Outright Assassination

by Adel Beshara

  To cap off their work, the myth crafters created a series of ceremonies and rituals around Sa’adeh. The annual “8 July Ceremony” became the most revered of these ceremonies. It begins on the evening of 7 July with a visit to Sa’adeh’s burial place during which a wreath is placed on his grave and pledges of all sorts are made. His supporters then gather in small lots, usually at party offices or members’ homes, to remember his martyrdom.46 At the precise time of Sa’adeh’s execution they recite “The Priest who Confessed Him” and then stand in silence for three minutes in observance of their fallen leader. Formal commemorations are held the next day in the form of mass rallies attended by the general public, leading dignitaries, and all those who couldn’t make it the previous night. Occasionally, Sa’adeh’s execution is re-enacted at these rallies and children of different ages may participate in military-style parades. The commemorations usually end with a major public gathering during which organizers trot out speakers from a stable of poets and orators, generally professional men of letters and political speakers, for florid speeches. Antun Sa’adeh’s heroic status could be called on by speakers to press for change within the system, or by the party to make an ideological statement. Or it could be invoked by his trusted followers to demand respect for his legacy and a share of the power.47

  Sa’adeh’s post-1970 hero myth represented the posthumous comeback of a reputation that was at its lowest ebb. Why did this comeback occur? And how did Sa’adeh regain his heroic stature if his impact on popular imagination was not great?

  Here, a number of factors have to be kept in mind. Obviously, Nasser’s fall from grace after the Six-Day War is crucial in that it inspired a new search in the Arab world for individuals or leaders who might qualify as popular heroes. The problem was complicated by the absence of anyone remotely as reputable as Nasser and by the explosion of revolutionary sentiments among the Palestinians and their Arab supporters. Nasser himself remained after the War an object of popular fascination, but there was concomitantly a radical shift towards prevalent icons of revolutionary struggle. Here, some found the hero in Marx or in Marxist revolutionary and public figures such as Lenin, or Mao Tse Tung, or Che Guevara; others turned for answers to the religious heroes in the Islamic past;48 and others still rediscovered the hero in Sa’adeh, although the turn in his direction was somewhat slow and contingent on a deeper and more somber clarification of his ideas. Sa’adeh’s stature received another boost in 1970 when Nasser died and Arab nationalism subsequently found itself demoralized and leaderless. Nasser’s death provided a far different context for the Arab nationalists to operate in and to act and think more independently.49 Their attitude towards Sa’adeh, as a result, softened considerably and many of them began to see positive aspects in him they had stubbornly refused to entertain while Nasser was alive. Some pan-Arab leaders even paid homage to Sa’adeh’s legacy and began to fashion a new appreciation of his ideas, a trend evident in the increasing observance of the anniversary of his death. A measure of the transformation can be gauged from various pan-Arab testimonials of this period. Abdullah al-Mashnouq, the radical pan-Arab activist and editorialist who once reviled Sa’adeh, is a clear case in point. In 1979 he was quoted as saying, “When we speak about the Syrian Social National Party and its founder Antun Sa’adeh we should pause for in-depth reflection before the greatness of this party and the outstanding personality of its leader.”50 His colleague and government minister many times over, Bahij Taki al-Din, was even more flattering of Sa’adeh: “Antun Sa’adeh’s crime in the eyes of those who committed outrages against him is that he opened our eyes at a time when we were oblivious to what imperialism was hatching for us . . . His greatest crime is that he alerted us to the imminent danger of Zionism while other leaders crawled around for a throne or a high position or status. As a result, Zionism managed to carve a place for itself in the heart of the Arab World, just as Antun Sa’adeh had predicted.”51

