In Flanders Flooded Fields
Page 19
In the Tervaete Loop, despite incessant Belgian artillery support, the situation had been deteriorating steadily. German guns had been brought in close to the eastern river embankment and they now pounded away mercilessly at the crumbling Belgian defence. A hastily arranged but fierce local response failed to throw the Germans back across the river.
By the time a major counter-attack was organized in the afternoon, the enemy strength west of the river had grown to two battalions with a dozen machine guns. Belgian Grenadiers and Carabineers attacked heroically but the flat, treeless landscape did not offer a lot of protection against the murderous bursts of bullets now coming from every direction. The countless waterlogged ditches prevented rapid advance. In the end a handful of brave Grenadiers under the command of Major d’Oultremont managed to reach the river embankment. But it was all in vain. The enemy kept pouring in more infantry and machine guns and the main Belgian assault wave got stuck a few hundred metres from the river. By nightfall, in order to establish a defensive line, the few Belgians left forward had to retreat for the night. High Command had to concede that the vulnerable Tervaete Loop had been lost in its entirety to the enemy.
At 17:00, while the Belgian defence was crumbling in the centre, the generals d’Urbal and Grossetti met King Albert in Furnes. They once more explained their planned offensive. d’Urbal even expressed the wish that the majority of the Belgian Army should follow his move east by crossing the river. The king was not impressed. He in turn aired his misgivings about the feasibility of the project and repeated that his troops were unable to take to the field again. Rather, he wanted to see the existing, shaky defence strengthened.
The king’s remarks did not throw d’Urbal off balance: he distrusted the combative-ness of the enemy and, as a well indoctrinated French officer, engaged in promoting the virtues of the offensive. This behaviour had the opposite effect on the king: he made the wry comment that if that were so, why were the Franco-British forces not yet at the Rhine instead of the enemy occupying Belgium and a large part of France?
In the evening Admiral Hood docked in Dunkirk to meet Colonel Bridges and the French Admiral Favereau, recently appointed commander of the French forces in the Channel. The British squadron was now being considerably strengthened: the old Apollo class cruisers Brilliant and Sirius and the sloops Rinaldo and Wildfire were arriving in Dunkirk. Since the British Fleet was now providing escort services world wide for various large army convoys from all over the Empire and bound for Europe, it was stretched to the limit. So any reinforcement that the Dover Patrol could get was greatly appreciated. Winter was approaching and Hood had to point out that a sudden northerly gale would probably force an end to the involvement of the monitors and the gunboats.
But the French offensive now in the works justified taking a risk. The cooperation of the British squadron was essential to the planned drive along the coast. By recovering Ostend the French would not only reopen the port to British reinforcements but they would also deprive the Germans of naval support on their right flank.
While Hood and Bridges were conferring with Favereau the order from General d’Urbal for his offensive towards the north-east arrived at Belgian General Headquarters. It stipulated three main drives: the first from Ypres towards Roulers with three French divisions in accordance with the British left attacking towards Courtrai; the second thrust would depart from Dixmude to Thourout with the fusiliers marins and the Belgian right; the third pointed from Nieuport to Ghistelles with the French 42nd and the Belgian left. The king’s advisors were stunned. Where Joffre and Foch had not succeeded in laying their hands on the Belgian Army, now it was d’Urbal’s turn to give it a try.
Reality forced Wielemans to send Colonel Brécard to d’Urbal informing him that the Belgians would not be able to comply. Instead he asked the general to direct his 42nd Division towards the centre of the Belgian front rather than to Nieuport. But Brécard returned empty handed. Reluctantly General Headquarters issued a new Army Order at 02:15 on the morning of 23 October, asking the troops in the Nieuport bridgehead to:
… cover the exit for the French 42nd Division; for the Marine Fusiliers and Belgian detachment in Dixmude to prepare for an offensive, … but that they would have to wait for orders through the intermediary of the commander of the Fifth Division; that the other troops keep their current mission until the situation in the Tervaete Loop has cleared.
