In Flanders Flooded Fields

by Paul Van Pul

  6. Gibson was the secretary to Brand Whitlock, at the time American Ambassador in Brussels.

  7. Exactly 100 years earlier British troops had already landed in Ostend and Nieuport to replace Prussian troops that had ‘liberated’ the then so-called ‘Belgic Provinces’ of the Netherlands from French rule after the abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte in April 1814.

  Chapter IV

  To Leave or Not to Leave

  Early on the morning of 11 October, Baron de Broqueville sent a note to the French Ambassador asking permission for the Belgian government to enter France and install itself, if possible, at Le Havre. For the army he asked hospitality without any further specifications.

  It is interesting to note that in the long declaration from Baron de Broqueville, dispatched by the French Ambassador in Belgium to his government, King Albert himself was not explicitly mentioned. But the reason given for the selection of Le Havre as a possible refuge read:

  With regard to our special friendly terms with England, the resources it provides us with … especially in military matters, the government would like to establish itself in such a manner as to facilitate our connections with our English friends.

  Is there a hint here that the king – and part of his Field Army – in extremis, might want to cross the Channel instead of following the ministers?

  The French Mission at Belgian GHQ in the meantime had warned the Generalissimo that the Belgian Army would enter France and move to the Boulogne/Calais region. Twenty minutes after the arrival of this message, General Joffre had angrily answered that this proposal was unacceptable. Instead he reiterated his Lys River concept and advised General Pau to direct the Belgians towards the Ypres/Poperinghe area. But he left a door open:

  It is up to General Foch to prescribe other measures if the situation seems to be modified. Contact him immediately.

  Indeed, Joffre had just appointed General Ferdinand Foch as his Deputy for the (French) ‘Armies of the North’.

  At 22:00 the Generalissimo forwarded a detailed order to Foch involving, among others, his immediate contacts with the various commanders of the armies in the north. Joffre’s opinion concerning the French relationship with the British and Belgian commanders was expressed as follows:

  Manage to get along with the Marshal [Sir John French of the BEF] regarding General Rawlinson and with General Pau relative to the Belgian divisions … [Our italics]

  What had all of a sudden happened to the words ‘King Albert’ and ‘the Belgian Army’?

  In his orders to Foch, Joffre didn’t seem to be quite sure about the Belgians complying with his directives. At the end of his message to Foch he added subtly:

  I ask the Minister of War to settle as soon as possible the question of command of the Belgian Army.

  It must have been quite irritating to the French Generalissimo that he was not able to give orders directly to the – in his eyes relatively small – Belgian Army as he did to the BEF. Anyway, regarding the latter that’s what he thought he did!

  The British troops were fighting for what he saw as the ‘common cause’ and as such acted within the French strategy. But what Joffre was unaware of was that Sir John French had strict orders from London not to engage in actions that would risk his Expeditionary Force.

  Moreover the French people in general did not grasp the whole concept of Belgian neutrality and the resulting policy. Having observed strict neutrality and having been dragged into this conflict against its will and against international agreements, Belgium did not want to take sides and wanted to continue an independent course.

  By lunch time there was still confusion about the final destination of the Belgian Army. Belgian High Command informed General Pau that the Army would be transferred to the Boulogne/Calais/St Omer region starting the next day.

  As a result it notified the Cavalry Division at 13:00 to move from Ghent to Thielt, some 20km west, ‘in order to be able to cover the march of the army to the southwest tomorrow’. More importantly GHQ also announced the formation of a Second Cavalry Division out of the Groupement Clooten.

  This decision concentrated virtually all Belgian cavalry assets into two divisional units. It is another indication that Albert, King of the Belgians, was preparing for an eventual departure of his infantry for England. The Francophiles among the staff officers at High Command perhaps did not realize this but the royal advisers nevertheless managed to get it ordered. The stage was now set for the Belgian cavalry to eventually cover the embarkation – a vulnerable operation indeed – after which it would be able to retreat into France to join the government in exile. Moreover such a decision would save thousands of horses – still a valuable asset in those days – for which there would have been no room on board a flotilla.

