by Mark Zuehlke
BY LATE MORNING on July 19, Lieutenant General Simonds believed his corps ready for Operation Atlantic’s second phase. At 1100 hours, he announced that 3rd Division would concentrate on reorganizing while consolidating its grip on Colombelles and Vaucelles. The 7th Brigade would, however, attack and clear the industrial suburb of Cormelles southeast of Vaucelles.
Simonds declared the highway running from Caen to Falaise as the boundary between his two divisions, with 3rd Division to keep left of it and 2nd Division to the right. The latter division’s 5th Brigade was now to advance from Vaucelles to Fleury-son-Orne and the high ground through to Hill 67, which lay a short distance beyond. One battalion would then go left to secure Ifs. At the same time, 6th Brigade would advance from Hill 67, due south to Saint-André-surOrne.14
How II Canadian Corps operations coordinated with the bold armoured breakout of Operation Goodwood was no longer clear. Throughout July 18, the three armoured divisions had advanced at great cost in tanks disabled or destroyed. The 11th Armoured Division alone counted 126 tanks, virtually half its strength, out of action by nightfall.15 On the left flank, the Guards Armoured Division had lost sixty tanks in their battle christening.16 Yet at 1620 hours, General Bernard Montgomery had signalled General Sir Alan Brooke, “Complete success … bombing decisive … spectacle terrific … ordered recce regiments to crossing between Mezidon and Falaise … difficult to see what the enemy can do … few tanks met so far.” Appended was a long list of villages and towns taken, several of which remained firmly in the German grip.17
By the time Simonds issued his orders on July 19, great expectations for Operation Goodwood had been abandoned. Although VIII British Corps continued battering away, it was clear there would be no breakout. Instead, at 1035 hours, Lieutenant General Richard N. O’Connor and his three divisional commanders agreed on a series of set-piece attacks starting at 1600 hours against villages that were to have fallen the day before. Bras was 11th Armoured’s target, Bourgébus 7th Armoured’s. The Guards Armoured would reorganize around Cagny.18
Well before this, Simonds launched the Canadians on their tasks. A report that the Germans had withdrawn from Cormelles and that 29th British Armoured Brigade had tanks in orchards immediately to the south prompted Simonds to order 3rd Division’s 9th Brigade to make a grab from the eastern flank of Vaucelles, rather than waiting for 7th Brigade to get organized.19
The Highland Light Infantry’s ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies, accompanied by the mortar, carrier, and anti-tank platoons, headed towards Cormelles a little after noon. Caught in a rain of mortar and shellfire, the force was repeatedly driven to cover. When it was discovered that some of the fire was coming from Canadian artillery, the advance was held up until these guns were stopped. At 1647 hours, the Highlanders reported they were in Cormelles and meeting only snipers.20
Cormelles was a big town, so the HLI were unaware that Lieutenant Lorenzo Bergeron and his Regina Rifles scouts had arrived at noon. Bergeron and his men encountered a large, happy group of civilians “who laid out an excellent meal for them, also bottles of wine in celebration of liberation from the Hun.” The platoon remained in Cormelles until after dark, when the Royal Winnipeg Rifles arrived to relieve them. At no time did the scouts and the HLI meet. Bergeron returned to the Regina headquarters with seven prisoners, two German motorcycles, and a couple of bottles of cognac.21
FOR 2ND DIVISION’S 5th Brigade, July 19 was its combat debut. Le Régiment de Maisonneuve (Maisies) led off with an advance from Vaucelles adjacent to Route 162. Fleury-sur-Orne was three miles distant. ‘A’ Company under Major Alexandre Dugas led on the left with Major Léon Brosseau’s ‘D’ Company out front on the right. Behind them, ‘C’ was on the left and ‘B’ Company the right. Fleury was clearly visible, standing on a hill’s summit. The plan was simple: leading companies would follow a creeping barrage to the edge of the village. Then the reserve companies would pass through and clear it.22 ‘B’ Squadron of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers was accompanying the infantry. A 2nd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment troop would come forward once the village was secure and help repel any counterattack. Because it was unclear whether the Royal Regiment had driven all German forces away from the west bank of the Orne River, which Route 162 followed closely, a Toronto Scottish heavy machine-gun platoon was positioned to screen that flank.
