Breakout from Juno

by Mark Zuehlke

  The squadron commanders and Major R.D. Telford of 23rd Field Regiment stood in a circle around Halpenny to discuss the advance on Point 206. Smith and Amy shrugged at each other. Neither could believe they were actually holding an O Group on an exposed hill with nothing but tank hulls for protection. “What a stupid place to be,” Smith thought.12

  Point 206 stood about 2,500 yards distant and was obviously strongly defended. In the valley between the two hills, the little hamlet of Fontaine-le-Pin was surrounded by artillery, mortars, and infantry stationed in the orchards. More gun positions stood behind the railway embankment passing a mine north of Potigny. As many as fourteen tanks and a large force of infantry were visible in Quesnay Wood. About two miles to the rear and northwest of Point 195, an 88-millimetre battery fired from another wood.13 All agreed that the Grenadiers would only reach Point 206 with lavish and well-directed artillery and air support. When Halpenny tried to raise 10th Brigade on the wireless, however, he was unable to get through.

  It was 1155 hours.14 Smith was antsy. This crazy meeting had gone on too long. Suddenly 88-millimetre shells tore up great gouts of earth around the Shermans. Shrapnel clattered off armour and sizzled overhead. Halpenny and Telford leapt into their Shermans. Major Williamson bolted off on foot, leaving his tank crew to extricate themselves. Smith and Amy stood in front of their respective tanks, directing the drivers. “Back up,” Smith yelled, “straight back. As fast as you can.” Amy shouted similar commands. Halpenny’s tank roared off. Smith and Amy had just slipped into their turrets when the area erupted with explosions.15

  Most of the fire came from a line of trees extending from Aisy, a village on the Caen-Falaise highway directly opposite Point 195.16 Telford smothered the tree line with artillery. His tank had been hit in the turret, knocking the fake wooden gun barrel askew. The 75-millimetre guns had been removed from FOO tanks and a wooden barrel substituted to create room inside for the wireless equipment. The dummy gun drooped “drunkenly,” giving the Sherman a wrecked appearance that led the German anti-tank gunners to ignore it. But Telford’s direction of the artillery from inside, noted the Grenadiers’ regimental historian, made the derelict “indirectly the most effective weapon on the hill.”17

  The intense shelling of Point 195 presaged a major attack from Quesnay Wood. Six tanks and about three hundred infantry headed up the long slope. Scooting along at a rapid fifteen miles per hour ahead of tanks and infantry were three small remote-controlled tanks.

  Smith stood on his tank’s hull, a long cord threading back from his headset into the turret to the wireless set. Because Halpenny was engaged in discussion on the brigade wireless net over the infeasibility of advancing on Point 206, Smith temporarily controlled the regiment. Seeing the remote-controlled tanks, he rapped on the turret and pointed them out to his gunner.18

  As the Grenadiers opened fire, each remote tank exploded in turn. It was unclear whether they had been hit or prematurely detonated by their operators. “Their value is problematic,” the Grenadiers’ war diarist commented, “for the blast, being vertical, caused no material injury to us.”19

  Their real purpose may have been to distract. Eliminating the little tanks left the Grenadiers exposed. Several Shermans were burning by the time Smith resituated the squadrons to meet the attack. Although the German tanks were driven off by artillery, the infantry kept coming.

  “For over an hour the battle raged,” one Grenadier report stated. The tanks threw out “a veritable hail of machine gun and [high-explosive] fire. Elements of the [Argylls] … ably assisted us. Defensive [artillery] fire was called down … both medium and field. In return the enemy kept up a bitter blanket of mortar, 88, H.E. and machine-gun [fire] and, although the attacking infantry was halted, they gave no sign of retiring.”20

  ‘B’ Company’s Private Albert Clare Huffman “thought it was maybe the end of the world.” Shells were exploding all around. Men were dying wherever he looked. Huffman manned a Bren gun. “I was stopping some. It was just a job to do because I realized that they were out to get me. If I didn’t stop them, well, I guess that’s the basics, isn’t it, of war? You get the other guy before he gets you … I was never a killer or anything, never wished to kill anyone, but I know I did.”