  Nevertheless High Command was overconfident in its appraisal of the situation. On the orders it read:

  … the Second Cavalry Division will probably move to the Thielt region while you [the First Cavalry], no doubt, will move to Roulers.

  Pro-French officers did not have to rejoice for long though: at 14:20 a new order for the cavalry divisions was issued by High Command. In it the move announced to Thielt and Roulers was cancelled and instead the cavalry was ordered to stay closer to Ghent guarding a canal running north from Deynze.

  * * *

  King Albert had a busy day at the Royal Chalet. Apart from the military matters that dominated his days since the beginning of the war there was now the impending departure of his government and the ultimate fate of his army. At 07:00 he asked for information on the naval transports. In Ostend alone some 10,000 wounded were without proper care or medical equipment. He and the queen wanted them evacuated towards safer ground as soon as possible.

  Later in the day the king met twice with the Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Léon Van der Elst and at 16:00 he met with Commander Bulthink, Head of the Nautical College and Professor at the Navigation Academy in Ostend. Baron de Broqueville rounded off the list of dignitaries with a visit.

  A striking list of visitors indeed, and in a logical sequence. Mister Van der Elst was a long-time loyal civil servant, remarkably knowledgeable in foreign relations. Commander Bulthink of course was an expert in naval matters and an intimate friend of King Albert. Baron de Broqueville, as head of the cabinet, had to countersign any royal decision. Again, did they discuss a naval evacuation of the army to England?

  General Foch, informed by Pau of the Belgian intentions, was furious. At 13:15, in a strongly worded telegram to Joffre, he explained that the Belgians were combat-wary, that they refused to follow Joffre’s guidelines – in other words a retreat towards Ypres/Poperinghe – and were only interested in getting away from the enemy. Three quarters of an hour later Joffre ordered the French Mission at Belgian General Headquarters to halt all Belgian troop transports destined for France.

  The latter order by Joffre was apparently not a reaction to Foch’s telegram. It was somehow a simple practical decision: traffic on the rail network of the French Compagnie du Nord was already overstretched due to the arrival of the BEF from Soissons, large domestic French troop transports, the arrival of Belgian recruits and the fact that Dunkirk itself was being readied as an entrenched camp.

  As a result the first train with Belgian soldiers, part of the Second Army Division arriving from Selzaete, was halted in Furnes on its way to Dunkirk. But the situation was now evolving fast. Half an hour later Foch, evidently in an effort to solve this major complication within Allied ranks, reported to Joffre the compromise he had suggested to Pau:

  If the Belgian Army cannot be assembled south of Ostend, with that city as a base, let it then assemble south of Dunkirk, with the latter city as a base; there it can rest and reform.

  In the late afternoon reports arrived at Foch’s headquarters that French troops had retaken Hazebrouck from German scouting parties and were advancing east on Lille, a city that was now besieged by the enemy. This positive news apparently convinced Joffre not only to support Fo
ch’s idea of a concentration of the Belgian forces south of Dunkirk or Ostend, where they would be close at hand, but it also strengthened him in his belief that this Belgian Army had to be under his overall command. At 19:00 he dispatched the following telegram to the French Minister of War:

  I again insist on the necessity to solve the question of command of the Belgian Army. At this moment it is essential for the development of the current manoeuvre that I can give direct instructions to this army.

  Colonel Léon d’Orjo de Marchovelette, Belgian representative at Joffre’s Headquarters, relayed an even bolder account to Belgian High Command:

  They wonder if, under the new conditions, that is the Belgian Army being reduced to a lesser strength and having to work with the Franco-British Armies, the king would not consider to delegate one of his generals to take command of the army …

  Now, with an independent Belgium being reduced to a small strip of territory, King Albert more than ever rejected the idea of relinquishing his command. The only offer he could make to Joffre was that the French Generalissimo should communicate with him directly, in the way Joffre already did with British Field Marshal Sir John French.

