In Flanders Flooded Fields

by Paul Van Pul

  For the queen the whole naval spectacle was breathtaking:

  The bombardment becomes so powerful that we leave the house and walk up the dune to watch the ships. We can see the flash each time a gun is fired. Between 14:00 and 15:30 it becomes almost unbearable, windows vibrate, we feel the shaking.”

  The Nieuwendamme Sluice in 1992. The piers were still the same but, removing the massive median wall and replacing it with a third lift gate, had enlarged the opening.

  Author’s photo archive.

  As a result of the heavy shelling the German 3rd Reserve Corps decided to hold back its 4th Ersatz Division in front of Nieuport and have its main body pass inland behind the 5th Reserve Division.

  To the south the German attacks were fierce and the weary Belgians lost Mannekensvere, Keyem and Schoore. Once driven in the open fields local commanders desperately organized some counter-attacks and by sunset Keyem, part of Mannekensvere and Schoore were back in Belgian hands.

  The Franco-Belgian cavalry divisions, roaming the countryside east of the Houthulst Wood, could still reach as far as Roulers but the offensive by the British towards Courtrai and the Lys River was not advancing as planned.

  During the day several intelligence reports arrived at Belgian General Headquarters concerning the strength of the German Fourth Army. Among them was the message that the city of Courtrai had been advised by the German occupier to arrange billeting for 30,000 men. The enemy was preparing for a decisive battle.

  Foch, informed that the fighting on the Nieuport-Dixmude front had erupted, sent the Belgian liaison officer attached to his headquarters to Furnes in order to ask the king to hold the line on the Yser at all cost. He also announced that the 42nd Division under General Paul François Grossetti would be able to intervene from 22 or 23 October. But if the Belgians thought that the 42nd would come to reinforce their ranks they were wrong; the French had not yet given up their offensive ambitions along the Belgian coast.

  By noon General Bidon, commanding the French Territorials behind the Ypres Canal, visited Furnes. He too was planning an offensive action, departing on the left from Dixmude, with the fusiliers marins, supported by a regiment of goumiers 3 and his own Territorials on the right. The move would be coordinated with the Cavalry Divisions already operating east of Dixmude. This action was to be a part of the overall plan outlined by Foch in his report to Joffre:

  When the 42nd has arrived it will support the Belgian left; the marines will be in the centre; the Ypres Group will be on the right. Perhaps we can now think of acting…. The morale of the Belgian Army has completely recovered. I hope to use it.

  While the previous attempts by Joffre to gain control over Belgian High Command had failed, Foch was now simply trying to ‘frame’ the Belgians. By interspersing them with French troops, under a vigorous French commander – that would soon prove to be General d’Urbal –, the Belgians would be forced to cooperate with a French offensive.

  By the time evening arrived no enemy had yet been spotted in front of Dixmude. As the Germans seemed to be concentrating their assault in the northern sector, Belgian High Command turned back to its idea of the previous evening. At 18:00 a dispatch was sent to General Bidon asking if it would be possible to direct the French Cavalry Corps, assisted by the Belgian Cavalry in the direction of Thourout, turning north before reaching the town and attacking the enemy from the rear. To protect this move on the left flank, the Belgians asked Bidon to move his Marine Fusiliers from Dixmude north-east and his Territorials to the north of Houthulst Wood.

  Belgian High Command saw this merely as a ‘hit-and-run’ action: only the combined cavalry force would attack the German rear.

  While usually on Sundays Nieuport was a quiet, mostly devout fishing port, 18 October 1914 was totally different: the first German shells whistled overhead and exploded in and around town. Most civilians had fled, the streets were deserted. Only soldiers and officers in their different dark coloured uniforms could be seen galloping, riding or marching through town. Around The Goose Foot the situation grew tenser by the hour.

  In the midst of all this commotion lockmaster Dingens could not refrain from voicing his opinion on the ongoing military operations around his domain. As he saw the carnage approaching he tried to persuade the military, even if it were only the men around him, that their actions were futile. In a discussion with a few soldiers of the guard detachment he tried to convince them that the Belgian Army was not strong enough to withstand the German war machine – that the government would be better advised to offer the Germans free passage without putting up any resistance. Sergeant Henry, upon hearing these defeatist views could not but admonish the lockmaster strongly and forbade him to use similar language in the presence of the soldiers in the future.

  In the morning, 3km south of the locks in the village of Ramscappelle, farmer Pieter Ghewy had attended mass. Pieter owned the Blue House Farm a kilometre north-east of the village. For three days already a battery of Belgian field guns was stationed in his yard but Pieter quickly noticed that the Belgian cannons were no match for the German artillery firing from Mannekensvere across the river. Pieter later wrote down his tale:

  Sunday October 18 after mass I noticed that the Belgian staff was installed at the village school. Determined I walked in and asked if I could talk to the commanding general. The guard did not let me pass but a young officer noticed me and I asked him if I could meet his superior while I showed him my passport. He told me that not everyone could just walk into the general’s office but he asked me to give him the message which he would deliver. I insisted though and finally I was allowed to enter.

  I presented myself as the owner of the Blue House Farm and told the general that from the attic of my house, 30min walking from the river, I could see the enemy positions across the river. If these positions were not inundated immediately the Belgian Army would have to retreat soon.

  Amazed the general looked up at me and asked if such a decision was actually to be taken by a simple farmer. But I insisted and was allowed to continue my story. … I begged him to open the locks in Nieuport at high tide and flood the whole countryside up to Ostend, Ghistelles and even further so the Germans would drown before they would trample us all.

  I told him also that the farm of my grandparents in Oost-Dunkerke had been inundated twice, in 1813 and 1814 to cover the retreat of the French Army. That my grandparents had had to move their cattle into the dunes and that the land had been barren for a few years after the flooding in 1814 with seawater.

  The general informed me that they had been thinking about it but that exactly the fear for ruining the farmland had made them waver. … [Our italics]

  This was a remarkable story from a farmer in the polder indeed. It was another testimony that everyone knew about the military floods - and its consequences … in the past. But not only does it prove that the army did consider this option, it also highlights the fact that High Command feared for the negative environmental impact and its effect upon the livelihood of the local population.

  Monday morning, 19 October, King Albert left La Panne at 8:30 for Furnes. The fog, lingering in the air, produced an icy feeling. But the weather did not prevent the Germans from launching new attacks on the villages of Lombartzyde and Keyem. To reinforce the latter the king ordered a brigade of the Third Army Division to Nieuport, but Keyem fell for the second time. The loss of Keyem was an important tactical defeat. From this locality the enemy had access to the Tervaete Bridge across the river. From here they would be able to aim flanking fire on the men defending the Yser between kilometres 8 and 12 in the so-called ‘Tervaete Loop’ of the river.

  In order to retake Keyem and simultaneously relieve the pressure on Lombartzyde the king decided at 9:00 to launch a counter-stroke from Dixmude to the north. To secure the right flank of this attack the king wanted the cooperation of the French Cavalry Corps towards Thourout. At 10:30 the king put his request to Colonel Brécard. But neither the request from the previous e
vening to General Bidon nor the appeal to Colonel Brécard seem to have had any positive reaction from General Foch. His priority at that moment still seems to have been to cover the left flank of the already stuttering British offensive towards Courtrai in the east.

  Without waiting for a French reply the king ordered the Marine Fusiliers, supported by Belgian artillery, to march from Dixmude towards the village of Beerst, 3km to the north. The Fifth Army Division followed but with the objective of reaching Vladsloo, a village 3km east of Beerst. In the absence of French support the First Cavalry Division was to cover the right flank.

  At first the results were favourable: both villages were retaken. But by four in the afternoon an aerial reconnaissance announced the march of several German columns 4 from the east and north towards the Dixmude area. Simultaneously Belgian and French cavalry were under attack some 10km east of Dixmude. To make matters even worse news arrived that the French Cavalry Corps had been forced to evacuate Roulers.

  Incoming intelligence reports now even indicated that at least four German infantry divisions were marching towards Dixmude. These alarming messages prompted King Albert to recall his small attack force back across the Yser.

  Unlike the Belgians, General Foch was not concerned about the strength of the enemy. In the morning he still cabled the Generalissimo:

  The total enemy forces in this region are estimated at about 10,000 men, very tired and belonging to the most diverse units.

  In the evening, sending in his daily report, Foch reiterated his proposal to mount an offensive with the available French troops, including the Belgian Army, from the coast to Ypres. He explained that he hoped to launch his attack on 22 October after the arrival of the 42nd Division. He expected the Belgians to hold the Yser line until that date and if they did not he would start from the line Furnes-Ypres.

  While shells were now exploding constantly in the Nieuport bridgehead, the British squadron off the coast was again pounding German artillery positions. The sand dunes prevented any point-blank fire but forward observers within the Belgian lines on shore now designated various targets. The bulk of the bombardment was directed against a series of German batteries located between Westende-Bains and Slype. The firing was so fierce that by 14:00 the ships’ ammunition was getting low. Admiral Hood therefore asked to be reinforced with some older gunboats. Such vessels were not suitable anymore for fleet operations but they would still pack a good punch when used in shore bombardment. At the Admiralty the suggestion was immediately adopted and some otherwise obsolete vessels were readied for sailing.

  Undeterred by the British shelling on the one hand and the rain showers falling relentlessly out of the heavy overcast sky on the other, the German infantry advanced steadily along the Bruges Canal. The Belgian forward defenders on the south side of the canal were thinly spread with the result that Kets Bridge, the Old Fort Nieuwendamme and the intermediate Nieuwendamme Sluice were soon lost to the enemy.

  With it any hope of large scale flooding of the right bank of the river, as suggested by Captain Thys, had now evaporated.

  On the opposite, north side of the Bruges Canal, 1,000m downstream, the Belgians withdrew towards the Great Bamburgh Farm. This amalgamation of sturdy old buildings with their vaulted cellars and moat provided a stronghold for the Belgians, but the Germans, advancing along the towpath of the canal, threatened to cut it off from the Nieuport bridgehead. When darkness fell nonetheless the defenders, cooped up in the farm, gave a sigh of relieve: they had kept the enemy at bay – but for how long?

  * * *

  Back in La Panne, King Albert was pessimistic about the situation. It was now certain that the Germans were concentrating on an all-out assault on the Yser line. Without immediate French reinforcements his troops would not be able to hang on to the river-bank. General Foch kept on talking about launching an offensive east of the river by 22 October but meanwhile he had not even provided cavalry support for the Belgian flanking attack. So when Foch bombastically predicted that he would be in Ghent by 26 October the whole affair indeed seemed unrealistic. Didn’t French High Command realize what was really going on in Flanders? And was it worthwhile to go on sacrificing hundreds, even thousands of young Belgian lives?

  The king was so convinced about the desperate situation of his army that, before the royal couple went to bed, he made certain that all their belongings were organized in such a way that they would be able to leave the villa at the slightest notice.

  Early the next morning, 20 October, the Germans opened a heavy bombardment on the Great Bamburgh Farm, followed by an infantry attack supported by several machine guns. Soon the Belgian defenders, in pouring rain, were forced to withdraw towards the Boter Dyke, only 600m from the lock system. Immediately the Germans occupied and fortified the farm buildings. Unfortunately from here they could now strike St Georges, Lombartzyde and Nieuport with direct fire.

  Since Admiral Hood was afraid of a nightly submarine attack, the Dover Patrol flotilla in the evening retreated to Dunkirk. But at 6:30 the next morning eleven British vessels returned from Dunkirk, this time followed, at noon, by three French men-of-war, including the brand new destroyers L’Aventurier and L’Intrépide. They were heavily engaged with the German artillery positioned between Middelkerke and Nieuport.

  As the enemy attack reached its crisis point and the battery at Westende was still firing, Admiral Hood rushed inshore at full speed with all the destroyers, firing rapidly in the hope of creating a diversion. Naval gunners were well accustomed to firing accurately while at speed but Hood counted on the inexperience of the enemy land artillery in coping with fast moving targets. The effect was reported to be good and he kept it up till finally the enemy guns hidden in the dunes got the range. As a result the destroyer Amazon was so badly holed that she was put out of action. Later on targets indicated were a number of heavy batteries in the area of Westende/Middelkerke/Slype: in the late afternoon also the Blokhuis Farm and troop concentrations at Westende-Bains were included.

  British naval support did not end with shore bombardment. During the day the Belgians had asked the Admiral for a machine-gun detachment to work with them ashore against the Bamburgh Farm. Lieutenant Wise of the Severn and twenty-eight men from the naval squadron landed in Nieuport-Bains and proceeded along the Yser Mouth towards the Nieuport bridgehead by mule and cart.

  While the men were heading across the open fields towards the fortified farm the Germans had their rifles trained on them. Chilled Belgian troops in the neighbouring trenches shouted a despairing warning but their Flemish and French words were not understood. At fifty metres from their target the Germans opened fire. The young officer was killed almost instantly together with sixteen of his inexperienced men. In shock and in panic the survivors retreated to friendly lines. After Belgian stretcher-bearers had dressed their wounds temporarily the unlucky party returned empty-handed to the relative safety of their ships.

  To lighten the load on the men defending the bridgehead a battalion of the Third Army Division was dispatched to retake the farm. The men, in reserve in Triangle Wood west of Nieuport, crossed the town on the double: Church Street, Market Square, Long Street, Ypres Street. When they arrived in front of the open land surrounding the locks German observers in a kite-balloon above Mannekensvere spotted the reinforcements. A barrage of fire was laid on the Five-Bridges Road and soon the dead blocked the pavement while the wounded, groaning and crying, tried to crawl for shelter. In the end, after a murderous approach, only eight soldiers and one lieutenant reached the foot of the farm buildings. It had been a useless exercise in bravery. Utterly depressed the men retreated and, surprisingly, made it safely back to the Belgian lines.

  Almost at the same time and only a stone’s throw away, the village of Lombartzyde was also lost to the enemy. A counter-attack by hastily organized reinforcements proved fruitless. In such a precarious tactical situation General Dossin was forced to order the troops in the bridgehead to fall back on a new defensive line, only a
few hundred metres in front of the locks at The Goose Foot. Meanwhile he ordered his engineers to investigate the possibility of establishing footbridges across the Yser mouth, sheltered from enemy view, in case the safe passage on the open Five-Bridges Road became utterly impossible. To this end Major Le Clément and Captain Thys arrived at the locks in the afternoon to investigate the situation at first hand.

  With the Belgian bridgehead so small the Germans now held it by continuous heavy shelling. Any movement around the sluices was promptly answered by machine-gun fire. This situation was becoming too much for the lock personnel and their families still living in the battered houses nearby. Lockmaster Dingens finally gave in to the unbearable pressure and in the afternoon told his loyal staff that they should leave the locks, their homes and gardens and flee. That morning Dingens had phoned his colleague in Furnes, Lockmaster-Collector Victor-Cyrille Kemp, to tell him that he was forced to leave and that he, Kemp, could expect similar treatment from the military soon.

  In spite of the heavy bombardment, one of the aides, Theo Provost, still managed to reach his house, located between the Ypres Lock and the Spring Sluice. While shrapnel had already torn pieces of the front and a machine gun rattled from a position east of Lombartzyde, Theo ran down the brick stairs and into the vaulted cellar to get his wife and children. Sheltered with them were the elderly couple Quyo, the Nieuwendamme Sluice keeper and the family of Constant Dugardein; in all thirteen terrified people. When he reappeared the brave locks man was carrying his crying children in his arms. Theo quickly made his way along the hedges, across the narrow lock doors and into the relative safety of the nearby first row of houses. But halfway in their flight his wife stumbled, fell and fainted. Undaunted Theo ran back, somehow got his wife back on her feet and supporting her they both made it unscathed across the lock doors.