by Andrew Cook
In Detective Superintendent (DS) Gerald McArthur’s report,6 he relates the statement of Assistant Inspector Thomas Kett who recalled that:
The train stopped between Leighton Buzzard and Cheddington and he estimates the time at 3.15 am. This time is incorrect as will be seen later. A few minutes later the train began to move and he heard steam escaping from the rear of his coach and he formed the opinion that coupling between his coach and the next had broken. Someone pulled the communication cord and others shouted through the windows to attract the attention of the driver. No further action could be taken by them to draw the driver’s attention to the position because there was no corridor communication between the High Valued Packets Coach and the parcels van which separates the former from the diesel engine.
Kett said that in accordance with instructions all doors and windows of the High Valued Packets coach were closed and fastened. (This was untrue because the corridor door of the HVP coach was only capable of being locked by a spigot key and there was no indication that this key was turned. A hook and ring higher on the door was not capable of being fastened.) The train travelled for what he estimated to be half a mile and then stopped again. A window of the coach was broken. He shouted to the others that it was a raid and they all began piling mailbags against the sliding doors as a barricade and the other doors were bolted. Someone outside shouted ‘They are barricading the doors. Get the guns’. Another window was broken and two men climbed through it into the coach waving coshes. Other men entered through the rear gangway door and one of them was waving an axe. Within seconds Kett says six to eight unauthorized men were in the coach and he could hear others shouting outside. One of the men hit Kett on the arm with a cosh and then all the GPO men were herded into the front of the coach and made to lie down. The man who hit Kett with a cosh stood guard over them making them keep their heads down and eyes closed.
Kett heard the sound of mailbags being unloaded. Afterwards they were told not to leave the coach for half an hour. He saw the driver and fireman come into the back of the coach. He noticed the driver was injured. As soon as things appeared quiet he and Penn left the attacked coach and walked back along the tracks to the remainder of the train. On the way he says he met the guard and told him what had happened. The other Post Office men on the coach, broadly speaking, support the evidence given by Kett. There are, however, differences of opinion as to the exact sequence of events and what part each played in trying to protect themselves or the coach. No doubt their differences are the result of fear which was put into them when mention of guns was made by one of the raiders. None of these Post Office men could identify any of their attackers.7
Frank Dewhurst, the post office official in charge of the HVP coach tells a similar story:
Just after 3 o’clock the train stopped. I was in the High Value Package coach then. It started in a matter of minutes. I heard something after it stopped again. Only our part of the train started again. I heard the steam pipe break and made me realise we had parted company. I called out to Mr Kett that the train had broken adrift. He went to the back and shut the door. The train stopped a short time after that. After we stopped the second time one of the offside windows smashed as if something had come in. There was nothing on the floor. At the same time another train went by. Mr Kett called out ‘It’s a raid’. I tried to stack bags against the glass doors. Mr Kett and Mr Ware were at the gangway door trying I think to put the lock on. I heard someone shout ‘Some bastard’s putting the bolt on. Get the guns’. I continued to stack bags. The next I knew I turned to my right and I saw a thick set person with an axe raised above his head. I put my hands up thinking the person with the axe was going to hit me and as I turned I was hit several times from behind and I fell to the floor. I saw the person who hit me from waist high and I assumed he was a tall person. I do not think he hit me with his hands. It was something hard but not iron. I went face downwards on to the floor. I was not hit while I was on the floor. I was hit about 4 or 5 times before I went on the floor. Someone put their boot into my ribs and asked if I was all right. I did not reply at first but when they repeated it I said ‘Yes’.8
In the third coach of the train, that is the coach immediately behind the High Valued coach, were four other Post Office employees. Two of them were Stanley Edward Hall, a High Grade Postman, and Dennis Ronald Jeffries, a Higher Grade Postman. Hall joined the train at Carlisle and was present in his coach when the train stopped at Sears Crossing. After it had been stationary for a few minutes, out of curiosity, Hall opened the nearside door of his coach and saw a man standing between his coach and the High Valued Packets coach. After a few seconds Hall saw another man come from under and beneath the joining bellows of the two coaches. One of them spoke to the other and they then both walked away towards the diesel engine. Hall thought no more of this because he believed the two men to be railwaymen who had affected a repair. Hall closed the door and walked through his coach towards the bellows of the High Valued Packets coach and as he did so he saw it move away and suddenly the steam pipe burst and his vision was impaired due to escaping steam. When the steam cleared he saw that the High Valued Packets coach was drawing further away and one of the GPO employees inside it was closing the corridor door. Hall still did not realise anything was seriously wrong, but he was puzzled because he noticed the signal at red.9
Stanley Hall’s curiosity actually led to him seeing one of the robbers, who at this stage was not wearing a balaclava:
After we had been standing for a few minutes, out of curiosity I opened the near side leading door – in other words the left hand door looking towards the train. I was alone at this time and I saw some person standing between my coach and the High Value coach.
