by Andrew Cook
Brigadier J.N. Cheney, chief constable of Buckinghamshire Constabulary, and representatives of his staff including DS M. Fewtrell; Commander G.H. Hatherill, OBE of the Criminal Investigation Department, New Scotland Yard, and representatives of his staff including DS G. McArthur; Brigadier K.S. Holmes, CBE, director of the Postal Services Department, General Post Office, and representatives of his staff; Mr C.G. Osmond, OBE, controller of the Investigation Branch, General Post Office, and representatives of his staff; Mr W.O. Gaye, chief of police, (CID) British Transport Police, and representatives of his staff.3
Brigadier Cheney and DS Fewtrell told the gathering about the information in their possession regarding the robbery and the enquiries being conducted. The IB’s controller, Clifford Osmond, said that he believed the theft would be in the region of £2.5 million, which was greeted with shock and incredulity.4
At the conclusion of the meeting, Hatherill told Cheney that DS Gerald McArthur would be sent to Aylesbury to assist in the enquiries. McArthur and Detective Sergeant (DSgt) Jack Pritchard later left for Aylesbury where they arrived at 10.20 p.m. that evening. On arrival they immediately set about arranging for road checks to be made the following morning for a period of two hours, commencing at one hour before the time of the robbery to one hour after the time of the robbery. It was hoped by this means to trace regular travellers in the area who might have seen something that could assist enquiries. They also conferred with several local farmers and with the aid of an Ordnance Survey map examined the area surrounding the scene of the robbery. Deserted farms and outbuildings, ex-RAF and army camps likely to be used by the thieves as a hideout were also pointed out to them.
Early the following morning, McArthur and Fewtrell discussed the statements made by train driver Mills, fireman Whitby and the GPO staff, who had all mentioned one of the robbers saying that someone would be watching the train for thirty minutes and concluded that this was possibly the time that the thieves had allowed themselves to get clear away from the scene of the robbery to their hideout. They further calculated that if this was so, then the maximum distance they could have travelled would be in the region of 15 to 30 miles.5
The possibility was discussed of being able, even with maximum help, to search such a vast area in an attempt to locate the robbers before they vacated their hideout and destroyed any evidence it may have contained. They believed it to be an impossible task but decided to announce to press and radio reporters their belief that the hideout was within 30 miles, knowing that the ensuing publicity might well concern the robbers enough to make them abandon their hideout before they were ready. The announcement to the press was made at the first press conference on 9 August 1963.6
DSgt Pritchard remained at Police Headquarters in Aylesbury while DS McArthur and DS Fewtrell left for Cheddington station where the train was now under guard. DS Ray of the fingerprint department, who was to carry out a forensic search of the locomotive, met them at Cheddington only to find the engine missing, which was now apparently in Crewe. After an angry phone call to British Railways officials, McArthur was promised the engine’s return the following morning, Saturday 10 August.
On Friday afternoon, a series of conferences were held at Police Headquarters in Aylesbury with officers of the British Transport Police and the Post Office Investigation Branch. It was agreed that the IB would take statements from the GPO employees who had been on the train, other than those in the HVP coach, who had already given statements to the Railway Police. It was also decided to release information to the press, radio and television concerning the 10-ton army lorry seen by David Whitby.
The IB, being a post office department, came under the overall responsibility of a government minister, the postmaster general. Reginald Bevins, the Conservative MP for Liverpool Toxteth, broke off his family holiday as soon as news of the robbery reached him and flew to London. After a one-hour briefing by ministry officials and IB officers Frank Cook and Harry Lyons, Bevins spoke to press and TV journalists: ‘I want to find out why the precautions taken were not adequate. Clearly our security arrangements have not been satisfactory … one cannot rule out an inside job.’7
On Bevins’s instructions, one of the key lines of the IB investigation was to focus on establishing whether or not it was an inside job and, if so, who was responsible for assisting the gang.
When the Post Office held their own post-mortem on TPO security the following afternoon, the issue of possible inside collusion very quickly surfaced:
IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE
Minutes of a meeting held on the 9 August 1963
To discuss the security of TPOs
1. The Chairman referred to the attack on the Up Special TPO on the 8 August when very heavy losses were incurred. He thought that all the time the Post Office was committed to carrying HVPs our policy should continue to concentrate the traffic on TPOs. The recent attack had demonstrated however that the security of TPOs was not adequate and it was necessary to make them as safe as possible with the minimum of delay. The present meeting had been called to discuss additional security measures that the Post Office thought to be necessary.
2. Repairs to HVP coaches The Chairman explained that there were three special HVP carriages which had been equipped with bars over the windows, additional bolts and catches on doors, lockers and bandit alarms. The up and down special TPOs each included one of these carriages and the other was held in reserve. On the 8 August these three carriages had been withdrawn from service for repairs and an old HVP vehicle had been included in the up special which did not include the special security measures. The LPR confirmed that one of the special carriages had been returned and would be in use tonight. Mr Fiennes confirmed that unless there is something especially wrong with the other two coaches they would be returned to service by the beginning of next week. He would also find out why it took so long to affect the repairs.
