Breakout from Juno

by Mark Zuehlke

  Spring was to launch on July 25, and before then II Canadian Corps must first secure the start lines from which the operation would begin. On the western flank, the Camerons were still hanging on to Saint-André. Complicating matters was the fact that Etavaux, a village east of the Orne, remained in German hands. This village was behind the Camerons and roughly adjacent to Hill 67. The Germans were reinforcing the Etavaux garrison by passing troops and supplies across the Orne from Maltôt.

  Before Simonds met with Dempsey on July 22, he ordered the Germans thrown out of Etavaux by 5th Brigade’s Le Régiment de Maisonneuve. At the same time, a 43rd British Infantry Division battalion would seize Maltôt. Because the German hold on Etavaux depended on possession of Maltôt, the British assault was of primary importance. During his O Group, Lieutenant Colonel H.L. Bisaillon said the Maisies were not expected to hold the village. They would instead pull out of Etavaux just before the British shelled Maltôt.

  Because his ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies had been badly mauled in the earlier assault on Fleury-sur-Orne, Bisaillon used only his other two companies—‘D’ Company, under Major Gérard Vallières, and Major Jacques Ostiguy’s ‘C’ Company. Their line of advance was on either side of a railroad track that crossed the Orne by bridge just south of Etavaux. The Maisies attacked at 1300 hours behind an artillery barrage.37

  When the barrage lifted, the Maisies were met by heavy machine-gun fire from a network of trenches in front of the village. Major Vallières was killed, and the attack stalled. That was when Sergeant Benoit Lacourse, commanding ‘ C’ Company’s No. 15 Platoon, charged the machine guns with four men. In quick succession, the little party wiped out three machine-gun posts with grenades.38

  The rest of ‘C’ Company, however, failed to follow Lacourse’s group. Seeing his troops going to ground, Major Ostiguy filled a haversack with grenades and rushed the machine-gun line alone. After knocking out four positions, Ostiguy was out of grenades and under fire from a fifth machine gun. Snatching up a rifle, Ostiguy dashed forward and shot the crew dead. Between them, Lacourse and Ostiguy shattered the German resistance.39 ‘C’ Company pushed into the village and then withdrew as scheduled at 1500 hours. The sergeant was awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal and the major a Distinguished Service Order. After dark, the Maisies returned and secured the village, gathering about a hundred prisoners in the process.40

  Opposition in Etavaux had been badly underestimated, and the attack cost the Maisies ten dead, forty-eight wounded, and another fifty evacuated with battle exhaustion. Combined with the Fleury-sur-Orne losses, the battalion was down about two hundred men, who could not be immediately replaced with French-speaking reinforcements. This put the Maisies temporarily out of the fight.41

  Southeast of Etavaux, the Camerons had spent another hard day repelling counterattacks from “unfriendly neighbours, strongly posted in St. Martin-de-Fontenay … The casualties from shelling mounted steadily and our troops faced the added discouragement of having to exist for long hours in muddy slit trenches, without food or sleep. But the Camerons held firm and beat off every attack,” stated one report.42

  The unfriendly neighbours in Saint-Martin were infantry, but the Germans persisted in throwing armour against the Camerons as well. Fortunately, Major Radley-Walters and his Sherbrooke’s ‘A’ Squadron kept a watchful eye over Saint-André. Counting only six Shermans, ‘A’ Squadron squared off against about fourteen Panzers at 1000 hours. After a rapid hour of exchanging fire, five of the German tanks were burning and the rest withdrew. Then, at 1600 hours, the Germans returned but kept outside of ‘A’ Squadron’s range. Radley-Walters managed to get ‘B’ Squadron to send him a Firefly Sherman with the 17-pounder gun. At 1800 hours, he was guiding this tank into a firing position when several Panzers appeared just a hundred yards distant. Somehow they had managed to navigate through dense woods and the ruins of buildings to close on the Canadians. A quick exchange of fire followed that left two Panzers burning, but also one Sherman. The Germans broke off the engagement.43

  One thing that allowed the Camerons to hold on was the liberal medium artillery support directed against the Germans in Saint-Martin. In the afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Ross went back to brigade headquarters in Ifs to ensure that Brigadier Hugh Young kept these guns on call. Young told Ross to be careful with it, because his FOO, Captain Bob Lucy, was dropping shells very close to the Camerons. “The lads are quite happy,” Ross replied. “Nobody’s upset about this.” With the artillery support, the Camerons felt they could hold Saint-André indefinitely.

