Outright Assassination
Page 30
13 Ibid.
14 Qadiyat al-Hizb al-Qawmi: 27.
15 Martin Blumenson, “Can Official History be Honest History?”, Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter, 1962): 153.
16 A classic example in this respect is Dudley Collard, Soviet Justice and the Trial of Radek and Others. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1937.
17 See Kamal Jumblatt, Istijwab Jumblatt al tarikhi lil hukuma hawla istishhad Sa’adeh ome 1949.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 See Abdullah Qubarsi, Memoirs. Vol. 4. Beirut: Dar al-Furat, 2004.
21 Kamal Jumblatt, Istijwab Jumblatt al tarikhi lil hukuma hawla istishhad Sa’adeh ome 1949.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Yamak Z. Labib, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis. Harvard: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1969: 65.
25 Time, Monday, 30 July, 1951.
26 Correlli Barnett, The Human Factor and British Industrial Decline: An Historical Perspective. London: Working Together Campaign, 1977: 21.
27 Ibid.
28 See M. V. Pylee, “Free Speech and Parliamentary Privileges in India.” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring, 1962): 11–23.
29 See Gordon S. Wood, “The Real Treason of Aaron Burr.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 143, No. 2 (June 1999): 280–295.
30 Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000: 179.
31 Andrew Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949–1961. London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 1995.
32 See Adel Arslan, Mudhakkirat (Memoirs). Beirut: Dar al-Taqaddumiyyah, 1994.
33 An-Nahar, Beirut, 4 July, 1992.
34 See, for example, Robert G. Rabil, Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.
35 For an elaboration of this point see Adel Beshara, “Sa’adeh and the Greater Syria Scheme,” in Antun Sa’adeh: The Man, His Thought, ed. Adel Beshara. Reading: Ithaca Press, 2007: 121–162.
36 Avi Shlaim, “Husni Za’im and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria.” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Summer, 1986): 71.
37 For a chronological breakdown of this theory see Naji Jurji Zaydan, “Man Qatala Antun Sa’adeh? Al-Dawr al-Israeli” (Who Killed Antun Sa’adeh? The Israeli Role). Fikr, No. 73 (July 2000): 69–74.
38 The most elaborate is In’am Raad, Harb wu-Jud la Harb Hudoud (A War of Existence, not a War of Borders). Beirut: Dar Bissan, 1999; Al-Sahyuniah was al-Sharq al-Awsatiyyah min Herzel ila Peres (Zionism and the Greater Middle East From Herzel to Peres). Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbu’at, 1998.
39 See Vols. 14, 15 and 16 of Sa’adeh’s Complete Works.
40 See Haytham Kader, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: Its Ideology and Early History. Beirut: n.p., 1990.
41 See Vol. 16 of Sa’adeh’s Complete Works: 123.
42 This theory can be found in In’am Raad’s various books particularly his Harb wu-Jud la Harb Hudoud (A War of Existence, not a War of Borders). Beirut: Dar Bissan, 1999.
43 Sami Jam’a, Awraq min Daftar al-Watan, 1946–1961 (Pages from Homeland Records, 1946–1961). Damascus: Dar Tlas, 2000: 65–82.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 John Major, “The Search for Arab Unity.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Vol. 39, No. 4 (Oct., 1963): 551–563.
52 Ibid.
53 Beshara Khoury, Haqa’iq Lubnaniyyah (Lebanese Truths). Vol. 3. Beirut: Awraq Lubnaniyah, 1961: 238.
54 See The Social Nationalist Reform Committee, al-Thamin min Tammouz: Wathaiq al-Thawra wa al-Istishhad (The Eighth of July: Documents on the Revolution and the Martyrdom [of Sa’adeh]). USA: n.p., 1992.
55 Nadhir Fansah, Ayyam Husni Zaim: 137 Yawman Hazzat Suria (Days of Husni Zaim: 137 Days that Shook Syria). Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, 1983: 82.
