C-130 Hercules

by Martin W Bowman

  In the afternoon C-130A 65-0548 in the 21st TAS, 374th TAW from Naha Air Base on Okinawa, temporarily deployed to Cam Ranh Bay piloted by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Delmore was hit repeatedly by small arms fire as it was landing at Khan Duc. The linkage to the power levers on all four engines was damaged and the engines could not be throttled back for the landing so Delmore had to feather all four props so he could set the aircraft down on Khâm Đức’s runway. With the brakes shot out the aircraft veered off to one side of the runway, struck the wreckage of the Chinook that had been shot down earlier and came to rest with its nose stuck in the earth. Twenty minutes later a Marine Corps CH-46 evacuated all five crew out of Khâm Đức. C-130B 60-0297 in the 773rd TAS, 463 TAW temporarily based at Tân Sơn Nhứt and flown by Major Bernard Ludwig Bucher with a crew of six was one of the last aircraft to fly out of Khâm Đức. The aircraft, which was crammed with an estimated 150 Việtnamese irregular troops and their dependants, took several hits and a few minutes later an FAC pilot who was airborne in the vicinity reported that the Hercules had exploded in mid-air and crashed into a ravine about one mile from the camp. Although it was not possible to reach the wreckage the aircraft was completely burnt out and there was no chance of any survivors. Captain Warren Robert Orr, 5th Special Forces Group also died.1

  Captain Bill Barry, whose C-130 had taken off from Cam Ranh and carried palletized cargo to Đà Nẵng and spent two hours waiting for directions as to where to go next was not especially looking forward to flying into Khâm Đức in the face of NVA troops, ‘who clearly surrounded the place and would have been firing directly on us in any further evacuation flights at that point in the afternoon. Finally, at 11:20 in the morning, we were told to return to Cam Ranh and await further orders. We landed at Cam Ranh an hour and ten minutes later and were informed that we were now the number two alert crew for dispatch to Khâm Đức in support of the evacuation mission. We sat for about two hours and then were told to go into crew rest. One crew from our deployed squadron at Tachikawa was new to the theatre and was tasked to take a three-man combat control team (CCT) into Khâm Đức to coordinate the original reinforcement order. Their airplane required maintenance after they were tasked and it wasn’t until later that they finally took off with the CCT aboard. By this time, the camp had been ordered to evacuate, but the C-130 crew did not know it. They landed at Khâm Đức and the CCT drove off the ramp of their plane in a jeep. For all intents and purposes, the CCT were now trapped on a base that everyone else thought had been evacuated. Once the situation became clear to aircraft in the area, a C-123 Provider flown by Lieutenant Colonel Joe Jackson landed in the face of intense enemy fire and took the CCT out again.’2

  It was not until 1630 hours in the afternoon that three C-130s succeeded in evacuating the last of the garrison. Of 1,500 survivors at Khâm Đức, the Air Force succeeded in bringing out more than 500, almost all of them just before the outpost was overrun.

  C-130E of the 50th TAS/314th TAW boarding troops at Đà Nẵng Air Base.

  ‘The evacuation of Khâm Đức was complete and no more crews were needed for that action’ wrote Captain Bill Barry. ‘After a day spent sitting in the cockpit in the heat of Đà Nẵng and Cam Ranh, once we were released from alert I literally skipped off the plane and made for the officers’ club, an early dinner and a goodly number of drinks. Khâm Đức was a cardinal example of the ‘fog of war’ principle. It began with a surprise enemy action, went through two exactly opposite command decisions as to how to respond and, with messed up communications, resulted in both heroism and tragedy. By the time it was over, Khâm Đức cost losses of two C-130s, an A-l Skyraider and five helicopters.’

  That night US aircraft bombed and strafed the camp’s new occupants. Despite the loss of the camp, the evacuation of Khâm Đức stands out as one the most heroic episodes in the history of the war in Việtnam.

