The Great Train Robbery
Page 22
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. DPP 2/3719, 1 of 3 (originally closed until 2045; redacted version opened 25/6/10). The ‘colonel’ was an alias used by Bill Goodwin (Colonel Summers).
53. Ibid.
54. POST 120/97 (closed until 1993; opened 1994).
55. MEPO 2/10571 (still closed at time of writing).
56. Ibid.
57. DPP 2/3717, Report 15 (originally closed until 2045; redacted version opened 25/6/10). Those suspected ‘of assisting Roy John James to evade arrest’ were George Frederick Wright, Kenneth Thomas Simmons, Peter Alan Kelliem and Maureen Jean Willers (DPP 2/3858; still closed until 2045 at time of writing).
58. See note 54 above.
10
OPERATION PRIMROSE
Great mystery still surrounds the events that took place on the evening of Tuesday 10 December 1963 on a busy south London street, less than half a mile from the Elephant and Castle. The official version is succinctly outlined in a recently opened DPP file:
On 10 December 1963 at about 6.35 pm, as a result of information, Detective Chief Superintendent Butler and Detective Inspector Williams went to a telephone kiosk at Great Dover Street SE1, at the junction of Blackhorse Court. They found two sacks containing bundles of money. It was at first examined by Dr Holden and Detective Superintendent Ray. The former took away the sacks and debris for forensic examination whilst Detective Superintendent Ray removed two top and two bottom notes of each bundle for fingerprint examination. Superintendent Ray took away with him notes to the value of £401. The remainder of the money was counted and examined by Mr Charles of the National Provincial Bank Ltd. He counted £46,844 which added to that taken by Detective Superintendent Ray makes the total amount found in the sacks as £47,245.1
The officer who received the telephone tip-off was, according to the police report on the find, DCI Sidney Bradbury. Apparently the caller had with him ‘a person who has got £50,000 of train robbery money with him in sacks’. The sacks would be left at the Great Dover Street kiosk. The caller then hung up after telling Bradbury to ‘be there in five minutes’. Bradbury then immediately passed on the message to Williams.2
However, there is reason to believe that Williams had prior awareness of the drop and had in fact been expecting it. Furthermore, he may well have participated in an earlier aborted attempt to pass over the £50,000 at Nunhead station in Peckham, south London, a few weeks beforehand that was never disclosed in his reports.3
The two potato sacks found in the kiosk were taken back to Scotland Yard by Williams and Butler, where they were opened. Inside were bundles of Irish, English and Scottish banknotes apparently in 100 lots of £500. DCS Butler then instructed DCI Bradbury to sleep in his office overnight with the two sacks, prior to their collection and dispatch to Aylesbury Police Station the following morning.4
The Buckinghamshire CID was equally puzzled by this turn of events. DS Malcolm Fewtrell first heard the news about the £50,000 from a reporter. His immediate reaction was to privately wonder how the Flying Squad knew that there was £50,000 in the two sacks when no one, so far as he knew, had yet counted the money. His bewilderment heightened the next day when the money was delivered to him at Aylesbury Police Station. On examination, the money was found to be still damp and musty, suggesting that it had recently been dug up from its hiding place; many of the notes were, as a consequence, stuck together. Tellers from the National Provincial Bank, who were called in by Fewtrell, took two days to peel the notes apart and count them. Their final tally was £46,844. When this was added to the £401 taken by DS Ray, the total came to £47,245, £2,755 short of £50,000.5
While Hatherill was given only the briefest information by Butler about the find (and indeed no reason for its presence in the telephone box), his view was that the money was left there by one of the robbers who had been questioned at length but not charged. Hatherill’s theory was that the money was getting too hot for him.6 However, it seems clear that Hatherill was not privy to the activities of Frank Williams and that in spite of assurances to the contrary given to Williams by Butler, both Hatherill and Millen were clearly out of the loop so far as Williams’s overtures to those still on the run were concerned.7
From Williams’s reports it is clear that he was dealing with several intermediaries in order to pass on messages to those robbers still at large and used code letters to protect their identities. He was trying to do deals with several of those on the run to turn themselves in with reasonably large sums of money - in exchange for playing down their role in the robbery.8 There is equally a suggestion that the Great Dover Street episode was part of a deal to hand over money in exchange for the police not pursuing those on whom there was little or no evidence to connect them to the train robbery.9
Ten days after the Great Dover Street drop, Williams was to hear from Scotland Yard’s C11 Section, that they had received information that another train robbery was possibly being planned, this time on the Weymouth-Waterloo line. Most intriguing was the suggestion that some members of this gang ‘were connected with the gang concerned in the Up Special TPO Robbery (on 8 August)’.10
It was on the same day that the IB’s R.F. Yates also heard about C11’s information:
Whilst at Scotland Yard on the evening of 20 December 1963 I saw Commander Hatherill. He mentioned that he had received information from three sources indicating that an attack on the TPO running from Weymouth to Waterloo was being planned. The attack, he said, was expected to take place early in the New Year and he asked that I furnish him with brief factual details of: -
(i) the TPO concerned, with running times;
(ii) the make-up of the train;
(iii) the approximate number of HVP bags carried;
(iv) the number of Post Office personnel on the train.
On Monday 23 December, I handed to Commander Hatherill a copy of the schedules and pointed out that immediately following Christmas large amounts of monies would be remitted by the banks, in HVPs, to their Head Offices in London. Commander Hatherill said that he intended to call a Conference at an early date to which he proposed to invite Chief Constables of the area of the route of the TPO, the Post Office, and Railway Police. He said that at that Conference he would disclose the full facts of his information and attempt to arrange for security and detective measures to be stepped up. So far as I could gather the venue of the suggested attack is not, as yet, known.11
This information confirmed the somewhat vague earlier intelligence that came to the attention of C11 back in September, to the effect that a raid on the Weymouth-Waterloo line was being planned. Senior IB investigator William Thomas wrote a memo that day following receipt of the information:
IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE
Threatened attack on SW TPO
1. Information has reached New Scotland Yard (C11) which suggests that the threat of attack on high value mails carried on the SW TPO Up (Weymouth-Waterloo) has been renewed.12 The information, which is somewhat nebulous, is to the effect that a raid is again being planned with mention of Weybridge as the possible target. This information was passed to PD/IB (Mr Yates) by C11 officers late on Thursday 5 September 1963.
2. PSD/PMB(S) and D/LPR (TPO Section) were advised of the above development early on Friday 6 September. At the same time I confirmed by direct enquiry of BTC Police (Supt Ward) that the SW TPO Down and Up are included in the special precautions currently being taken by BTC Police for the protection of certain TPOs – ie that 2 BTC Police officers travel as escorts on both down and up journeys of the SW TPO from Monday to Friday nights inclusive.
3. Follow up action has been taken by PSD/PMB(S) to alert LPR, HCR and SWR as to the renewed threat so that security arrangement connected with the TPO, station and feeder services security may be checked and local Police forces advised of the possibility of attack.
4. At the request of PD/IB (Thomas-Supt, Ward), BTC Police have undertaken to provide two additional Police officer escorts who will trav
el on the TPO Up from Southampton to Waterloo on Tuesday and Thursday nights commencing Tuesday night 10/11 September, 1963. This arrangement will continue until further notice subject to review after four weeks.
W Thomas
6 September 196313
As Thomas’s memo stressed, the information at hand in September was somewhat non-specific. With new and more detailed information now coming forward, security was to be significantly ramped up in the new year. Commander Hatherill took the initiative in calling a round-table conference at Scotland Yard immediately after the Christmas/New Year holiday on 8 January 1964, to put the wheels in motion. The same day that invitations to the conference were sent out by Scotland Yard, IB assistant controller R.F. Yates summarised the progress of the investigation, so far as the hunt for those who were still at large was concerned:
On 4 December, 1963, it became known that Bruce Reynolds and his wife had been residing in West Croydon but had left hurriedly on the night of 3 December. He has not been seen since but finger prints found at the West Croydon house established that both Daly and James had visited there.
To summarise the situation up to that stage, offenders who have so far been arrested:
12 were charged with robbery
8 were charged with receiving stolen money
1 (Mr Wheater) was charged with conspiracy
The total sum recovered amounted to a little less than £350,000 which is about 14% of the total stolen. It is important to note that these recoveries were effected despite the fact the identifiable notes recorded by the Banks amounted to about .05% of the notes despatched.
Detective inquiries continue concerning three groups of criminals:-
Group A:
Reynolds, White and Edwards – Definite evidence exists against these men.
Group B:
H T Smith CRO 1551/47 and Daniel Pembroke CRO 27206/56 – Both these criminals are strongly suspected of being members of the criminal team led by Reynolds. Pembroke has already been questioned, with negative result.
Group C:
Terry Hogan CRO 38593/45 and Ronald Harvey CRO 1196/51 – Suspected.14
Commander Hatherill’s sources seem to be the same ones that provided much of his inside knowledge about the planning of the robbery and those who had taken part in it.15
As a memorandum on this highly secretive meeting shows, Hatherill’s informants were clear that those behind this second potential train robbery included some of those connected with the Great Train Robbery the previous August:
MEMORANDUM
1. A meeting took place this morning at Scotland Yard of Metropolitan Police and the Chief Constable on the route of the SWTPO. Mr Morgan Philips, Chief of Police in the British Railways Police, was present and from the Post Office Messrs Wesil, Osmond, Yates (IB) and Shires (LPR) were present. The meeting was called by Commander Hatherill but in fact it was chaired by Mr Bacon Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.
2. The object of the meeting was to discuss a threatened attack on the SWTPO. Commander Hatherill explained that information had been received which suggests very strongly that an attack on this TPO was being planned by criminals some of whom were connected with the gang concerned in the Up Special TPO robbery. The timing of the attack was not known but was likely to be in the early part of the year extending into spring and early summer.
3. For the Post Office we explained what the arrangements were on this train, what amounts were carried and when the peak periods of values carried were likely to be and we stressed that in the present season the greatest amount carried was likely to be tonight. We said that although we had taken certain measures to improve the protection of the sorting coaches on this train, it was impracticable for us to make it impregnable and that in any event some of the measures which we wanted to take could inevitably be carried out only in the longer term. We were bound to rely on the Railway Police and the Police Force through whose territory the train passed for proper protection and on this I stressed the supreme importance of everyone concerned of avoiding another successful attack.
9 January 196416
It was only after the Scotland Yard conference had taken place that Postmaster General Reginald Bevins was told about the new information and how Hatherill intended to combat the threat:
Postmaster General
You will wish to know that the Police have received information which suggests that an attack may take place on the South Western TPO which runs from Weymouth to London. The information is not precise about the date when the attack can be expected, but the early part of 1964 has been mentioned and the threat may hang over us until the spring or even early summer. The attack would be carried out by a large gang at least on the scale of the one that carried out the Up Special robbery on the 8 August.
Yesterday a meeting took place at Scotland Yard of Chief Constables of the police forces along the route of the TPO and adjacent forces. It was chaired by an assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and was attended by the Head of the Crime Department of the British Railway Police. We were represented by members of the administration, the Investigation Branch and the London Postal Region.
The meeting decided to form a working Party of the police forces directly concerned, under the chairmanship of the Chief Constable of Hampshire, to deal with the threat. The first meeting of the Working Party is taking place today at Winchester. We are attending and will, of course, give the Police every assistance. At the same time we have done what we could to strengthen the physical defences of the train, which is not wholly a Post Office train but carries passengers. For the time being Railway Police and Investigation Branch Officers are travelling on the train each night.
We will keep you informed of developments.
9 January 196417
The whole exercise now took on a distinctly melodramatic air by naming it ‘Operation Primrose’. The day after the Scotland Yard conference, another meeting was held in Winchester, the first of the ‘Primrose’ taskforce meetings,18 which pulled in representatives from a wide range of organisations in the areas seen as possible locations for the hold-up.
S E C R E T
‘PRIMROSE’
Meeting of Planning Group held on Thursday 9 January 1964 at West Hill, Winchester
Purpose of Group:
Reliable information of intended robbery of travelling post office Weymouth/Waterloo, one night during the coming 3-4 months.
Agreed:
Object of the exercise would be to ensure that if such an attempt is made those responsible would be apprehended. It follows that all arrangements should be secret and no disclosure to the press of plans in hand. Post Office and Railway Police would take steps to ensure maximum physical security of train and persons travelling thereon. Railway Police travelling on the train might well be employed in plain clothes.
Survey of Railway Line:
In view of the considerable mileage involved, it was pointed out that it was essential to eliminate unlikely areas of attack as far as possible. Mr Duck (Assistant to Traffic Superintendent, SW Line) agreed to supply aerial photographs of route on basis of one master copy of whole route to the Chief Constable, Hampshire, with additional copies to Chief Constables Dorset and Surrey, covering their own areas.
Agreed:
Survey of railway line in each Force area should be carried out forthwith by Police in conjunction with Railway Police and Railway Authorities. In addition to unlikely areas of attack, particularly vulnerable points should be noted. The Chief Constable Hampshire, agreed to set up a special Control Room equipped with communications which would operate each night throughout the period of the running of the train. Other County Forces would, of course, have to make local arrangements for receiving signals and acknowledging but Dorset and Surrey frequencies would be monitored from the Central Control Room. The Chief Constable, Hampshire, would also provide two officers to act as intelligence officers. One of these would be the officer on duty at the appropriate time
in the Central Control Room. These officers would also co-ordinate and disseminate all intelligence received regarding the exercise. They would work in close co-operation with Mr Walker, C11. GPO intelligence at London end would be passed through Mr Walker.
Detective Chief Superintendent Jones would produce a circular for distribution to officers directly concerned showing particulars of two principal suspects, this circular to be distributed to detective officers on vicinity of the railway line. Officers receiving this circular would be strictly instructed as to secrecy.
If suspects seen, not to be interrogated but information passed with code word ‘PRIMROSE’ to Central Operations Room, Hampshire Constabulary. (Note: The two officers appointed are Inspector Childs and Sergeant Head, with direct telephone line at Winchester 61627 in operation from noon on Friday, 10 January. Alternatively, intelligence to be passed to Detective Chief Superintendent Jones or Detective Chief Inspector Stuchfield at Winchester 3333. Preference to be given to the first telephone number.)
ENQUIRIES TO BE SET IN TRAIN
(a) Run-In: The probability was that the criminals would seek to find a run-in within 20 miles of the railway line. Accordingly checks should be made forthwith of all vacant and suitable premises in this area and where agents-reliable arrangements made for the Police to be notified of enquiries regarding purchase or tenancy of such premises.