As I opened the door the man standing on the permanent way looked at me. He did not have a mask on and he had a roundish face and was wearing glasses. I can’t give any idea of age at all, except to say that he was neither very young nor very old. He was bending down most of the time but by the height of the running board I would say he was on the shorter side of about 5’ 6”. He was rather thick set. I have got the impression he was wearing a Railwayman’s cap but not a shiny topped one as there was no reflection from the light. He was wearing blue material type clothing similar to that worn by railwaymen. When he looked out of the door the man would be about 12 feet away from me. He did not speak to me; he only glanced in my direction. After a few seconds another man came from under and beneath the two coaches.
When the train pulled away there was four of us in our coach, Mr Connell, Mr Jeffreys, myself and someone else I can’t remember who it was. I have decided in my own mind that a railwayman must have been involved in this as the uncoupling was done so quickly and it would take an experienced man to do that. He also didn’t touch the steam pipe as he must have known he would have been scalded and also it would make a noise.
I have never been approached by anyone to give any information about Post Office trains nor have I heard of anyone else who has. When the two men came out from the train one of them had a torch. I didn’t see the actual torch just the light from it. I don’t think I would know either of the men again.10
Thomas Miller was the guard on the train and he was in his compartment at the rear of the train when it stopped at Sears Crossing. He recorded the time as 3.03 am. Two minutes later he heard the brakes go on and saw the vacuum gauge in his compartment drop to zero. He walked through to the ninth coach and then got down on to the nearside track. He looked towards where the diesel engine should have been but could not see it. Neither did he see anyone. He walked towards the front of the train expecting to meet the fireman. He continued the length of the train and found the engine and first two coaches missing. He could not hear the diesel engine or see any sign of it. He returned to the ninth coach and asked the GPO staff in it to apply the handbrake. He then returned to his compartment, collected detonators on the track at a quarter of a mile, half a mile and one mile from the train. He then returned to Sear
s Crossing Signals where he found the signal box telephone wires had been cut. He continued along the line believing something serious had happened but not realising that the train had been robbed. He placed detonators at 100 yards from the train and then decided to walk to Cheddington. He came across the remainder of the train at Bridego Bridge.11
Miller noticed the nearside door of the High Valued Packets Coach open and also the corridor door. Inside the coach he saw Mills the driver and Whitby the fireman sitting on some bags handcuffed together. He noticed the injuries to Mills. He also saw three of the GPO staff inside the coach. They told him of the robbery and Miller then set off towards Cheddington Station to seek assistance. He stopped a train which was coming toward him, told the guard of the robbery and asked him to stop at the abandoned diesel engine and attended to it. Miller then continued to walk towards Cheddington and en route was picked up by a passing train. At Cheddington Signal Box he arranged for assistance. He recorded his time of arrival there at 4.15 am.12
Thomas Wyn-De-Bank was the signalman on duty at Leighton Buzzard No 1 Signal Box, during the night of 7/8 August 1963. At 2.58 am he saw the Travelling Post Office pass his signal box. At 3.00 am he received an indication on a buzzer in his box that the signal lights at the Distant Signal at Sears Crossing were out. He assumed it was a signal failure and took no action but waited for a telephone call from the fireman on the Travelling Post Office. He did not receive such a call and at 3.10 am the signalman from Cheddington Signal Box telephoned him to enquire where the train was. Mr Wyn-De-Bank told him that the train had entered his section and of the signal failure. At 3.15 am Wyn-De-Bank noticed on his indicator that the train had passed the signals at Sears Crossing. At the same time his indicator showed the approach line to Sears Crossing as being still engaged. He assumed that a vehicle or part of the train had been left behind or that there was a track failure. He arranged for a linesman to be called out to check the line and advised the Control Office, Euston, and the signalman at Cheddington Box of the circumstances and his intention to ask the driver of the next ‘Up’ train to examine the line and report the position of the Travelling Post Office at Cheddington. He later spoke to the driver of the next ‘Up’ train, a Mr Cooper, and as a result of this action, Cooper discovered the Travelling Post Office and was informed of the robbery. Cooper instructed his fireman, W G Green, to take the front portion of the Travelling Post Office to Cheddington. On the way to Cheddington, Driver Cooper spoke to Euston Control and asked them to arrange for the police and ambulance to attend.13
As the official enquiry into the robbery was later to note:
By cutting nearby telephone wires, the gang was able to delay information of the robbery coming to the notice of the police. From the time the train was first brought to a halt at Sears Crossing at 3.03 am and the gang leaving Bridego Bridge at about 3.30 am, it was not until 4.25 am that a telephone call from Cheddington Signal box reached Aylesbury, via Euston and New Scotland Yard.14
As a result of the telephone call made to Euston station from Cheddington signal box shortly after Thomas Miller’s arrival, the British Transport Commission Police logged an immediate crime report:
BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION POLICE CRIME REPORT
British Railways Board, London Midland Region
PC Blake 7 ‘M’ by Train Control, Euston
Euston 4.30am 8 August, 1963
Sears Crossing, between Leighton Buzzard and Cheddington, Buckinghamshire, 3.05am 8.8.63. Train Crew. Am No4
GPO Mail, High Value Treasury Notes
6.50pm ex Glasgow to London Euston
Driver: Jack Mills – Crewe Loco
Co Driver: David Whitby – Crewe Loco
Guard: Thomas James Miller – Euston
Train stopped at unauthorised signal, signal faked with aid of glove to cover green light and four six volt Ever-Ready Dry Cell batteries to keep ‘Red’ showing. Driver and Co-Driver attacked and Diesel Engine and two front coaches un-coupled. Driver forced to take it about one mile to a point at Sears Crossing, where raiders attacked GPO Staff in Royal Mail Coach K30204M and 120 Mail bags stolen.