56 Al-Bina’, nos. 981–982 (17 July, 1990): 94–95.
57 See George Johnson, Architects of Fear: Conspiracy Theories and Paranoia in American Politics. Los Angeles: Tarcher/Houghton Mifflin, 1983.
58 James Shelby Downard and Michael A. Hoffman II. “King-Kill/33°: Masonic Symbolism in the Assassination of John F. Kennedy,” 1987. Website excerpt, 1998. Retrieved 16 July, 2007.
59 See Stephen Knight, Jack the Ripper: The Final Solution. London: George G. Harrap Co. Ltd., 1976.
60 John M. Robison (1739–1805), Proofs of a Conspiracy Against all the Governments of Europe, carried on in the secret meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies. Edinburgh: Printed for William Creech; and T. Cadell, Junior, and W. Davies, London, 1797
61 http://www.enterprisemission.com/tower2.ht
62 Sa’adeh joined a local Masonic lodge founded by the Syrian diaspora of Brazil in the mid-1920s but it was for only a short period of time. See Nawaf Hardan, Sa’adeh fi al-Mahjar: 1921–1930 (Sa’adeh Abroad: 1921–1930). From about the mid-1800s, Freemasonry attracted some of the leading thinkers in Syria like Maroun Aboud, Ya’qub Sarrouf, Jirgi Zaydan, Amin Rihani, and Sa’adeh’s father, Dr. Khalil Sa’adeh. The movement was perceived as an embodiment of the new-age principles of the French Revolution and, by some, as a temporary refuge for political and national agitation. See Souhail Suleiman, Athar al-Banna’een al-Ahrar fi al-Adab al-lubnani (The Impact of the Freemasonry on Lebanese Literature: 1860–1950). Beirut: Noufal Press, 1993.
63 Sa’adeh, al-Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works). Vol. 16. Beirut: SSNP Cultural Bureau, n.d.: 185.
64 Reproduced in al-Bina’, Beirut, 11 July, 1992: 9–10.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism. London: Polemic, 1945.
69 See in this regard Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle Eastern Fears of Conspiracy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998.
70 Vamik D. Volkan, “The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach.” Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 2, Special Issue: A Notebook on the Psychology of the U.S.-Soviet Relationship (Jun., 1985): 219–247. Also, The Need to have Enemies and Allies. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1988.
71 Ted Goertzel, “Belief in Conspiracy Theories.” Political Psychology 15 (1994): 733–744.
72 Juliet al-Mir Sa’adeh, Mudhakkirat al-Amina la-Ula (Memoirs). Beirut: Dar Kutub, 2004: 110.
73 Ibid.
74 Hisham Sharabi, al-Jamr wa al-Rimad (Embers and Ashes). Beirut: Dar Tali’a: 1978.
75 Abdullah Qubarsi, op. cit., 53.
76 Juliet al-Mir Sa’adeh, Mudhakkirat al-Amina la-Ula (Memoirs): 124–5.
77 Ibid., 125.
78 Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements.” American Behavioral Scientist, 50 (2007): 1380.
79 Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000: 177.
80 Ibid., 183–3.
81 Ibid., 185.
82 Ibid., 183.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 177.
87 Ibid., 176.
88 Ibid., 188.
89 Ibid., 183–4.
90 See Youmna Asseily and Ahmad Asfahani, A Face in the Crowd: The Secret Papers of Emir Farid Chehab, 1942–1972. London: Stacey International, 2001.
91 Ibid., 186.
92 Ibid., 177.
93 Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000: 167.
94 The New York Times, July 19, 1949.
95 Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order.” The Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 10 (2007): 1–23.
96 See Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999.
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97 See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1978.
98 See Vincent Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
99 Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements.” American Behavioral Scientist, 50 (2007): 1370.
100 Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements.” American Behavioral Scientist, 50 (2007): 1375.
101 See Len Oakes, Prophetic Charisma: The Psychology of Revolutionary Religious Personalities. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997.
102 Bob and Nepstad, op. cit., 1379.
103 See Helen Fein, “Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World.” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1995): 170–191.