At 1300 hours, the two leading companies advanced to the start line, misread its location, and went on another three hundred yards. This placed them precisely where the first salvo of the creeping barrage was to fall. The mortar platoon commander, Captain Achille Louis Orieux, was up with the lead companies in order to situate his mortars to cover the advance. Before anyone realized the deadly error, the barrage started. Both companies were smothered with shells. Terrific carnage ensued. Brosseau was killed while trying to get his men under cover. Orieux fell dying.23 Eleven other men died, thirty-seven were wounded, and twenty-seven were evacuated as battle-exhaustion cases.24
Realizing that his two lead companies had been shattered, Lieutenant Colonel H.L. Bisaillon immediately ordered ‘C’ and ‘B’ Companies to take the lead. The company commanders had their men run until they caught up to the barrage, which the gunners—oblivious to what had happened—were continuing as scheduled. Dugas, meanwhile, managed to restore ‘A’ Company to order and it fell in behind.
The advance was virtually unopposed. By 1630 hours, Fleury was secure, and the battalion had established an all-round defence.25 Despite the tragedy, the Maisies had proven their ability to recover quickly and continue their mission. Although the Maisies had gained Fleury, they had taken longer than originally planned. This had left the Calgary Highlanders waiting on their own start line, sweating in the intense mid-afternoon heat with no source of shade. Finally, at 1715 hours, their advance began. Their first battle, they had decided it appropriate to go forward to the skirl of their three pipers. The Calgaries passed through Fleury and headed for their objective—Hill 67—fifteen hundred yards off. Lieutenant Colonel Donald MacLauchlan advanced his men in the standard box pattern with two companies forward, two back, his headquarters in the middle, and the support company at the rear. The pipers skirled away as the battalion marched through “a hail of terrific” mortar and artillery fire.26
Advancing across open fields, they heard machine-gun and rifle bullets swishing through the waist-high wheat. The Sherbrooke squadron in support opened fire with its machine guns and 75-millimetre guns, zeroing in on any muzzle flash or stream of tracers marking an enemy position. As the Highlanders went up the hill, they saw German infantry “scurrying out of the wheat fields.” At 1800 hours, Hill 67 was theirs.
Thirty minutes later, they were still digging in when the Germans counterattacked. Captain S.J. “Sandy” Pearson was with ‘C’ Company on the forward slope and “could see them across the valley,” tanks and infantry, coming fast.27 Supported by the Sher-brooke tanks, the company held its ground, despite taking heavy casualties. ‘B’ Company, on its right, caught the attacking Germans with flanking fire. As casualties mounted in ‘C’ Company, two platoons from ‘D’ Company reinforced it.
To one side of the hilltop position, a small patrol from ‘C’ Company had been caught in the open.28 Lieutenant Vernon Francis Kilpatrick saw three German tanks closing in for the kill. Grabbing a PIAT and some rounds, Kilpatrick moved fifty yards to the front of his men, as if to shield them from the tanks. Two Panthers and a Mark IV presented difficult targets for a PIAT, but Kilpatrick managed to immobilize the Panthers and his final round blew the turret off the Mark IV. Moments later the twenty-two-year-old, who had begun the war as a private, was killed by a sniper round. Soon after Kilpatrick knocked out the tanks, the counterattack crumbled.29
Holding Hill 67 had cost three officers and eighty-nine other ranks wounded, one officer and three other ranks killed, and two men missing. “It can be safely said now,” the Calgary war diarist wrote, “that for ‘green horners’ in real live battle, we have proven our worth.”