Believed Army type vehicle – 3-Ton with Large Wheels. High Floor. (2) Land Rover Type. Grey or Light blue. (3) Unknown.15
By the time the first police car containing two officers arrived at Cheddington at 4.36 a.m., the gang and the money were long gone. As dawn broke, the train was extensively photographed before being moved to Cheddington station to be fingerprinted. The sabotaged signals, the cut telephone lines and abandoned pick-axe handles used to smash into the carriage were caught on film, but no prints were found. It seemed there was very little for the police to go on and the gang was in with a chance of getting clean away.
Notes
1. locomotive D318 was used by the film company. The 1988 film Buster, starring Phil Collins, used Class 40 locomotive D306. The technical information about the train, its coaches and layout are to be found in POST 120/110 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).
2. The basic narrative of this chapter is drawn from the regular investigation reports written by DCS Gerald McArthur (original reference 202/63/943), which were originally closed until 2045. They were opened on 25/6/10 as a result of a Freedom of Information application made in connection with research for this book (TNA, DPP 2/3717/1). A significant number of sections in these reports were redacted under Section 40 (2) of the FOI Exemptions regulations (and at the time of writing remain redacted until 2045). However, full and unredacted zerox versions of some of the McArthur reports that were originally copied by Scotland Yard to the Post Office Investigation Branch are to be found at the British Postal Archive; see POST 120/96, 120/97, 120/98, 120/99. While some of these have deteriorated over the past fifty years due to light exposure, they remain the only unedited copies available to researchers.
3. POST 120/96 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).
4. DPP 2/3718, part 3 of 6 (originally closed until 2045, but opened under FOI request 25/6/10).
5. Ibid.
6. Although McArthur was, in theory, a Scotland Yard adviser to the Chief Constable of Buckinghamshire, Brigadier John Cheney, he was effectively in charge of the police investigation in Buckinghamshire.
7. POST 120/96 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).
8. DPP 2/3718, part 1 of 6 (originally closed until 2045, but opened under FOI request 25/6/10).
9. POST 120/96 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).
10. DPP 2/3718, part 1 of 6 (originally closed until 2045, but opened under FOI request 25/6/10).
11. POST 120/96 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. HO 287/1496 (originally closed until 1995; opened 1996).
15. BTPC/Euston A.001718.
3
THE 30-MINUTE CLUE
At 8.30 a.m., Detective Constable (DC) Keith Milner from Bucks CID in Aylesbury arrived at Bridego Bridge:
Just off the south west side of the bridge I saw two rods with white material attached. On the track by the bridge itself I found a railway man’s cap and a long crowbar. I took possession of these articles. I then went to the home signals at Sears Crossing, where I took possession of 4 x 6 volt batteries which had been connected to the red signal light, and a glove which covered the green signal light. Inside the glove was a piece of black paper.1
At around the same time as Milner arrived at the trackside, Clifford Osmond, controller of the Post Office Investigation Branch, based at St Martin-le-Grand in the City of London, telephoned Brigadier John Cheney, chief constable of Buckinghamshire, and it was agreed that a meeting should be held of all interested parties at GPO Headquarters, London, at 3 p.m. that afternoon.
At 10.30 a.m. a message was sent to New Scotland Yard and to the chief constables of Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Hertfordshire, Oxfordshire and Northamptonshire as follows:
At approximately 02.45 hours today a mail train robbery occurred betwe
en Leighton Buzzard and Cheddington, Bucks. 120 mail bags containing a very considerable sum of money are missing. It is thought that the persons responsible may have hidden up and attempted to get away by mingling with normal morning traffic. Observation and frequent spot checks of traffic vehicles is requested.2
Shortly afterwards, Brigadier Cheney telephoned Commander George Hatherill, head of CID at Scotland Yard, asking that the Yard be represented at the GPO conference scheduled for that afternoon. The conference was held at the head office of the GPO in London and some thirty attended, the most prominent being: