The Portable Greek Historians: The Essence of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius (Portable Library)

by M. I. Finley

  But about the 124th Olympiad, as I have said, a change of sentiment prevailed among the Achaean cities, and they began again to form a league. This was just at the time of Pyrrhus’ invasion of Italy. The first to take this step were the peoples of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, and therefore we find no stele recording their adherence to the League. About five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their garrison and joined the League, and next the people of Bura put their tyrant to death and did the same. Simultaneously, Caryneia was restored to the League. For Iseas, the then tyrant of Caryneia, when he saw the expulsion of the garrison from Aegium, and the death of the ruler in Bura at the hands of Margus and the Achaeans, and when he saw that he was himself on the point of being attacked on all sides, voluntarily laid down his rule; and, having obtained a guarantee for his personal safety from the Achaeans, formally gave in the adhesion of his city to the League. the original bearers of this ancestral name have no superiority over others, either in the size of their territory and cities, or in wealth, or in the prowess of their men. For they are far inferior to the Arcadians and Lacedaemonians in number of inhabitants and extent of territory; nor can these latter nations be said to yield the first place in warlike courage tc any Greek people whatever. Whence then comes it that these nations, with the rest of the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, have been content to adopt the constitution and the name of the Achaeans? To speak of chance in such a matter would not be to offer any adequate solution of the question, and would be mere idle evasion. A cause must be sought; for without a cause nothing, expected or unexpected, can be accomplished. The cause then, in my opinion, was this. Nowhere could be found a more unalloyed and deliberately established system of political equality and freedom of speech, and, in a word, of genuine democracy, than among the Achaeans. This constitution found some of the Peloponnesians ready enough to adopt it of their own accord; many were brought to share in it by persuasion and argument; some, though acting under compulsion at first, were quickly brought to acquiesce in its benefits. For none of the original members had any special privilege reserved for them, but equal rights were given to all comers; the object aimed at was therefore quickly attained by the two most unfailing expedients of equality and humanity. This then must be looked upon as the source and original cause of Peloponnesian unity and consequent well-being.

  That this was the original principle on which the Achaeans acted in forming their constitution might be demonstrated by many proofs; but for the present purpose it will be sufficient to allege one or two in confirmation of my assertion.

  39. When the Pythagorean clubs in the district of Italy then called Magna Graecia were burnt down, there followed great constitutional disturbances, as was natural on the sudden disappearance of the leading men in each state; and the Greek cities in that part of Italy became the scene of murder, civil strife, and every kind of disturbance.26 Deputations were sent from most parts of Greece to endeavour to bring about some settlement of these disorders. But the disturbed states preferred the intervention of the Achaeans above all others, and showed the greatest confidence in them in regard to the measures to be adopted for removing the evils that oppressed them. Nor was this the only occasion on which they displayed this preference. For shortly afterwards there was a general movement among them to adopt the model of the Achaean constitution. The first states to move in the matter were Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, who began by erecting a common temple to Zeus Homarios, and a place in which to hold their meetings and common councils. They then adopted the laws and customs of the Achaeans, and determined to conduct their government according to their principles; but, finding themselves hampered by the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse, and also by the encroachment of the neighbouring barbarians, they were forced much against their will to abandon them.

  Again, later on, when the Lacedaemonians met with their unexpected reverse at Leuctra [371 B.C.], and the Thebans as unexpectedly claimed the hegemony in Greece, a feeling of uncertainty prevailed throughout the country, and especially among the Lacedaemonians and Thebans themselves; because the former refused to allow that they were beaten, the latter felt hardly certain that they had conquered. Then the Achaeans were the people selected by the two parties, out of all Greece, to act as arbitrators on the points in dispute. And this could not have been from any special view of their power, for at that time they were perhaps the weakest state in Greece; it was rather from a conviction of their good faith and high principles, in regard to which there was but one opinion universally entertained.

  At that period of their history, however, they possessed 42. Why did I go back to these times? First, to show clearly at what epoch the Achaeans entered into the second league, which exists at this day, and which were the first members of the original league to do so; second, that the statement of their principles might rest, not on my word only, but on the evidence of the actual facts. It was in virtue of a sustained policy—by holding out the offer of equality and freedom, and by invariably making war upon and crushing those who, on their own account or with the support of the kings, enslaved their native cities—that they finally accomplished the design which they had deliberately adopted, in some cases by their unaided efforts, and in others by the help of their allies. For in fact whatever was effected in this direction by the help of these allies in after times, must be put down to the principles and policy of the Achaeans themselves. They acted indeed jointly with others in many honourable undertakings, and in none more so than with the Romans; yet in no instance can they be said to have aimed at obtaining from their success any private advantage. In return for the zealous assistance rendered by them to their allies, they demanded in exchange nothing but the freedom of each state and the union of the Peloponnesus. But this will be more clearly seen from the record of their actual proceedings.

