have emerged in the preceding chapters, they are clear from the record and the literature. They are further clarified by some understanding of Turkish self-identity in 1940.

  The part Britain played in beating the Nazis was crucial and desperate in 1940–41, and became gradually less so as the USA and the USSR took up arms. The official British war historians, without acknowledged access to secret intelligence which enabled Churchill to hold his own as one of the Big Three well after the true facts of world supremacy had passed Britain by, worked from primary sources which incorporated intelligence reports and assessments based on the contribution Ultra made to the course of events but without acknowledging it. Ultra’s immediate contribution is thus subsumed in the official record of the way the war developed. To assess its significance it has to be stripped out of existing accounts of the course of the war – in order to calculate how Britain would have fared had Ultra not existed. ‘In the jargon of my trade,’ writes Prof Sir Harry Hinsley, now the only surviving architect of the structures at Bletchley which actually turned Enigma into Ultra, ‘We have to engage in counter-factual history’, acknowledging this to be ‘a dubious enterprise, only permissible if we are fully aware of what we are doing. But it is equally true that unless we attempt it, we shall not grasp the significance of Ultra’s contribution.’ What that was was best expressed in a 1945 report by the late Brig E.T. (‘Bill’) Williams: he concludes his report on the contribution of intelligence to tactical Allied victories by asserting that the whole intelligence apparatus ‘was a hyphen between Bletchley Park and the soldier at war’. Had his report been made available to historians at any time between 1945 and 1973, a rather different history might have been written, though the actual narrative would not have differed more than marginally from what was published.

  What Williams said of Ultra’s part in Britain’s contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers can be said even more of its diplomatic dealings with the neutrals and particularly with Turkey, because these were all part of the common aim which was to beat the Germans by all and every means possible. And they were both in large part conducted by the same person – the nearest thing Britain’s constitution permitted to a warlord. While since 1973 the Ultra contribution to winning the war at sea and in the Mediterranean and North Africa has become a target for historical scholarship, the ambassadorial reports from European capitals which Churchill used to handle Turkey were released over twenty years later, as recently as 1994. This means that diplomatic historians have had no more than a few months to review the new material and undertake the dangerous counterfactual exercise which Hinsley both warned against and also showed had to be undertaken. This book has attempted to strip out the diplomatic messages from the general progress of Turco-British wartime relations to see whether, and how differently, Churchill would have played the Turkey hand on behalf of the Allies had this material not been available to him – in the actual words – in DIR/C. This attempt reveals that very little was to Churchill’s hand apart from BJs and his own instinct about the importance of a strong Turco-British relationship, which may have been based on his experiences over the Dardanelles in 1915. The consequence of this is to take seriously his insistence on seeing the actual Turkey-based BJs, and that has been the thrust of the foregoing chapters.

  Churchill, as has been shown, studied the Turkish BJs continuously from 1941 to 1944 and adjusted his policy in the light of that study. But it was not only the study itself which convinced him that he could persuade the Turkish leadership to attach their country to the Allied cause. His strong instinctive reaction to the German successes of 1940 had its roots in the First World War. So he might have pursued this will o’ the wisp regardless of the BJs. Why, then, does their release in 1994 create a significant gap, requiring filling, in wartime diplomatic history? The answer to this fundamental question is that the BJs, however important at the time to Churchill and the Southern Department, did not of themselves develop in Churchill’s mind a policy other than that to which he was already committed and which he consistently if unavailingly pursued.

  APPENDIX ONE

  DIR/C – HW1: Public Record Office

  DIR/C first appeared at the PRO in spring 1994. The files date from 1940 to 1945 but there are significant gaps, particularly at the beginning. They are prefaced in the listings supplied by the PRO by a short summary of their content, which differs only marginally from what appears in Chapter 2. This summary draws attention not to five but to three items:

  1) Items CX/FJ, CX/JQ and CX/MSS – Enigma.

  2) Naval headlines.

  3) BJs: selected translations of intercepted diplomatic telegrams.

  They also mention ‘certain original cover notes and actual documents passed to Churchill or in his absence the Lord Privy Seal and Deputy Prime Minister [Attlee], using Boniface, complete with annotations and minuting.’

  All these documents are said by the PRO archivist to have been returned by Churchill to GCCS for safekeeping. This is doubtful. The BJ component was intended for immediate destruction after reading by each named recipient of each BJ; many of them had been reading and burning them for years before the start of DIR, and would never have lost the habit. In the FO wartime files there are no authentic BJs, though there are summaries, paraphrases, ‘gists’ and references to them as ‘reliable sources’ or sometimes ‘our secret sources’. In WO106 and 208 there are clear indications of prewar BJs.

