by Mark Zuehlke
At 1500 hours, the artillery began firing, while several squadrons of Typhoon fighter-bombers briefly appeared overhead. The Canadians stepped out behind the creeping barrage and into the waist-high wheat. They advanced towards tragedy.
[ 11 ]
We Need Help
UNLIKE THE SOUTH Saskatchewans and Fusiliers Mont-Royal ascending the long slopes up the ridges, the Queen’s Own Camerons descended towards Saint-André-sur-Orne and Saint-Martin-de-Fontenay. Saint-André’s small cluster of buildings stood west of the main road and slightly north of Saint-Martin on the road’s east side. Immediately south of Saint-Martin was a mine complex with buildings surrounding the main shaft’s tall lift tower. Maps incorrectly had identified this complex as some kind of factory. The Canadians were unaware of the network of iron mines running through the area south of Caen.
The Camerons passed through a gap east of Hill 67 and the slopes of Verrières Ridge. They were deployed in T-formation—‘A’ Company out front on the right, ‘B’ Company on the left, and ‘C’ Company following. ‘D’ Company was farther back. The Sherbrooke Fusiliers’ ‘A’ Squadron, under Major Sydney Radley-Walters, would provide fire support from alongside Hill 67.1
Lieutenant Colonel Norman Ross’s tactical headquarters was tight behind the leading companies. He was walking with the battalion adjutant, a wireless signaller, and a 6th Field Regiment FOO team. The battalion’s White scout car followed a few yards back with the headquarters’ company commander, battalion intelligence officer, two signallers, and a driver aboard. The large wireless in the scout car provided Ross’s lifeline to 6th Brigade.2
Communications were immediately damped when the leaden sky opened with heavy rain. The Camerons were five hundred yards out, moving through a wheat field adjacent to the road from Hill 67 to Saint-André when a hidden anti-tank gun destroyed the scout car. Headquarters commander Captain Howard Grundy and intelligence officer Lieutenant James Edward Maloney were killed. The scout car’s loss severed the link to brigade.3
Across the Orne, the ground was supposed to have been secured by 43rd British Infantry Division. But it was clearly in German hands. Besides the anti-tank gun, machine guns opened up on ‘A’ Company.4 The 6th Field Regiment’s FOO, Captain Robert Lucy, had contact with his regiment. He called in fire that silenced the machine guns. Lucy also shelled Saint-André to quell fire from there. Unmindful that the wireless set’s long antenna marked him and his signaller for snipers, Lucy kept feeding targets back throughout the advance. Even when a mortar dropped well-aimed rounds just feet away, Lucy kept working the guns. His unceasing efforts, which Ross figured enabled the advance to continue, resulted in a Military Cross.5 “We had tremendous support from the guns. We just asked for gunfire and we got it,” Ross said.6
As they closed on the villages, machine-gun and mortar fire from the western flank of Verrières Ridge thickened. Snipers were also taking a toll. Moving through the wheat fields, ‘B’ Company presented an easy target. Blinded by the rain, the Camerons could only keep walking. When ‘B’ Company gained the outskir ts of Saint-Martin, they reported “no live enemy … due to their hasty withdrawal.” ‘B’ Company quickly pushed on and soon looked out upon the mine complex. ‘A’ Company, meanwhile, had cleared a large orchard on Saint-André’s west flank, and Ross pushed ‘C’ Company in between to clean out this village. The moment the Camerons entered Saint-André, they came under heavy mortar and artillery fire.7
Ross used a network of German trenches in the orchard for a battalion headquarters. As some prisoners marched by, Ross liberated a huge pair of binoculars from a passing officer. Rumour held that German optics were superior, a fact confirmed the moment he looked through the lenses.