  43. For the first twenty-five years of the League between the cities I have mentioned, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were elected by each city in turn. But after this period they determined to appoint one strategus only, and put the entire management of their affairs in his hands. The first to obtain this honor was Margus of Caryneia [in 255 B.C.]. In the fourth year after this man’s tenure of office, Aratus of Sicyon, then only twenty years of age, by his energy and courage delivered his city from its tyrant, and, being a passionate admirer of the Achaean principles, caused his city to join the League. Eight years later, Aratus, being elected strategus for the second time, laid a plot to seize the citadel of Corinth, then held by Antigonus; and by his success freed the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus from a source of serious alarm; and having thus liberated Corinth he caused it to join the League. In his same term of office he got Megara into his hands, and caused it to join also. These events occurred in the year before the decisive defeat of the Carthaginians [in the First Punic War], in consequence of which they evacuated Sicily and consented for the first time to pay tribute to Rome.

  Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so short a time, Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of leader of the Achaean nation, and in the consistent direction of his whole policy to one single end, which was to expel the Macedonians from the Peloponnesus, to depose the despots, and to establish in each state the common freedom which their ancestors had enjoyed before them. So long, therefore, as Antigonus Gonatas was alive, he maintained a continual opposition to his interference, as well as to the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, and in both cases with signal skill and success; although their presumption and contempt for justice had risen to such a pitch, that they had actually made a formal compact with each other for the dissolution of the Achaean League.

  44. After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms with the Aetolians, and joined them energetically in the war against Demetrius [who succeeded Antigonus to the Macedonian throne in 239 B.C.]; and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility there arose between them, for the time being, a sentiment of brotherhood and affection. Upon the dea
th of Demetrius, after a reign of only ten years, just about the time of the first invasion of Illyria by the Romans, the Achaeans had a most excellent opportunity of establishing the policy which they had all along maintained. For the tyrants in the Peloponnesus were in despair at the death of Demetrius, who had been their chief supporter and paymaster. And now Aratus was forever impressing upon them that they ought to abdicate, holding out rewards and honours for those of them who consented, and threatening those who refused with still greater vengeance from the Achaeans. There was therefore a general movement among them voluntarily to restore their several states to freedom and to join the League. Indeed, Lydiades of Megalopolis, foreseeing with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to happen, had, of his own deliberate choice, already abdicated as tyrant in the lifetime of Demetrius, and adhered to the national league. His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xenon of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise abdicated and joined the democratic league.

  45. But the increased power and national advancement which these events brought to the Achaeans excited the envy of the Aetolians, who, besides their natural inclination to unjust and selfish aggrandizement, were inspired with the hope of breaking up the union of Achaean states, as they had before [about 270 B.C.] succeeded in partitioning those of Acarnania with Alexander [II of Epirus], and had planned to do those of Achaea with Antigonus Gonatas. Instigated once more by similar expectations, they had now the assurance to enter into communication and close alliance at once with Antigonus (at that time ruling Macedonia as guardian of the young King Philip), and with Cleomenes, king of Sparta. They saw that Antigonus had undisputed control of Macedonia, while he was an open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to the surprise of the citadel of Corinth; and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the League, they would easily subdue it, by selecting a favourable opportunity for their attack, and securing that it should be assaulted on all sides at once.

  And they would in all probability have succeeded, but that they had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely, that in Aratus they had to reckon with an opponent to their plans of ability equal to almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted this violent and unjust interference in Achaea, so far from succeeding in any of their devices, they, on the contrary, strengthened Aratus, then head of the League, as well as the League itself. So consummate was the ability with which he foiled their plan and reduced them to impotence. The manner in which this was done will be made clear in what I am about to relate.