Again a seaside view of the Spring Sluice but this time from a lower angle (see picture p. 126). On the left a set of flap doors installed during the war by the inundation company to replace the regular doors and stop planks that were systematically destroyed by the enemy artillery.
Nieuport 1914–1918, R. Thys, 1922.
In fact this order was a mere delaying tactic. Belgian GHQ was sitting on the fence, waiting for the inevitable to happen.
After the icy morning fog had dissipated, Major Le Clément and Captain Thys returned to the Spring Sluice. To their satisfaction they discovered that a large part of the Nieuwendamme Polder was flooded. Via the culvert under the Yser the water was even up to the village of St Georges and the Bruges Road. To make sure that the flood was maintained François was ordered to open the lift doors at each rising tide to raise the water level even more. This was done until 26 October when his guard detachment left the locks.
As pointed out earlier the Germans were theoretically able to drain the water via Ostend. This initial flooding should have been an omen for them of what was possible in this low lying part of the country. But fortunately the German Army Staff never realized what could happen. The reader will find more about the reasons why they ignored this sign at the end of the book.
The next day, Friday 23 October marked the sixth day of relentless combat for the Belgian troops. During the night the small bridgehead at Schoorbakke had become untenable because of the enemy machine guns that were now taking the men under flanking fire. Before daybreak the defending battalion of the 4th de Ligne Regiment evacuated the bridgehead and blew up the Schoorbakke Bridge. But by now the Germans were already building footbridges in several locations. Soon afterwards the 3rd de Ligne had to stop an enemy attempt to break out from the Schoorbakke hamlet, a few houses leading to the river levee by the bridge with the same name.
With regard to the French offensive the results were not encouraging and seemed to be more consistent with what the Belgians had anticipated. In Ypres, where the French Ninth Corps was supposed to attack, the British were still awaiting the latter’s arrival, while in Dixmude a more realistic Admiral Ronarc’h was of the opinion that:
The French Rear Admiral Ronarc’h, commander of the Marine Fusiliers Brigade. After their heroic defense of Dixmude the brigade would often lend a helping hand to the Belgian inundation company at the Goose Foot in Nieuport.
Onze Helden, R. Lyr, 1922.
… An offensive undertaken with exhausted troops will lack vigour … and that… the offensive will be halted at a hundred metres from its starting line … because of the proximity of the German trenches.
The enemy was certainly not cooperative: the whole morning the town of Dixmude and the river embankment north and south of it were bombarded with shrapnel and high-explosive shells. Around 12:00 an infantry attack followed after which, between 16:00 and 17:00, the shelling resumed.
From 22:00 the 84th Brigade and one battalion of the 83rd, both from the French 42nd Division crossed the lock system in Nieuport and the Yser Mouth by means of makeshift footbridges. While they were advancing through the dunes towards Lombartzyde and Westende the German artillery opened up heavy shelling and the infantry made a violent attack on the Belgians in the front line. The latter, driving them back with the help of the British naval artillery in turn managed to capture two machine guns and a lot of prisoners. But the French were not able to get far beyond the Belgian lines. The heavy packed poilus had trouble advancing in the loose sand of the dunes. Although they made some progress towards Westende they came to a halt in front of B
amburgh Farm.
General d’Urbal was completely frustrated with the Belgian unwillingness to take the offensive. He made this clear in his report to Foch at 9:25:
Following its operational order the Belgian Army attacks little or not at all. It is necessary that it attacks, if only because it was to put on airs.
Yesterday I attacked on my front and thanks to this, not only did I keep the position on the Yser intact, but I also gained terrain.
It will be the same for the Belgian Army if it attacks. If it stays passive on the Yser it will end up being pierced at one point or another.
For days the British naval squadron had been in a serious dilemma. The planned French advance on Ostend required any help the ships could give but they could never do their utmost if they were in ever-present danger of submarine attack. As long as Ostend was open to German vessels the sea would not be safe for an hour. As such the Admiralty wanted to bombard the harbour and disable its facilities. On the other hand, if the advance was to achieve its ultimate objective, Ostend had to be left intact as a port of re-entry for the army. Finally, at 12:00 on 23 October Admiral Hood was authorized by Belgian High Command to shell the port.
Back in Britain steps were being taken to minimize the risk run by the squadron. Trawlers with anti-submarine sweeps were sent across and another division of destroyers was dispatched. Barges with nets were being equipped for the protection of the larger ships when in action. At midnight the Admiral did receive specific orders from London on how to destroy the Ostend docks and railway station. Meanwhile block ships for closing the port were being prepared and Hood was to report on the feasibility of running them in under protection of his vessels and sinking them in the entrance to the harbour.
This scheme was actually not implemented until 1918. Then, on 23 April, the aforementioned Brilliant and Sirius, now transformed into block ships, headed for Ostend but due to German trickery with the buoys both vessels ran aground east of the harbour entrance. Another attempt on 10 May, with the cruiser Vindictive, was nevertheless more successful.
On both sides of the front the guns thundered violently the whole day. There was no better panoramic view of these dramatic events along the Yser river than from atop the church tower in Furnes. Since it was a clear sky it came as no surprise that during the day King Albert himself climbed the steep stone steps and watched through his binoculars the artillery duels raging some 12km away.
At the edge of the Tervaete Loop, the 8th de Ligne managed to hold on to Tervaete hamlet until 12:00 and then it, too, had to withdraw through the open fields towards Vicogne Farm. From there the front line now ran to the village of Stuyvekenskerke and then towards the Schoorbakke Bridge, leaving the entire bend in enemy hands.
Maurice Duwez, pen name Max Deauville, who was medical officer with the 1st battalion/1st Carabineers and treating many wounded in a lean-to on a farm in Stuyvekenskerke wrote later:
… All those with whom we have spend such hard times, we have seen them return mutilated, bleeding and with torn uniforms. Almost the whole battalion has been wiped out. Three of our officers have been left on the battlefield. Among them the elderly commander who always had this ironic smile on his face. … And the procession continues, the vast plain will always surrender its victims.
A few kilometres further north, in the village of St Georges, the 7th de Ligne Regiment had been resisting the German shelling with heavy calibre grenades for four days but unfortunately all along the front, exhaustion was taking its dangerous toll.
As a result the Deputy Chief of Staff informed Colonel Brécard at 18:15 that:
… all efforts have been made to restore the line or to limit the retreat. Because of the exhaustion of the troops and the lack of reserves, it is to fear that an enemy attack made tonight or tomorrow morning will widen the gap and completely break the Belgian centre. If this happens we face a retreat.
In the late afternoon Major Le Clément was at the locks again and explained to Lieutenant François a new hydraulic manoeuvre he would have to execute during the night. The guard detachment would have to lift the five double gate paddles at the Ypres Lock simultaneously at ebb tide in order to create a strong current in the narrow canal. It was hoped that this sudden suction would destroy the enemy footbridges across the river by pulling them from their moorings. Later in the evening Le Clément sent François the following order:
The manoeuvre to be executed by means of the gate doors on the canalized Yser, as I explained to you at 17:00, cannot be realized yet. Continue to study and prepare it. You will receive the executive order in due time, either directly from General Headquarters, or by my intermediary. 19:45. October 23.
Back at General Headquarters Colonel Wielemans, in the evening added to his earlier statements to the head of the French Mission, that a French offensive on the left flank looked quite risky. Instead he recommended that an energetic action by the largest number of troops of the 42nd in the Tervaete Loop could re-establish the now precarious situation and ‘… transform into a success that tomorrow could, on the contrary, become a rout’.
Belgian lancers on the beach at high tide, awaiting further orders.
Thys Family Archive.
