Hezbollah

by Levitt, Matthew

  Near Qish, a ferry commanded by a Mughniyeh deputy, Hajj Bassem, approached the Karine A in Iranian waters, and the process of loading the weapons—stored in eighty large wooden crates—from the ferry to the Karine A began. Hajj Bassem personally oversaw the transfer, according to Israeli and US accounts. Meanwhile, one of Bassem’s men aboard the ferry trained a member of the Karine A’s crew to configure the submergible flotation devices in which the weapons would ultimately be delivered.146

  The plan was to pass through the Suez Canal and unload the weapons onto three smaller boats, which would then approach the coast and drop the waterproof containers off the shore of El Arish in the northern Sinai and the Gaza Strip just to its north. The containers, designed in Iran specifically for weapons smuggling, would float just below the surface, where they would remain until retrieved, all the while invisible from above water. But mechanical problems resulted in slight delays for the ship, including a return to the port of Hodeidah, Yemen. Unbeknownst to the smugglers, Israeli intelligence caught on to the plot and planned a raid several hundred kilometers away from the Suez Canal.147

  The Karine A episode stands out not only for the magnitude and audacity of the arms Iran attempted to smuggle but for the quality of these weapons as well. The weapons seized aboard the Karine A were described as “force multiplier weapons systems” that would have drastically shifted the balance of power between Israeli forces and Palestinian militant groups. The weapons included 107-and 122-millimeter rockets and launchers with ranges of up to twenty kilometers, antitank launchers, 120-millimeter mortars, antipersonnel mines, and more. Some of these arms still bore serial number markings revealing they were produced in Iran in 2001. By some accounts the money needed to purchase both the ship and the arms was underwritten by Iran, while the ship’s operational expenses (crew salaries, insurance payments, etc.) were covered by the Palestinian Authority.148 But according to another account, the Palestinian Authority paid $15 million for the apparently discounted weapons themselves, but Hezbollah footed the $400,000 bill for the boat, purchased by a Palestinian Authority official.149 Asked who he thought sent the weapons, the Palestinian captain of the Karine A replied, “I believe it was from Hizballah.”150 Speaking before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, in February 2002, European Union head of foreign affairs Javier Solana described the Karine A as “the link between Iran and the PA [Palestinian Authority].”151

  While it is by far the biggest smuggling plot thus far funded by Iran, the Karine A incident is by no means the only one. Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command were both involved in other maritime smuggling efforts involving the Santorini and the Calypso-2, which between them made three successful smuggling runs to Gaza and the Egyptian Sinai—in November 2000 and twice in April 2001—before a fourth attempt was thwarted by the Israeli Navy in May 2001.152 In May 2003, the Israeli Navy intercepted the Abu Hassan, a fishing vessel on which Hezbollah was attempting to smuggle to Palestinian militants thirty-six CD-ROMs featuring bomb-making instructions, detonators, and a radio activation system compatible with rockets, suicide bombs, and remote-controlled explosives. The Israeli commandos also captured Hamad Abu Amar, a Hezbollah explosives expert, on board the boat.153

  Six years later, in January 2009, Sudan’s continued role as the preferred weapons smuggling route in the region was exposed when Israeli fighter-bombers, backed by unmanned drones, destroyed a twenty-three-truck convoy traveling through the Sudanese desert carrying arms destined for Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The arms arrived at Port Sudan and were loaded into the vehicles for the cross-desert trek. Iran’s role in the plot was confirmed when news broke that several Iranians were reportedly killed in the airstrike.154 Two years later, another Israeli airstrike targeted a car some fifteen kilometers south of Port Sudan, killing both passengers. One of them, according to press reports, was a Sudanese citizen; the other was a senior Hamas military commander.155 In October 2012, four aircraft—presumably Israeli—bombed a Khartoum weapons factory reportedly run by the IRGC.156 In the words of one analyst, Sudan offers “a very practical supply route for the Iranians to use.” Sometimes it is not just a route for transporting weapons but also a place to procure them. “The arms market in Sudan is thriving and acts as a very easy way for Iran to send agents, mainly though Hezbollah, to come under false passports into Sudan, buy those arms, and transport them primarily via trucks across Sudan and into the Sinai Peninsula” and from there to the Gaza Strip.157

  Colluding with Sunni Extremists in East Africa

  By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hezbollah operatives began appearing in areas where Sunni Islamist groups were operating. For example, a 1987 CIA report documented Hezbollah’s propaganda ties to Egyptian extremists. “Although logistical ties probably are extremely limited and are likely to remain so,” the CIA noted, “for Hezbollah and its Iranian patron closer public ties and apparent cooperation with radical Sunni groups constitute a valuable propaganda success underscoring their commitment to Islamic unity.”158 Within a few short years Hezbollah would be cooperating much more closely with Sunni extremist elements in Africa.

  In November 1993, reports emerged indicating that several Hezbollah operatives, including car-bomb experts, had arrived in Mogadishu and “could be planning car bomb attacks on U.S. and U.N. forces in Somalia.” According to US officials, hardline followers of Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed had established ties to Hezbollah.159

  Thirteen years later, a few months after the end of the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the United Nations revealed that during the war Somalia’s radical Islamic Courts Union (ICU) dispatched approximately 720 experienced militants to Lebanon to fight alongside Hezbollah against the Israeli military. “One of the criteria of the selection process,” the UN monitoring group reported, “was individuals’ combat experience, which might include experience in Afghanistan.” Only eighty or so members of the Somali militant force returned to Mogadishu after the fighting ended, some of whom were wounded and received medical care at a private hospital the United Nations described as “operated and secured” by the ICU.160

  In early September, the United Nations reported, around another twenty-five Somali fighters returned home, accompanied by five Hezbollah members. The UN report did not specifically say what business the five Hezbollah members had in Somalia, though it did note elsewhere that “the Hezbollah movement (operating in Lebanon) has provided military training to ICU and has made arrangements with other States on behalf of ICU for the latter to receive arms.” Among the Somali fighters who had not returned home, the report added, “a number” extended their stays in Lebanon to attend advanced military training courses provided by Hezbollah.161

  Hezbollah’s presence in Somalia from the 1990s until the present day mirrored a larger shift in the group’s operations and fundraising activities from West to East Africa, with a particular emphasis on Sudan. In the mid-1990s, according to former CIA chief George Tenet, Hassan Turabi, the leader of the Sudanese National Islamic Front, not only hosted terrorist conclaves and allowed terrorists to run training camps in Sudan but also facilitated the travel of North Africans to Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon.162

  According to the State Department’s 1999 global terrorism report, Sudan continued to serve as “a meeting place, safe haven, and training hub” not only for Hezbollah but for members of al-Qaeda, the Egyptian terrorist groups al-Jihad and al-Gama’a, and a variety of the Palestinian terrorist groups.163 By rubbing shoulders in Sudan, where they enjoyed safe haven and openly engaged in terrorist training, such groups sometimes developed unlikely relationships.

  One such relationship began when Hezbollah and Iran established contacts with senior al-Qaeda members in Sudan in the 1990s. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “while in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaeda maintained contacts with Iran and the Iranian-supported worldwide terrorist organization Hezbollah.” Intelligence, the 9/11 Commission found, “ind
icates the persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after Bin Laden’s return to Afghanistan.” In fact, following the successful al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbor in October 2000, Iranian officials reached out to al-Qaeda in a “concerted effort to strengthen relations,” according to the 9/11 Commission Report.164

  In 1991 or 1992, the 9/11 Commission determined, “discussions in Sudan between al-Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support—even if only training—for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives.” Yet another delegation trained in explosives, intelligence, and security procedures in Hezbollah camps in Lebanon in fall 1993, the commission remarked.165 As part of their agreement, the CIA noted, “experience from Hezbollah and Iran should be transferred to new nations/extremist groups who lack this expertise. This would then allow [bin Laden’s] Islamic Army members [al-Qaeda] to gain the necessary experience in terrorist operations.”166

