The ALL NEW Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate

by George Lakoff

  ★ 12 ★

  Metaphors That Kill

  —March 18, 2003, edited July 2014—

  The 2003 version of this chapter appeared just before the start of the Iraq War. It is reprinted here to provide a sense of what the study of framing brought to an understanding of that war before it happened.

  Metaphors can kill.

  That’s how I began a piece on the Gulf War back in 1990, just before the war began. (See georgelakoff.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/metaphor-and-war-the-metaphor-system-used-to-justify-war-in-the-gulf-lakoff-1991.pdf.) Many of those metaphorical ideas are back, but within a very different and more dangerous context. Since the Iraq War is due to start any day, perhaps even tomorrow, it might be useful to take a look before the action begins at the metaphorical ideas being used to justify the Iraq War.

  One of the central metaphors in our foreign policy is that a nation is a person. It is used hundreds of times a day, every time the nation of Iraq is conceptualized in terms of a single person, Saddam Hussein. The war, we are told, is not being waged against the Iraqi people, but only against this one person. Ordinary American citizens are using this metaphor when they say things like “Saddam is a tyrant. He must be stopped.” What the metaphor hides, of course, is that the three thousand bombs to be dropped in the first two days will not be dropped on that one person. They will kill many thousands of people hidden by the metaphor, people that we are, according to the metaphor, not going to war against.

  The Nation as a Person metaphor is pervasive, powerful, and part of an elaborate metaphor system. It is part of an international community metaphor in which there are friendly nations, hostile nations, rogue states, and so on. This metaphor comes with a notion of the national interest: Just as it is in the interest of a person to be healthy and strong, so it is in the interest of a nation-person to be economically healthy and militarily strong. That is what is meant by the “national interest.”

  In the international community, peopled by nation-persons, there are nation-adults and nation-children, with maturity metaphorically understood as industrialization. The children are the “developing” nations of the third world, in the process of industrializing, who need to be taught how to develop properly and must be disciplined (say, by the International Monetary Fund) when they fail to follow instructions. “Backward” nations are those that are “underdeveloped.” Iraq, despite being the cradle of civilization, is seen via this metaphor as a kind of defiant, armed teenage hoodlum who refuses to abide by the rules and must be taught a lesson.

  The international relations community adds to the Nation as a Person metaphor what is called the rational actor model. The idea here is that it is irrational to act against your interests, and that nations act as if they were rational actors—individual people trying to maximize their gains and assets and minimize their costs and losses. In the Gulf War, the metaphor was applied so that a country’s “assets” included its soldiers, matériel, and money. Since the United States lost few of those “assets” in the Gulf War, the war was reported, just afterward in the New York Times business section, as having been a “bargain.” Because Iraqi civilians were not our assets they could not be counted among the “losses,” and so there was no careful public accounting of civilian lives lost, people maimed, and children starved or made seriously ill by the war or the sanctions that followed it. Estimates vary from half a million to a million or more. However, public relations was seen to be a US asset: Excessive slaughter reported in the press would be bad PR, a possible loss. These metaphors are with us again. A short war with few US casualties would minimize costs. But the longer it goes on, the more Iraqi resistance and the more US casualties, the less the United States would appear invulnerable and the more the war would appear as a war against the Iraqi people. That would be a high “cost.”

  According to the rational actor model, countries act naturally in their own best interests—preserving their assets, that is, their own populations, their infrastructures, their wealth, their weaponry, and so on. That is what the United States did in the Gulf War and what it is doing now. But Saddam Hussein, in the Gulf War, did not fit our government’s rational actor model. He had goals like preserving his power in Iraq and being an Arab hero just for standing up to the Great Satan. Though such goals might have their own rationality, they are “irrational” from the model’s perspective.

  One of the most frequent uses of the Nation as a Person metaphor comes in the almost daily attempts to justify the war metaphorically as a “just war.” The basic idea of a just war uses the Nation as a Person metaphor, plus two narratives that have the structure of classical fairy tales: the self-defense story and the rescue story.

  In each story there is a hero, a crime, a victim, and a villain. In the self-defense story the hero and the victim are the same. In both stories the villain is inherently evil and irrational: The hero can’t reason with the villain; he has to fight him and defeat or kill him. In both, the victim must be innocent and beyond reproach. In both, there is an initial crime by the villain, and the hero balances the moral books by defeating him. If all the parties are nation-persons, then self-defense and rescue stories become forms of a just war for the hero-nation.

  In the Gulf War, George H. W. Bush tried out a self-defense story: Saddam was “threatening our oil lifeline.” The American people didn’t buy it. Then he found a winning story, a rescue story: the “rape” of Kuwait. It sold well, and is still the most popular account of that war.

