Hundred Days : The Campaign That Ended World War I (9780465074907)
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Cambrai–Saint-Quentin line crucial 175
Crown Prince Rupprecht comments on fighting 193
falls on 9 October 208, 212, 214
few tourists now xxxiii
Gouzeaucourt repeatedly fought over xxv–xxvi
great British objective 95, 135
Haig comments on remarkable progress since 32–3
heavy British attacks around 177
and the Hindenburg Line 144, 170
remained in German hands on 3 October 194
trucks commandeered 55
Cameron, Major-General George 153
Camp, R. H. 231
Canadian Corps
in action on outskirts of Valenciennes 242
at Amiens 31, 36–7
and the Drocourt–Quéant Line 95, 98–101
exhausted after breach of Hindenburg Line 188
fighting at Framerville 53
four miles inside the German lines 49
and German destruction 263
only 420 casualties at Mont Houy 243
plan to cross Canal du Nord 168
DIVISIONS
1st 56, 101, 230–31
2nd xxix, 56, 266
3rd 56, 208
4th 52, 60–61, 169
BRIGADES
11th 55
REGIMENTS
5th Mounted Rifles 37, 210
BATTALIONS
10th 44
18th 54–5
28th 266
47th 232
Canal du Nord
attack across 169–71
British decide to take advantage of 144
Currie’s forces placed here 167–8
heavy British attacks around 177
Thomas Cotterill killed at xxix–xxx
Carignan-Mézières rail link 152
Carlepont 57
Carlowitz, General von 175
Carpenter, Lieutenant William 121
Central Powers 141–2, 226
Champagne fever see Flanders fever
Charleroi 238
Charleville 237
Charlton, Captain A. H. 186
Château de Bombon 24, 29–30, 62–3, 95, 141
Château de la Fraineuse 180
Château-Thierry 2, 25, 115
Chaulnes 56
Chauny 74
Chemin des Dames 14
Chenu, Lieutenant Charles 3–6, 119
Cheppy 160
Chipilly 30, 39
Chipilly–Rosières–Roye line 57
chlorine gas 102
Churchill, Winston 191
Clark, Brigadier-General J. A. 64–5
Clarke, Miss C. W. 159–60
Claudel, Major-General Henri 206
Clausewitz, Carl Philipp von 61
Clemenceau, Georges
brings back Mangin 75
conference on 16 October 216
description 20
Foch hands him Armistice conditions 270
Foch to provide report on military terms of armistice 226, 228
furious pronouncements of 14
visit to Montfaucon 166
and Wilson’s Fourteen Points 200
Colt, Lieutenant-Colonel 81
Comines 213, 221
Composite Army C 128, 148
Congressional Medal of Honor 120
Cook, Tim 102
Corbie (Somme) 134
Cotterill, Florence xxx
Cotterill, George Thomas xxvi–xxviii, xxx, xxxiii, 80, 172, 293n.4
counter-battery fire 102, 105
Courcelles 80
Cox, Bertram Howard 48
Crown Council meeting 72–4
Crozat canal 57
Crutchley, Corporal 186
‘culminating point’ 61
Currie, Sir Arthur
agreed to mount operation to secure Mont Houy 242–3
and Andrew McNaughton 35
breaks through Drocourt–Quéant Line 98–100
Canadian troops exhausted 189
deception plan worked perfectly 54
description of 31–2
and fall of Cambrai 208
and the front 61, 64–5, 167–8, 170, 230–31
‘neglect nothing’ policy 31–2, 243
petitioned for earlier date of attack 41
Curtis, W. E. 44
Cuts 74
cyanosis 19
Dallas, Gregor xxxi
‘Dead Man’s Corner’ 174
Debeney, General Eugène
attack on Montdidier 47
battle at Amiens 40
came to prominence under Pétain 77
captures Hangest and gains ground 59
convinced of the need to desist 66
feeling increasingly queasy 65
First Army criticized for hanging back 210–11
First Army gained sixteen kilometres of ground 265
forces did not attack on 29 September 191
forces moved up 77
and the Hindenburg Line 144
noble fatalism of 78–9
northern offensive 138
ordered by Foch to capture Roye 63
ordered to postpone attacks 67
sent two tank battalions 33
temporarily under orders of Haig 29–30
‘deep penetration’ 63
Degelow, Major Carl 93–4, 176–7, 264
Demicourt-Graincourt road 171
Department of War Neurosis, Bonn 111
desertion 9–10, 245
Distinguished Service Order xxix
Division Aérienne 36, 40
Dixon, Lieutenant R. G. 118–19, 228
Dominion corps 31–2
Douai 99, 220
‘doughboys’ 120–21
Doullens Town Hall 21
Downing, Sergeant Walter 49, 86
Drews, Dr 239–40
Drocourt–Quéant Line 95, 99–101, 143, 167
Drum, Hugh 154, 160–61
dug-outs 184
Duncan, G. S. 23
Dunkirk 25
Durrant, Colonel J. 85
Ebert, Friedrich 266, 274, 330n.7
Edwards, Major P. C. 174
electro-shock therapy 111–12
Elles, Hugh 38, 56
Elser, Sergeant 222
Erzberger, Matthias 252–5, 266
Étain 155
Éterpigny 107
Faulkner, Corporal Frank 1
Fayolle, General
came to prominence under Pétain 77
crushing blow to the German right flank 6
no question of giving Mangin everything 76
Fifth Army (Germany)
at the front Apremon–Metz 128
censor reported morale relatively bad 205
could muster only 190,000 men 151
could no longer maintain sustainable resistance 238
heavy losses at Argonne 162
Marwitz in command 149, 152, 242
to fall back to Hirson–Mézières line 238
First Meuse–Argonne cessation 204
Flanders
attack on the Mount Kemmel sector 37
front held by German Fourth Army 176
German Army position crumbled/collapsed on 28 September 176–8
German reserves there at their thinnest 175
Ludendorff’s Operation Hagen 14–15
Flanders fever 92
Foch, General Ferdinand
Armistice negotiations 252–5
attack towards Cambrai 167
character of 20–22
Clemenceau complains about Montfaucon 166
concerned about Allies crossing Hindenburg Line 180
concerned that OHL might sanction pre-emptive withdrawal 63
decision to limit Saint-Mihiel operation 137–8
discussions with Haig 66, 191, 207, 226–7
exhausting night drawing up Armistice 266
hated by Ludendorff 178–9
headquarters of 24
inspected A
merican sector with Weygand/Pershing 140
left Rethondes for Paris on 11 November 270
looked favourably on what had been achieved 94
made Marshal of France 62
meeting at Senlis of Allied Commanders-in-Chief on 27 October 226–8, 323n.28
meeting with three Allied commanders 139
ordered Debeney to capture Saint-Quentin 191
and Pershing 131, 136–7
preferred US forces under French command 128
Prince Max blames him for Wilson’s demands 218
‘series of movements’ plan 25–7, 29–30
sought to extend battle line further 95–6
talk with Colonel House 278
urged an attack on Chaulnes–Roye front 67
urged Pétain to grip his commanders 77
wanted to capture road junctions near Roye 64
working practices of 62–3
Foch, Germain 21
Fokker DVII aircraft 94
Foot, R. C. 81–3, 105–6
‘Forester’s House’ 248
Forêt de Nieppe xxix
Fort Gironville 129
Foster, Arthur James 100
Fourteen Points (Wilson) 198–202, 223, 252
Fourth Army (Germany)
held front in Flanders 176
ordered to fall back from Lys 99
troops to Amiens 60
Framerville 53–4, 182
France
cooperation/coordination with UK 21–2
dreaded Americans dictating a peace 217
expectations from Americans 121
final days xxxiii
and the German Spring Offensive xxxi, 294n.10
Marne losses 18
number of guns at Armistice 33
rapid increase in US manpower in 118
Rheims victory 2
shied away from occupation of Germany 278
superior aircraft production 35–6
warm initial perspective on US troops 119
see also Allies; French Army; and various army entries
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke xxvii
French 15th Colonial Division 131
French Army
active front length narrowed dramatically by last weeks of war 241
and Amiens 29
approaching total exhaustion at the Armistice 275, 277
destined to stay in centre to cover Paris 127
facing devastated countryside in final weeks of August 1918 78
guns in the Amiens sector 35
Haig worried about the exhausted state of 227
harrying the retreating German armies 207
majority supported armistice discussions 211–12
Mangin’s aggression/confidence not welcomed 76
morale rose ‘like mercury’ as advance continued 100
old-fashioned methods disliked by Pershing 124–5
only two tank battalions 33
operations 8–29 August cost 100,000
casualties 95
relied heavily on their guns 83–4
to push forward, past River Aisne 95
tough resistance on northern coast of Greece 142
wasteful tactics dispensed with 75
worn out after four years of war 26
see also Allies; France; and various army entries
ARMIES
First
aiming for the town of La Capelle 247
and Amiens 29–30, 47
criticized for hanging back 210–11
did not attack on 29 September 1918
encircled Montdidier 59
gained sixteen kilometres of ground 265
‘hanging back’ accusations 191
marched into the village of Guise 250, 327n.43
mounts major operations 17–24 October 228
nearly 15,000 casualties during October 211
objective of Stenay–Le Chesne–Attigny–Rethel 153
Second 151
Third 63
Fourth
assistance to US Army at Argonne forest 153–4, 156
impressively big, consisting of seven corps 154–5
on the march for twenty-five nights in late October 229
Pétain complains about lack of progress 191–2
ready to go deep into German flank on 25 September 149
to mount an attack west of the Meuse 137
Fifth 145
Sixth 6, 75
Tenth
faced largest German Army Group 145
and Hellé 23
Mangin pleased with achievements of 76
Operation Marneschutz-Reims 3
CORPS
IX 38
X 65
XVII 206
XX 3
XXXI 40, 47, 49
XXXV 65
DIVISIONS
1st Moroccan 3
154th 229
Frisby, Captain Cyril 171, 231
Fuchs, General-Leutnant Georg 128, 148
Gallwitz, Max von
Army Groups of 145–6
counter-attacks at Argonne 161
did not replace Ludendorff 236–8
initially sceptical about US troops 150–51, 313n.2
and Saint-Mihiel salient 128–9, 131–2
saw Marwitz 10 November 264
gas 102–6, 173, 181, 191
George V, King 187
German Air Force
on its knees by 30 October 264
limitations of 175
outflanked by RAF 93
see also air power
German Armistice Commission 252–3, 261
German Army
across the Canal du Nord 99
acute shortage of horses 109
Aisne attack another disaster 74
Allies shared a common goal of breaking 200
Amiens a unique experience/greatest defeat 35, 49–50, 54, 61, 70–71
approaching defeat on a grand scale 242–6, 326n.29
at long last seemed to be breaking apart 67
battalion field strength poor by end of War 146
commanders concerned about morale at Argonne 162
continuation of fight would have been disastrous 276
crumbling 73, 88
decreasing quality of recruits being drafted into 111
defences worn out by late October 222, 230, 241
despair, depression and fear on 11 November 266
in disarray, but benefited from falling back 86
divided into five Groups in the west 145
divisions back to last defensive positions in October 214
endurance of shellfire worst thing 110
experience of retreat tough 212
Foch believed they would break 63
gradual fall-back through Somme sector 87
had limited, dwindling number of tenacious units 175
and Haig 24
harrowing day of Allied attacks on 27 September 174
headquarters repeatedly moved back 108
and the Hindenburg Line 95, 143
imaginative and ingenious booby-traps of 210
increasingly experienced horror of mustard gas 106
long winter campaign expected in August 1918 79
Ludendorff’s resignation meets mixed feelings 235
makes its way home 274–5, 330n.7
morale of 89, 91–3
needed to regroup 113
news of retreat spread quickly 97
nothing but chaos, disorganization, shellfire and fighting 192
position in Flanders crumbled with alarming speed 176
proclamation issued to on 24 October 225
relied upon a system of defence in depth 132
retreat caused Allied logistic problem 106
and Saint-Mihiel salient 129–31
Saint-Quentin left in flames 208–9
speculation of retreat as far as Rhine 139
strain of Marne fighting 7, 9
suffering fr
om Allied air attacks 93
tactical changes 32
unease and confusion on 9 August 57
units desperately tried to hold Saint-Quentin Canal 183
US understands why not defeated 115
withdrawal from exposed lines advocated 11
see also Germany; German Supreme Command (OHL); Western Front
ARMIES
Second
at Hattencourt 58
continually engaged, suffered heavy losses 148
counted over 120 bombs fallen in Cambrai 93
defeat due to enemy tanks/exhaustion 50, 69
devastating beginning to Amiens battle 44–5, 54
fought well but removed from the canal 187
issued October message, peace would bring worse devastation 245–6
local counter-attacks on 9 September 57
Marwitz removed from command on 22 September 148–9
not in best of condition 38–40
occupied line of the Sambre–Oise canal 247
only three divisions completely fit for action 175
retreat of led to outflanking of Eighteenth Army 70
retreat to the Hindenburg Line 99
Third 128
Sixth
all peaceful on 3 October 194
ordered to fall back from Lys 99
troops to Amiens 60
Ninth
Army Group to withdraw and link up with 57
Chief of Staff changed three times 113
not yet engaged at Amiens 70
retreat to the Hindenburg Line 99
withdrawal of the right wing of 74
Seventeenth
all peaceful on 3 October 194
beginning to fall back 67
occupied line of the Sambre–Oise canal 247
plan for three corps to push forward against 79
retreat to the Hindenburg Line 97, 99
troops to Amiens 60
Eighteenth
at Hattencourt 58
division sent northwards 50
Fourth French Army on heels of 211
measures to preserve strength 57
occupied line of Sambre–Oise canal 247
only one division completely fit for action 175
reaches outskirts of Roye 59
reported exhaustion in divisions 193
retreat to the Hindenburg Line 99
Second Army’s retreat led to outflanking of 70
staggering casualties 54
strengthened by three divisions 60
corps
51st 187
I Bavarian 182
IV Reserve 187
XIV Reserve 147
DIVISIONS
1st Guard Reserve 99
1st Guards 163
2nd Guard Reserve 88, 99
2nd Guards 146
2nd Landwehr 161–2
3rd Guards 162–3
3rd Naval 175
4th Bavarian 88
5th Bavarian Reserve 161
6th Cavalry 175, 192
10th 129
14th Bavarian 47
21st Reserve 245
26th Reserve 174–5
27th Württemberg 39
34th 192
37th 161
41st 39, 50, 52, 54