Breakout from Juno
Page 26
Concurring, Bradley ordered Patton to leave only minimum forces to “secure Brittany.” The new American mission was to “drive eastward and expand the continental lodgment area.” Patton set eyes on the Seine. Although the initiative was American, Montgomery recognized the developing breakout “radically changed the entire conception of how operations would develop.” On August 4, he cabled the Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke: “The main business lies to the east.” Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, and General Eisenhower all agreed that the Americans should advance towards Paris. This large wheeling turn would force the Germans to retreat to the Seine River. As all bridges there had been destroyed, they might be pinned against the river and crushed.16
Against these developments the Germans could do little. Commander in Chief, West Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge had been hamstrung by Hitler, who on July 31 had issued orders that “no withdrawal would be tolerated.”17 Even as these orders were being sent to von Kluge at his headquarters in Le Mans, he was describing Normandy as “a hell of a mess” in a signal to Hitler that warned the American advance was unstoppable.18 The only recourse was a rapid retreat to the Seine and establishment of a strong blocking position on its northern bank.
Hitler would have none of it. On August 2, he ordered von Kluge to muster his armoured strength and assume the offensive. With remarkable self-delusion, Hitler envisioned stopping the Americans with a breakthrough assault at the point where the two U.S. armies met at Mortain. The German tanks would then charge twenty miles to Avranches on the Atlantic coast. This attack would buy time for the recently deployed V-1 and V-2 rockets to so devastate London that the Allies would agree to negotiations.19
Five panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions were to attack on August 7. They would include 116th Panzer, 2nd Panzer, 2nd SS Panzer, and 1st SS Panzer Divisions and remnants of 17th SS Panzer-Grenadier Division. The 1st SS Panzer Division would have to be withdrawn from the Canadian front.
Oberdommando der Wehrmacht’s deputy chief of operations, General der Artillerie Walter Warlimont, visited Panzer Group West’s headquarters the day after Hitler hatched his plan. General der Panzertruppen Hans Eberbach “described our situation to him with complete candour and frankness. We suggested a retreat to the Seine as the only possible solution. He answered that Hitler would never accept that. He was unable to give us an objective or hope for a positive solution. Those at the top expected everything from the counterthrust of Seventh Army to Avranches which we considered as hopeless.”
Warlimont doled out Hitler’s tortured reasoning and offered promises of reinforcement and supply both men knew would never materialize. Eberbach obstinately repeated that “ultimately the situation of the two German armies will become untenable.”
“But you have been able to hold on until now. If you can do this for another month or two, this summer’s fighting will not have been in vain,” Warlimont declared. “The British people have been assured that the war will end this year. If this fails to happen, there exists for us one more great opportunity.” This allusion to the V-weapons breaking British morale failed to impress Eberbach. “The situation of Seventh Army makes it necessary to arrive at a big decision,” he countered.
Warlimont insisted that Eberbach release four armoured divisions for the “thrust to Avranches and to cut off the Americans.”
“If the SS divisions are pulled out south of Caen, the enemy will attack there and break through,” Eberbach replied. While Eberbach wanted to withdraw these divisions from the immediate front lines, he pleaded with Warlimont to agree that the “SS divisions must be held ready in the rear to support the front. The main question remains how the front can be held in the long run against an enemy so far superior in matériel.” Warlimont promised him two SS brigades from Denmark and said OKW was combing “the homeland and occupied France … for all available matériel.”
Eight to ten days to move the brigades from Denmark, Eberbach estimated. Too long—the matter would be decided by then. Moving the SS divisions to the Mortain area would require three to four days. It was impossible to say what Seventh Army’s situation would be then. Warlimont promised that a thousand new fighter planes would be deployed in the second half of August and Allied air supremacy broken.