  When a tank next to Private Jim Coughlin’s slit trench exploded in flame, “only the guy sitting up in the turret managed to get out by doing a perfect back flip into some brush behind the tank.” He listened in horror to the screams of the others.21

  A shell tore into Sergeant John Henry Andrews’s Sherman and he ordered the crew out. As Andrews turned to run, he heard Guardsman M. Lutsky crying from inside the tank. Climbing back in, Andrews saw his gunner had both feet blown off. Andrews lifted Lutsky out, lowering him to the ground. Kneeling beside the flaming wreckage, Andrews wrapped a tourniquet around each stump to stem the gushing blood. Then he carried Lutsky to an improvised aid post on the hill. Andrews stayed there the rest of the day giving medical aid to the wounded. He was awarded a Military Medal.22

  At 1300 hours the attack crumbled, “but seven or eight shattered tanks were still brewing on the side of the hill under the August sun to warn the regiment of the fury of the German guns that surrounded it on all three sides.” Telford estimated there were twenty-four self-propelled 88-millimetre guns firing on Point 195. Halpenny, meanwhile, had been instructed by 4th Armoured Brigade’s Brigadier Leslie Booth to stay on the hill with the Argylls. There would be no advance on Point 206 until infantry could “knock out the anti-tank guns.”23

  Booth told Halpenny the Governor General’s Foot Guards were en route to reinforce Point 195. Firing smoke to blind the guns in Quesnay Wood, Nos. 2 and 3 Squadrons of the Foot Guards dashed towards Point 195. No. 1 Squadron remained in reserve. Their arrival secured the Canadian grip on Point 195, but the Germans refused to concede. Heavy shelling and repeated counterattacks lasted all day.24

  LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIMONDS realized that to reach the heights overlooking Falaise, the Quesnay Wood strongpoint had to be first eliminated. Advancing beyond Point 195 was impossible due to the guns in the wood. Left of Quesnay Wood, the Poles had seized Estrées-la-Campagne and Soignolles. Attempting to push on from these villages to Point 140, the Poles “attacked wherever the enemy was found and made every effort to exploit even the smallest success.” But all was in vain. At every turn, the Polish right flank “received a ferocious mauling from … Quesnay Wood.”25

  With 4th Armoured Division near the end of operational effectiveness, Simonds decided to bring 3rd Canadian Infantry Division forward. Since Major General Rod Keller’s wounding, 8th Brigade’s Brigadier Ken Blackader had taken temporary command. Simonds gave him 2nd Armoured Brigade and, in addition to the divisional artillery, thatof the Poles and II Canadian Corps. Typhoons would strike before the infantry advanced. Driving the Germans out of Quesnay Wood was the first objective, but Simonds also wanted the infantry to retrieve Operation Totalize’s momentum. They were to push southward from Quesnay, gain a crossing over the Laison River, and then advance to a commanding ridge west of Épaney—attaining the prized view over Falaise.26

  Blackader ordered his brigade, temporarily commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jock Spragge, to carry out the attack. During his briefing at 1500 hours, Spragge said intelligence on enemy dispositions “was meagre,” but the advance must continue. The attack would happen at 2000 hours.27

  It would be a two-battalion show—the Queen’s Own Rifles on the right, and the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment on the left. Once the wood was cleared, Le Régiment de la Chaudière would pass through and drive south to the mine north of Potigny. The latter regiment would be supported by the 1st Hussars. Because the woods were thick with anti-tank guns, no tanks would support the other two battalions. They would rely on the artillery and Typhoons.28

  Stretching about a mile from north to south and approximately the same distance in width, Quesnay Wood was an irregularly shaped cultivated forest. Within were strips and patches of
open ground where trees had been harvested. Being completely surrounded by open fields, the wood was impervious to surprise attack. About two hundred panzer grenadiers supported by twenty tanks and numerous 88-millimetre anti-tank guns were inside the wood.29

  Neither the Queen’s Own nor the North Shores welcomed the assignment. It seemed too hurried and ambitious. Major Steve Lett detailed all the Queen’s Own objectives, including an advance beyond the wood by Major R.A. Cottrill’s ‘D’ Company to a hill overlooking Falaise. Cottrill growled, “There must be a new boy on the staff, who can’t read maps. No one else would expect a single company … to advance five miles through enemy held territory.”30