Shortly afterwards an intelligence message arrived in Furnes from Foch’s headquarters putting the enemy strength in the Tervaete Loop at five and a half battalions. This persistent tendency to belittle the Belgian military effort and the repeated refusal to send any large reinforcements was now more than the king could take. He dictated a strong worded dispatch destined for French High Command. In his message the Commander-in-Chief recalled the events of the previous days and the role his army had played in resisting the German advance without any French help. He also reminded the Generalissimo about the promises that had been made and as a result of which the Belgian Army had now used up all its reserves. He protested against the constant French practice, since the beginning of the war, of downplaying the forces of the enemy facing the Belgians.
It is interesting to note that although the monarch also referred to the British forces, he did not mention them by name. He clearly wanted to aim solely for the French High Command’s high-handed attitude. Now that the situation had again become uncertain, perhaps he regretted his earlier decision to stay on national soil instead of embarking for the United Kingdom.
Fortunately for everyone concerned the message was never sent, for Colonel Brécard arrived with the news that General d’Urbal had finally given in to the repeated Belgian requests. He had ordered General Grossetti to leave one brigade of the 42nd Division in Lombartzyde and take the other two, including all divisional artillery, to the village of Pervyse in front of the Tervaete Loop. There he was expected to launch an attack, together with Belgian troops, early next morning.
At 23:30 Foch cabled Joffre that the 42nd had taken Lombartzyde. Trivializing the Tervaete Loop debacle he continued:
… Tomorrow this division will send a detachment to stop the Germans that have crossed the river south of Schoorbakke. Situation good. Tomorrow the attacks will be reopened with the 42nd Division and the 9th Corps.
Sometimes one gets the strong impression that Ferdinand Foch ‘fed’ Joffre a self-censored version of the situation. The bigourdan was a smart man: not only did he know how to deal with his subordinates and get the best out of them, he also knew how to approach his superiors. The situation in the north was indeed shaky so the next day he himself visited Furnes to evaluate the conditions firsthand.
An hour and a half later Colonel Brécard sent in his daily report to the Generalissimo. His assessment of the situation was more down to earth:
… In the centre the enemy has progressed significantly. He arrived at 500m off Pervyse and now occupies Schoorbakke and Stuyvekenskerke. As I judged the situation as serious, I referred to the Generals Foch and d’Urbal. It has been decided to proceed this morning with a counter-attack on the Yser bend by the 42nd. Four 120-mm batteries arrived yesterday night.
The Belgian a
rtillery itself got a much-needed boost by the French. In the Carnet des Officiers d’Ordonnance [AKP #AE 530/1] we read for that day:
A great deal of French artillery (120-mm guns and 155-mm howitzers) is put at the disposal of the Belgian GHQ.
The same evening Major Maglinse, Head of Operations told Captain Commandant Nuyten to stay at the disposal of General Grossetti. As such Nuyten, shortly after midnight, accompanied the French general to Pervyse by car. One and a half kilometres before reaching Pervyse, immediately after they had crossed one of the main vaarts of the region, they turned north onto a muddy farm road and reached the headquarters of the First Army Division. It was 03:00.
Here, at Vogelsteen Farm and in the dead of night, Grossetti discussed the tactical situation with his Belgian counterpart, General Baix. Grossetti estimated that he could only spare four battalions and six batteries to send to the centre. Moreover, he was interested to know what forces the Belgians could add to support his action. After consultation, High Command agreed to release the only Belgian reserves left: the four battalions of the Second Army Division that had been withdrawn from the Nieuport bridgehead when the French had arrived. After the meeting Grossetti dictated his orders for the coming attack and had them immediately distributed to his units.
Chapter X
The Railway Embankment
In the morning of Saturday 24 October the overall situation looked grim. Despite the fact that they had been bombarded the whole night by French and Belgian artillery, all the infantry of the German Sixth Division had crossed into the Tervaete Loop. Due to the relentless Franco-Belgian shelling however, no German guns had been ferried across.