  The only person who did not routinely burn them was Churchill himself, exercising his magpie ins
tinct to throw nothing away. Strong efforts were made during his many absences from London not only to get the fullest possible amount of intercept material to him wherever he was, but also to safeguard security and ensure that the end-user, after Churchill, destroyed them himself. But Churchill must have somehow kept nearly 4,000 DIR files. Prof Hinsley tells me that they were discovered almost by chance at Chartwell after his death, and transferred immediately to GCHQ where they were used extensively in the history of British intelligence in the Second World War as ‘Dir Archive’. The blue cover notes which accompany most of them emanated from ‘C’ and carry a serial number from 6112 (HW1/3) to 9995 (HW1/715). Thereafter the serial number ceases. For other Boniface messages the PRO archivist refers the researcher to ADM223/1–7 and 438–640, as well as to DEFE, the main source used by previous researchers into the use of wartime high-grade sigint (see Anthony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936–41; London, Routledge, 1995, p. 235).

  Below are listed all those files containing Turkey-related BJs, many of them used in the chapters that precede this. Dates of decryption are also given: there are occasions on which the date of the file cover note may differ from that shown on an individual BJ. On the BJ, at the start of the series, two different dates sometimes appear, indicating the time difference between receipt of the intercept and its distribution in processed form. Churchill queried any undue delay indicated by these dates. Their usefulness derived largely from their immediacy.

  HW1 (DIR/C) Diplomatic Intercepts Relevant to Turkish Neutrality in the Second World War from September 1941 till D-Day

  1941

  38

  1 September BJ 095065: the Turkish ambassador in Moscow reported on British aims on Persia, and that the British believe the Germans will invade the Caucasus and get the Baku oil; the Russians will lose. Britain would pressurise Turkey to take the Suez canal: Turkey must take action before the Allies (Soviet Union and Britain) occupy Tehran. He also reported a discussion with the British ambassador – Sir Stafford Cripps.

  44

  4 September BJ 095168: Irish intercept, Berlin to Dublin; Turkey has grave cause for anxiety.

  49

  5 September BJ 095195: Italian intercept, Kabul to Rome (marked by Churchill: ‘to be sent to the F Secy 6/9’); ‘the Afghan government were prepared to grant whatever the British cared to ask’.

  51

  6 September BJ 095218: the Turkish ambassador in Madrid reported Axis demands on Turkey for the passage of the Italian fleet through the Straits to the Black Sea; the demand was ‘not such that its rejection by you will involve our country in war’.

  64

  13 September BJ 095416: Italian intercept, Quaroni in Kabul to Rome; the Japanese ambassador in Ankara told him about increased Allied pressure on Turkey, which will be resisted by the Turks ‘because they are afraid of Germany’.

  67

  15 September BJ 095417: Italian minister in Sofia to Rome: ‘British would pressurise Turkey to allow British ships through the Dardanelles. Papen favoured gradualism, Ribbentrop a more radical approach. Papen may be sacked’. BJ 095432: the American ambassador in Turkey made clear to a Persian diplomat that Roosevelt disapproved of the Russo-British adventure in Persia (Ankara to Washington).

  79

  20 September BJ 095665/795 and 796: French intercept from Vichy to Ankara. Dr Carl Clodius, in charge of German negotiations over chrome with Turkey wanted the French to help Germany but the Turco-Franco-British accord of 8 January 1940 only provided chrome for France as well as Britain. None the less ‘les negotiations se derouleraient dans une atmosphere cordiale.’

  82

  24 September BJ 095748: Japanese intercept, Berlin to Tokyo reported on Turkey’s predicament: ‘the German armies are contemplating crossing from the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts and landing in the Caucasus at one bound. So Turkey’s position may well be jeopardized . . . Britain will be compelled to thrust her fleet into the Black Sea and upset Germany’s landing scheme . . . if the German army attacks Turkey the British fleet would force the Straits and enter the Black Sea . . . As Germany is aware of this, Germany will not at present attack Turkey.’

  86 (7629)

  26 September: PM’s query on distribution of Boniface.

  93

  27 September: the Japanese chargé in London reported to Tokyo that ‘Turkey had given in to Germany’s vigorous demands’ for chrome. This was circulated to the MEW.

