Half-Life: The Divided Life of Bruno Pontecorvo, Physicist or Spy

by Close, Frank

  44. Joseph Albright e-mail, September 17, 2012; Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 134.

  45. Joan Hall interview, January 25, 2013; Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 191.

  46. There is speculation that Hall may have been involved in some activity from 1948 to 1950 (Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 189–192). The possibility that Hall met Lona Cohen again, in February 1950, is discussed in Bombshell, p. 221. The 1949 meeting between the Halls and the Cohens took place in New York’s Central Park, according to Morris Cohen in Bombshell, p. 200. The possibility that there were two meetings between Ted Hall and one or more of the Cohens in 1949 is also mentioned there. This could be consistent with Joan Hall’s recollection that the four of them met in a park in New York, but “not Central Park” (Joan Hall interviews, January 25, 2013, and May 1, 2013).

  47. Interview reported in Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 134; Joseph Albright e-mails, September–December 2012.

  48. Krasnikov family archive, 1993, quoted in Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 134; I confirmed this with Joseph Albright via e-mail communications, from September to December 2012. There is some uncertainty about when Cohen’s uranium odyssey occurred. One account (that of V. N. Karpov, as related in Bombshell, p. 134) places it in “late 1944 or 1945.” If this is correct, then it is possible that Lona could have overlapped with Bruno Pontecorvo before the Gouzenko debacle. This scenario would imply that he too had obtained uranium from Chicago, as none was being produced in Canada until much later. However, the dates do not fit with other accounts, which state that Cohen was not reactivated until mid-January 1945. On balance it seems more likely that the uranium originated from Canada in 1948.

  49. T. M. Samolis, ed., Veterany vneshnei razvyedki Rossii: Kratkiye biograficheskiye spravochniki [Veterans of Russian Foreign Intelligence: Short Biographical Summaries] (Moscow: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, 1995), as reported in Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 134.

  CHAPTER 10

  1. The British security files on Pontecorvo show that the authorities were always nervous about his alien background, notwithstanding the fact that he had adopted British nationality. Klaus Fuchs was already under surveillance when, on October 19, 1949, Max Born of the University of Edinburgh wrote to him, encouraging him to send “one of your men” (Pontecorvo) to attend a physics conference in the city in November. Born wanted Bruno to speak about his research on cosmic rays. This was open research with no significance for national security, but MI5 nonetheless made a note in Bruno’s security file because the invitation had come via Fuchs (19b in TNA KV 2/1887). It is ironic therefore that after Bruno and his family disappeared behind the Iron Curtain in 1950, the version of events put out for public consumption was that Pontecorvo had no relationship with Fuchs at all. Additional note to readers: All quotes in this chapter come from file KV 2/1887 in the National Archives unless stated otherwise.

  2. TNA KV 4/282.

  3. TNA KV 2/1888.

  4. Segrè was not in Paris during Pontecorvo’s residency, nor was he on the ship Quanza, as he was based at Berkeley in 1940. He was based in Palermo in 1937, and visited Copenhagen and Germany, but there is no record that he visited Paris or met Pontecorvo anywhere. He immigrated to the United States in June 1938. See Segrè, A Mind Always in Motion.

  5. TNA KV 2/1888.

  6. AN FBI report recorded by MI5 in TNA KV 2/1888, memo 97a: “Bruno Pontecorvo’s sister Giuliana lived at 1839 Wallace Ave Bronx. At 1845 Giuseppe Berti lived—alleged comintern agent and Italian Communist leader.”

  7. Klaus Fuchs files, TNA KV 2/1248–1250.

  8. Copy of invitation in Bruno Pontecorvo files, CAC.

  9. TNA KV 2/1889 and AB 6/635; Turchetti, The Pontecorvo Affair, p. 108.

  10. This news may be what stimulated Harwell to send all employees a questionnaire about their families. The advertised reason was the arrest of Fuchs. In turn, this enabled Arnold to talk with Pontecorvo without raising any suspicion. Michael Goodman interview, October 7, 2013.

  11. Godfrey Stafford interview, December 20, 2012.

  12. Lorna Arnold interview, January 4, 2013.

  13. TNA KV 2/1887, memo 20 and 20a.

  14. TNA KV 2/1887, memo 21a.

  15. Other documents point to the source as being an MI6 representative in the British embassy in Stockholm.

  16. TNA KV 2/1887, memo 26a.

  17. This suggests either some misunderstanding by Arnold, relating to the events of 1946, when Bruno turned down offers from the US in favor of Harwell, or a clever piece of disinformation by Pontecorvo, as there is no record among the extensive Pontecorvo papers of any such opportunity arising in 1950. It seems unlikely that this was a misunderstanding on Arnold’s part, first because of his experience as an interrogator, and second because he has carefully said that Bruno “already toyed” with Rome, and is “at present” considering America. It is unclear what advantage Bruno saw in making such a claim, unless it was to emphasize that he was much sought after.