  Al-Qaeda and affiliated Egyptian terrorist groups sought to gain operational knowledge from Hezbollah and Iran in order to advance their own capabilities. Ali Muhammad, an Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative who was also involved in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, pointed to Hezbollah’s success in the 1983 bombing of the marine barracks at Beirut International Airport and explained that both al-Qaeda and EIJ wanted to learn how to replicate such attacks.167

  Seeking to achieve such objectives, al-Qaeda and EIJ operatives held a series of meetings in Sudan with their Iranian and Hezbollah counterparts. Ali Muhammad described one particular meeting between Hezbollah’s international operations chief, Imad Mughniyeh, and bin Laden. According to Muhammad’s testimony following the meeting, “Hezbollah provided explosives training for al-Qaeda and al Jihad [EIJ]. Iran supplied Egyptian Jihad with weapons. Iran also used Hezbollah to supply explosives that were disguised to look like rocks.”168

  Yet while Sudan and Iran built ever-closer ties, Khartoum’s relationship with Hezbollah eventually seems to have soured. In summer 2006, just after Hezbollah’s war with Israel, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir publicly commended “the steadfastness of Hezbollah under the leadership of Nasrallah.”169 Three years later he praised Hezbollah again, saying, “We trust Hezbollah and its leadership and we consider them a genuine resistance group deserving respect and honor.”170 But in the same year, in a first-ever acknowledgment of Sudan as a weapons-smuggling route, a Sudanese diplomat in Egypt claimed that Sudanese rebel groups in the country’s south may have partnered with Hezbollah to facilitate weapons smuggling through Sudan. “The suspicions of [Hezbollah] dealing with rebel groups that are spread all over Sudan are real since these movements do not recognize the national sovereignty in the first place,” he said.171 A year later, perhaps trying to placate the central government in Khartoum, Hezbollah came to President al-Bashir’s defense after the International Criminal Court indicted him for the second time, this time for genocide. In a statement posted on a Hezbollah website, Hezbollah expressed “complete solidarity with Sudan—with its president, its government, and its people—over the new allegations leveled against the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, by the International Criminal Court.”172

  But that was not all. Also in 2010, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah reportedly offered to put Hezbollah fighters at the disposal of the Sudanese government to confront what Nasrallah described as “the colonialist forces in Darfur.” There is no evidence the offer, apparently made in a letter to the governor of Northern Darfur, was acted upon, but the governor seems to have responded positively. “Darfur is a land in which Islam runs deep and we are more than eager to support the Palestinian and Lebanese causes though Jihad and martyrdom,” the governor reportedly replied. Echoing a typical Hezbollah mantra, he added, “This is not religious extremism, rather the defense of rights of the oppressed around the world.”173

  And then something changed, albeit quietly. No announcement was made, but sometime in 2010 Sudan reportedly added Hezbollah to its list of terrorist groups and organizations. According to press reports, a US diplomatic cable dated December 26, 2010, noted the addition to the secret Sudanese government lists, which, the cable stressed, are not published and are available only through personal connections with officials from Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service.174 At the time, Sudan was working hard to win Washington’s good graces. Though weapons smuggling for Hamas, in particular, and other support for terrorism continued, the State Department reported in 2010 that Sudan remained a cooperative partner in actively targeting global jihadist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.175 Sudan remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, however, and it is not clear if Sudan’s designation of Hezbollah—if, in fact, the cable documenting the unpublished list is accurate—ever led to any concrete action by Sudan targeting Hezbollah.

  Information pointing to continued Hezbollah and al-Qaeda ties persisted through September 11. “Circumstantial evidence” indicates that senior Hezbollah operatives were “closely tracking” some of the September 11 hijackers’ trips into Iran in late 2000. For example, in November 2000, September 11 hijacker Ahmed al-Ghamdi traveled to Beirut on the same flight as a senior Hezbollah operative. In addition, three of the September 11 hijackers, Wail al-Shehri, Waleed al-Shehri, and Ahmed al-Nami, flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then to Iran. On their flight to Iran, a senior Hezbollah official traveled on the same plane. According to the commission report, “Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were expecting the arrival of a group during the same time period. The travel of this group was important enough to merit the attention of senior figures in Hezbollah.”176 While the 9/11 Commission found no evidence that Iran was “aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack,” it cited “strong evidence” that Iran facilitated al-Qaeda members’ travel—including that of some of the September 11 hijackers—through Iran to Afghanistan.

  Hezbollah’s African Narco-Terrorism Connection

  One area in which groups affiliated with both Hezbollah and al-Qaeda are now active is smuggling drugs through Africa. A particularly lucrative means of terrorist financing, the African narcotics pipeline has secured the immediate attention of intelligence and law enforcement officials around the world. In late February 2012, Yuri Fedotov, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, informed the UN Security Council, “The West African transit route feeds a European cocaine market which in recent years grew four fold, reaching an amount almost equal to the U.S. market. We estimate that cocaine trafficking in West and Central Africa generates some $900 million annually.”177

  A year earlier, in February 2011, US director of national intelligence James Clapper testified, “Drug trafficking continues to be a major problem in Africa.” Speaking in the context of his annual US intelligence community worldwide threat assessment, Clapper highlighted “the emergence of Guinea-Bissau as Africa’s first narco-state” in an effort to “highlight the scope of the problem and what may be in store for other vulnerable states in the region.”178 The drugs flowing through the small West African nation were not African in origin. With almost no drug cultivation or production of its own, Guinea-Bissau hosted only the corruption and lawlessness that made it an attractive transit route for traffickers of South American narcotics. Drugs from Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela—and some from elsewhere in Africa—pass through Guinea-Bissau en route to southern Europe, according to the State Department’s 2010 counternarcotics report.179

  At least some of this activity, according to Interpol and UN reports, involves Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. “Cocaine traded through West Africa accounts for a considerable portion of the income of Hezbollah” and other terrorist groups, according to one report. Hezbollah leverages Lebanese Shi’a expatriate communities in South America and West Africa “to guarantee an efficient connecti
on between the two continents.”180 Speaking in April 2009, Interpol secretary-general Ronald Noble acknowledged that law enforcement efforts “dismantled cocaine-trafficking rings that used their proceeds to finance the activities of the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and Hezbollah, while drugs destined for European markets are increasingly being channeled through West African countries.”181

  The drug smuggling threat came into focus in spring 2007, when two cocaine shipments from South America—each around 630 kilograms—were seized in Africa, one in Guinea-Bissau and the other in Mauritania.182 By April 2010, the problem had become so endemic that the US Treasury Department felt compelled to designate Guinea-Bissau’s former navy chief of staff and its then–current air force chief of staff as drug kingpins. Among other activities, the two officials were “linked to an aircraft suspected of flying a multi-hundred kilogram shipment of cocaine from Venezuela to Guinea-Bissau on July 12, 2008,” according to the Treasury Department.183 Then, in November 2009, an unmarked Boeing 727-200 commercial jet mysteriously crashed in the northern Mali desert some ten miles from a makeshift airstrip. Though completely burned out, the aircraft was suspected by authorities to be carrying a massive shipment of drugs, with a plane that size capable of carrying up to ten tons of narcotics. The mystery was compounded by the revelation that Mali’s aviation authority was barred from investigating the crash for more than three weeks, and Mali’s police counternarcotics unit was not allowed to investigate the crash at all. The entire investigation was run by Mali’s secret intelligence service. In the wake of these episodes, American and British diplomats drafted cables expressing heightened fears about “the prospect of al-Qaida and Hezbollah exploiting the region’s UN-estimated $1.3bn-a-year drug trade to fund terror.”184