  The North Shore’s Major Robert Robichaud, meanwhile, “had a premonition that something would go wrong.” His ‘D’ Company would be out front on the left with Major Ralph Daughney’s ‘C’ Company alongside.31

  Keeping as close to the barrage as possible, the Queen’s Own headed for the wood. Then the barrage lifted, and “a murderous fire opened from hidden tanks and the German infantry.” ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies gained the edge of the wood. But the following ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies strayed into a U-shaped grain field with woods on three flanks bristling with panzer grenadiers and tanks. Nebel-werfers and mortars had zeroed in on the open ground. The two companies were pinned in the shoulder-high grain for four hours. On the edge of the wood, neither of the other two companies could make further progress.32

  The North Shore attack was similarly stopped cold. Robichaud was struck in the chest by a bullet and temporarily paralyzed. Lieutenant Kevin Keirans led one ‘D’ Company platoon forward and Lieutenant Harry Smith another. As the company crossed a low rise and headed towards the wood, mortar rounds started falling and machine guns fired from the tree line. Smith was killed. Keirans and his men were three hundred yards from the wood when a tank started shooting. As Kierans threw a grenade into a slit trench on the edge of the wood, he felt a twinge in his left hand. Drawing his pistol, Kierans jumped into the trench and found it empty. Unable to move his lefthand, Kierans glanced down and saw blood dripping from the wrist. Then he looked back and discovered none of his men were there. Kierans went back and found only four men unwounded. Someone said Robichaud was lying in the field they had crossed and was in a bad way. Kierans crawled to him. Carrying on to the company tactical headquarters, Kierans directed stretcher-bearers to where the company’s many wounded men lay.33

  On the right of ‘D’ Company, Major Ralph Daughnay’s ‘C’ Company had also met withering fire. Daughnay was killed. Only forty-five men reached the woods. They remained pinned against the edge through the long night and withdrew at daybreak.

  Shortly after first lighton August 11, both battalions regained Canadian lines. The Queen’s Own had lost twenty-two killed and sixty-three wounded. For the North Shores the cost was slightly less, twenty-two killed and fifty-eight wounded.34 Lieutenant Colonel Buell had been badly wounded by shellfire. The North Shores considered Buell the division’s best battalion commander, and his loss was keenly felt.35

  “WITH THE FAILURE to take Quesnay Wood General Simonds’ new plan had fallen to the ground,” the official army historian conceded. “We had advanced some nine miles from our start line of 7 August; but the enemy, inferior though his forces were, had successfully stabilized the situation. To penetrate to Falaise First Canadian Army would need to mount another large-scale deliberate attack.” Simonds cancelled further operations and ordered the Canadian and Polish armoured divisions be relieved by infantry divisions—3rd Canadian Division taking over from the Poles, 2nd Canadian Division relieving 4th Armoured Division.36

  Pulling back was not easy for those on Point 195. The Grenadier Guards, having suffered numerous tank losses during the morning of August 11, left first. Six Shermans were picked off during the escape.37

  The Grenadiers reached Langannerie at about 1500 hours. Major Hershell Smith was surprised to see some of the men shedding tears of relief at having escaped the cauldron. “These guys need stiffening up,” he thought. Then someone reported a tank with a broken wireless had missed the order to withdraw. “I’ll go back and get them,” Smith said. As Smith walked along a hedgerow that led up to Point 195, he saw three Germans in a dugout. Realizing he had left his pistol behind, Smith shouted: “God damn it! Get out of there!” Pimply-faced youths crawled out with hands up. Dropped their guns, grenades, everything. “Go down there,” Smith barked, pointing towards Langannerie. Dutifully, they filed off. “All they had to do was shoot me. I just scared the hell out of them. It was a spontaneous thing, not thought out. I was scared mad.”

  Smith found the wayward tank. The crew commander was “scared and lost.” Smith jumped up and grabbed the main-gun barrel. “I’ll hang on to the gun and don’t shoot it,” he cautioned. “Go like hell,” he said, and the tankers did. Huge plumes of dust roiled behind them, but they made it to safety. As Smith dropped clear, an officer from Halpenny’s headquarters ran up. “Go over and put that officer who raised the cloud of dust under charge,” the man said.

  “Go back and tell Halpenny to stick it up his ass,” Smith bellowed. “I brought the tank and the crew out. All are safe and I’m not concerned.” As the man dithered, Smith said to tell Halpenny to press the issue personally. Which, he knew, Halpenny wouldn’t do.38

  Over the course of the night of August 11–12, the Argylls were replaced by the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders. Then the Governor General’s Foot Guards left.

  Totalize failed to achieve its final objective. As a consequence, the army’s official historian deemed it a failure and blamed the troops—particularly the Canadian and Polish armoured divisions. Due to Totalize’s failure, he wrote, “the capture of Falaise was long delayed.” Had Totalize succeeded, Falaise would have fallen, with the Germans likely encircled and destroyed in Normandy. This would have led to the war’s earlier end. “Had our troops been more experienced, the Germans would hardly have been able to escape a worse disaster.”39

  Lieutenant General Harry Crerar pointed his finger at the Poles. Why had they stopped advancing because of the fire from Quesnay Wood? They could have fired smoke to screen the wood and left a small containing force behind while advancing in strength on a wider front farther to the east. The Polish failure to keep abreast of the Canadians allowed the Germans to concentrate on a narrow front that eventually bogged the whole operation down.40

  Simonds directed his ire at 4th Canadian Armoured Division’s commanders, particularly the tankers. During a subsequent meeting of corps senior commanders, Simonds lashed out. Major General George Kitching thought it “a very tough and unpleasant briefing … Simonds blasted armoured regiments for their lack of support for infantry—he quoted the heavy infantry casualties of the past month compared to armour. He demanded greater initiative from [armoured regiments]—drive on—get amongst the enemy … Forget about harbouring at night—keep driving on. Arrange your resupply accordingly. Don’t rely on the infantry to do everything for you! It was a real blast and it shook everyone up. I was upset because … I felt our commanders of regiments did not deserve such treatment … it is important to remember that up to that occasion none of our [armoured regiments] had had to operate in the dark—it was policy to harbour and refuel.”41

  At no time did Simonds concede that Totalize had been a large, overly complex operation. The precisely scheduled aerial bombard-ments had failed to shatter German defences. Masters at regrouping—not only the 12th SS but even the 89th Infantry Division—had offered stout resistance not easily overcome. And did Simonds really think that if the armoured regiments had got “amongst the enemy” their Shermans would have lived long in close-range shootouts with the 12th SS Tigers and Panthers?

  Remarkable was what Totalize did achieve. An advance of nine miles over four days was unprecedented in Canadian or British formations in Normandy. Where Operation Goodwood had failed to break the German cordon at Caen, Totalize shattered it. At Totalize’s end, the Can
adians were more than halfway to Falaise and within grasp of the overlooking heights. During Totalize, the Canadian, Polish, and British divisions had 560 men killed and 1,600 wounded.42

  PART FOUR

  THE GAP

  [ 24 ]

  Without a Hitch

  AT 1400 HOURS on August 11, Lieutenant General Harry Crerar and Lieutenant General Guy Simonds met to consider First Canadian Army’s next move. Crerar first briefed Simonds on General Montgomery’s new orders. On August 8, U.S. Fifth Army Group’s General Omar Bradley had realized that the disastrous German counterattack at Avranches presented the Allies with an unforeseen opportunity. Instead of the wide American sweep to the Seine, Bradley proposed sending a corps from General George Patton’s Third Army due north from Le Mans through Alençon to Argentan. This would place the Americans twelve and a half miles southeast of Falaise. If the Canadians and Americans then drove towards each other, they could close this narrow gap to “isolate and destroy the German forces on our front.”

  Montgomery had immediately recognized that “the prospective prize was great.” Leaving Bradley to oversee the American drive, he worked up conforming orders on August 8 for Twenty-First Army Group. British Second Army would “advance its left to Falaise” as a “first priority, and a vital one.” First Canadian Army would then “capture Falaise. It is vital that it should be done quickly. The army will then operate with strong armoured and mobile forces to secure Argentan.”

  By the time Crerar and Simonds met, Montgomery had adjusted his plan so that First Canadian Army would now “swing to the east around Falaise and then south towards Argentan, at which point it is proposed to link up with the Third U.S. Army.” The Canadian advance would take it in a southeasterly direction that would cut the main road out of Falaise at Trun and then south to Argentan.1