  Besides the fact that there did not (yet) exist a unified command – and as such the French and British could not really be considered ‘allied’ – the irony was that Joseph Joffre, at that moment still a general, in a hierarchical sense, could not exactly give orders to Sir John French, who himself was a field marshal!

  It is interesting to note also that in 1918 General John Pershing, Head of the American Expeditionary Force, faced similar pressures from French High Command. He too would adamantly oppose any ‘amalgamation’ of his forces with the French Army.

  All in all the tactical situation had not deteriorated throughout the day. In fact various reports indicated that the land west of Ghent and north of Ypres was still free of Germans. In the east the enemy was still a three-days’ march away. The only threat might come from the Hazebrouck/Lille/Ypres area. But there only light German forces were operating which could be dealt with by guarding the bridges across the Yser river between the French border and the Ypres-Yser Canal. Consequently, there was no need for an urgent retreat and for the time being, the intended restructuring of the army in the Furnes-Ambacht region, as discussed in Eecloo, could go ahead.

  At 17:40 orders were issued for the next day. The First, Second, Third and Fourth Army Divisions were to stay at their present encampments that were, in the same order, Westende, Furnes, Nieuport and Ghistelles (see map ‘12 and 13 October’). The Sixth Army Division was to move west from Dixmude and occupy the bridges across the Yser between the French border and the Loo Canal. The Fifth Army Division finally was to move from Thourout to Dixmude and guard the entrances to this last town.

  Except for the First and Fourth, all army divisions would then be within the Yser perimeter, protected from sudden German intrusions from the south. The First Army Division, still in Westende, could be across the river within hours while the Fourth, 15km out at Ghistelles, was ready to deploy, if necessary, in an advanced position … or perhaps it could be in Ostend within hours to embark for Britain!

  The decision to whether or not withdraw into France having been postponed momentarily suited King Albert and satisfied the Generalissimo.

  At the same time the Second Cavalry Division was in formation in the area Deynze/Thielt: the brigade de cavalerie indépendante had been released by General Clooten and was being reinforced by the cavalry of the Fifth Army Division and other mounted troops. These were mainly two squadrons of Garrison Guides, three squadrons of mounted gendarmerie, two companies of cyclists, a group of horse artillery and divisional transports.

  During the day some confusion arose concerning both cavalry divisions. First, at 13:00 High Command informed the First Cavalry to prepare for a move towards Thielt to be followed, probably the next day, by another transfer to Roulers. The Second Cavalry was to come after. But an hour and a half later the message was cancelled. The First was instead to guard the Lys north of Deynze while the Group Clooten was to stay in place west of the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal.

  The next day, 12 October, the newly formed Second Cavalry left its southern encampments and travelled north to take up positions behind what was left of the Groupement Clooten. This apparent reversal in tactics demonstrates the desire of the king to guard the approaches to Ostend and Nieuport, rather than patrolling the right flank of the Field Army. Perhaps the king anticipated that Rawlinson’s Third Cavalry Division had been assigned this task but on 12 October this division was already moving from Roulers to Ypres, thus exposing the Belgian right.

  12 October

  An hour after the army orders for the next day had been issued a written note arrived, taken from a telephone conversation and emanating from Lieutenant Colonel Colin, Chief of Staff of General Pau, to the French Mission at Belgian General Headquarters. Colin (or Pau?) had agreed with Baron de Broqueville and Colonel Wielemans that the Belgian Army would concentrate in the Nieuport/Dixmude/Furnes area and would be ready for action within forty-eight hours.

  While at lunchtime Pau had still agreed on a withdrawal towards Boulogne, he now expected the Belgian Army to be capable of action within two days! While Joffre, through this government, was trying to ‘dethrone’ the king from his supreme command, he relied on the acquiescent attitude of the Belgian Minister of War and his protégé, the Deputy Chief of Staff, to entice the Belgian Army into almost immediate – and certainly adventurous and perhaps even disastrous – action.