  In the Iraq War, George W. Bush is pushing different versions of the same two story types, and this explains a great deal of what is going on in the American press and in speeches by Bush and Powell. If they can show that Saddam Hussein equals Al-Qaeda—that he is helping or harboring Al-Qaeda—then they can make a case for the self-defense scenario, and hence for a just war. Or if weapons of mass destruction ready to be deployed are found, the self-defense scenario can be justified in another way.

  Indeed, despite the lack of any positive evidence and the fact that the secular Saddam and the fundamentalist bin Laden despise each other, the Bush administration has managed to convince 40 percent of the American public of the link just by asserting it. The administration has told its soldiers the same thing, and so our military personnel see themselves as going to Iraq in defense of their country. In the rescue scenario the victims are (1) the Iraqi people and (2) Saddam’s neighbors, whom he has not attacked but is seen as threatening. That is why Bush and Powell keep on listing Saddam’s crimes against the Iraqi people and the weapons he could use to harm his neighbors. Again, most of the American people have accepted the idea that the Iraq War is a rescue of the Iraqi people and a safeguarding of neighboring countries. Actually, the war threatens the safety and well-being of the Iraqi people.

  And why such enmity toward France and Germany? Via the Nation as a Person metaphor, they are supposed to be our “friends,” and friends are supposed to be supportive and jump in and help us when we need help. Friends are supposed to be loyal. That makes France and Germany fair-weather friends! Not there when you need them.

  This is how the war is being framed for the American people by the administration and the media. Millions of people around the world can see that the metaphors and fairy tales don’t fit the current situation, that the Iraq War does not qualify as a just war—a “legal” war. But if you accept all these metaphors, as Americans have been led to do by the administration, the press, and the lack of an effective Democratic opposition, then the Iraq War would indeed seem like a just war.

  But surely most Americans have been exposed to the facts—the lack of a credible link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda, no WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) found, and the idea that large numbers of innocent Iraqi civilians will be killed or maimed by our bombs. Why don’t they reach the rational conclusion?

  One of the fundamental findings of cognitive science is that people think in terms of frames and metaphors—conceptual structures like those we have been describ
ing. The frames are in the synapses of our brains, physically present in the form of neural circuitry. When the facts don’t fit the frames, the frames are kept and the facts ignored.

  It is a common folk theory of progressives that “the facts will set you free.” If only you can get all the facts out there in the public eye, then every rational person will reach the right conclusion. It is a vain hope. Human brains just don’t work that way. Framing matters. Frames once entrenched are hard to dispel.

  In the Gulf War, Colin Powell began the testimony before Congress. He explained the rational actor model to Congress and gave a brief exposition of the views on war of Clausewitz, the Prussian general: War is business and politics carried out by other means. Nations naturally seek their self-interest, and when necessary they use military force in the service of their self-interest. This is both natural and legitimate.

  To the Bush administration, this war furthers our self-interest in controlling the flow of oil from the world’s second-largest known reserve, and in being in the position to control the flow of oil from central Asia. This would guarantee energy domination over a significant part of the world. The United States could control oil sales around the world. And in the absence of alternative fuel development, whoever controls the worldwide distribution of oil controls politics and economics.

  My 1990 paper did not stop the Gulf War. This paper will not stop the Iraq War. So why bother?

  I think it is crucially important to understand the cognitive dimensions of politics—especially when most of our conceptual framing is unconscious and we may not be aware of our own metaphorical thought. I have been referred to as a “cognitive activist,” and I think the label fits me well. As a professor I do analyses of linguistic and conceptual issues in politics, and I do them as accurately as I can. But that analytic act is a political act. Awareness matters. Being able to articulate what is going on can change what is going on—at least in the long run.

  ★ ★ Part V ★ ★

  From Theory to Action

  ★ 13 ★

  What Conservatives Want

  Liberals tend not to understand conservatives, and their confusion is showing. On the one hand liberals see conservatives in disarray and react with glee at the fragmentation: the Tea Party vs. Libertarians vs. Neocons vs. Wall Street. Eric Cantor, the Republican Majority Leader, brought down by a Tea Party unknown. John Boehner unable to control his majority in the House. Republican primary challenges everywhere.

  On the other hand, liberals are scared stiff of the Koch brothers and other wealthy Republicans bankrolling Republican candidates at every level all over the country. They are scared of a Republican takeover. And they should be.

  Which is it?

  There are real splits, disputes, dislikes, even hatreds among conservatives. Is it tearing conservatism apart?

  Many say yes. The tearing-apart theory is easy to understand and constantly discussed.

  On the other hand, it is also possible that the divisions form a system that welds the diverse parts together. And this may be making conservatives stronger at the nexus points, where views are shared, not weaker.

  The welding-together theory has not been considered, but it is quite possible that this is what is happening among conservatives, at the systems level. Consider the uniformity of opinion among conservatives on everything from Obamacare to abortion to the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision. It is strong, and there are many instances where conservatives of all stripes are fervently against all liberals and all liberal positions. Where they have found common ground fits consistently within their overriding moral framework, and where they have found common ground, their resolve strengthens.

  And if it is true that the divisions among conservatives make them stronger, not weaker, then progressives had better be aware of it.

  No matter what progressives believe about conservative fragmentation, though, they need to understand who conservatives are and what they want, both group by group and on the whole.

  At the heart of conservatism is strict father morality, as we have seen. But strict father morality has complexities and natural variations. What liberals don’t see is that the diversity can give conservatism as a whole considerable strength.

  Different versions of conservatisms are defined by particular domains of interest. Strict father morality applies to all the domains—individual liberty and self-interest, world power, business, and society. These domains of interest characterize libertarian, neocon, financial, and Tea Party conservatives.

  Domain of Interest

  Type of Conservative

  Individual liberty

  Libertarian

  World Power

  Neocon

  Business

  Wall Street

  Society and Religion

  Tea Party

  They have the same general strict father morality, but apply it to the domains that they care about most in different ways. The split is not in the moral theory, but in the domains of interest. With complementary differences, they stand together as one.

  A focus on unimpeded pursuit of self-interest—and with it, extreme limits on state power over the individual—defines the libertarian strain of right-wing thought.

  Neocons believe in the unbridled use of power (including state power) to extend the reign of strict father values and ideas into every domain, domestic and especially international. They are concerned with global financial and military power, and the use of power at home. They sometimes run up against libertarians, who object to the use of governmental power and to global involvements that require the buildup and use of state power.

  Wall Street conservatives are primarily concerned with the acquisition of wealth via the corporate world. They include CEOs and upper management of wealthy corporations, investment bankers, venture capitalists, private asset managers, hedge fund managers, and anyone whose income primarily comes from investments. Such conservatives have many political concerns: tax policy, economic treaties, import-export policy, protection of foreign investments, government contracts, access to minerals on government lands, protection of patents and copyrights, property rights versus environmental rights, energy supplies, control of markets, privatization of public resources, and so on. They tend to work through lobbyists, advertising, and control of the media and public discourse.

  Finally, there are Tea Party conservatives—social and religious culture warriors, who want to act aggressively on every front in the culture war against liberals and progressives.

  On the whole, the right wing is attempting to impose a strict father ideology on America and, ultimately, the rest of the world. Although the details vary with conservative areas of concern, there are general tendencies. Many progressives underestimate just how radical an ideology this is.

  Here is an account of what the radical right seems to have in mind.

  God. Many conservatives start with a view of God that makes conservative ideology seem both natural and good. God is the ultimate strict father—all good and all powerful, at the top of a natural hierarchy in which morality is linked with power. God wants good people to be in charge. Virtue is to be rewarded—with power. God therefore wants a hierarchical society in which there are moral authorities who should be obeyed in each domain: individual power, global power, financial power, social power.

  God makes laws—commandments—defining right and wrong. One must have discipline to follow God’s commandments. God is punitive: He punishes those who do not follow his commandments, and rewards those who do. Following God’s laws takes discipline. Those who are disciplined enough to be moral are disciplined enough to become prosperous and powerful.

  Christ, as savior, gives sinners a second chance—a chance to be born again and be obedient to God’s commandments this time around.

  The moral order. Traditional power relations are taken as defining a natural moral order: God above man, man above nature, adults above children, Western culture above non-Western culture, America
above other nations. The moral order is all too often extended to men above women, whites above nonwhites, Christians above non-Christians, straights above gays.

  Morality. Preserving and extending the conservative moral system (strict father morality) is the highest priority.

  Morality comes in the form of rules, or commandments, made by a moral authority. To be moral is to be obedient to that authority. It requires internal discipline to control one’s natural desires and instead follow a moral authority. What that authority is depends on your domain of interest: the individual, governing institutions—both public and private, Wall Street, conservative society.

  Discipline is learned in childhood primarily through punishment for wrongdoing. Morality can be maintained only through a system of rewards and punishments.

  Economics. Competition for scarce resources also imposes discipline, and hence serves morality. The discipline required to be moral is the same discipline required to win competitions and prosper.

  The wealthy people tend to be the good people, a natural elite. The poor remain poor because they lack the discipline needed to prosper. The poor, therefore, deserve to be poor and serve the wealthy. The wealthy need and deserve poor people to serve them. The vast and increasing gap between rich and poor is thus seen to be both natural and good.

  To the extent that markets are “free,” they are a mechanism for the disciplined (stereotypically good) people to use their discipline to accumulate wealth. Free markets are moral: If everyone pursues his own profit, the profit of all will be maximized. Competition is good; it produces optimal use of resources and disciplined people, and hence serves morality. Regulation is bad; it gets in the way of the free pursuit of profit. Wealthy people serve society by investing and giving jobs to poorer people. Such a division of wealth ultimately serves the public good, which is to reward the disciplined and let the undisciplined be forced to learn discipline or struggle.