Outright Assassination

by Adel Beshara

  There is no question that the Lebanese State killed Sa’adeh with this factor on its mind. Sa’adeh’s execution created a dangerous vacuum for the party not only because he was irreplaceable, at least in the eyes of its members, but also because he died before designating a successor. Although the party’s leadership eventually overcame this problem by hastily electing George Abdul Massih as its next “President,” it never was able to find anyone able to fill Sa’adeh’s shoes or to be remotely as popular as him. Abdul Massih was an administrative leader with an aptitude at organizational tasks, but he lacked the flair and intellectual dynamism of Sa’adeh. Moreover, the scope of his authority and profile among the population, and even the movement itself, was much narrower than that of Sa’adeh. As a result, the tight, personalistic bond between leader and follower, so common to the dynamic of Sa’adeh’s leadership, deteriorated under the new leader.57

  Sa’adeh’s killing also exercised significant effects on the movement’s development. Initially, the event produced a new sense of solidarity among its members and a desire to reunite and resist state repression. The new leader skillfully used Sa’adeh’s killing as a catalyst to generate greater mobilization and to establish new organizational bases on which to maintain or expand the party. However, no sooner had the situation calmed down, major problems quickly set in and the deleterious effects of Sa’adeh’s loss became more apparent: conflict quickly engulfed the movement’s top echelons as secondary figures scrambled for the mantle of leadership and members faltered in factional infighting. Moreover, the party developed new ideological trajectories and drifted waywardly into political currents with which it had few common grounds. As a result, its identity as an independent ideological movement suffered irreparable damage and its development as a whole slowed down.

  In Lebanon at least, state repression reduced the political opportunities that facilitated the movement’s earlier developments. It made organizing difficult and dangerous, as those who sought to re-activate its organizations or form new ones became easy targets for sanctions. Moreover, it caused ordinary movement participants to drop out to avoid the high costs and risks involved, and created a sense of hopelessness and resignation among those who were stunned by Sa’adeh’s execution. But all was not lost. Despite the devastating loss of Sa’adeh, the party rebounded and could be seen back in action in Lebanon as early as 1950. Incensed by Sa’adeh’s killing and eager to avenge it through any means, the movement gained unity and strength, even while the state suffered defections. Of course, the movement’s strength still paled by comparison to the Lebanese state, and this prolonged the conflict for several more years.

  Contrary to the State’s expectations, Sa’adeh’s killing played an important role in sustaining the party. The reason lies in the nature of repression. Sometimes the killing of a movement’s leader may yield the anticipated results for the killers; other times it may produce a powerful backlash:

  At times . . . repression can backfire, leading to broader protest, augmenting movement resources, and ultimately tipping the balance of power against a state. In the wake of harsh repression, such as a leader’s killing, mobilization by two broad populations is possible. Most important are actual or potential movement constituents, people from the aggrieved group itself, who usually have the greatest chance of achieving real change within their societies. In addition, third parties sympathetic to but not part of the aggrieved population may also be activated by repression, providing resources, personnel, and moral support that can strengthen a movement.58

  In this case, state repression worked to the advantage of the SNP in four ways:

  (1) By encapsulating the movement’s broad grievances in a single dramatic event, repression inadvertently increased awareness of the SNP and created a basis for mobilization by potential but previously un-politicized constituents.

  (2) It generated strong emotions around the SNP and created a “moral shock” among both the aggrieved group and the general population.

  (3) It strengthened members’ militancy as they sought to vindicate their “sunk costs” in a movement and as they perceived fewer options for working within the existing system.

  (4) It increased the sense of efficacy and empowerment in the Party by fostering the impression that the authorities felt their power slipping away or considered the party to be a viable threat.

  The Lebanese government’s ambition to decapitate the SNP by killing its leader may have succeeded were it not for certain fortuitous circumstances. One of those was the overthrow of Husni Zaim in Syria, which re-opened that country up to the Party and provided new resources against the Khoury regime. Had Zaim remained in power, it would have taken the SNP much longer to recover and it may possibly have disintegrated under the strain of Lebanese repression. One of the first acts of the new Syrian regime was to lift all bans on Sa’adeh’s wife and release party members from captivity, which gave the SNP a new breathing space to re-consolidate.

  Another factor was the Lebanese government’s inability to match the execution of the SNP leader with repression of its sub-leaders or to sustain the terror against its mass base. True, the government did crackdown hard on the party after the uprising, but it was low-level repression constrained by scanty resources and inadequate social support. It quickly ran out of steam to the party’s advantage. Where even small opportunities remain, as in this case, movements stand a chance of rebirth.59

  In another respect, Sa’adeh’s perception of martyrdom as sometimes necessary in realizing important goals gave meaning to his killing as a tragic but predictable step in the realization of his vision.60 It enabled the movement to convert him into a martyr after death and to instigate broader attention to its cause among the aggrieved population:

  The concept of martyrdom is probably present to some degree in all cultures and can therefore be appropriated by many movements. But some movements may be better prepared than others to incorporate a martyred leader into the movement’s story line. Probably the most important factor is the leader’s own publicly expressed views of martyrdom. When leaders openly anticipate the possibility of their own murders and frame this as a sacrifice that will strengthen the struggle, they may help the movement transform tragedy into opportunity.61

  Sa’adeh’s regular uses of political imagery associated with martyrdom, encapsulated in clear idioms,62 enabled the movement to garner its resources to re-galvanize itself. It meant that the party could continue to mobilize even after Sa’adeh’s killing, ensuring that his death was not in vain. Moreover, because the martyr concept had broad resonance with Sa’adeh, the SNP was able to portray the execution as a meaningful martyrdom. With help from the Lebanese press, it quickly succeeded in validating Sa’adeh’s sacrifice as an act precipitated by his courageous and outspoken views. This translated into solid support for the party, particularly in Syria where support and sympathy for its cause swelled. The party gained political recognition with the election of one of its leaders, Issam Muhairy, to the Chamber, and its strength inside the Syrian military grew further. Such results, reciprocally, gave its crusade inside Lebanon, where it had continued to work secretly and obtrusively under enormous risks,63 a belated but much-needed boost.

  By 1952, the situation had reversed to the evident advantage of the SNP: Riad Solh was there no longer, the Khoury regime had fallen, the Lebanese press had regained its freedom, and the party was back in action. After Chamoun’s accession to power, the SNP and the Lebanese state began a new era of cooperation. The party was granted a permit to operate legally and its members who had been in prison were pardoned en masse and released. The party was also allowed to openly take part in parliamentary elections and even succeeded in getting its President, Asad al-Ashqar, elected to the Chamber. So great was the transformation in the relationship between the two sides that by 1958, when law and order broke down in Lebanon, the SNP, aside from Pierre Gemayel’s Phalange party, would emerge as the primary backer of the State.64

  The Imp
act on the Sa’adeh Family

  At the time of his execution, Sa’adeh was married to Juliet al-Mir, a nurse he met during his exile in Argentina in 1941. They had three daughters: Sofia, Alissar and Raghida. Juliet al-Mir was an exceptionally gifted woman and a devoted wife. Unpretentious and modest in her conduct and lifestyle, firm but sympathetic and understanding toward others, she became an extremely dedicated and well-liked individual. She was gracious, even-tempered and of strong character, a person of cheerful disposition, totally devoted to her family and to the upbringing and education of her children. She ran an exemplary household, was industrious and efficient, and had a penchant for neatness and orderliness. There is no doubt that the Sa’adehs were, in many respects, an exceptionally closely knit family.

  Sa’adeh always preserved a very close and special relationship with his wife. She was supportive and always there by his side. His cause was also hers. She performed her duties alongside him without grumble and encouraged discipline, industry and diligence, especially in party-work. Even during periods of grief and adversity she placed her husband above herself, providing for him material comfort, care and security. After Sa’adeh’s execution, she was elected to the Supreme Council of the Party and remained an active member until her death in 1968. No wonder Sa’adeh insisted on seeing her and the children before execution.

  After the Jummaizeh incident, Juliet al-Mir followed her husband to Syria to be by his side. In her recently-published memoirs, she gives a moving account of the hardship she confronted in Damascus trying to link up with Sa’adeh during the uprising:

  I went to the hotel at three in the morning. Yet, I was disturbed. I wanted to be near Sa’adeh. Why shouldn’t I? If I went to one of the nationalists’ houses to keep my daughters there with the house maid who takes care of them, I could then stay with Sa’adeh. The next day, Sunday, July 3rd, I was paid a visit by several comrades, including Adele Sa’ab. I said to her, “I need to be near Sa’adeh. He will never need me more than he does now.” I asked her to give me a room at her place wherein my daughters and their maid could stay for a few days, so I could be with him. I also told her that I could not leave the hotel except with the security officers following me to the hotel door. When I go to the restaurant, they follow me and surround my table. Therefore, I cannot possibly head for the residence where Sa’adeh is staying. However, she replied, “I am sorry I have rented one of the rooms in the house.” “They could stay in the dining room”, I returned. “This is an emergency.” But, she repeated, “Impossible, sorry.”65

  On 6 July, as the revolution collapsed, Sa’adeh’s safety came back to haunt her. Her solitary desire in those singular moments was to be by Sa’adeh’s side:

  On Tuesday, news of the failure of the revolution was all across newspapers. I had the same feeling that I sensed the last time I met with Sa’adeh; that his life was in danger, and that no one was aware of that or took any precautions. It was foggy and I felt I was suffocating. No sooner had I seen a comrade, whom I think was Ajaj Al-Muhtar, who came to visit me at the hotel, than I burst in a voice screaming with pain and desperation, “Take me to Sa’adeh. I want to see him; I want to be with him. Place me anywhere, but take me out of here. I can go out alone, but where do I go and what do I know about the house I will step into?”66

  The thought of suicide crossed her mind as she struggled to come to terms with her new circumstances: “When it was Friday, I decided to do something which may be against my conscience, since I no longer believed that there were people around Sa’adeh, who were quite near the hotel, and who kept coming and going, but who were unable to take me temporarily to any house anywhere! I felt that no one cared about my concerns.”67

  The following morning she heard that President Zaim had agreed to a meeting with Sa’adeh. Anticipating the worse, she went ballistic:

  I was horrified by this news, since I had, for the past days, been contemplating the heavy price we paid as a result of getting in touch with this fickle man. The moment I heard that, I screamed, “What understanding to reach with a man who broke his promise over and over again? How can we trust him? I only see that he is changeable; how can we trust him, given everything that has happened in this revolution?” I cried in pain, and begged Bashir saying, “I can’t stay here another minute. I want to go to Sa’adeh; I want to talk to him. I do not feel good about this Hosni Az-Za’im. I want to say that to Sa’adeh. How come you all keep seeing Sa’adeh, while I, his wife, cannot see him for a second?”68

  Eventually, she was whisked away to another location, but to no avail. The Syrian Security quickly discovered her new hideout and impounded her in the Saydnayya Monastery – “I had no idea that Sa’adeh had been handed over [to the Lebanese authorities] or that he was in their custody.”69 On her way to the Monastery, she told her liaison officer: “Tell Sa’adeh to leave the country at once, and not to stay for a single moment. Tell him to let them [ie., the Syrian authorities] be distracted by me, and not to take any action for my sake, whatever happens. I was under the impression that the leader was in hiding and that they were holding me back till he came. However, the situation was quite the opposite. The plot against Sa’adeh’s life had already taken place while I was away.”70

  Juliet spent several days in Saydnayya Monastery uninformed of Sa’adeh’s fate: “We headed for Saydnayya, and were received by the head of the monastery. She gave us a room to stay in: it had only an old bed and a wooden bench. We stayed there for two days, contemplating the situation. The maid asked for another bed to place on the ground. There were two beds, on which we and the children would spend the night. I used to see a security officer sitting on a chair outside the room. I hence grasped that we were technically under arrest.”71 Two days after Sa’adeh’s execution, on 10 July, she discovered the truth:

  On Sunday, July 10th, the personal maid of the Monastery’s abbess came to me while I was washing my hands and bluntly and directly said to me, “You are a sensible woman. If I tell you that they killed your husband, you will not do anything rash.” I could no longer tell whether I heard this while awake or asleep. I no longer knew what to say or what to do. Had this piece of news been true, my entire world had thus crumbled down, and everything was ruined in my eyes. I guess I started running from the first to the ground floor screaming for help, hoping to find any of my comrades. However, I could only see the sisters, each saying a word, or mumbling a phrase. Everything they said was nonsense, because they had no idea how tremendous the calamity was. I completely broke down, and found myself surrounded by the sisters, as if the whole world was dressed in grim black, as if the whole world was mourning a stranger.72

  Sa’adeh’s family remained in the Saydnayya Monastery contemplating its next move. With Lebanon closed to her and Syria wanting the family no more, Juliet was subjected to irresistible pressure from the Orthodox Patriarch to return to Argentina. “I have conditions,” she replied. “They must first allow me back in Lebanon to pack my house and personal possessions. The government must also be prepared to handover Sa’adeh’s corpse. Only then will I consider leaving.”73 Three days later the Patriarch returned with an answer: “Riad Solh will not allow you back in Lebanon, but is willing to pay for all your expenses provided you leave the country. The Government will be happy to send your entire possessions to Argentina, but readmittance to Lebanon is out of the question. You know too many of your husband’s secrets.” She retorted: “Well, in that case, leaving the country is also out of the question. If Riad Solh thinks he can buy Sa’adeh’s blood with money, well I am not one who will sell it.”74 Several days later, the Argentinean Consul General in Lebanon showed up at the Monastery, allegedly at the request of the Lebanese Government, to persuade her to go back to Argentina, but to no avail.

  Juliet al-Mir lost her husband but not her fighting spirit. She remained in Damascus, coping with life after Sa’adeh, and attending to family and party matters with renewed willpower. She was elected to the party’s Supreme Council and becam
e even more determined to carry on Sa’adeh’s work. But her life was interrupted again in 1955, in an equally dramatic fashion, with the assassination of Adnan Malki by an alleged SNP member. Although she had nothing to do with the assassination, she was placed under house arrest and imprisoned for over a decade. She died in 1969 from cancer.

  Conclusion

  The impact of the Sa’adeh killing was far greater than the literature has allowed. Although it did not cause a massive haemorrhage on the national political system of Lebanon, it exercised considerable effect on the incumbent regimes in Lebanon and Syria. In Lebanon, it helped broaden the anti-government front and gave the opposition forces greater depth and scope than before. As a result, the Khoury regime found itself in a virtual state of suspended animation. It threatened and cajoled, and even used violence in an effort to defuse the explosive situation, but to no avail. Once the SNP caught its breath it struck back with vengeance, ensuring that Sa’adeh’s killing would not pass unnoticed.

  As with most political killings, it took some time for the full impact of Sa’adeh’s tragic loss to surface. In Lebanon, apart from the violent reprisals it produced, the event weakened the nascent secular movement by robbing it of one of its most outspoken figures. It also reduced possibilities of dialogue, either deliberately or inadvertently, and thus, kept the country in a draining sectarian stand-off for decades. In Syria, the killing speeded up the movement to depose Zaim and, by extension, affected the fate of the Khoury regime in Lebanon. From another point of view, the killing robbed the SNP of its leader and threatened to destroy everything that Sa’adeh built. These outcomes suggest that the true impact of Sa’adeh’s killing cannot be measured purely in short-run political terms. A broader longer-term perspective is essential to grasp its meaning.