  Meanwhile in Nieuport on the Belgian coast the traffic started to increase. Up until now the war seemed to have been a distant event experienced only by city people in Liège, Brussels and Antwerp. The only reminder that a war was on had been the occasional visit of British patrols, mainly motorized units from Commander Samson’s base in Dunkirk, that would pass by at the locks, on the way to one of their outlying landing strips more east. The only stark reminder of the war was on 3 October when 2,000 Belgian recruits arrived.

  Jules Vermeulen, Parish Priest in Nieuport from 1907 to 1920 described their arrival and subsequent stay as follows:

  On Saturday October 3 all of a sudden 2,000 rookies arrived in Nieuport. That is how they called recruits in 1914. They arrived in their civvies and had left their barracks in Antwerp in great haste since these had been bombarded already. The men were starving and were exhausted. They hadn’t gotten any food the whole day and had slept outside for two nights. As such the citizenry immediately welcomed them fraternally, yes enthusiastically. They filled them up with food and drink and in all schools and public buildings sleeping-places were organized. It was said that they would stay for some time and that they would learn the art of soldiery here. But after three days they suddenly had to leave without even lunch. They had to take the train and tramcar to travel France’s way. After all, it was said, a German Army was on its way through Flanders to capture the young recruits.

  With compassion the people of Nieuport saw the rookies off, not only because everyone had become sympathetic to them but also because this departure spelled doom for all of us.

  Four days after the ‘rookies’ had left, Saturday 11 October, also in Nieuport things were getting even more serious. The city was informed by army authorities to prepare for the arrival and billeting of 10,000 soldiers – mainly the men of the Third Army Division. The Reverend Father Jules Vermeulen again strikingly described their arrival in the city:

  Never have I seen a more sad spectacle. The army passed by in disarray, everything was grimy and slipshod, the superiors looked sorrowful and disgruntled. Soldiers and horses looked totally worn out and on all faces one could read despondency. Every citizen took it to heart to see our army in such a miserable state.

  Everywhere soldiers were billeted – 2,000 on a hastily arranged carpet of straw in the church alone – and by the end of the week all pubs and stores were sold out. On 11 October one peculiar incident happened which we should men
tion.

  In the morning a few Belgian soldiers wandered onto the locks, apparently showing up from nowhere and seemingly without any commanding officer. They got a hold of a couple of steel racks mounted on wooden beams that were meant to manipulate the lock doors. As they got ready to cut the timber to pieces lockmaster Dingens, alerted by one of his aides, arrived on the spot.

  ‘What are you trying to accomplish?’ he asked furiously.

  ‘We want to cook our food.’ the troopers replied.

  ‘But these are my tools!’ Dingens exclaimed.

  The soldiers were imperturbable.

  ‘You can replace them with ropes,’ they said, ‘it will work just as well. By the way, don’t be too concerned, tomorrow the army will take over the place.’

  A discussion followed in which the soldiers finally agreed to return the beams to the lockmaster. But, as they insisted on getting wood to cook their meal, they got a hold of the handles of the ice picks the locksmen used in winter to break up the ice along the gate- and lock doors. Fortunately, soon afterwards the troublemakers disappeared.

  In the afternoon, the four British soldiers that had stayed at the lockmaster’s dwelling for the past four days made preparations to leave. After courteously acknowledging the hospitality of lockmaster Dingens they finally left by motorcycle for Roulers. They were on their way to rejoin Rawlinson’s forces that were now covering the Belgian right flank and were moving from Ghent southwest to Thourout and Roulers.

  They had hardly left when a French speaking second lieutenant and a sergeant of the Belgian Engineers arrived on the scene. With an air of superiority they literally occupied the lockmaster’s office and even prevented him from using his precious telegraph equipment. Dingens protested vigorously: