John Carter and the Gods of Hollywood

by Sellers, Michael D.

  For a first time director, this was an unusually “friendly” arrangement -- meaning that the producers were handpicked by the director who would look to them to enable the production. There was no “studio cop” in the equation, reflecting Cook’s decision to accommodate and enable the production rather than try to tightly control it. It was an all-Pixar team, except for Wilson, and although it was not released as “the first Pixar live action film” it was largely produced as such.

  The script that Stanton wanted to shoot contained plenty of production value elements -- aerial battle, action set pieces -- that are traditionally associated with driving a budget higher, but more than any of these elements, it was the huge amount of screen time occupied by the 3D Thark characters -- Burroughs’ fifteen foot high (reduced to twelve in the movie), six limbed green Martians -- that was the budget buster. Stanton intended to accomplish the Tharks using 3D motion capture techniques much as James Cameron had used to film the “Na’vi” in Avatar -- but in the case of John Carter, the “Thark screen time” was greater, and almost all the scenes involved combining humans and Tharks in the same frame, something that only rarely occurred in Avatar. Achieving a Pixar level of characterization for the Tharks--as well as all the other CGI required for the film -- was the main factor driving the budget and when Morris came back to Stanton with a budget, it was substantially higher than Cook’s target.

  The hard reality was that the film as envisioned by Stanton included more animated shots than either Wall-E or Finding Nemo — and that was just the animation. While Finding Nemo had cost a relatively modest $94M, Wall-E had ended up as a $180M production investment -- and so with more animation shots than either of these films, plus a full complement of live action material, Morris, Collins, and Stanton came to the conclusion that there was no reasonable way to shoot this script and contain the budget within the $150-175M range.

  Was consideration given to rewriting the script in such a way as to reduce the budget? There is no indication that such a course of action was ever considered. Should it have been? With the benefit of hindsight, seeing the difference in outcomes of John Carter and Prometheus, the question lingers -- what would have happened if a concerted effort to contain the budget at a maximum of $200M had been made?

  As it was, the decision made by producing team was that the budget needed to be defended, not reduced. The film, at a cost of around $250M, was only 30% higher than Wall-E and obviously consisted of an infinitely larger and more complicated production scenario. Plus no one was getting paid exorbitantly: It was the cost of an army of 3D visual effects artists and animators working for three years, coupled with the wind and grind of a large scale live action shoot, that drove the budget to $250M.

  And so it was that the producers went back to the studio with budget in hand and basically said this is what it will take — we can’t make the movie you hired Andrew to make with anything less.

  Cook could have drilled down into the budget to figure out what was driving the budget so high, and required rewrites to bring it down, but there are no indications that this happened. If Stanton could hit Wall-E numbers or, better yet, Nemo numbers, the budget wasn’t a problem.

  Was the timing of the budget decision a factor in Cook’s willingness to go along with the higher budget, no-name cast formulation?

  All indications are that the budget decisions took place after May, 2009, which marked a watershed in Cook’s relationship with Disney CEO Bob Iger, with Iger openly criticizing Cook on the conference call announcing the Q2 financials.79 The months after that watershed were the months in which John Carter budget and casting decisions were being made -- and they were also, as it would turn out, the final months of Cook’s tenure as studio chief. Did the likely knowledge that he was on his way out affect Cook’s decision-making regarding John Carter?

  Whatever the reasons, one key element in Cook’s legacy was that Stanton was allowed to cast two relative unknowns in the lead roles of John Carter; and he was allowed budget “breakage” prior to the start of filming that took the agreed upon budget all the way up to $250M, putting John Carter on a par with the most expensive films ever made.

  As with the decision to acquire the property in the first place, it seems likely that the Disney-Pixar relationship entered into Cook’s analysis. In a sense, Disney owed Pixar one —the animation studio had certainly brought in Disney infinitely more rewards than the “budget gap” that was now under consideration.

  After the casting of Kitsch and Collins was announced on June 12, 2009, the next casting decisions came in quick succession. On June 14 Thomas Haden Church was announced; then on July19th came the announcement that Willem Dafoe would play Tars Tarkas, John Carter’s Thark ally. Meanwhile a start date of November 2009 was announced. On September 6, Disney announced Samantha Morton as Sola, Dominic West as Sab Than, and Polly Walker as Sarkoja.

  The start date was then moved to January 4th, 2010.

  JCOM was heading into production with a budget of $250M that envisioned a 100 day principal photography shoot, and 6 days of reshoots. Disney did not announce the budget, and in fact it would not be until August 2011, more than a year after principal photography was complete, that anyone from Disney would speak of the budget having reached $250M -- but it reached that point in pre-production, as part of the production plan drafted by Morris and approved by Cook.

  Shakeup at Team Disney

  On May 5, 2009, on the heels of a quarter that had included the release of Confessions of a Shopoholic, Race to Witch Mountain, and The Jonas Brothers: 3D Concert, Bob Iger took the microphone at the quarterly conference call with Disney investors and analysts and began with a startling slap at Studio Chief Dick Cook: “Our second quarter performance reflected the weak global economy, as well as disappointing results at our movie studio.”80 The criticism of Cook was a break from protocol, and he reiterated it slightly later in his presentation: “Studio performance was disappointing, something they would be the first to admit.”

  Iger’s presentation contained other indications that change was in the wind: “As we look ahead, we see a blend of new and traditional media and business models utilizing both established and new distribution marketing and platforms. The movie theater isn’t going away. Neither is broadcast television, but the same can also be said of new media. It isn’t going away and we expect it to grow in size and significance to people’s lives. For that reason, we absolutely must be where our consumers are going.”

  In the conference call, Iger established two critical narratives: First, that Cook’s choices were subject to open questioning, not just within the halls of Disney Studios, but publicly by the highest officer of the Disney parent corporation, and second, that new media was here to stay and learning to deal with it effectively was a top priority for the company and the studio division.

  What Iger didn’t mention in the conference call was that he was closing in on the completion of a deal to acquire Marvel -- an acquisition that would have profound implications for ‘boy franchise’ starter John Carter of Mars. Three months later in August 2009, Disney announced the acquisition of Marvel with Iger emphasizing that the acquisition gave Disney “5,000 characters.” In reporting the acquisition, Brooks Barnes writing in the New York Times note: “The brooding Marvel characters tend to be more popular with boys — an area where Disney could use help.” Barnes also noted, ominously for John Carter of Mars: “As Disney’s film division becomes suddenly crowded, the company may find its new partnerships bumping into one another.”81

  Barnes was exactly right. Cook, as the conference call had foreshadowed, was history and his selected vehicle for achieving a “boy franchise’ -- John Carter of Mars -- was about to be swamped in the Marvel tsunami. The Marvel deal had been a major focus of Iger’s attention, and now that it was done -- it was only a matter of time for Cook, and by extension, John Carter of Mars. After all, Marvel characters had a large, active, existing fan base that went to movies, while the John Carter existin
g fan base following was limited for the most part to the boomer contingent that included George Lucas and James Cameron who, like the boomer fans, had become followers of the Mars novels during the Burroughs reboot in the 1960′s and 70′s when paperback versions of Burroughs’ books were widely available.

  A little more than a month later, on September 19, 2009, it was over. According to some sources the end came without warning, Cook was called into a meeting with Iger and told that his services were no longer needed — that the studio “wanted to go in a different direction.” Other sources claim that Cook did in fact know the end was coming; that he was given an opportunity to chart a course more in line with Iger’s vision and opted not to – even choosing the date of his departure.82 Either way, after 38 years at Disney, Cook was gone, and John Carter was suddenly and completely an orphan.

  Weeks later, in October 2009, Rich Ross, head of global operations for the Disney Channel and thus a consummate Disney insider who had Iger’s trust based on the exemplary performance of the TV unit, took over as Chairman of Disney Studios with a mandate to apply the lessons learned from his global TV operation to the Studio and drag Disney Studios operations, kicking and screaming if necessary, into the 21st century.

  Ross, who was 46 at the time he took over as Studio Chief, was a curious choice for the studio chief position. Lanky, with a smile that brought comparisons to the iconic Disney character Goofy, Ross had been immensely successful as the head of Disney’s global TV operations, overseeing worldwide hits such as Hannah Montana, That’s So Raven, and Lizzie Mcguire, causing Jacques Steinberg to write in the New York Times that Ross had an uncanny ability to encase “old fashioned themes in a modern sensibility” that resonated worldwide. He also had demonstrated what the Times called a “shrewd ability to coordinate different parts of the Disney machine, from radio stations to Disney-branded magazines to Web sites, and his uncanny connection to young people’s sensibilities.”83

  Ross promptly fired more than a dozen senior staff including the heads of production, marketing, and distribution, as well as the head of Miramax. The heads of physical production and casting were also let go, as was the president of the Disney Studios Motion Picture Group. Of particular significance was the brand solidification behind Disney as the “family” brand and phasing out the more adult brands Touchstone, and Buena Vista. This would prove significant for John Carter of Mars.

  From the perspective of insider Hollywood, Ross had one huge negative in the view of most observers: He was a “TV guy” with no hands on experience in either picking a slate of movies, or bringing them to the marketplace. Clearly Disney CEO Robert Iger felt that the success in television programming would transfer over to developing a slate of movies that matched Disney’s aesthetic, and successfully appealed to Disney’s market, but the jury was out as to whether his experience in TV could be transferred to the peculiar discipline of motion picture marketing.

  One thing for sure was that Ross understood the role of the studio in the larger Disney scheme. It had been many years since the studio was the most profitable of Disney divisions -- but it had the distinction of being the intellectual property “wave-maker” -- with hit properties having the capability to quickly generate demand for everything from sequels to merchandise, products, soundtracks, games, digital devices, theme parks, cruise lines, stage adaptations, and more.

  From Ross’s perspective JCOM came with many red warning flags attached to it. At $250M it was very pricey; it didn’t have a built-in fan base sufficient to justify such a budget; and it was a distraction from what at that point seemed a far more promising set of properties — the Marvel collection, and the Pixar portfolio. Had Marvel been in the fold in early 2007 when Cook acquired the rights to A Princess of Mars, it is highly unlikely that such a green light would ever have been given.

  Iger himself was negative about JCOM and let Ross know it. He openly criticized Cook’s decision to green light, and the decision to let the budget increase to $250M, and made it clear to Ross that the JCOM production was more of a problem to be addressed, than an opportunity to be realized.

  Andrew Stanton, continuing with his prep for the movie’s start of principal photography in January, waited for the shoe to drop with a shutdown of the production. "I thought, 'Are we gonna lose the green light?' In the very beginning I assumed it would be like that, cause who's gonna give me the keys to a Ferrari if I've never driven before?"84

  But the project was all but mounted. It was scheduled to begin shooting in January; all the principal cast had been signed; all contracts with major suppliers had been set. Above all -- and this was, in the end, what carried the day and caused Iger and Ross to allow JCOM to proceed -- was that John Carter of Mars, even though it wasn’t officially a Pixar project, was in fact a “Pixar baby” -- a passion project of Andrew Stanton who was supported and believed to be “owed the opportunity” by Pixar chief John Lasseter.

  The decision was made. JCOM would be allowed to go forward.

  Decision: Half Measures in Marketing

  A second decision was also made which all but sealed the fate of the film. JCOM and Stanton would be offered full production support in the form of the necessary financing to complete the movie, but -- and this was a huge ‘but’ -- JCOM, a film that was “too big to fail” due to its enormous budget, would be allowed to do just that. Marketing support would be limited to that afforded a “normal” release; there would be no major push to obtain the merchandising, licensing, and co-promotion deals that would normally be deployed to create the kind of “event” atmosphere that a film at the highest level of budget ever seen in Hollywood would need.

  Production financing, yes.

  All-out marketing support? No so much.

  Recipe for disaster? You bet.

  Meanwhile, Ross promptly put on ice the next tentpole project in the pipeline approved by Cook -- “Captain Nemo: 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea.” Nemo was scheduled for a February production start. Disney’s announcement went to pains to state that “event pics like 20,000 Leagues, John Carter of Mars and Tron” were still a priority under new chief Rich Ross.

  Through the remainder of the fall and into the first quarter of 2010 Ross worked to put in place a team whom he felt would respond to his vision and be able to implement the mandate to shake things up in the film division.

  One of his first hires was Sean Bailey, producer of Tron: Legacy, to take over as head of production, a role that would make Bailey responsible for overseeing the production of John Carter of Mars. Commenting on the appointment, the L.A. Times noted: "Bailey, who has no experience as a studio executive, faces a steep learning curve in assembling slates of movies and managing dozens of executives and filmmakers."85

  Bailey came on board in January 2010, the same month that JCOM began principal photography. Bailey was a young producer with no experience as a studio executive. He had been slated to be the producer of the canceled Captain Nemo as well as Tron Legacy, and it had been a smart, hi-tech presentation he had made to Ross concerning that movie that had caught Ross’s eye and ultimately resulted in the appointment. Bailey would not, however, take a hands-on involvement in the production of John Carter; rather he would delegate that primarily to production executive Brigham Taylor, who had been on the project since inception.

  A key position that was unfilled as of January 2010 was the head of marketing job. Ross made it clear from the outset that, although he would interview some industry insiders for the job, his preference--supported by Iger--was to look outside the pool of Hollywood veterans .

  The Search for a Marketing Chief

  In Hollywood, veteran marketers who specialize in theatrical movie marketing consider themselves to be a unique breed, and are skeptical of the idea that an outsider can prosper in their universe. History supports their view: In the 1990’s, both Disney and Warner Brothers experimented by hiring an outsider to head their marketing divisions. For Disney, the choice was Burger King’s John Ciwnyski, while
for WB it was Brad Ball of Macdonalds. Neither proved to be a good fit for the unique discipline of movie marketing, and neither lasted long.

  The challenge of movie marketing is singular: Typically in the “normal” world of marketing, brands are built over a number of years, with multiple campaigns, attempted, some of which work better than others, and with the marketers having the ability to engage in a certain degree of trial and error to find the best way to grab an audience and get them to try the product. Not so with movie marketing. Movie marketers only get one shot to develop a globally recognized brand name that, in a matter of weeks, goes from being unheard of by the vast majority of the general public, to a must-see event that with a call to action” has extremely high requirement -- a requirement that the target audience not only get up off the couch and go stand in line to spend $10 or more to watch the movie -- it has to get them to do this on precisely the same weekend -- the opening weekend when a movie earns as much as 40% of its total and defines itself as either a hit or a flop. With movie marketing, there are no second chances, and course corrections have to be deft and quickly handled. Virtually no other marketing discipline features this type of pressure to orchestrate all elements of a campaign according to a schedule with a single end point that is both daunting and unforgiving.

  Disney CEO Robert Iger was fully aware of the unique demands of theatrical film marketing, and of the history of failure of bringing in outsiders, but in 2009 when he appointed Rich Ross as studio chief he made clear that he expected Ross to shake things up in the movie marketing arena, where Iger believed that the studio had been out of synch with a film business that was rapidly evolving towards a global digital future. Iger didn’t buy the argument that only “movie guys” could crack the code of movie marketing, and he was against the idea of continuing to draw from a pool of entrenched insiders at a time when rapid change through digitalization and global reach was changing the landscape.