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While the Calgary Highlanders had advanced on and then held Hill 67, the Black Watch had also moved through Fleury eastward to Ifs. Encountering several groups of Germans probing towards Hill 67 from the east, the Black Watch sent them running. By midnight, the battalion had taken the village but was being harried by snipers and subjected to the inevitable heavy shelling.30
When one shell set the Regimental Aid Post on fire, Sergeant William Francis Clements organized stretcher-bearer parties and made sure all the wounded were safely evacuated despite the flames and smoke boiling around him. His self less heroism garnered a Military Medal.31
AS JULY 19 closed, General Myles Dempsey decided Goodwood was finished. Montgomery was in damage-control mode, claiming the offensive’s objective had really only been to enlarge the Orne bridgehead and keep German armoured divisions fixed there.32 Such a reversal in twenty-four hours from his signal to Brook was hard to credit and contradicted statements he and his staff had made to attached war correspondents. “All the high hopes were not realized,” Canadian Press correspondent Ross Munro wrote, “for the tanks had not been able to shake loose through the open country leading to Falaise, twenty miles south of Caen.”33 Twenty-First Army Group’s Brigadier Charles Richardson bemoaned the fact that Goodwood “had been a tremendous flop.”34
Dempsey set about securing what had been won. He made I British Corps responsible for the left flank and reinforced it with 49th British Infantry Division and 33rd Armoured Brigade from XXXCorps on the western flank. The flagging VIII Corps must finish taking Bourguébus and hold until relieved by II Canadian Corps, which would have to broaden its front substantially. The Canadians would take over “Bras and Hubert-Folie and be responsible for all the country westwards to the Orne, establishing a forward division to the west of Bourguébus on the Verrières ridge. West of the Orne XII Corps would conform with II Canadian Corps’s operations, working forward from Hill 112 to Maltôt … while further west XXX Corps was also to work forward.” This realignment would strengthen Second Army’s hold on what it had won and continue to divert German attention from the American front.35
VIII Corps had lost 271 tanks. Though many were retrievable, repairing them and replacing those destroyed would take time. The armoured divisions had suffered thousands of men killed and wounded—the numbers were still being tallied. More, undoubtedly, would result from the remaining fighting, which would fall upon 7th Armoured Division’s shoulders.36 The other two divisions were being pulled out immediately, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division relieving 11th Armoured Division. Simonds announced his intention to carry out that relief on July 20. More importantly, however, 2nd Division must advance southward and establish itself on the “Verrières feature.”37
Although intelligence regarding German defences on Bourguébus Ridge and the higher Verrières Ridge was vague, Foulkes told Simonds that “the enemy forward appeared to be softening up.” As late as 1800 hours, Simonds was considering “ a real push that night.”38 He ordered the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders to move from Carpiquet to the western outskirts of Caen at 1500 hours “with the object of preparing a night attack.” Arriving in this concentration area at 1630, the battalion immediately moved through to Fleury-sur-Orne, its forming-up position. The Camerons were still marching when informed at 2000 hours that “the plans had been changed and the … decision was that the attack must go in the following day.”39
Simonds and his staff had realized belatedly during the evening that 6th Brigade and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers could not possibly move that night from positions on the west side of the Orne to the start lines. There was also the need to reorganize 2nd Division, so that it would be in a position to capitalize on the breakthrough Simonds expected to win in the morning.40 If Bourguébus and Verrières Ridges fell, and he took for granted they would, 4th Brigade would advance to Bruyères Château next to the village of Lorguichon. This was about two miles south from Verrières along the Caen-Falaise highway.41
Accordingly, 2nd Division’s 4th Brigade was pulled from positions west of the Orne around Louvigny and replaced by 43rd Division’s 4th Brigade. The British would protect the Canadian right flank during the forthcoming advance.42
As darkness fell, 6th Brigade’s three battalions learned they would carry out the forthcoming attack. The Camerons were on the march. South Saskatchewan Regiment started walking towards the Caen bridges at 0200 hours.43 For some reason, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal was only ordered to move at 0415 hours. The men were quickly mustered and set marching with the expectation that they would receive breakfast at the forming-up position.44 The Sherbrooke Fusiliers also spent a busy night getting across the Orne. There was no bridge for the tankers, so each Sherman was loaded onto a raft and winched across the river by engineers. Although this only took five minutes per tank, the night was well advanced by the time all were across.45