  18. TNA KV 2/1887.

  19. TNA KV 2/1887, minute sheet note 36 (see Image 10.1). In other words, they suspected that he had passed information, but had insufficient proof to arrest him.

  20. Michael Goodman interview, October 7, 2013.

  21. Weart, Scientists in Power, p. 259. The CIA claim comes from “National Intelligence Survey: France,” CIA archives, 1952, pp. 73–73, 73–79; US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1949, Volume I, pp. 466, 488, 626, cited in Weart, Scientists in Power, p. 328, note 4. Joliot-Curie’s speech was reported by Jacques Fauvet in Le Monde, April 4–5, 1950, and L’Humanité, April 6, cited in Weart, Scientists in Power, p. 328, note 6.

  22. Weart, Scientists in Power, p. 261.

  23. TNA KV 2/1887.

  24. TNA KV 2/1887.

  25. Chapman Pincher interview, November 13, 2013. Some—e.g. Chapman Pincher in Treachery—have argued that Hollis was in reality a KGB double agent, or at the very least complacent and inept. Although I offer no opinion on the more extreme version of this claim, the lack of action on the Pontecorvo file during the summer of 1950 seems in accord with such criticisms.

  26. TNA KV 2/1887.

  CHAPTER 11

  1. Laura Arnold interview, March 18, 2013.

  2. Gil Pontecorvo interview, June 12, 2011.

  3. The Abingdonian archive; Sarah Wearne interview, October 7, 2011.

  4. Abingdon record: “After taking his degree in summer 1949 Mr J F H Barker BA stayed up at Oxford for an extra term”

  5. Today this grand house is the head teacher’s residence.

  6. Section A, or A Branch, was involved with bugging, phone tapping, covert entry and specialized secret photography. See http://www.powerbase.info/index.php/MI5_A_Branch.

  7. He was made a Companion of the Bath—a British military order of chivalry.

  8. One student said that a career in MI5 planting bugs was appropriate for Barker “because he was a nasty man.” Another said he was the best teacher in the school.

  9. Macintyre, Agent ZigZag, p. 70.

  10. Interview with anonymous source, August 20, 2013.

  11. Pincher, Treachery, chap. 54 and Chapman Pincher interview, November 13, 2013. Chapman Pincher commented that in those times MI5 had a secret informant in every Fleet Street office. Another person confirmed that MI5 came to them for background, and so it’s possible that “someone could think that I was MI5.” Having someone in place around Harwell would be consistent practice.

  12. Guy Liddell diary, July 10, 1946, TNA KV 4/467.

  13. The memories of former pupils vary. When Barker left the school, one account states that they were told he was “to return to the Navy”; another that he was “to go to intelligence.”

  14. Anthony Gardner interview, February 25, 2013.

  15. Bruno Pontecorvo, Autobiographical notes.

  16. Anthony Gardner interview, February 25, 2013; Paul Gardner interview, March 4, 2013.

  17. David
Lees interview, October 15, 2013.

  18. Anthony Gardner interview, February 25, 2013.

  19. TNA KV 2/1888, memo 117.

  20. TNA KV 2/1888. The fiancée was named Jean Archer. The engagement was later terminated.

  21. TNA KV 2/1888, memo 118b.

  22. TNA KV 2/1888.

  23. TNA KV 2/1888.

  24. TNA KV 2/1887, memo 42a.

  25. Abingdon School archives. Sarah Wearne interview, October 7, 2011.

  26. The fees for the term itself totaled fourteen pounds. The remainder consisted of an outstanding four shillings and six pence for a photograph, and one penny owed to the school snack bar.

  27. TNA KV 2/1888.

  28. TNA KV 2/1887, note 70d.

  29. His passport subsequently showed that August 6–8 was spent in Austria.

  30. Letter from parents to Guido; translation by Guido in TNA KV 2/1889. The original Italian version was returned to the parents.

  31. TNA KV 2/1888. Bruno’s parents arrived in Chamonix on August 24 and started a search when they failed to find him there.

  32. TNA KV 2/1889.

  33. Transcriptions of telegrams, translated by MI5, TNA KV 2/1888.

  34. Caledonian Insurance Company, policy 4/49BM279, for travel in “France Italy and Switzerland for the period 25 July to 24 August.” TNA KV 2/1888.