  Ross was in his jeep en route to Saint-André when an 88-millimetre shell exploded, and he found himself lying on the ground. The smashed jeep stood neatly parked on the verge with the driver dead behind the wheel. One of Ross’s legs gushed blood. He hefted it up on the bumper and tried to remember the first-aid training he had taken in Winnipeg before going overseas. “Where the hell were the damned pressure points to stop the bleeding in the lower part of the leg? Blood was spurting all over. I didn’t know how to stop the stuff.” He was lying there cursing, certain he would die because of a simple failure of memory, when a jeep full of Camerons arrived. They had been searching for their overdue commander. Ross would live, but his war was over.44

  A Bren gunner and his loader are deployed in a ditch during the July 4, 1944, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade attack on Carpiquet. Ken Bell photo. LAC PA-131417.

  A Sherman tank stands next to burnt-out hangars on the southern end of Carpiquet airfield. Possession of author.

  Surrendering Germans emerge from a machine-gun position near Gruchy on July 9. Harold G. Aikman photo. LAC PA-151169.

  The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (mg) Vickers machine-gunners inflicted heavy casualties on ss troops in their counterattack against Carpiquet on July 4. Donald I. Grant photo. LAC PA-138359.

  Canadian troops use Luftwaffe bunkers as quarters at Carpiquet airfield. Note the men cooking in the field kitchen. Possession of author.

  A Canadian patrol moves cautiously along a battered street in Caen on July 10. Harold G. Aikman photo. LAC PA-116510.

  Regina Rifle Regiment infantrymen and a despatch rider (in long jacket) engage in house-clearing operations in Caen on July 10. Ken Bell photo. LAC PA-132727.

  A platoon of Canadian troops leapfrog through one of the countless small villages that had to be taken in the advance south from Caen to Falaise. Possession of author.

  A soldier stands amid the ruins of the still-burning factories of Colombelles on July 19. Harold G. Aikman photo. LAC PA-131396.

  Stretcher-bearers from the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa treat a wounded soldier during the fighting around Caen on July 15. Possession of author.

  Heavily laden Private R. Pankaski waits for the barrage to clear near Ifs before joining the advance on July 25. Canadian soldiers quickly disposed of the small folding regulation shovel in favour of regular shovels and picks that, despite their extra weight, enabled them to dig slit trenches quickly. Ken Bell photo. LAC PA-163403.

  Just after dawn on July 25, infantry advance on Verrières Ridge as part of Operation Spring. Ken Bell photo. LAC PA-131378.

  Self-propelled tanks like these were used to counterattack the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry at Verrières. Possession of author.

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  Desperate Move in the Dark

  BEFORE OPER ATION SPRING could be launched, II Canadian Corps had to control the necessary start lines. In 2nd Canadian Infantry Division’s sector, this entailed the Saint-André–Hubert-Folie road passing by Beauvoir and Troteval Farms and a road south of Saint-André-sur-Orne. On July 23, Simonds ordered 6th Brigade’s Brigadier Hugh Young to evict the Germans from these starting points by no later than midnight of July 24–25. Young duly directed the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders to gain control of the twin villages of Saint-André and Saint-Martin-de-Fontenay while Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal took the farms.1

  Because of the rain, little photo-reconnaissance intelligence exist
ed on the German defences. Simonds fully appreciated that the Goodwood and Atlantic plans had failed to take into account the extent to which the terrain south of Caen favoured the Germans. The Caen-Falaise highway, one analysis began, ran for thirteen miles “without a curve or bend, and … was flanked by fields of tall wheat.” It passed “villages built well back in the surrounding farmland, and climb[ed] steadily from near sea-level to a height of nearly 600 feet.” The Germans held the crest of the ridge that extended from May-sur-Orne “across the smooth hump of Verrières [Ridge] through Tilly-la-Campagne.” Behind this covering position, the main German forces were believed to be “disposed … from Fontenay-le-Marmion through Rocquancourt to Garcelles-Secqueville.” But the real strength of the German position lay “in the spur immediately behind this line, for just west of Cramesnil the road rises to a point over 250 feet higher than Bourguébus. From this series of increasingly lofty elevations the enemy could see as far back as the Canadian gun-positions in the vicinity of Faubourg [de Vaucelles.] Thus all movement in that long perspective could be observed and was likely to bring about immediate and violent reaction from the enemy’s guns, mortars and machineguns.”

  In front of 2nd Division, the “ground was particularly hazardous … The way up along the road through Fleury-sur-Orne and Saint-Martin-de-Fontenay was largely dominated by the high ground west of the river,” particularly from Hill 112, “and the ridge running south-west from Verrières.” It was at Verrières Ridge that the attack’s first phase would be directed. And the infantry would have no alternative but to climb “these exposed and enfiladed slopes” in the face of enemy fire. “Attacking these positions again would inevitably be costly, for as experience had shown, the Germans could be counted upon to resist any penetration with the utmost vigour.”2

  Another feature working to German advantage and unappreciated by Canadian intelligence staff were the mines south of Caen. Two iron mines—one immediately south of Saint-Martin and another on the southern outskirts of May-sur-Orne—had been reported by French civilians on July 23. The lift tower of the first stood over a twelve-hundred-foot-deep shaft. A network of tunnels spidered out from this shaft, and via one of these, Germans defending the twin villages were able to move freely without being seen or fired upon. A system of large vents that fed air into the tunnel served equally well as points through which the Germans could come and go.

  The May-sur-Orne shaft was the hub for an even more extensive tunnel network running to an opening on the edge of the Orne River and also through Fontenay-le-Marmion to Rocquancourt. II Canadian Corps intelligence officers concluded that the “enemy is probably making use of this as a storage place or part of a defensive system.” That the various mine-shaft openings and air vents were used to move troops between May-sur-Orne, Fontenay-le-Marmion, and Rocquancourt was so ill appreciated that existence of the tunnels was not passed down from 2nd Division headquarters to 5th Brigade.3

  Arrayed in front of II Canadian Corps was a formidable force. On the left, 1st SS Panzer Division held the ground from Cagny west to Verrières. This division had been bulked up with the remnants of 16th Field Division’s infantry and artillery.4 From Verrières to Saint-André, 272nd Infantry Division was in place. Its troops were of uneven quality, sometimes fighting tenaciously while at other times prone to surrender. To stiffen the 272nd’s backbone, a tank battalion and panzer grenadier battalion from both 2nd Panzer Division and 9th SS Panzer Division had been added to this sector. A 10th SS Panzer Division reconnaissance battalion was also at hand. The rest of 9th SS Panzer Division stood in close reserve northwest of Bretteville-sur-Laize, and 2nd Panzer Division’s main body was farther back at Tournebu.5 These two divisions had been facing XXX British Corps to the west but had just been shifted to face the Canadian front, because the Germans were certain it was here that the next offensive would be launched. The newly arrived 116th Panzer Division stood in reserve near Saint-Sylvain, about seven miles south of the Canadian left flank.6

  Canadian intelligence had no reliable information on the strength of these divisions. Later investigations, however, determined that on July 24, the Germans had approximately 8,850 men before them. This was approximately half the total strength that these formations normally fielded. At their disposal were 5,900 rifles, 1,910 machine guns, 57 mortars, 54 Panzerfausts, 4820-millimetre anti-aircraft guns, 113 75-millimetre guns, 18 105-millimetre guns, and 3 150-millimetre guns. They also fielded a mixture of 72 Mark IV and Mark V tanks, with some 20 Tigers lurking near Verrières. Added to this strength were the artillery, mortars, and tanks that could bear from Hill 112 west of the Orne River.7

  Equally mysterious was the German main resistance line’s location. General opinion placed it well south of the crest of Verrières Ridge. The Germans on the ridge were considered a delaying force intended to slow any advance towards the higher ground adjacent to Bretteville-sur-Laize. Aerial photographs showing construction of defensive positions under way in this area led to the belief that the main resistance line was situated here.8

  As unobserved movement in the Canadian sector was impossible, Simonds decided that “any major attack had to be done in darkness.” Because of 2nd Division’s combat inexperience, he wanted to allow them as much time for forming up as possible while leaving sufficient time for Verrières Ridge to be won before daylight. “These conditions,” he wrote, “left very little latitude in the choice of ‘H’ hour.”9

  The attack was set for 0330 hours. To prevent troops from blundering blindly across the battleground, anti-aircraft searchlights would bounce beams off the clouds. Nicknamed “Monty’s Moonlight,” this technique not only lit the way but supposedly blinded the German defenders.

  Simonds thought creeping barrages wasted ammunition, alerted the enemy, revealed the start line, and drew accurate counter fire onto the advancing troops. Instead of relying on a barrage, nine field, nine medium, and two heavy artillery regiments would carry out a fire program on July 24 from 1800 hours to midnight against seven selected targets. Then, for sixty minutes before the attack, a series of timed concentrations would be fired.10 Operation Spring would proceed no matter the weather conditions, so air support was not assured and Simonds confined it to medium bombers targeting the woods east of Garcelles—once at 2120 hours on July 24 and then again at 0730 the following morning.

  Despite its limited intentions as a holding exercise, Operation Spring was still an ambitious enterprise. Yet its success depended on just three Canadian infantry battalions bringing off a night assault—the North Nova Scotia Highlanders, the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders, and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal. In this first phase, 3rd Division’s North Novas would assault from Bourguébus to Tilly-la-Campagne. Once that village fell, the Highland Light Infantry would pass through with a supporting squadron of Fort Garry Horse to Garcelles-Secqueville.

  On the Canadian right flank, 2nd Division would advance 5th Brigade’s Calgary Highlanders from Saint-André to take May-sur-Orne. Their start line was to be won before midnight by the Camerons. At the same time, 4th Brigade’s Royal Hamilton Light Infantry would pass through Troteval Farm—to be secured earlier by the Fusiliers—to seize the village of Verrières. At 0550 hours, 5th Brigade’s Black Watch would advance on Fontenay-le-Marmion, while 4th Brigade’s Royal Regiment of Canada passed through Verrières to capture Rocquancourt.11

  SIMONDS BRIEFED HIS senior officers during the early afternoon of July 23.12 Although having no role in the operation, 4th Canadian Armoured Division’s Major General George Kitching attended. Kitching saw that both Major General Charles Foulkes and Major General Rod Keller were “concerned at what lay ahead.” Earlier, Simonds had confided to Kitching his growing misgivings about both men.13 Foulkes’s handling of 2nd Division during Operation Atlantic had led Simonds to suspect he “did not have the right qualities to command.”14

  A meticulous planner, Simonds had so tightly scripted Operation Spring that Foulkes and Keller were reduced to stage managers for their divisions. B
oth aware that they skated on thin ice, neither offered suggestions nor raised any concerns.

  Foulkes could well have questioned his division’s ability to fulfill its role. Two of nine battalions—the South Saskatchewan and Essex Scottish Regiments—were incapable of offensive action. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal was on the brink of incapacity, and the attack on Troteval Farm would likely tip it over the edge. Le Régiment de Maisonneuve was so reduced by casualties that Foulkes had placed it in divisional reserve. The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders were just hanging on at Saint-André, and securing the start line for 5th Brigade’s advance could exceed its capabilities. That left just four battalions, of which two—the Calgary Highlanders and Black Watch—had been heavily engaged during the past couple of days and so were well below regular strength.

  Brigadier Bill Megill, the 5th Brigade commander, was dismayed. The operation seemed to have been planned without consulting a contour map or conducting any detailed ground reconnaissance. Megill saw little hope of success in assaulting Verrières Ridge from the north and west flanks, where the troops would be under observation from three sides.