104 Thus, Davenport and Armstrong assert that only when democratic institutions exist in combination do they mutually reinforce one another to prevent states from engaging in repression: “Until there is a particular combination of institutions and behavioral factors in place, authorities will not be compelled to respect human rights. Below the critical point, the constraints are not comprehensive or severe enough to deter repressive action nor are the social control mechanisms well enough situated to provide viable alternatives for state repression.” Davenport and Armstrong, “Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976–1996.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2004): 538–54.
105 Alyssa Prorok, “Still More Murder in the Middle? A Reassessment of Repression in Mixed Regimes.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, 28 Aug., 2008.
106 Al-Massa’, Beirut, 18 November, 1935.
107 Anis Sayigh argues that the plan to get rid of Sa’adeh was conceived the moment his plane touched the tarmac at Beirut Airport on 2 March, 1947. See his Anis Sayegh a’n Anis Sayegh (Autobiography). London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2006.
108 Yet doubters remain: “But it must be remembered that the Phalanges, though generally cooperating with Khouri, were opponents of Sulh.” Eyal Zisser, Lebanon the Challenge of Independence. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000: 184. True, but in the days leading up to the Jummaizeh incident Premier Sulh and the Kataib were on good terms and had actually struck a deal for unity and cooperation.
109 In 1948 Sa’adeh told his followers: “Our objective is not to get rid of the government or those in power, but rather to establish a new system for national life in its totality. And in this clear endeavor it was difficult for us to find a single group among the opposition forces willing to understand this conception and to join us in our pursuit of it.” Antun Sa’adeh, al-Muhadarat al-Ashr (The Ten Lectures). Beirut: SSNP Publications, 1978: 147.
110 See U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, with an introduction by Frank Church (New York, 1976).
111 Michal Belknap (ed.), American Political Trials. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994: 179.
112 See Michal Belknap, Cold War Political Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist Party and American Civil Liberties. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977.
113 See Julius Ruiz, Franco’s Justice: Repression in Madrid After the Spanish Civil War. London: Oxford University Press, 2005: 9.
114 In Istijwab Jumblatt al-tarikhi lil-hukuma hawla istishhad Sa’adeh ome 1949 (Jumblatt’s Historic Interpellation to the [Lebanese] Government over Sa’adeh’s Martyrdom in 1949). Beirut: SSNP, 1987.
115 William Hanchett, The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992: 242.
116 Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK. Berkeley: University of California, 1996: 6–7.
7 REPERCUSSIONS
It is probable that the authors of the plan to eliminate Sa’adeh did not visualize all the potential implications of such an undertaking. Two scenarios have emerged about their state of thinking: (1) that the potential for retribution and political unrest was likely to be negligible once Sa’adeh had been exterminated; and (2) that execution would create a break point from which his followers would be unlikely to recover quickly. “All too frequently,” wrote Bob and Nepastad, “governments kill social movement leaders in an attempt to halt challenges to state power. Sometimes, such repression yields its intended effect; other times, it produces a powerful backlash, strengthening mass commitment and bolstering protest.”1 In the case of Antun Sa’adeh, elimination produced divergent outcomes. On the one hand, it deprived his followers of a strong leader and disrupted the function and administrative unity of the party; on the other, it let loose a torrent of anger against the regime that proved difficult to contain and cost lives.
From a strictly Lebanese perspective, the saga fostered two major tendencies: a disposition towards authoritarianism aimed at critics of the regime, and another towards piecemeal reforms to deflect attention away from the real issues and to placate an emerging public agenda. Both aspects were the function of a concerted drive by the Khoury regime to re-assert its central authority over the country and frighten the opposition into submission. It succeeded only tentatively with the first and failed miserably with the second, quite the opposites of what it had intended to achieve.
This chapter explores the repercussions of the Sa’adeh saga in its effects on individuals as well as on the wider polity. Though political consequences are sometimes difficult to identify with any certainty because of the complexity of Lebanese politics, other outcomes were more tangible, particularly at the military institutional level, which witnessed a decisive change in its scale of activity, and at the national press level, which gained in importance and identity despite strict censorship and physical intimidation of journalists and editors.