“But there still remains the question whether the situation in the Seventh Army area can ever be restored,” Eberbach insisted.20
It was a losing battle. Eberbach had to order 1st SS Panzer Division to prepare for withdrawal from Verrières Ridge. A lready this division had been badly weakened by casualties, as well as the need to cover the entire front facing the Canadians when 9th SS Panzer Division moved west of the Orne in an attempt to stem British Second Army’s advance.21 The 1st SS were scheduled to entirely withdraw on the night of August 5–6, being replaced by the newly arrived 89th Infantry Division. Once this hand-off was complete, the only armoured division east of the Orne would be 12th SS Panzer Division, which had left the front lines on the night of August 3–4. Except for one battle group sent west of the Orne to reinforce the German forces there, the division stood in reserve.
ULTRA INTERCEPTS ALERTED the Allies to the planned German thrust into the twenty-mile-wide corridor leading to Avranches. Bradley, who was privy to Ultra intelligence, presented his knowledge to Patton and Hodges as a hunch. He positioned U.S. VIII Corps’s four infantry divisions and elements of two armoured divisions to defend this front. For extra insurance, Bradley also ordered Patton to halt three divisions from X X Corps about fifty miles to the east at Saint-Hilaire-du-Harcouët. If needed, he would turn these divisions about to cut the Germans off from behind. The order disgusted Patton, who thought reining in his divisions based on a hunch was bloody poor tactics.22
Unlike their American counterparts, British and Canadian Army commanders were apprised of relevant intelligence gleaned by the Ultra code breakers. Both Crerar and Simonds had been informed. Knowing the Germans intended to attack the American sector on August 7, Crerar had his chief of staff, Brigadier C.C. “Church” Mann, phone II Canadian Corps headquarters on the night of August 4 and ask whether the Canadian offensive could proceed on that date rather than the day following. II Canadian Corps chief of staff Brigadier Elliot Rodger quickly canvassed Simonds and other key staff and then replied that advancing the operation was possible.23
By now the Canadians knew that 9th SS Panzer Division had slipped away and 1st SS Panzer Division was thinning its strength to hold everything from La Hogue across to May-sur-Orne. This change prompted Major General Charles Foulkes to order a renewed attempt to eliminate the threat posed by the mine shafts next to Saint-Martin-de-Fontenay. The Cameron Highlanders with a sixteen-man party of sappers from 11th Field Company were directed to raid the mine area on the night of August 4 –5 and blow both mine shafts shut with explosives. Brigadier Hugh Young objected to the timing, arguing it would be better to strike just before the major offensive. Anxious to keep the Germans engaged, Foulkes stood firm.
At midnight, Camerons and sappers advanced behind a covering bombardment. Meeting light resistance, they isolated the two mine shafts, and the sappers began setting charges. It was soon apparent they lacked sufficient explosives to seal the shafts at ground level. Thinking they could block the shafts by dropping the sturdy hoist towers onto them, the sappers climbed twenty feet into the rigging and began placing charges. It was a clear, moonlit night, and German snipers in the nearby ruins fired on the exposed men.24 Seven sappers were killed or wounded before the Camerons’ Major A.C. Kavanagh ordered the attempt ended. The raiders retired to Saint-Martin. The Camerons had one officer and eight men missing and another twenty-one other ranks wounded.25
On August 5, a new Ultra intelligence alert reported that 1st SS Panzer Division might move to join the forthcoming assault on Avranches. At 1330 hours, Brigadier Mann called Rodger at II Canadian Corps with the news. He ordered the two front-line divisions “to push their necks out” to maintain contact and try to stop them
.26
Hours earlier, 5th Brigade had relieved 6th Brigade on the western flank in order to free the latter to rehearse for the forthcoming offensive. Brigadier Bill Megill had expected to quietly ease the reconstituted Black Watch into a combat role. The battalion was now commanded by a Black Watch veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Mitchell, but only thirteen of its twenty-seven original officers remained.27
By Megill’s reckoning, a battalion that had suffered as heavy losses as had the Black Watch should have at least a month to absorb and train new men. Now, just eleven days after its virtual destruction, the Black Watch re-entered the line.28
Megill had previously considered the Black Watch his best battalion under the “outstanding” leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Cantlie. Megill had little use for Mitchell, considering him unfit for command, while Mitchell blamed Megill for destroying his regiment. The friction between the two men was palpable.29
Mitchell established his headquarters in Saint-André-sur-Orne on the evening of August 4, and the battalion’s companies were distributed through Saint-André and Saint-Martin shortly after midnight. At dawn, both towns were subjected to steady artillery and mortar fire, and a number of snipers were active in Saint-Martin. The Black Watch war diarist noted that it was “rather disconcerting to have bullets whistle around one’s ears in the odd moments when we are not ‘biting the dust’ on account of [Jerry] mortar and 88-mm fire.”