  95 (7667)

  26 September: ‘C’ and PM on ‘dangerously large circulation of BJs’.

  108 (7706)

  2 October BJ 096091: Ankara to Tokyo reported that ‘the Turkish government is disquieted as German action seems imminent . . . The foreign minister . . . hopes that by Spring Russia will be defeated and that the war will thus be brought to an end by negotiation before Turkey is compelled to take part in it.’

  109

  BJ 096081: Italian intercept (De Peppo), Ankara to Rome; reported his conversation with Clodius who ‘took some political soundings too and is convinced Turkey [garbled] to maintain her neutrality’.

  110 (7709)

  3 October BJ 096132: German intercept, Stockholm to Berlin; reported that ‘the whole world has its eyes on Turkey’.

  112(7713)

  3 October: Japanese, Ankara to Tokyo re Turco-German relations.

  119

  6 October: Enigma message that Der Tag was postponed until further notice.

  159 (7858)

  21 October: Japanese (Oshima), Berlin to Tokyo reported on German plans for an invasion of England.

  206

  11 November BJ 09756/326: Japanese, Berlin to Tokyo (Oshima).

  207

  12 November BJ 097604: Japanese, Ankara to Tokyo.

  211

  BJ 097641: Japanese, Washington to Tokyo.

  255

  20 November BJ 097939.

  253

  24 November BJs 098092, 098093, 098094: Turkish, Vichy to Ankara.

  254

  24 November BJ 098097: Japanese, Tokyo to Berlin (Oshima).

  269 and 277

  27 and 29 November: Turkish, Ankara to Tokyo, predicted an early start to the US-Japanese war.

  281

  30 November BJ 098360: Churchill on fear; also BJ 098373/219: Turkish intercept, Ankara to Berne, re Turkish unity.

  288

  2 December BJ 098452: Tokyo to Berlin (Oshima): ‘We are about to be at war with the USA’.

  314

  9 December BJ 098766: Ankara to Tokyo reporting ‘Turkey will support the Axis in the spring.’

  317

  11 December – eleven BJs including four ambassadorial reports by Turks to Ankara, including BJ 098813: Turkish ambassador in Rome reporting the new agreement between Britain, Turkey and the USA.

  1942

  374 (8611)

  27 January BJ 100577/69 and 100519/24: Italian, Ankara to Rome. Churchill read he was to resign and the British cabinet would be reconstructed – sent the intercept to Eden.

  Silent from 382 of 23 January 1942 till 385 of 23 February 1942.

  452

  27 March BJ 102680/82: Sofia to Tokyo, Turkey in a state of extreme anxiety. Two hundred more BJs, including BJ 102687/23 re German casualties and 102689/96: Tehran to Ankara, Russians discriminating against Turks.

  454

  28 March BJ 102695: Ankara to Chungking re assassination attempt on von Papen; also BJ 102709 (also Ankara to Chungking): ‘Turkey is being hemmed in by the Soviets and may have to escape by the Dardanelles if Germany occupies the Crimea.

  456

  9 April BJ 102755/101 of March 29: Kuibyshev to Ankara; King Boris of Bulgaria will not send troops to Russia but may ask Russia that Turkey would not be allowed to attack Bulgaria if Bulgaria did agree to send troops there.

  456

  29 March BJ 102755: Kuibyshev to Ankara.

  473

  4 April: PM to ‘C’ – ‘your hens seem to be eggbound’.


  484 (9155)

  9 April: Berlin to Tokyo re German intentions against Turkey, and Kesselring’s tactical exercise without troops.

  497

  15 April: London to Ankara re PM’s invitation to Turkey’s ambassador to Britain to accompany him to Washington to beg matériel from the Americans.

  513

  21 April BJ 103496/26: Berlin to Tokyo re Turkey’s offer to mediate between Germany and Britain.

  560

  10 May: Ankara to Rome: ‘if Turkey had to fight Russia she would fight Britain too’.

  563

  11 May BJ 104279: Ankara to Lisbon; BJ 104284: Ankara to all stations abroad.

  577 and 578

  17 May: Madrid to Ankara; Suner reported Allied decision to occupy Turkey. See also 595, 596, 598 and 599.

  589 (9555)

  22 May: Turkish, Madrid to Ankara.

  631

  8 June BJ 105334: Madrid to Ankara re British threats to Turkey.

  683

  1 July BJ 106218: Berlin to Ankara re consequences to the Allies should Turkey join the Axis.

  689

  2 July BJ 106219: Ankara to Chungking.

  700

  5 July BJ 106356: Ankara to Lisbon: ‘Turkey must declare herself soon’.

  706

  7 July BJ 106248: Ankara to Tokyo (Kurihara), ‘I think we should lean on Turkey’.