  On 18 May Captain Bill Barry left Tachikawa as the navigator on a rapidly configured crew, all of whom had previously spent a thirteen month tour in Southeast Asia. ‘We proceeded across the Pacific in a somewhat random manner. We flew as a deadhead crew to Mactan where we picked up a C-130B that was going back to the US for major maintenance and inspection. Our route home was from Mactan to Clark to ‘CCK’ [Ching Chuang Kang Air Base] in Taiwan and then to Midway Island and McClellan AFB in California. From McClellan, I flew home on a commercial jet. My last tour in support of the Việtnam War was over.’3

  In May 1966 Hercules aircraft were employed in an operation to destroy the giant Long Biên or Ham Rong (‘Dragon’s Jaw’) road and rail bridge over the Sông Mã River, three miles north of Thanh Hòa, the capital of Annam Province, in North Việtnam’s bloody ‘Iron Triangle’ (Hảiphòng, Hànôi and Thanh Hòa). The 540 feet long, 56 feet wide, Chinese-engineered cantilever bridge, which stood 50 feet above the river, was a replacement for the original French-built Bridge destroyed by the Việt Minh in 1945, blown up by simply loading two locomotives with explosives and running them together in the middle of the bridge. The new bridge, completed in 1964, had two steel through-truss spans which rested in the centre on a massive reinforced concrete pier sixteen feet in diameter and on concrete abutments at the other ends. Hills on both sides of the river provided solid bracing for the structure. Between 1965 and 1972 eight concrete piers were added near the approaches to give additional resistance to bomb damage. A onemetre gauge single railway track ran down the 12 foot wide centre and 22 foot wide concrete highways were cantilevered on each side. This giant would prove to be one of the single most challenging targets for American air power in Việtnam. It had first captured the attention of the US planners in March 1965 when the decision to interdict the North Việtnamese rail system south of the 20th Parallel led immediately to the 3 April strike against the bridge. This and the repeated strikes by USAF and USN fighter-bombers, ended in failure and with the loss of sixteen USAF pilots alone.

  The Air Force decided to try mass-focusing the energy of certain high explosive weapons against the stubborn structure using two specially modified C-130E aircraft in the 314th Troop Carrier Wing to drop the weapon, a rather large, pancake-shaped bomb 8 feet in diameter, 2.5 feet thick and weighing 5,000lb. The USAF had undertaken a special project in late 1965 to develop a method of conducting a stand-off attack against bridges in North Việtnam, many of which were heavily protected by anti-aircraft artillery. The primary target of such an operation was the Thanh Hòa rail bridge about nine miles upstream from the mouth of the Sông Mã River in northern Việtnam, one of the longest of the region, rising in the northwest. It flows south-eastward through Laos for about fifty miles, cutting gorges through uplands to reach the plains region at which northern Việtnam begins to narrow. The river enters the Gulf of Tonkin, 65 miles south of Hànôi, after a course of 250 miles. Like the Red River to the north, it has an irregular regime with maximum flow toward the end of the summer. The Ma River delta differs, however, from that of the Red River because of its narrowness and the presence of sandy soil.

  In September 1965 the Air Force Armament Laboratory (AFATL) undertook development of a floating mine, that could be dropped in the river away from the bridge and detonate when it came into contact with it. As part of Project 1559, also known as ‘Carolina Moon’, AFATL’s Technology Branch designed a mine with a 6-foot diameter and an approximate weight of 4,000lbs, of which half was explosive in a focused warhead. The weapon would be dropped from either a C-123 or C-130 aircraft and would feature two 64-foot parachutes to retard its fall. The mine would have two fuses. One of these was modified from that used on the CIM-10 Bomarc surface to air missile. The other was an infrared optical fuse. The radar fuse had a cone of 70 degrees, while the optical fuse had a cone of 3 degrees. Work began on fabricating the weapons in October 1965. The steel mine casings were fabricated at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, an Atomic Energy Commission facility operated by Union Carbide. AFATL’s Targets Division designed and built the optical fuses and the saf
e-and-arm assembly with parts fabrication by a local contractor. The US Army’s Picatinny Arsenal modified thirty BOMARC fuses and the Air Proving Ground Center assembled the weapons.

  10 February 1968 - USMC KC-130F BuNo149813 of VMGR-152 piloted by CWO Henry Wilefang, which was delivering 115/145 avgas to Khê Sanh when it was riddled by .50-calibre machine gun fire during its final seconds in the air and skidded the length of the runway in a fireball when the fuel bladders on board were set alight and the airframe burned out on the runway, killing one crewman and five passengers. A bullet also struck the cockpit and one of the engines caught fire. Struggling to reach them - and to clear the runway - rescue teams fought the holocaust with foam. One rescuer had to be saved when overcome by smoke. Rescuers edged their fire trucks directly against the flaming plane, aiming high-pressure foam at the inferno’s heart. They ignored the danger of the other fuel tanks bursting into geysers of burning aviation fuels. The fire chief without even a mask, had tried to enter the cabin, but its roof collapsed just ahead of him. It had been hopeless from the start. Finally, the rescue team chief, never having found time to put on his mask, stood exhausted by the hulk of the plane and helpless tears streaked down his face. (David Douglas Duncan)

  In the end, twenty live weapons and another ten inert items were produced at a cost of $600,000, in addition to wages for personnel working on the project. The final design had a weight of 3,750lbs, a maximum width of 96 inches and a maximum height of 31.5 inches. In November 1965 preparations were made for testing of the assembled weapons at Eglin Air Force Base. During the tests 75 drops were made into water to develop a working rigging design and dropping procedure. The mine’s sensors were tested separately in dummy mines against a bridge and the boom of a floating crane. The safe-arm device was found to be successful. No full destruction test of the weapon was conducted at Eglin because of lack of suitable facilities. Test data theoretically estimated an equivalent 1 kiloton blast effect approximately 20-30 feet above the weapon.

  Following the tests, an initial operation plan was developed on 28 February 1966. TAWC analyzed the proposed operation and concluded that the chances of success were small because the mines, when dropped far enough upstream to avoid effective anti-aircraft defences, would, run aground. Alternative proposals were said, however, to apparently offer a lesser chance of success and TAWC was directed by Headquarters, USAF to develop an operation plan to support the project. On 4 April TAWC published OPLAN 155, ‘Carolina Moon’ in which two crews (a primary and an alternate) would be trained to conduct the operation using two C-130E aircraft provided by TAC, including one equipped with the AN/APN-161 Ka-Band radar system. The aircraft (64-0513 and 64-0511; the first aircraft being equipped with the specialized radar) were provided by Ninth Air Force. Between 11 April and 15 May Major Richard T. Renners and crew and Major Thomas Franklin Case and crew in the 62nd Troop Carrier Squadron trained at Eglin for the operation. Training included three hours of mission orientation, forty hours of weapon system training, 24 hours of target study, 24 hours of mission planning, 25 hours of day mission training and lastly fifty hours of night mission training. The last two segments involved two and seven weapon drops respectively and the two crews completed a total of fourteen drops.

  The two crews and their aircraft deployed to Đà Nẵng Air Base on or about 19 May where they received additional target information and participated in final selection of the mission profile. On 20 May Pacific Air Forces ordered the execution of Operation ‘Carolina Moon’ by Seventh Air Force. The first mission was conducted on 29/30 May. Both aircraft were sortied, with the second acting as an airborne spare. The C-130s flew very low to evade radar along a 43-mile route - which meant they were vulnerable to enemy attack for about seventeen minutes - and dropped the bombs, which floated down the Sông Mã River until they passed under the ‘Dragon’s Jaw’, where sensors in the bombs would detect the metal of the bridge structure and cause them to detonate.

  Cargo ground crew girls clowning at left side paratrooper door (aft of the wing) of the C-130 at Tân Sơn Nhứt AB, Saïgon in 1972. Note the four mounts at left side of photo for a JATO (Jet Assisted Takeoff) system. The jets would be ignited for a short time during takeoff, propelling the C-130 into the air supposedly and incredibly in as little as a few hundred feet. (Robert D.Young)

  After the first aircraft successfully reached the mouth of the Sông Mã River, the second aircraft was recalled. The first aircraft flew at 100 feet AGL toward the target, with the planned release point of 12,000 feet short of the Thanh Hòa Bridge. A proviso had been inserted into the frag order that said that if the anti-aircraft fire was light the aircraft could continue another 5,000 feet, releasing the weapon 7,000 feet short of the span. The aircraft received light fire and proceeded to the 7,000 foot release point, popping up to 400 feet AGL for thirty seconds prior to the release. After releasing five weapons, the aircraft returned to the previous altitude and departed the area. A flight of four F-4C aircraft were tasked to conduct a diversionary strike fifteen miles south of the bridge as well. Both the C-130E aircraft and the F-4C flight reported heavy anti-aircraft fire in the vicinity of the bridge during the operation. The crew of the C-130E reported that the mission had been a success, but subsequent bomb damage assessment showed no damage to the bridge.

  Concerns about appropriate river flow rate and about compromising the objectives of the operation led to the decision to launch a second strike on the night immediately following, on 31 May/1 June. The ingress route was changed for the second mission, but the final run remained the same. Because the slow-moving C-130Es would need protection, F-4C Phantoms of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon would fly a diversionary attack to the south, using flares and bombs on the highway just before the C-130E was to drop its ordnance. The F-4Cs were to enter their target area at 300 feet attack at 50 feet and pull off the target back to 300 feet for subsequent attacks. Additionally, an EB-66 was tasked to jam the radar in the area during the attack period. The first C-130E was to be flown by Major Richard T. Renners and the second by Major Thomas Franklin Case who had been deployed to Việtnam only two weeks before. Ten mass focus weapons were provided, allowing for a second mission should the first fail to accomplish the desired results. Last minute changes to coincide with up-to-late intelligence included one that would be very significant. Renners felt that the aircraft was tough enough to survive moderate AAA hits and gain enough altitude should hail-out be necessary. Case agreed that the aircraft could take hits, but considered that the low-level flight would preclude a controlled bail-out. In view of these conflicting philosophies and the fact that either parachutes or flak vests could be worn, but not both, Renners decided that his crew would wear parachutes and stack their flak vests on the floor of the aircraft, whereas Case decided that his crew would wear only flak vests and store the parachutes.

  Renners and his crew, including navigators Captain Norman G. Clanton and 1st Lieutenant William ‘Rocky’ Edmondson, departed Đà Nẵng at 00.25 hours and headed north under radio silence. Although the Hercules met no resistance at the beginning of its approach, heavy - though fortunately, inaccurate - ground fire was encountered after it was too late to turn back. The five weapons were dropped successfully in the river and Renners made for the safety of the Gulf of Tonkin. The operation had gone flawlessly and the Hercules escaped unharmed thanks, in part, to the diversionary attack by the two Phantoms and jamming of North Việtnamese radar by the RB-66. Both F-4s returned to Thailand unscathed. Unfortunately the excitement of the C-130 crew was short-lived, because post-strike reconnaissance photos taken at dawn showed that there was no noticeable damage to the bridge, nor was any trace of the bombs found indicating either that the bombs had not detonated or they had not exploded in the right position. A second mission was therefore planned for the night of 31 May.

  The plan for Major Case’s crew was basically the same, with the exception of a minor time change and a slight modification to the flight route. A crew change was
made when Case asked 1st Lieutenant ‘Rocky’ Edmondson, the navigator from the previous night’s mission, to go along on this one because of his experience gained on the first ‘pancake bomb’ mission. C-130E 64-0511 departed Đà Nẵng at 01.10 hours and the two F-4s again flew as a diversion for the Hercules strike. At 0850 Seventh Air Force reported that an F-4C had been lost south of the Thanh Hòa Bridge and that this was one of the aircraft involved in a second diversionary strike related to ‘Carolina Moon’. One of the two F-4C’s backseaters (63-76640) was 38-year old Major Dayton William Ragland, a top USAF fighter pilot during the Korean War and the veteran of many missions in ‘MiG Alley’.4 Having flown 97 combat missions in Việtnam, Ragland was about ready to be rotated back to the US, but agreed to fly in the back seat of the 497th Tactical Fighter Squadron F-4C piloted by 25-year old 1st Lieutenant Ned Raymond Herrold from New Brunswick, New Jersey to give the younger man more combat flight time while he operated the sophisticated technical navigational and bombing equipment. The two Phantoms left Thailand and headed for the area south of the ‘Dragon’, flying at times only 50 feet above the ground. At about two minutes prior to the scheduled C-130 drop time, the F-4Cs were in the midst of creating the diversion when crew members saw AA fire and a large ground flash in the vicinity of the bridge and it was assumed that the aircraft had either been shot down or had flown into the ground or the river. No trace of the aircraft or its crew was discovered despite several reconnaissance missions. During the F-4C attack, Herrold and Ragland’s jet was hit: on its final pass the damaged Phantom did not pull up, but went out to sea, continuing nearly five miles off shore before exploding. The two crew may have ejected before the explosion because a search-and-rescue aircraft discovered a dinghy in the water the following day.