3. Reserve HVP coaches The Chairman then suggested that some action was required to avoid a repetition of the situation. It was agreed that an additional reserve carriage should be specially fitted out as quickly as possible. The LPR agreed to make arrangements to let Mr Fiennes have the numbers of the carriages to be so fitted together with a list of the scale of protection required.
4. Security installations LPR confirmed that bolts and throw over catches had been fitted on all the coaches on the up and down specials except on one gangway door. The LPR agreed to arrange for this to be done immediately. Mr. Mitchell confirmed that the bolts and catches were adequate provided they are fitted correctly. The LPR agreed to arrange for all new fitments to be inspected.
Finally, Mr W O Gaye, Chief of Police (Crime) BR explained that experiments were being made by the railways in conjunction with the Bank of England and the Home Office radio departments with a view to establishing radio communication between the train and the constabularies through which they have passed. He agreed to take the first opportunity of mentioning the post office interests in these experiments with a view to possible participation.8
The fact that all three of the special HVP security coaches equipped with barred windows, reinforced doors and bandit alarms had, for the very first time ever, been out of service at the same time due to various defects, raised once more the spectre of possible inside collusion. Earlier that morning, Bevins had again been pressed on the matter by BBC TV News, and had responded:
BEVINS: These trains have made thousands and thousands of journeys without the slightest mishap, without the slightest loss of money over the past 120 years; this is the first time it’s happened.
INTERVIEWER: Are you blaming British Railways?
BEVINS: No, I’m not saying that at the moment.
INTERVIEWER: Are you now more convinced than you were yesterday that this may be an inside job?
BEVINS: Well, when I was asked the question yesterday, I said I did not rule out the possibility of it being an inside job, I don’t rule it out now.9
Bevins clearly had the bit between hi
s teeth on this issue, as after the television interview he wrote a memo to his private secretary making his suspicions crystal clear:
Private Secretary
On the mail robbery and the coincidence that all 3 high value vans were off the road on 7 August for the first time ever, do you know whether any of the authorities
(a) Have investigated this detail, since it is very doubtful if the robbery would have been attempted or been successful had one of the 3 vans been in commission;
(b) Know who, among rail and PO workers, was aware that on that particular night and indeed on earlier nights a van without a bandit alarm would be in use on the down run, ie who knew that 2 or 3 were out of use?
My information about these 3 vans is –
Off road
Repaired
Defect
22 June
Willesden (?)
Hot Box
4 July
?
Hot Box
1 Aug
Willesden
Flat tyre
The more I think about this the more strongly I feel that gang must have known the situation. The question is who could have co-operated with them and also informed them. If the authorities could get an answer to this the rest would not be difficult.
PMG10
While keeping a civil servant’s sense of perspective, Bevins’s private secretary was clearly concerned:
Postmaster General
On the point which you raise in the attached note, your information about the three vans is correct as regards the dates of withdrawal from services and the nature of the defects. In each case however repairs were carried out at Swindon.
Your suspicions about the three vans being out of commission on the night of the 7/8 August are shared by all of us and the Railway Police have been enquiring diligently into this aspect of the case. Mr Osmond is satisfied from what he knows of their investigations that the technical grounds on which the vans were withdrawn from service were in each case unchallengeable and there is confirmation for this in the fact that the vans were taken out of service by responsible people working in three different places, ie Carlisle, Wigan and Euston. It remains a question whether the defects in the vans were brought on deliberately, or their return to service delayed so that the vehicles should be out of commission on the day of the robbery but the Railway Police have so far found no evidence to support this but intensive enquires are continuing.
The possibility of collusion between railway or Post Office staff and the criminals has all along been very much in the minds of both the Railway Police and the Investigation Branch. A considerable number of railway and Post Office people could have been aware of the withdrawal of the vehicles, including the TPO staff and railway staffs at terminal and intermediate stations on the Euston-Glasgow run as well as at the sidings where the TPO vehicles are parked. Enquiries have so far failed to produce any evidence that the gang obtained information about the HVP coaches from Post Office and/or railway staff but this aspect is also the subject of intensive enquiry by the Railway Police and the IB.11
The issue of possible sabotage was to become a key part of both the IB and the British Transport Police investigations over the following two months and again put British Railways procedures under critical gaze. Having already blotted their copybook for removing the locomotive before further forensic work could be carried out in the cab, it finally arrived back at Cheddington on the morning of Saturday 10 August. DC Keith Milner was again on hand to accompany Scotland Yard’s Dr Holden in examining the interior. It is noteworthy that Milner made the following comments in his report:
On 10 August, 1963, I was present at Cheddington Station when Dr Holden removed blood samples from the engine cab window and from a ledge in the engine. I took possession of these samples, but on 17 August I handed them to Dr Holden.12
While the removing of such a vital piece of evidence as the engine and transporting it to Crewe was nothing less than a major blunder on the part of the railway authorities in disturbing a crime scene, it would appear that the crucial blood traces were not unduly harmed or erased. In fact, Milner’s remark that blood was found on a ledge in the cab gives some credence to the view that while Mills was indeed struck from behind, he could well have hit his head on the instrumental panel when he fell to the floor, which may or may not have been responsible for accentuating his injuries.13
On that same Saturday morning, the first solid information about those thought to have taken part in the robbery reached DS Cummings and Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) Walker of Scotland Yard’s C11 Department. They immediately drove over to Aylesbury to discuss the breakthrough with DS McArthur and told him that:
Bobby Welch (identical with Robert Alfred Welch, CRO No 61730/58), was one of the gang responsible for the robbery. They said that Welch was missing from home and that his wife had received a message that he would be home in two or three days’ time. In addition, their information was that the thieves anticipated having twenty minutes in which to leave the scene of the robbery and get safely to their hideout before the alarm was raised. The hideout was believed to be a farm and was somewhere on the outskirts of Aylesbury.
