Outright Assassination

by Adel Beshara

  “You know that the interference of the Jordanian army and their entrance into Lebanon would mean isolation for Syria, and restraining it within its borders. At that point, I realized I was forced to hand in Sa’adah and sacrifice him, or else the axis that we formed would disintegrate; the axis of Damascus – Cairo – Riyadh. It never occurred to me that they would execute him that fast.” I replied, “This all makes sense, but it does not justify his handover to Lebanon. You could have asked Sa’adah to leave the country and then closed the borders between Lebanon and Syria to stamp out any suspicions of Syria and refute charges of stirring up a revolt in Lebanon. I swear, had Sa’adah resorted to Israel, they would not have done to him what we did. They would never have turned him in, even if America itself had asked for him.”54

  In view of this unanimity, it is hardly surprising that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been incriminated in Sa’adeh’s execution. This incrimination owes its existence not only to the powerful influence that the two countries exercised over the Levant, but to a common belief in Lebanon that Solh and Khoury could not possibly have acted on their own accord. Repeated references to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in autobiographies covering Sa’adeh, imperfect as they may be, have also helped to confirm and strengthen such feelings and contributed further to a sense that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were in daily communication with the Syrian-Lebanese authorities and thus gave their wholehearted endorsement to the execution. They are seen acting as silent partners in the saga.

  Of course, there never had been any direct evidence of an Egyptian-Saudi complicity in the Sa’adeh affair or in the events that led inexorably to the tragic moment of execution. There are no supporting documents to prove or disprove the various allegations against them. Most of the information comes to us from personal accounts, although some of these accounts are fairly trustworthy and independent. Without official documents it is difficult to determine exactly the nature and extent of Saudi and Egyptian influence on the course of events. Did they want Sa’adeh out of the way enough to kill him? Moreover, there are some errors and inconsistencies between the various accounts that make it difficult to construct a coherent picture. For example, Qubbani’s storyline is slightly different from that of Nadhir Fansah, Zaim’s first secretary and brother-in-law. Fansah’s account is also important, but it exonerates the Egyptians and their King, Faruq:

  The following morning, I was handed a copy of Al-Ahram newspaper with my breakfast. One of its main headlines read “Antun Sa’adeh has been handed over, tried and executed.” I was stunned by this news. I immediately picked up the phone and rang Karim Thabet and told him that I refuse to go back to Damascus because I object to being deceived in such a ludicrous and underhanded way by senior government officials who make promises but then break them. When I saw King Farouk several hours later with Karim Thabet they appeared deeply disturbed by the whole thing.55

  The crudity of Fansah’s account, however, permits two positive conclusions: either King Faruq had put on an act to his Syrian guest in order to cover his tracks or that Fansah had twisted the facts to protect the King who had decorated him with an Egyptian state honor. There is much that is personal as well as political in his narrative. Fansah’s recollection of the trip to Egypt is also factually inaccurate: he claimed that he was calculatedly sent to Cairo ahead of Sa’adeh’s betrayal, yet his trip to the Egyptian capital occurred on 7 July, that is, after Sa’adeh’s delivery to Lebanon.56

  4. Freemasonry

  For mysterious reasons, “Freemasonry” seems to pop up whenever conspiracy theory is spouted. Abraham Lincoln,57 John F. Kennedy,58 Jack the Ripper,59 and the Princess of Wales are just some of the public names that have been linked to Freemasonry plots. There have also been occasional attempts to find causes of major historical events, such as the French Revolution,60 in Masonic lodges. Even the September 9/11 terror attack has been woven into a masonry conspiracy theory.61

  Predictably, after his death, Antun Sa’adeh was made to be the victim of a Freemasonry conspiracy undertaken jointly by local and regional masonries. This theory, which originated in the 1950s and flourished as the event became more distant, does not point to purported Masonic symbols as evidence of the conspiracy but emphasizes a series of coincidental factors: (1) Sa’adeh’s public repudiation of Freemasonry;62 (2) the active involvement in his saga of certain men widely suspected of being Freemasons, most of all Riad el-Solh and King Farouk of Egypt; (3) and the peculiar idea that Freemasonry, as a Jewish front for world domination, partook in Sa’adeh’s downfall as a service to Israel and world Jewry. Fed by a growing literature, the theory takes as its starting point an internal party edict issued by Sa’adeh on 3 January, 1949 proscribing members from joining the Masonic movement:

  The internationalist circular and ambiguous objectives of Freemasonry are in direct conflict with the Social Nationalist objectives [of our movement] in such a way that render allegiance to the two at the same time irreconcilable. Therefore, in so far as doctrine and objectives are concerned, a person has either to be a social nationalist or a Freemason [but not both]. Anyone who is a Freemason and wishes to join the Social Nationalist order and become a member of the [Syrian] Social National Party must repudiate the principles of Freemasonry, dissociate himself from its associations, and sincerely declare that in the application form.63

  An unflattering proclamation concerning Freemasonry made on 10 May, 1949,64 purportedly “accelerated the conspiracy against Sa’adeh”65 by uniting influential Masons against him. Apart from Solh and Farouk, the conspirators are thought to include the Lebanese President Beshara el-Khoury, the then Chairman of the Lebanese Chamber Habib Abi Chahla, “and other Masons holding top level positions in the State.”66 The proclamation re-affirms the position stated in the edict of 3 January, but makes three pointedly anti-Masonic points:

  That Freemasonry is an international Jewish establishment, whose history, influence and symbols are Jewish.

  That an essential element in the Masonic grandiose plan is to re-build the Temple of Solomon on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem as a “symbol of Jewish authority over Syrian land.”

  That Masonry conceals its secrets from all except the Adepts and Sages, and uses false explanations and misinterpretations of its symbols to achieve “destructive” objectives.67

  Three crucial points are noteworthy: (1) Sa’adeh did not divulge the secret symbols of Freemasonry or criticize its rituals; (2) he did not call for a ban on Freemasonry; and (3) he did not attack public stonemasons. Sa’adeh merely accused Masonry of constituting a separate system of loyalty that was inconsistent with loyalty to the national cause. Hence his declaration “in so far as doctrine and objectives are concerned, a person has either to be a social nationalist or a Freemason [but not both].” The Masonic movement in Lebanon did not respond to the proclamation.

  The charge against Freemasonry rests on the assumption that Freemasons pledge to come to each other’s aid under circumstances of distress. Yet hypotheses based upon the notion that certain classes of people actively conspire together, though emotionally attractive, are essentially implausible. In his essay “On nationalism,” George Orwell discussed the common habit of considering people as monolithic groups like “species of insect.” His criticisms stemmed from the fact that such classification is crude and misleading.68 It is probably true that at least some Masonry ideas circulated among Lebanon’s politicians, even at the highest level of the State. But those ideas were not entirely accepted by the political establishment – so the existence of any sort of direct influence is difficult to argue. At the very least, it is highly unlikely that Lebanese Masonries could have overcome their own internal religious, personal and political differences in time to pull off something quite as dramatic as the Sa’adeh killing.

  Even today, many Lebanese who are not otherwise given to thoughts of grand conspiracies and who don’t identify themselves with Sa’adeh can harbor vague suspicions towards groups like the Freemasons. But proving the existence
of a nefarious Masonry conspiracy against Sa’adeh is just as difficult as proving every other theory on Freemasonry wickedness.

  Other than that, there is the problem of ascertaining if the conspirators in the Sa’adeh case (allegedly Solh, Khoury, Farouk and others) were Freemasons at the time of the event. There has been no published information about their Masonry membership. Nor has anyone addressed the question of to what extent Freemasonry influenced their way of thinking and interpersonal relations. Therefore, it is wholly conjectural. On most occasions, the ‘conspirators’ behaved contrary to the ethics and moral philosophy of Freemasonry, which requires its members to extend fraternal indulgence at all times. They fought to outbid each other in politics and often placed their personal political interests ahead of other interests, Freemasonry or not.

  Another shortcoming is this: As it stands, the Freemasonry conspiracy theory against Sa’adeh provides a pattern of explanatory reasoning about events and situations of personal, social, and historical significance in which a “conspiracy” is the dominant or operative actor. On closer analysis, though, the theory is highly confusing. It leaves the investigator wondering who the guilty party in the conspiracy really was: Freemasonry for using its front men to conspire against Sa’adeh, or the front men for using Freemasonry to achieve their objectives. Such a misconstruction is not a mere mistake but rather the expression of a tendency to interpret the world in a particular way.

  Overall, this theory reflects the predilection of many in the Arab-Iranian-Muslim Middle East to make sense of their worlds through frequent use of conspiracy notions.69 It is not necessarily wrong but, as with the other cases, it needs many more details. At this point, we can neither prove nor disprove that Freemasonry fomented a plot, but there is little evidence, as opposed to supposition, that it did, and some of the arguments advanced are weak and highly hypothetical. Nevertheless, the theory can be analysed empirically to obtain some conclusions about the motives and reasons for its propagation in the first place.

  4. A Conspiracy From Within

  The various conspiracy theories concerning Sa’adeh were started by his closest associates and inner-circle comrades. Why? It is especially interesting to know whether they did it for genuine reasons or for ulterior motives they hoped will remain hidden.

  If we accept that they believed what they said, then from a sociopsychoanalytical perspective, the reason for theorizing about conspiracy theories lies somewhere among the following possibilities:

  Because the perpetrators needed an outlet from the social alienation and political disempowerment that followed Sa’adeh’s execution.

  Because they were desperate for “a tangible enemy”70 on which to externalize their angry feelings. Ted Goertzel calls it anomia – a syndrome whereby insecure or discontented people look for an enemy to blame for problems which otherwise seem too abstract and impersonal.71

  Because the available evidence in the public record and the press did not correspond with the common or official version of events.

  In recent years, however, an alternative theory based on self-interest has been advanced. Its adherents believe that those who fomented conspiracy theories about Sa’adeh may have done so to create a diversion away from their own responsibilities in Sa’adeh’s downfall or to conceal evidence of misdeeds that may somehow be linked to the crisis. Sensing the existence of a cover-up, they suspect that Sa’adeh may have been the victim of a conspiracy from within the party. What they lack in hard evidence they make up for with empirical observations and rational scrutiny. The theory has two broad elements: it emphasises questions of personal conduct, character, and motives rather than the event itself and it attempts to look at Sa’adeh’s tragic end from within to determine whether it could have been prevented and whether or not the party’s senior leaders had the opportunity to stop it but did not.