After touring the Cameron position, Ross decided the battalion front was too wide. He was particularly uneasy because German tanks were rolling along the ridge to the east and between his battalion and the Saskatchewan Rifles.8 Drawing ‘B’ Company back from Saint-Martin, Ross concentrated his defences around Saint-André and the orchard. The move was just finished when the Camerons were subjected to a series of counterattacks—mostly falling on ‘B’ Company. “Everyone was thoroughly miserable, although still keen for more fighting,” ‘B’ Company’s Captain H.R. McGill later wrote.9
Next to Hill 67, Radley-Walters and ‘A’ Squadron had supported the Camerons with main-gun fire. Spotting two German Panthers silhouetted on the ridge’s horizon about five hundred yards distant, his headquarters troop opened fire. One Panther brewed and the other was immobilized.10
Ross’s anxiety kept growing. The Camerons were out in a two-mile-deep salient. As the battalion’s support company had joined the rifle companies, Ross was now in contact with 6th Brigade via a Bren carrier’s wireless. But information from Brigadier Hugh Young’s staff was contradictory and confused. While they said all was well, when Ross peered through the rain with his fine new binoculars he saw Saskatchewan Regiment soldiers clinging to Verrières Ridge “by the skin of their teeth.” The Essex Scottish behind appeared surrounded by German tanks and infantry. Through the fury of the rainstorm, Ross was not sure he was interpreting the situation correctly. But he never doubted that the brigade’s attack against the ridge had gone badly and the Camerons were hanging in the wind.11
WHEN THE SOUTH Saskatchewan Regiment’s Major Reg Matthews had explained the brigade plan, there had been a general sense of disbelief. Matthews had shared his company commander’s concern. So had Lieutenant Colonel Fred Clift, sent the day before to temporarily take over 4th Infantry Brigade. Clift had tried to stay with the battalion until the attack was done. “I need tanks,” he told Brigadier Young. “I won’t put men across there unless you give me tank support.” Clift pointed out the advance up the long slope and the probability that, either before or after the objective was taken, the Germans would counterattack with a combined infantry-armour force.
Young promised tanks and ordered Clift to the 4th Brigade posting. But by the time the Sasks formed up in front of the village of Ifs, Matthews had been advised there would be no tanks.12 Major John Edmondson and Major Len Dickin declared the plan crazy. Matthews testily replied that the Shermans supporting the Camerons and Fusiliers Mont-Royal on their flanks would come to the rescue if needed. The two officers countered that the Sasks would be under enemy observation from at least two positions to the right. These were Point 88, the highest spot on Verrières Ridge, and the infamous Hill 112 across the Orne River. A Dieppe survivor, Edmondson finally demanded, “Is this action a must?” It was a divisional order, Matthews replied, and likely one coming from corps.13 During the divisional briefing, Matthews added, the German tank threat had been dismissed. Between the squadrons supporting the flanking battalions and the anti-tank guns, they were covered. Once the objective was gained, the battalion’s 6-pounders and the attached 17-pounders of 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment would rush forward to protect the infantry. Although a counterattack was to be expected, Matthews had been assured it would be infantry. Edmondson and Dickin were out of arguments.14
Of 6th Brigade’s battalions, the advance by the Sasks was deepest—three miles from the start line to the ridge’s main crest, between Saint-Martin-de-Fontenay and Verrières village. From their objective, the battalion would look down upon Saint-Martin to the west and Fontenay-le-Marmion to the south. The 4th Brigade’s Essex Scottish Regiment would advance behind the Sasks to the road running from Saint-André past Beauvoir and Troteval Farms to Hubert-Folie. This would put the Essex where they could shift quickly to support whichever leading regiment most needed help.15
The Sasks advanced with ‘A’ Company under Major Robert Wells left and Major Dickin’s ‘D’ Company right. In standard box formation, Major Edmondson’s ‘B’ Company trailed Dickin’s men while Captain Charles Doyle’s ‘C’ Company followed ‘A’ Company. Matthews had his tactical headquarters behind the two leading companies with a carrier hauling its wireless sets. Once on the objective, Matthews would quickly bring up the support com
pany with its mortar platoon and anti-tank guns.16
Keeping close to the barrage, the two leading companies had advanced about two thousand yards when ‘D’ Company came under fire from an infantry platoon supported by several 75-millimetre guns. The Germans were spread out and concealed in the wheat. ‘D’ Company broke into sections to eliminate these strongpoints. In the tall wheat, a section had to practically stumble on a German strongpoint to engage. Two Germans in a fighting pit, four feet square by one and a half feet deep, their tactic was for one to pop up to locate the nearest Canadians. When he ducked down, he would direct his light machine-gun partner where to fire through the wheat. It was almost impossible to situate the source of this fire unless one got lucky and noticed the spotter.
Neither side enjoying good fields of fire, fighting at each strong-point was usually hand to hand or at close quarters. When Dickin’s men located a German dugout, they chucked in phosphorous and fragmentation grenades. Mostly, however, the strongpoint was only revealed when the Canadians happened upon it. Then it was the Sten gun, a man spraying the two Germans with a full magazine. “We killed more Jerries with Stens that day than with any other weapon,” Dickin recounted.
In the midst of this running fight, a corporal with Dickin squeezed the Sten’s trigger just as a German fired a rifle at him. Both triggers clicked harmlessly—the Sten out of ammunition, the rifle jamming. The corporal reversed the Sten and smashed the German over the head. He then seized the enemy rifle, worked the jammed round clear, rammed a fresh bullet home, and shot the dazed German dead.
Dickin’s company kept moving up the slope, overrunning one strongpoint after another. But the fighting had caused ‘D’ Company to lose the barrage, and Dickin figured at least a company of Germans was trying to fight his men to a standstill. “The whole advance to the objective was a series of small actions—section commanders sending men forward with rifles, Stens, or Brens, to wipe out a slit trench.” Grenades were running short.17
Lieutenant A. Frederickson at the front of No. 18 Platoon spotted two Germans and killed both with rifle shots before a machine-gun burst cut him down. Sergeant P.T. Maule was just behind Frederickson with two men on either side of him. The machine-gun burst dropped the others but left Maule standing alone and unscathed. He summoned stretcher-bearers to evacuate the five wounded men.
Having lost twenty men and two platoon commanders, Dickin ran back to Matthews and asked that Edmondson’s ‘B’ Company take over the lead. Matthews said, “John, can you take over? You know where to go?” Edmondson nodded. “Yes, that’s alright.”
“Just move through him and that crossroad and go up onto the high ground,” Matthews added.18 Edmondson led ‘ B’ Company to the front.19 To the left, ‘A’ Company was meeting stiffening resistance from machinegun positions hidden in manure piles and haystacks. Snipers hunted through the tall wheat.20
‘A’ Company kept going despite the opposition, and Edmondson slipped his reserve platoon left so that his company was tied in alongside. The Germans started shelling directly behind the barrage. Germans were trying to surrender. Edmondson would yell at them to drop their weapons and point them towards the Canadian rear. Stopping would lose the barrage, and he had too few men to send back guards. After directing the occupants of one trench rearward, Edmondson glanced over his shoulder in time to see an SS soldier aiming a rifle his way. Then Lieutenant Bob Pulley appeared behind the man and shot him dead with a pistol. Edmondson realized the lieutenant had just saved his life.21
Shortly after the advance began it had started drizzling, but at 1600 hours this turned to a downpour. All wireless communication was immediately lost.22
The Sasks pushed on through increasingly stubborn infantry resistance. ‘A’ Company reached its objective on Verrières Ridge at 1725 hours. They were in an open field. Stretching from Verrières to their position was a dense row of tall trees not marked on the maps. MG-42 machine guns dug into this tree line started raking the exposed ground. Major Wells pulled back two hundred yards into the cover of a wheat field.23
Edmondson’s ‘B’ Company was to the right in an open pea field that offered no cover and was on the forward slope overlooking Fontenay-le-Marmion. Eight hundred yards west stood Point 88, the highest spot on Verrières Ridge. The major considered capturing it, but the attack plan had not allowed for this. Edmondson told the men to dig in.
Unable to see ‘A’ Company, Edmondson set out to find Wells. He had gone about twenty-five yards when someone yelled, “Get yourself out and dig fast!” Edmondson turned and saw the company sergeant major heading towards the rear with a wounded man. “Sergeant Major, where the hell are you going?” Edmondson yelled. The man lifted an arm dripping blood down the forearm. Edmondson waved the two onward.24
German artillery was inflicting casualties. Edmondson counted between one and two dozen of his men going back with shrapnel wounds. Close behind ‘B’ Company, Dickin’s ‘D’ Company was digging in. The ground the battalion was on was flat, the only cover the tall wheat. But the wheat also blocked the view. Edmondson was unable to see either ‘A’ or ‘C’ Companies on his left.25
Looking up, Dickin saw a lot of Germans moving about on Point 88. He pointed them out to an artillery FOO. The man was just beginning to direct fire on the hill when German tanks suddenly popped up inside ‘B’ Company’s area and began “shooting all hell out of everything in their path.”26 It was 1750 hours.
LEFT OF THE Sasks, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal had won the two farms next to the Saint-André–Hubert-Folie road. Lieutenant Colonel J.G. “Guy” Gauvreau had advanced ‘B’ Company on the right towards Beauvoir Farm and ‘C’ Company left to Troteval Farm. Once these were taken, ‘D’ Company would seize Verrières village. ‘A’ Company was in reserve.27
Notice of the attack had come so late that the Fusiliers had marched to the forming-up position without breakfast and lacking time for lunch. So it was a hungry group of men who advanced at 1500 hours. Still, Captain A. Britton Smith—a 4th Field Regiment FOO attached to ‘C’ Company—thought the men were in good spirits.
Advancing behind the creeping barrage, they were fired on by German snipers and machine-gun positions hidden in stooks of cut grain scattered across freshly harvested fields. Captain Fernand Mosseau’s ‘C’ Company two-inch mortar section retaliated by setting several stooks alight with phosphorous bombs. Facing the prospect of burning to death, the Germans started surrendering.28
Two cobbled-together tank troops from the Sherbrooke’s ‘C’ Squadron were in support. One had a full complement of three Shermans with 75-millimetre guns and a Firefly mounting a 17-pounder. The other had just three 75-millimetre Shermans. These represented all of ‘C’ Squadron’s operational tanks.29
At 1630 hours, the Fusiliers gained the two farms, and a fierce close-quarters struggle ensued. Having secured Beauvoir Farm, ‘B’ Company’s Major J.P.C. Gauthier advanced his men to the southern slope of the ridge. ‘C’ Company, meanwhile, dug in right inside Troteval Farm. Lieutenant Colonel Gauvreau and ‘D’ Company’s Major Jacques “Jimmy” Dextraze walked through Beauvoir Farm to talk with Gauthier. Suddenly, a “terrific concentration of mortar and gun fire opened up on the whole [battalion] front, especially around Beauvoir Farm,” Gauvreau wrote later. Gauvreau told Dextraze to push his company on to Verrières as planned. He then tracked down ‘A’ Company, finding it “pinned … to the ground,” and advanced it to a position right of ‘B’ Company.30
The tankers were also hard hit. Lieutenant William James Charters was killed by a mortar round striking his turret. With only three tanks, the troop advanced in support of ‘D’ Company, but as it crossed the Saint-André–Hubert-Folie road, a 75-millimetre antitank gun hit the troop commander’s tank with two rounds. The first was deflected by tracks welded onto the turret, but the second smashed the drive shaft and immobilized the Sherman. The crew bailed out safely.
Sergeant Martin Lefebvre and the other tank commander started backing up. A round pi
erced Lefebvre’s tank, killing him and Trooper Arthur Jelly. The German anti-tank gun continued hammering these two knocked-out Shermans until they brewed. Corporal A.T.P Connell, commanding the third tank, disengaged. He could barely see through the driving rain. Within an orchard next to the farm and alongside the other troop’s remaining two tanks, Connell “took up a position of observation.” At 1700 hours, three Panthers approached from Verrières. When they were five hundred yards from the orchard, Sergeant H. Fowlis in the Firefly knocked two out. The third Panther fled.31
Rain was jamming Gauvreau’s wireless communications, and he was completely out of touch with ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies. He had ordered the battalion support company and his headquarters forward to Beauvoir Farm, but this formation was stopped by fire four hundred yards to the north. When the gunfire lulled, Gauvreau jumped into a jeep and roared back to his headquarters company to use the more powerful wireless set there. Establishing contact with Dextraze, who was making no progress towards Verrières and taking heavy losses, Gauvreau ordered him back to a position left of ‘B’ Company.
Gauvreau’s only link to ‘B’ Company was via runners, who crawled through the grain to bring him news. They reported a desperate need for ammunition and grenades. Gauvreau loaded a small convoy of Bren carriers with ammunition, food, wireless sets, and other equipment. After only a short advance, several carriers were knocked out and “the project had to be abandoned.” German infantry and tanks were visible in the ground between his and ‘B’ Company’s area.32
Some relief reached ‘C’ Company at Troteval, the company sergeant major managing to get a jeep load through from rear echelon under the covering rain. On board were two canisters filled with stew and coffee, kept warm by insulating hay. There were also cases of . 303 a mmunition, 2-inch mortar bombs, and No. 36 grenades. Gunner Captain Smith noted the Fusiliers went for the ammunition first. Tearing cases open, men grabbed handfuls of bullets and filled Bren magazines. When these were all loaded, they pulled out khaki bandoliers containing five-round clips for the Lee-Enfields. After stuffing web kit pockets full, remaining bandoliers were slung around necks to be close at hand. Only when everyone was rearmed did attention turn to food. “Good discipline,” Smith thought.33