  46. Aratus saw that the Aetolians were ashamed to declare war openly on the Achaeans, because they could not ignore their recent obligations to them in the war with Demetrius; but they were plotting with the Lacedaemonians, and they showed their jealousy of the Achaeans not only by conniving at the treacherous attack of Cleomenes upon Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus (cities not only in alliance with the Aetolians, but actually members of their League), but by confirming his occupation of those places. In old times they had thought almost any excuse good enough to justify an appeal to arms against those who, after all, had done them no wrong; yet they now allowed themselves to be treated with such treachery, and submitted without remonstrance to the loss of their largest cities, solely with the view of creating in Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to the Achaeans. These facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other leaders of the League, and they resolved that, without taking the initiative in going to war with anyone, they would resist the attempts of the Lacedaemonians. Such was their determination, but immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to build the hostile fort in the territory of Megalopolis, called the Athenaeum, and showed an undisguised and bitter hostility. Aratus and his colleagues accordingly summoned the council of the League, and it was decided to proclaim war openly against Sparta. This was the date [229 or 228 B.C.] and origin of what is called the Cleomenic War.

  47. At first the Achaeans were for depending on their own resources for facing the Lacedaemonians. They deemed it more honourable not to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory and cities themselves; and at the same time the memory of his former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with Ptolemy [III Euergetes], and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted some time, and Cleomenes had revolutionized the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional monarchy into a tyranny, and, moreover, was conducting the war with extraordinary skill and boldness—seeing clearly what would happen, and fearing the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He perceived that Antigonus [Doson] was a man of activity and practical ability, with some pretensions to the character of a man of honour. He however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a natural friend or foe, but ever measure friendships and enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He, therefore, conceived the idea of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the certain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this matter he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, but would cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired should go abroad, and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue in secrecy. The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak and act in public in a sense contrary to his true sentiments, that he might conceal his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite nature. For which reason there are some particulars which he did not even mention in his own memoirs.

  48. It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the people of Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek the protection of Antigonus and the hopes of safety offered by Macedonia. For their proximity to Sparta exposed them to attack before the other cities, while they were unable to get the help which they ought to have, because the Achaeans were themselves hard pressed and in great difficulties. He also knew that they had special reasons for entertaining feelings of affection towards the royal family of Macedonia, founded on the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas [338 B.C.]. He therefore imparted his general design under pledge of secrecy to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis, who were family friends of his own and of a character suited to the undertaking, and by their means experienced no difficulty in inducing the people of Megalopolis to send envoys to the League, to urge that an application for help should be made to Antigonus. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves selected to go on this mission to the League, and thence, if their view was accepted, to Antigonus. The League consented to allow the Megalopolitans to send the mission; and accordingly Nicophanes lost no time in obtaining an interview with the king. About the interests of his own city he spoke briefly and summarily, confining himself to the most necessary statements; the greater part of his speech was, in accordance with the directions of Aratus, concerned with the general situation.

  49. The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell on were the scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and Cleomenes, and the necessity of caution on the part of the Achaeans in the first place, but even more on the part of Antigonus himself: first because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the attack of both, and second because if the Aetolians and Cleomenes conquered them, any man of sense could easily see that they would not be satisfied or stop there. For the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from being content to be confined by the boundaries of the Peloponnesus, would find even those of Greece too narrow for them. Again, the ambition of Cleomenes was at present directed to the supremacy in the Peloponnesus: but, this obtained, he would promptly aim at that of all Greece, in which it would be impossible for him to succeed without
first destroying the dominion of Macedonia. They were, therefore, to urge him to consider, with a view to the future, which of the two courses would be more to his own interests—to fight for supremacy in Greece in conjunction with the Achaeans and Boeotians against Cleomenes in the Peloponnesus, or to abandon the most powerful nation, and to stake the Macedonian empire on a battle in Thessaly, against a combined force of Aetolians and Boeotians, with the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to boot. If the Aetolians, from regard to the good will shown them by the Achaeans in the time of Demetrius, were to pretend to be anxious to keep the peace as they were at present doing, they were to assert that the Achaeans were ready to engage Cleomenes by themselves; and if Fortune declared in their favour they would want no assistance from anyone; but if Fortune went against them, and the Aetolians joined in the attack, they begged him to watch the course of events, that he might not let things go too far, but might aid the Peloponnesians while they were still capable of being saved. He had no need to be anxious about the good faith or gratitude of the Achaeans; when the time for action came, Aratus pledged himself to find guarantees which would be satisfactory to both parties, and similarly would himself indicate the moment at which the aid should be given.