  It is also about this time that a number of biographies began to appear linking Sa’adeh to revolutionary thought and describing him as a humble hero. These biographies of individuals now in the twilight of life provided fundamental new insights into the atmosphere of Sa’adeh’s execution as well as concrete details about his final days.52 Some exaggerated his virtues in their intense reaction to his death; others were uniformly positive but nonetheless objective in their assessment. Biographical works also played an important role in transmitting the memory of Sa’adeh to the new generation. Thus, new generations of Lebanese had ready access to his saga and, by reading between the lines, could form their own opinions about him. More importantly, the derogatory opinions of Sa’adeh that many of the biographers themselves had valued gave way to occasional praises or kindheartedness. As a way of illustration: in the 1950s, the Syrian interrogator Sami Jama’ flanked Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj in defaming Sa’adeh’s name and legacy and persecuting his followers. Many years later, the image of Sa’adeh that he projected to both the nation and the world in his autobiography is one of a David defying the Goliath. Sa’adeh was now generally portrayed no longer as a villain but as a victim “of a long ordeal carefully planned by the Americans” and executed by local cronies.53 This was similar to the image projected by other biographers, but there is no evidence that the sympathy displayed after 1970 was part of a conscious strategy.

  Another major category of explanation is the collapse of the Lebanese confessional system in 1975. On the local level, consequently, Sa’adeh’s fortunes shot up and his execution once again served as a reminder of what was wrong with the system: on the one hand, it highlighted how cruel and inadequate the system had been; on the other, it underscored Sa’adeh’s veracity in challenging the system.54 The memory of Sa’adeh was again called upon by erudite Lebanese and secular organizations as political ferment increased. The sense of urgency was significant and reflected the perceived desire for radical solutions. It provided the ingredients to exalt and to revitalize the perception of Sa’adeh as a revolutionary as well as a patriot and martyr. Some resurrected the national transformational aspect of Sa’adeh. Others set about writing new tracts in accordance with his canons and in a manner calculated to accentuate his role and merits in challenging the system.55 Equally important was the way his followers performed during the long years of the war. Their aversion to confessional blood orgies and sturdy secular response to the conflict changed Lebanese perceptions of Sa’adeh and created renewed interest in his ideas. The party then was able to capitalize on popular memory to recast Sa’adeh as a victim of an unforgiving system.

  However, Sa’adeh’s legacy did not resonate with most Lebanese until after the June 1982 Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon south of Beirut. In the ensuing struggle between the occupiers and the fledging Lebanese resistance, Sa’adeh was invoked by his followers to cause a dramatic shift in the character of the struggle. Using his execution as a symbol of resistance, they instigated the elusive phenomenon of suicide bombings as an alternative form of guerilla warfare and as a secular rather than religious experiment. One after the other, young men and, for the first time, young women,56 appeared on pre-recorded video footages recalling Sa’adeh’s martyrdom and life struggle and urging others to follow in his footsteps. This placed Sa’adeh at the centre of attention not only in Lebanon but all over the Arab World and both at the governmental57 and intellectual levels. His legend, as a result, again became politically operative in memory and a new, heroic mystique developed around him which recognized more fully his revolutionary stature.

  More than any other factor, the “martyrdom operations” of the 1980s played a crucial part in sharpening local awareness of Sa’adeh as an active, self-conscious and enduring historical legacy.58 It provided another opportunity for some to begin to rethink how he should be remembered. A flood of new articles projected Sa’adeh as the precursor of wars of national liberation and accentuated an earlier trend that identified him with seminal names in the field of national struggle. Apol
ogist authors were more strongly outspoken about this than others. According to these writers, the fierce attacks that had been directed against Sa’adeh have come from those whose political or economic interests he had unrelentingly assailed. It is true that he was uncompromising towards them, they admitted, but this was only to further the cause of justice, not for his own gain. If Sa’adeh had fought the system, it was because it had failed to live up to its promises and obligations to the people. Occasionally, however, Sa’adeh’s admirers helped tarnish his true image almost as much as his enemies. This is mainly because many who wrote favorably of him were former followers or belonged to groups which believe that, by lauding Sa’adeh, they are advancing their own cause, and the reader is therefore inclined to discount what they say as exaggeration. Many writers on Sa’adeh did nothing but repeat uncritically what others have said without investigating the facts for themselves.

  But this was not the only way that the Sa’adeh cult changed. The tone of his commemorations picked up, his myth was emphasized as a valuable component of the resistance, and ideas about his political significance were elaborated and put into new theoretical framework. Sa’adeh was presented in books, journals and newspapers, in prose and poetry, in song, painting and sculpture, as a heroic figure on a par with similar extraordinary historical personalities. The Sa’adeh myth now was at a close look paradoxical. Next to being a leader and a teacher, he was also a heroic instrument of the people, of the renaissance, and of the nation. What is more, the virtues extolled in the refashioned myth – honor, fidelity, justice, earnestness, perseverance, temperance, chastity – and above all, courage and rugged simplicity, were vividly portrayed to keep Sa’adeh constantly in spiritual presence.

  Martyr or Traitor: The Official Viewpoint

  The martyr is common to every culture, and all societies are proud to acclaim the sacrifices of their heroes. However martyrdom as a concept is difficult to define, let alone distinguish from simple heroism or idiotic folly, because the awarding of the martyr’s crown lies as much in the eyes of the beholder as in the logic of a precise definition.59 As Lois G. Schwoerer has succinctly observed, “the line between martyr and traitor is very fine indeed, depending entirely on the viewpoint of the observer.”60 Schwoerer then sets down three interactive factors that go into the making of a martyr: (1) dying or enduring suffering with great courage on behalf of some cause or principle; (2) challenging a government that is powerful enough to execute or impose great hardship on its critics; and (3) the existence of individuals who survive the one who has died and who admire or love him, identify with his views, and strive, for personal, political, or altruistic reasons, to preserve his memory.61

  The one common denominator in all martyrdoms (the word stems from the Greek martur, meaning “to witness” or “to attest”) is that the martyr, in attesting to his or her faith, dies for a noble cause. Its antithesis says Klapp is treachery:

  Heroic deaths have two common themes: voluntary sacrifice for a cause and defeat by treachery. Frequently these two themes are combined, as when Roland, or Joan of Arc, is both betrayed and martyred. The martyrs are, of course, innumerable among the heroes, not only in the case of the Christian martyrs but in the familiar stories of Beowulf, Antigone, Njal, Cuchulain, Hereward the Wake, Benkei, Davy Crockett, and others. The martyred heroes usually die fighting for a cause against superior enemies or persecuted by a powerful tyrant.62

  Technically, Sa’adeh is a martyr by the standard definition of the term: he died nobly, fighting for a cause, betrayed by his friends and overwhelmed by his enemies. Moreover, Sa’adeh’s personality and character, his political role up to 1949, and his adherence to certain political and ideological principles were essential ingredients in making him a martyr. The term is also legitimately applicable to him since he did not escape when he easily could have, instead welcoming the chance to display his faith and fortitude.

  Yet in the eyes of the Lebanese establishment Sa’adeh was neither a patriot nor a hero but a traitor. The choice of the word traitor to describe Sa’adeh was made for clear political reasons. By using this word, successive Lebanese governments were able to deny the political and social nature of his rebellion in 1949 or that there was any legitimacy to Sa’adeh’s cause, making him a criminal instead. The tempo was set by the Khoury regime, which sought to project Sa’adeh as a politically insignificant figure and dismissed his uprising as a social deviance. Successor regimes, though more prudent in their judgment of Sa’adeh, never varied much from this initial official characterization. There have been occasions on which Lebanese politicians have partaken in public commemorations of Sa’adeh, but the Lebanese establishment has, on the whole, resisted any move to recognize him as a martyr.

  In one respect this is quite an understandable position. Sa’adeh’s elevation to the status of official martyr requires a whole new trial or a state decree overturning the original verdict. This is neither novel nor impossible. History offers many examples whereby individuals have been rehabilitated and then elevated to national stature: Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua is one example;63 Emiliano Zapata in Mexico is another.64 Figures who dared to challenge the institution of colonialism have also been recognized for their struggle. So in that respect, the scope is ample. The problem, however, is that Sa’adeh’s rehabilitation, let alone his elevation to hero status, requires a major policy reversal on the part of the Lebanese State and condemnation of the political apparatus that killed him. Exploration of such an option would need to be sensitive to the diversities of local communities and their forms of political representation. Moreover, the invocation of Sa’adeh requires the projection of an alternative identity which the Lebanese state is neither prepared for, nor has the desire to adopt.

  Whether Sa’adeh has or has not the right to the martyr’s aureole is not all that is at stake. It is chiefly because of the broader historical implications that the subject is tricky; for this question bears upon the historical memory of the social groups in Lebanon and their own hero perceptions and myth-making. Venerating Sa’adeh under the present system has the potential to trigger a number of problems for which the Lebanese state is clearly unprepared: (1) it may open the floodgates for the veneration of numerous individuals who are perceived as heroes within their own constituencies or confessional milieus but not by society at large; (2) it could, by extension, create deep schisms among the groups and between the groups and the State; and (3) it would place the State at the receiving end of powerful groups who might feel offended by Sa’adeh’s veneration. Moreover, turning Sa’adeh into a martyr of the state is politically explosive. It attests to an unconscious admission of guilt as well as an acknowledgement that Sa’adeh died for ideals and convictions and not as a common criminal. It is an act of self-condemnation, a direct attack against the state’s legitimacy. Nothing would give greater credence to the truth of Sa’adeh’s message than the spectacle of commemoration. In any event, recognizing Sa’adeh as a martyr demands a spectacular demonstration of national unity which is almost impossible in as divided a state as Lebanon.

  Another cause for Lebanese State reluctance to embrace Sa’adeh is discomfiture. Consider the task facing the creators of an official textbook about Sa’adeh. The facts of Sa’adeh’s career must be strung together in a narrative that is politically acceptable, coherent, and consistent with the larger textbook narrative of Lebanese history presented by the text. The facts (as they might have appeared to an official historian) include the following: Sa’adeh was the charismatic leader of a disciplined party. He and his followers sought the reunification of Lebanon with the rest of Syria because he felt that unification was healthier than division. Sa’adeh rose against the sectarian Khoury regime in support of a secular regime and fought to overturn the political system because it was corrupt and dysfunctional. He issued a complete national plan calling for sweeping reform. He gave his life in the struggle. From the point of view of a political system that bases its claim to legitimacy on a delicate form
ula of sectarian co-existence rather than real national unity, these are potentially inconvenient facts. They negate a compelling historical narrative that has persisted for decades. The creators of Lebanese history texts face an especially problematic task in interpreting the 1949 uprising and Sa’adeh’s role in the struggle.

  In recent years, official attitudes towards Sa’adeh have mellowed considerably, due in part to the integration of the SSNP into the Lebanese political system. Constant civil and political instability since 1950 have also played a crucial role in reshaping state perceptions of Sa’adeh. While right-wing detractors have continued to spin narratives of a power-drunk Sa’adeh, the changing political realities of regional and national politics fostered a grudgingly amiable view of Sa’adeh inside the Lebanese State, especially from critics frustrated with the system. Moreover, the moral resilience of his followers during the civil war and in the post-1982 national resistance endowed Sa’adeh’s image with unusual vitality even at the top echelons of the state. One of the main ways in which that vitality was honored was by the participation of state officials in the ceremonies of commemoration held on the anniversary of Sa’adeh’s execution. Year after year the ceremonies were attended by representatives of national, local (qada’) and municipal governments from around the country, as well as the Lebanese military and other branches of the armed forces. In keeping with tradition, the President and Prime Minister of the republic do not attend but send delegates, often cabinet members, to represent them or to speak on their behalf.