At mid-day, Megill told Mitchell to ready for an advance on Maysur-Orne. He was joined shortly thereafter at Mitchell’s headquarters by Major General Foulkes, who said that the 1st SS was believed to be “withdrawing his depleted forces and we must keep contact with him and hold him where he is so that a larger plan may be successfully accomplished.” At 1620 hours, the Black Watch was to “ advance until the enemy is contacted.”
Major Tom Anyon’s ‘A’ Company led, with ‘D’ Company under newly promoted Major Ronnie Bennett close behind. ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies were, respectively, on the right and left flanks.30 Because so many of the men were inexperienced, Mitchell had Anyon take only fifty forward, leaving the rest, who were only likely to get themselves or someone else killed. ‘A’ Company advanced in two single files up opposite sides of the road. They passed bloated and decaying corpses of Canadians who had fallen in earlier attacks on May.
Supporting artillery shelled May until Anyon’s men were within a hundred yards of it.31 As the artillery lifted, the battalion war diarist recorded, “Jerry started plastering them with [mortar and artillery fire] as fast as he could load.” A tank ground out of May and into the midstof ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies, which had taken cover in the roadside ditches. This “tank caused havoc among their numbers.” Anyon was killed and most of his men were taken prisoner. Major Ronnie Bennett, who had survived the July 25 debacle, died when a mortar shell landed next to him. The Black Watch fell back to regroup between Saint-André and Saint-Martin. “Some of the new lads whom we have recently received as replacements are taking this action quite hard, for most of them are fresh from Canada,” the diarist reported. The Black Watch’s casualties were estimated at seventy all ranks.32 Twenty were fatal, and twenty-one men were lost as prisoners.33
At dusk, Megill ordered Le Régiment de Maisonneuve to advance through the Black Watch. He insisted that the “only defences there are a … few dug-in tanks,” the Maisonneuve war diarist wrote. The battalion was supported by a medium artillery regiment and a squadron of tanks firing from near Saint-Martin. ‘A’ Company advanced on the right and ‘C’ Company the left. So serious were the French-Canadian reinforcement shortages that each company fielded only forty men. The Maisies were trapped exactly as the Black Watch had been, and a confused firefight continued through the night. In the morning, the attack was broken off.34 Ten men died.35 The Maisies were twice unlucky on August 6, however, when two 88-millimetre shells struck their kitchen area as the regiment gathered for lunch. Thirteen men were killed and 22 seriously wounded.36 The regimental historian noted that during the period of July 25 to August 7, the Maisies reported 56 men killed, 116 wounded, and 4 missing.37
ON AUGUST 5, 4th Canadian Armoured Division had also tested German defences. In response to intelligence reports that Tilly-la-Campagne had been “evacuated by the enemy,” Lieutenant Colonel David Stewart was instructed to check it with a platoon of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. As Bourguébus had been subject to small-arms and mortar fire from Tilly throughout the day, Stewart questioned “the authenticity of this report.” But Brigadier Jim Jefferson insisted the intelligence was sound.
Sergeant Alexander McLaren led a thirty-man platoon from ‘B’ Company into the shell-cratered wheat field at 1630 hours. Thirty minutes later, Stewart, from the top of a three-storey building, watched the patrol enter Tilly and immediately come under fire from three sides. It took three field regiments and the battalion’s 3-inch mortars firing directly on Tilly to help the platoon break free. But it was really Private Edgar M. Purchase who saved the platoon.38
Many Argylls considered Purchase “the world’s worst soldier.” Yet it was this “dumb, dumb soldier,” as one Argyll put it, who “gathered up the hand grenades and ammunition and went in on the town himself.” As the others withdrew, Purchase walked forward “firing a Bren gun from the hip.” Initially believed killed, he was later confirmed as a prisoner of war. Years later, he told Lance Corporal Harry Ruch: “Harry, I woke up and found myself in the middle of Germans with a machinegun in my hand.” He had no memory of “getting up and charging.”39 For bringing back twenty-three of thirty men, McLaren was awarded the Military Medal.40
Despite clear proof that Tilly was held in force, Jefferson ordered another attack with two companies. From the three-storey building, Stewart examined the flat ground between Bourguébus and Tilly. “This is sheer slaughter,” Stewart said. “What’s the matter with those people back there, telling me to send these guys in?”41 A dutiful soldier, Stewart sent ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies in at 1900 hours with two troops of the South Alberta Regiment’s ‘C’ Squadron in support. Major Gordon Winfield’s ‘C’ Company went straight up the road towards Tilly with ‘D’ Company close behind.42 Two tanks were immobilized by mines, one after advancing only two hundred yards.43 As ‘C’ Company and the tanks closed on the village, Major W.K. “Bill” Stockloser swung the tail company out to the left to provide covering fire. Accompanied by four tanks, Lieutenant James G. Sloan’s platoon was struck by a maelstrom of fire the instant it entered the village. Anti-tank guns knocked two Shermans out of action, and machine guns ripped point-blank into the Argylls. Sloan was killed while single-handedly taking on an 88-millimetre gun. Agreeing there was no point in throwing more men into the grinder, Winfield and Stockloser ordered a withdrawal. The Argylls suffered twenty-four casualties.44 Several tankers were wounded but none killed.45 Montgomery remarked to Simonds that evening, “Congratulations, you’ve been kicked out of Tilly again.”46
If the two-company attack on Tilly was poorly conceived, the decision by Jefferson’s counterpart at 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade to send two platoons of the Lake Superior Regiment (Motor) into La Hogue was even more so. Brigadier Leslie Booth told Major Robert Keane—the battalion’s second-in-command—at 1400 hours that intelligence reports indicated that most SS troops in La Hogue “had departed” and a single platoon should easily take it. The platoon would be supported by artillery and two tank troops of the Canadian Grenadier Guards. Keane had no intention of sending only one platoon. He tasked the job to ‘A’ Company at 1800 hours, emphasizing that the attack had to begin in ninety minutes to benefit from the artillery. Major E.J.O. Gravelle decided to go in with just two platoons, with No. 1 Platoon coming up once the others gained La Hogue. Because the ground to the right of the field contained a minefield, the Grenadiers concentrated their tanks on the left side.47
When the artillery barrage lifted, the small force was caught in the wheat field by heavy machine-gun and mortar fire. No. 3 Platoon, under Lieut
enant R.A. Hinton, was so slowed by intense fire from the right flank that Lieutenant Frederick Thomas White’s No. 2 Platoon got well ahead. When a sniper shot Gravelle in the leg, the attack foundered, until the second-in-command, Captain P. Malach, arrived to take over. When he tried leading the platoons onward, No. 3 Platoon wavered before the fierce incoming fire. Again, White’s men outpaced the other platoon, until White was killed 150 yards short of La Hogue.
Realizing the Superiors would only die if they pushed on, Malach ordered a withdrawal. He called for artillery to smother La Hogue, to screen the men going back. The Grenadiers moved between the exposed infantry and the village, firing their 75-millimetre guns “until the barrels glowed red with heat.” This enabled the Superiors to extricate themselves.48 The Grenadiers continued shooting until the “barrels of the Brownings began to droop” and their “ammunition was almost expended.” Then they rumbled back to Bourguébus without suffering any loss.49
“This was the first action in which the [Superiors] had taken part in the war,” the regiment’s official historian wrote, “and it had been—one could not but admit it—a failure. It was small consolation that the Lincoln and Wellands and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders could do no better in their successive attacks upon Tilly-la-Campagne.”50
That night, 1st SS Panzer Division left the front. Many of its men had spent some portion of the past ten days in Tilly. “Tilly was a tiny and, in the context of the war, insignificant town. But none of the men who spent even a few days in that inferno will ever forget the name,” one wrote.51