McArthur, Cummings and Walker decided that observation should be placed on Welch’s home at 30a Benyon Road, Islington, London N1, and on the addresses of two of his associates.14
This was not the only key piece of information that came in by way of an informant on that Saturday morning. Bernard Makowski,15 who described himself as a London antiques dealer, related a detailed and intriguing story to Chief Inspector Peattie of the Post Office Investigation Branch, which Controller Clifford Osmond wrote up himself in the following memo:
NOTES OF A MEETING WITH AN INFORMANT WHICH TOOK PLACE AT 11 AM ON
SATURDAY, 10 AUGUST 1963
The informant is typical of his kind. He often talks in riddles; he leaves much unsaid and he either forgets or does not know the full names of the persons he mentions so that he is forced to refer to them by nickname. The sum total of the information which he gave is described in the paragraphs below.
He said that in January 1963, he was asked to become a member of a team whose job it was to scout a train job which offered a prize, if successful, of about £7m. He described the train as one which was due to run between Scotland and Kings Cross; that the attack was first planned to take place at York and that his part was to watch the unloading of the valuables at Kings Cross and to note the procedure. He said that, in fact, he had watched the unloading arrangements at Kings Cross and that he had counted the boxes as they came off. When asked about the size of the boxes he demonstrated with his hands that they were about 2 feet long and perhaps 1½ feet deep. He said that he thought the boxes were due to be taken to the Bank of England. He pinpointed the particular time of the day and a particular date on which his observation took place – i.e. the 17 April 1963, early afternoon, just after lunch. It was pointed out to him that this could not have been a plan to attack the mails but he said that he was under the impression it was a mail job as the boxes were being unloaded from a train which was standing at the platform which he described as a mail train. On further questioning, however he said that it was not a passenger train but a goods type of coach. He agreed that he did not know what a mail train looked like and he finally said that, although the attack which he had been talking about was due to take place at York on or about the 17 April, the arrangements went wrong – tip-off or something like that occurred – and so the plan was shelved and thereafter he himself was eased out of the team because he was a suspected informer.
The informant went on to say that, although he could not prove it, he felt sure that the same team concerned in what he now found to have been a plan for a bullion attack had carried out the big mail train robbery which occurred on the 8 August. In those circumstances I asked him to name and to describe all the men who might form the team concerned with that bullion plan.
He said that he himself had been invited
to become a member of the team by a man whom he knew as Benny Stewart (or Stuart) whose address he does not know but whom he met in the Pubs and Clubs of Soho. He described Stewart as about 40 years of age, a Scot, and a gentlemanly type of crook. He was particularly explicit about his gentlemanly attitude and made it clear that he was not a rough bandit type of man. When questioned, the informant said that Stewart had, he understood, flown to Germany recently and that he has not been seen in London since the attack on the train on the 8 August. He explained that he knew Benny Stewart extremely well and that they had both done some work together at Kings Cross Station in the proposed bullion case. He said that Benny Stewart had, in fact, worked for Billy Hill at one time but that, in his view, Billy Hill was not behind this current mail train robbery. The informant mentioned that on one occasion an ‘important’ man visited Benny Stewart and himself at Kings Cross Station. He was driving a cream Ford consul and his name sounded something like Falcon, Falcon Faloor. The informant said that he was known to him also as ‘Pat’, and he has a brother who is also a crook. It was put to the informant that the name might be ‘Falco’, a criminal who is known to be interested in Post Office crime and who at one time lived in the Angel, Islington, area.
A photograph of Tommy Falco, CRO No 19772/38 was then shown to the informant who alleged, however, that this was not the man he was talking about. He described the man as having a broken nose, slim build, dark hair. On the question of his importance, the informant said that in the bullion case he was what could be called ‘an organiser’ – i.e. the man who was responsible for establishing train times and Station organisation. The informant maintained that he did not know where Pat Falcon lived but he suggested that he could be found in Hatton Garden as he often worked with (or worked over the shop of) Mansfield of Hatton Garden and that he dealt specially in smuggled watches there. The informant did say, however, that Pat Falcon had a blemish on his cheek and it would appear that Tommy Falcon also has a blemish on his cheek.