  35. Even today, with the Mont Blanc Tunnel, it takes nearly eight hours.

  36. Date and time confirmed in TNA KV 2/1888, file 72. These are transcripts, the English translations having been made by Guido for MI5. I have not altered the English. The originals were returned to Bruno’s parents in 1951. The MI5 file notes that the letters and telegrams were “Bruno’s last communication to them and they would like to retain them for sentimental reasons.”

  37. TNA KV 2/1889, note 161A.

  38. TNA KV 2/1888.

  39. TNA KV 2/1888 and Anna Pontecorvo interview, November 11, 2011.

  40. Both quotes are as recounted by Guido to MI5, TNA KV 2/1888.

  41. Reed’s report notes this in TNA KV 2/1888.

  42. Years later Bruno claimed to Ugo Amaldi that he feared that a world war was about to erupt, and that he fled to the USSR as he “didn’t want to be on the wrong side” (Ugo Amaldi interviews, April 18, 2013, and September 12, 2013). This seems fanciful, given Bruno’s sudden decision to flee and the other details described here.

  43. Historian Simone Turchetti has made a compelling case that, after months of pressure, the patent dispute was a tipping point for Bruno. (See Turchetti, The Pontecorvo Affair.) While it seems certain that this played a role, people who knew Bruno are skeptical that the patent dispute alone could have been responsible. Whereas his colleague Emilio Segrè was famously concerned about the financial value of the patent, Bruno himself regarded it as a bonus but not in any obsessive way. Giuseppe Fidecaro interview, April 17, 2013, and Ugo Amaldi interview, April 18, 2013.

  44. There are some uncorroborated claims that Sereni then went to Moscow for about two months, immediately after Bruno’s flight. On November 10, Sereni landed at Le Bourget Airport in Paris, having arrived from Prague, but his passport showed that he’d stopped in Prague in transit from Moscow. There is no direct link to Bruno’s activities, but MI5’s analysis points to suspicion that in mid-August Moscow alerted Sereni to the need for contact with Bruno, and also that later in the year Sereni may have been a contact in the USSR once Bruno arrived there. See TNA KV 2/1889. Sereni’s diaries, however, don’t support this (Simone Turchetti interview, January 29, 2013). TNA KV 2/1889, memo 289A cites an unnamed source who came over to the West from the USSR in 1952. However, this source also claimed that Pontecorvo had gone to the USSR via Austria. We now know that this is incorrect, so some of the reports about Sereni’s movements in TNA may also be suspect.

  45. Simone Turchetti interview, January 29, 2013.

  46. Evidence for this will appear in Chapter 13.

  47. On March 24, 1953, Reed made his final assessment of the evidence and concluded, “I now think it may have been Emilio Sereni who persuaded Pontecorvo to defect.” TNA KV 2/1891.

  48. The MI5 files leave many questions open. In a letter to his parents Bruno mentioned that Antonio was in Ladispoli, which has been interpreted by MI5 and others to suggest that Antonio remained there alone. However, an innocent explanation of how the children got to Ladispoli is that all three were there with Giuliana’s children all along. The accounts in TNA, as told to MI5, do not paint a clear picture. There is also confusion about Gil, who in the MI5 files appears to be with his parents in Circeo, yet when Bruno later writes to his parents he says that Gil is in Ladispoli. Gil informed me that he had no memory of Circeo and, moreover, was sure that he had never been there. This has no great significance for this biography but may have relevance for anyone specifically interested in analyzing Bruno’s behavior and movements during this period.

  49. Ronnie Reed summary, TNA KV 2/1888.

  50. Anna had no recollection of seeing any car damage, but after so long could not regard this as significant. She said that the children were ferried to and fro between Rome and Ladispoli by coach (Anna Pontecorvo interview, March 21, 2012). Gil also has no memory of ever visiting Circeo. So it is possible that Bruno and Marianne were in Circeo alone, while the children were with Giuliana in Rome or Ladispoli.

  51. Anna Pontecorvo interview by MI5, TNA KV 2/1888.

  52. TNA KV 2/1888–1891.

  53. Anna Pontecorvo interview by MI5, TNA KV 2/1888.

  54. Bruno Pontecorvo told Miriam Mafai forty years later that his car went into the garage on August 29 (Mafai, Il lungo freddo, p. 11). Bruno would know that the car only went into the garage immediately prior to his departure from Rome, so this date seems reliable. It also agrees with the garage owner’s statements made to Italian police, who interviewed him on behalf of MI5. Mafai’s e-mail on March 7, 2012, confirmed that Gillo and his sister Giuliana told her “the same story.”

  55. Anna Pontecorvo interview, November 11, 2011, and phone conversations 2011–2012.

  56. Gil Pontecorvo suspected this and later confronted her. Gil Pontecorvo interview, November 22, 2011.

  57. Mafai, Il lungo freddo, p. 11; Miriam Mafai e-mail March 7, 2012.

  58. August 29 cable from SAS in Rome to Munich, TNA KV 2/1888. Thus the date of August 30, quoted in some accounts, based on a Sunday Express story published at the time, is wrong.

  59. TNA KV 2/1888, memo 105a.

  60. TNA KV 2/1888, memo 119c.

  61. Marianne had visited her family in 1938, and had not done so again until 1949. Bruno did not accompany her on the latter occasion, and “had difficulty getting her back” (Herbert Skinner quote in TNA KV 2/1888, memo 121c). Letters from Marianne’s mother to Marianne can be found in TNA KV 2/1888 et seq. and CAC. Letters from Bruno to Marianne are in CAC. Marianne’s letters to Bruno are not publicly available.

  62. Letter from Marianne’s mother to Marianne, July 1, 1950, TNA KV 2/1889.

  63. TNA KV 2/1888.

  64. Bruno was by now a naturalized British citizen, as were his sons. Marianne was still Swedish.

  65. TNA KV 2/1888.

  66. Sent August 31, 1950, at 3:15 p.m., TNA KV 2/1889.

  67. SAS confirmed to MI5 that Bruno Pontecorvo’s ticket booking was made in one office and that of Marianne and the boys was made in another. There is no record of when Bruno’s ticket was issued or of which specific office was involved. The passenger manifest confirms the different number sequences. TNA KV 2/1888.

  68. On October 28, the Daily Herald claimed that Bruno was afraid to return to the UK after a mystery encounter at Lake Como in August with two unknown men, one Italian and the other Czech. He was supposedly overheard to have said to Marianne, “I dare not go back. I should be sent to prison if I did.” There is no source given for this story.

  69. Chapman Pincher notes that a KGB source confirmed that this pattern was used in the defection of Burgess and Maclean, in 1951. Two KGB officers
met them as soon as they were out of British territory. Chapman Pincher interview, November 13, 2013.

  70. At 8:50 p.m., according to MI5 records, TNA KV 2/1888.

  71. According to Henrico Attavilla, the Stockholm correspondent of Il Tempo, MI5 files, TNA KV 2/1888.

  72. Gil Pontecorvo interview, November 22, 2011.

  73. MI5 sources discovered that, upon landing in Stockholm, Bruno declared the money in his possession to total 1,369 Italian lira, 685 Swedish kroner, and 199 Danish kroner, the equivalent of about 18 pounds. However, by the time he arrived in Finland, he had 1,360 lira, 100 Swedish kroner, 80 Danish kroner, and in addition had accumulated 436 US dollars (TNA KV 2/1888). Thus he would appear to have spent kroner to pay for food and accommodations, and acquired a gift of both airline tickets and US dollars. Possible explanations emerged later, when MI5 discovered that Emilio Sereni left for the USSR a few days before Bruno’s departure and remained there for a month. MI5’s source claimed that Sereni went to the USSR to introduce Bruno to Soviet officials (TNA KV 2/1888). MI5 did not obtain this information until three years later, and there are some reasons to doubt its accuracy, but it was the best information available at the time. MI5 commented in 1953, “This report is interesting as it fits the theory that [Ronnie Reed] considered the most likely” when he first reviewed the case in 1951. Reed’s judgment was that the good offices of the PCI (Italian Communist Party) or the Soviet embassy had provided the money for Bruno to go to Stockholm. “The further suggestion was that he there met a Russian representative who persuaded him to go to Finland and subsequently to Russia.” By 1953, the information in MI5’s hands led Reed to conclude, “I now think it may have been Emilio Sereni who persuaded Pontecorvo to defect” (Reed review, TNA KV 2/1888). This also resonates with the suspicions of Anna Pontecorvo (Anna Pontecorvo interview, November 11, 2011).

  74. Finnish customs official report to police, TNA KV 2/1888.

  75. TNA KV 2/1888.

  76. FBI File WF 65-5650.

  CHAPTER 12

  1. TNA KV 2/1888.

  2. TNA KV 2/1888.

  3. TNA KV 2/1888. This is not a direct quote of Bruno’s mother’s letter, which was written in Italian, but a transcription made by MI5 of Guido’s English translation.