In Operation Atlantic’s planning there had been provision for the Canadians possibly seizing Bourguébus Ridge, so Simonds reworked this. It had been anticipated that 11th Armoured Division’s tanks would have gained most of the ridge and so “there would not be very heavy opposition.” Now the British tanks were mostly gone. Therefore, Simonds decided he needed more infantry. Each brigade normally advanced two battalions while keeping the third in reserve. As the front was so broad, Simonds decided to deploy the entire brigade forward and bring in a battalion from 4th Brigade to form the reserve. This task went to the Essex Scottish.46
Learning of their assignment at 0200 hours, the Essex Scottish had to hand off their current area to the British and did not start marching until 0445.47 It took until 1130 hours to reach their forming-up position, which was thirty minutes before the original start time for the attack. In the words of one official army historian, the men “had little sleep, a poor breakfast, and less lunch.”48
All 6th Brigade battalions and the two Sherbrooke squadrons that were to support the attack reached forming-up positions at about the same time as the Essex. Everyone was tired, most hungry. It was a hot, muggy day. Low cloud and haze meant limited air support. None of this concerned Simonds. At 1000 hours, 6th Brigade’s Brigadier Hugh Young attended a divisional Orders Group (O Group). Simonds offered the “presumption … that the opposition on our front was not great and that quick offensive action should break through the enemy screen.”49
There would be the usual plethora of artillery, a creeping barrage to precede each battalion, and timed concentrations against suspected German positions. In addition to all Canadian divisional artillery regiments, 2nd Army Group, Royal Canadian Artillery, and 8th Army Group, Royal Artillery would add their medium and heavy artillery regiments.50 Despite the fact that 6th Brigade would advance on a front four thousand yards wide, except for the creeping barrages, the only large timed concentration consisted of a single three-minute “Murder” barrage on Saint-André-sur-Orne. Smaller concentrations “were [to be] fired on other targets across … 2nd Division’s front.”51
The 6th brigade objectives were between one and two miles distant. On the right, the Camerons need go only a mile to gain the twin villages of Saint-André-sur-Orne and Saint-Martin-de-Fontenay. These villages marked the most westerly flank of Bourguébus Ridge. Left of the Camerons, South Saskatchewan Regiment would ascend the long slope of Bourguébus Ridge and continue advancing southward up the eighty-foot-higher Verrières Ridge to look down upon Fontenay-le-Marmion beyond. On the far left, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal would first seize two large farms—Beauvoir and Troteval—and then carry on to Verrières village on the eastern flank of its namesake ridge.52
The Sherbrooke’s ‘C’ Squadron would support the Fusiliers and ‘A’ Squadron the Camerons. No armoured support went to the Sasks. They were dependent on their own anti-tank guns and those of a 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment troop. All three attacking battalions and the Essex Scottish had a troop from this anti-tank regiment. The Sherbrooke’s ‘B’ Squadron would stand ready to go wherever it was most needed. Two other troops from the anti-tank re
giment were also in reserve. Additional fire support would come from the Toronto Scottish Regiment’s heavy mortars and machine guns. Once all first objectives were won, the Essex Scottish would pass through the centre and establish a defensive line extending across the heights from Verrières to Saint-André.
Having reached the forming-up positions barely on time, all four battalions were forced to dig in to avoid German shells and mortar rounds. Then the attack was pushed back to 1500 hours, for two reasons. Simonds still hoped the clouds would lift and allow air support. There had also been an unexpected development on 2nd Division’s left flank.
Tanks from 7th Armoured Division had succeeded in occupying Bourguébus at first light. Except for a single Tiger tank, the village had been abandoned. Emboldened, the 4th County of London Yeomanry advanced tanks onto the crest of Bourguébus Ridge and west to Beauvoir Farm. Circling the buildings, the tankers decided to punch south to Verrières. Although driven off by strong opposition at noon, they were still on the ridge and where the Canadian artillery was to fall. Time was required for the tankers to get clear. Nobody considered altering the artillery program to enable the tanks to hold Beauvoir Farm until the Fusiliers relieved them. Instead, they pulled back to the east side of the Caen-Falaise highway near Bras.53
From vantages on the ridges, the Germans watched Canadian preparations and brought in reinforcements. Saint-André was defended by the 272nd Infantry Division, formed out of shattered Russian-front formations on December 12, 1943. It had arrived in Normandy with just under thirteen thousand men on July 13. By July 20, it had suffered losses of 40 –50 per cent. But the survivors were seasoned and determined fighters.54 Facing the Sasks and Fusiliers was a still tougher foe—2nd SS Panzer-Grenadier Battalion and two companies of 1st SS Panzer Division’s reconnaissance battalion. Lurking nearby were two companies of the division’s 2nd SS Panzer Battalion, a company of self-propelled guns, and elements of 1st SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment.55 The Germans had about seventy tanks in close proximity.