  Proponents of the theory utilize memoirs, narratives and accounts that are almost entirely concerned with Sa’adeh and written by his chief advisors and people at the highest level of party policy. Next, through content analysis and evaluation, they identify the properties that point to a potential cover-up. One is the existence of wide discrepancies between the various descriptions. Another is the manipulation of facts and circumstances for personal ends. A third property is the inability to unravel the past in a clear and unbiased fashion or to develop a larger or more useful picture of reality. Such equivocation, it is argued, makes it almost impossible to construct a coherent, unified account of what actually happened to Sa’adeh and serves to divert attention from the complex production of the truth. The underlying assumption is that, by twisting the facts, these narrators are either hiding something important or telling half-truths to camouflage their own shortcomings in Sa’adeh’s downfall.

  The theory draws heavily on individual conduct, or more specifically, on blatant transgressions committed by members of Sa’adeh’s inner circle. Suffice it to recount four transgressions that stand out:

  During the cleanup operation triggered by the Jummaizeh incident government forces found a basket of hand grenades inside the printing press building where the clash occurred. Apparently, it was brought into the building by George Abdul Massih, Sa’adeh’s right-hand man, without anyone’s knowledge. Although the small cache was not used during the ensuing clash, it gave the government a ready-made charge to make against the party. It also gave segments of the press physical evidence over which to condemn Sa’adeh. When quizzed, Abdul Massih retorted that it was done purely for precautionary reasons, but said nothing about why he kept the matter entirely to himself!

  It is now commonly accepted that Sa’adeh’s fate was sealed on 24 June at the Shtura meeting between President Zaim and his Lebanese counterparts, Solh and Khoury. One of the most startling revelations to emerge from this meeting is that Adib Shishakli, an SNP member and a close friend of Sa’adeh, was at the meeting and witnessed its entire proceedings. For mysterious reasons Shishakli did not inform Sa’adeh about the meeting, despite the gravity of the situation. What would have happened had he done so is now immaterial, but we can safely conjecture that Sa’adeh would have changed trajectory and the July uprising would not have taken place.

  Any insurgency involving direct armed resistance against an established government demands leadership, openness, communication, and transparency as well as the absolute commitment of its members and leaders. Yet during the ill-fated rebellion in the early days of July, the attitude of some of Sa’adeh’s top advisors was so apathetic and careless it harbored on total treachery. At one point, three of them took to Damascus’ nightlife even as the rebellion was falling apart and defeat was staring Sa’adeh in the face. Others lied to Sa’adeh, virtually:

  Yes, it was I who uttered those words [that the uprising will go ahead with or without Sa’adeh] because the insurgency had been declared and there was no turning back after all the preparations we had made. I retorted “How dare you tell Sa’adeh that you are not prepared to cancel the uprising when it was you who told me that the insurgents were not ready for battle. What’s more you confirmed to Sa’adeh that there will be more than seventy men under your command and yet it was hard for you to assemble seventeen of them. In fact, you managed to assemble only twelve. With such a flimsy number you encouraged Sa’adeh to go ahead [with the uprising] and to bear the responsibility for its failure?”72

  Recklessness was widespread. No one even considered putting together an escape plan for Sa’adeh in the event of failure.73 When the uprising was crushed it was every man for himself:

  On the next day I returned to Damascus. The moment I entered the town I sensed something unusual in the atmosphere. I got out of the car and walked in the direction of Yahya’s house. Before I entered Suq Sarouja I met George Salameh, Joseph’s brother, who told me that he had managed to escape from Beirut. He was in a terrible state of anxiety. He said “You should go back to Amman. Everybody’s being hunted in Syria.”

  I inquired about Sa’adeh. He said th
at he had disappeared from sight and nobody knew where he was.

  Once again I was assailed by that sense of pervasive fear which I had experienced in Beirut. I felt the blood chilled in my veins. We had come to be pursued in Syria as we had been, and still were, in Lebanon. Thus in the twinkling of an eye Damascus turned from a friendly, safe haven into a terribly dangerous place like Beirut.

  I hurried to Yahya’s house, but he wasn’t there. I went to the Oasis and found him sitting by himself reading a newspaper. As he caught sight of me he cried, “What are you doing here? Why did you come back? Haven’t you heard the news?”

  He gave me an account of the rumors that had been spreading in Damascus to the effect that Adib Shishakly had been discharged or removed from his post, that Husm ez-Zaim had handed Sa’adeh over to the Lebanese Government and that the Mazza Prison was brimful with prisoners. I sat down, feeling totally exhausted and awfully starved. I got up and went with Yahya to a small restaurant opposite Socrates Restaurant. We ate fatit maqadim which lifted my spirits somewhat. Over the coffee Yahya said, “The main thing is that we should arrange for your return to Amman. We should first get you an exit visa from the Security.”74