It is important to note that the event, the trauma and tremors, the shocks and the solitude, the criminality of the act and the callousness of the authorities continue to haunt the Lebanese State to this day. At times, as in 1958,2 the wounds showed signs of recovery, but it was always ephemeral dictated by political interest rather than genuine forgiveness.
The Impact on Lebanon
Sa’adeh’s execution produced no discernable changes in Lebanon’s political system. There is little indication that the saga had any salutary effect on the political administration of the country or on the thinking of the Lebanese people, as evidenced by their general apathy. The Khoury regime, though shaken, remained intact, daily life returned to normality and, apart from a vociferous press, most Lebanese seemed eager to put the matter behind them and get on with life. It does not mean that the saga passed quickly and unnoticeably. Press revelations about the government kept the affair politically alive and helped to expand its outcome. The press intensified the crisis of the regime not only by what it did or said, but also by provoking more blunders from the government.
1. Regime Austerity
In the first place, the saga introduced a dynamic and unpredictable element into the country’s dominant political culture. It led to changes in the governing style of the Khoury regime and gave the government fresh justification for draconian laws along the whole range of the political spectrum. Any person known to have shown sympathy for the rebels was dismissed from positions of public influence. Suspect soldiers and army officers were degraded or repatriated. The repression even entered schools where teachers were subjected to a new code of conduct penalizing them for infractions of state orders. Worst hit was the Lebanese press, which became an instant target of various intimidating and censorship rules designed to silence it into submission. Intimidation was carried out against newspaper owners or key editors deemed by the authorities as hostile to ‘national security’ or ‘neighborly Arab relations.’ At the same time, Lebanese authorities revived olde
r censorship rules and threatened to shut down newspapers if they failed to adhere to censor’s instructions.3 These instructions included foremost a strict ban on Sa’adeh’s ideology and his saga. News about the SNP was also among the forbidden topics. Certain words and complete paragraphs were systematically censored to render targeted articles totally incomprehensible or to stifle criticism of the regime. Any subtle expressions of sympathy to Sa’adeh were strictly controlled or banned.4
Strict control over printed material was also exercised by invoking a particular clause in the Press Law dealing with the licensing and distribution of newspapers in the country. Through this clause, the Lebanese government could prohibit publications from entering the country or confiscate any material sent from overseas if it determined that the publication contravened censorship rules. Thus, on 28 August, a decree was issued proscribing the overseas weekly newspaper al-Alam al-Arabi (The Arab World) from entering Lebanese territory “because it publishes news about the Syrian Social National Party.”5 Another casualty of the decree was the Paris-based al-Arab newspaper, but there were other casualties as well.6 The main targets of these bannings were Lebanese expatriate journalists who had the freedom to condemn the regime more openly than their counterparts back home. South American Syro-Lebanese diaspora journalists were particularly active in this regard owing to their personal acquaintance with Sa’adeh during his expatriate years among them. Officials also kept a close watch for signs of agitation and subversion in the publishing and printing presses of Beirut. They revived an earlier practice of forcing bookstores to hand over banned material. A short book about Sa’adeh’s life entitled “from al-Mahd to Glory” was apparently seized just as it was leaving the printing building and the author, Naim al-Zublu’, as well as the printer’s owners were detained and interrogated.7
Lebanese newspapers, on the whole, had no qualms about censorship of material dealing with sensitive military secrets or matters affecting security. But when censors became excessively touchy and capricious in their application of the law it turned the government into a laughing stock and drew cynical polemics from the press. In one polemic an author, using the penname of ‘shahid’ (martyr), addresses a hypothetical Human Rights Council of the United Nation saying: “You ask about human rights in Lebanon. Well, let me assure you that human rights in this country are protected – in fact, sanctified . . . A citizen has only to say something or to dot down anything and it is all the way to a prison. More than that, he has the right to choose how he wants to die.”8