One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power

by Smith, Douglas V.

  47.Memorandum, Chief of Bureau of Navigation to All Flag Officers, 9 August 1938, Nav-en. Records of the Bureau of Navigation, National Archives.

  48.House Document No. 566, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, 16 January 1940, p. 4.

  49.Ibid., pp. 19–20.

  CHAPTER 6

  Admiral Joseph Mason “Bull” Reeves, Father of Navy Carrier Aviation

  Douglas V. Smith

  Admiral Joseph Mason “Bull” Reeves.

  War at sea in the twenty-first century was dominated in all its aspects by the advent and evolution of carrier aviation. More than any other single individual, Admiral Joseph Mason “Bull” Reeves left his mark indelibly on the mating of the aircraft carrier and her embarked aircraft as the centerpiece of American seaborne offensive lethality. Moreover, Reeves deserves significant credit for America’s victory against the Japanese in World War II.

  EARLY STAGES OF NAVAL AND CARRIER AVIATION

  As early as April 1917 the Navy had 54 aircraft, and by November 1918 it had 2,107—yet the Navy’s first carrier, the experimental USS Langley (CV-1), was not re-commissioned from the old collier Jupiter until late March 1922, well prior to entering the fleet.1 General Billy Mitchell lamented during his trial by courts-martial in 1925 that the Navy had estimated a requirement of $37,360,248 for aircraft procurement while the Army Air Corps—“entrusted by law with the serial defense over the land areas of the United States and its possessions, including protection of navy yards”—asked for only $24,582,000.2 Mitchell found the Navy’s obvious intent of building a huge land-based air fleet outrageous because the Navy had only one aircraft carrier, the Langley, an obsolete collier converted to a carrier capable of holding only thirty-six small airplanes (at that point in time) and with extremely limited speed—15.5 knots, half that of a battleship—and was building two more aircraft carriers, the Lexington and Saratoga, which were “practically obsolete before they were completed.”3 He and others wondered why the Navy was intent on investing so heavily in aircraft that had questionable ability to support its congressionally mandated role of gaining and if necessary maintaining control over lines of American communications or intended battle areas at sea.

  Thus the U.S. Navy found itself in the position of having to devise operational concepts, tactics, and doctrine for aircraft carriers that were not purpose-built and had not even reached operational status. What resulted, however, was not the disarray and lack of focus and purpose that one might expect. Detailed planning, gaming, and concept generation were completed at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, well prior to USS Langley joining the fleet. Commissioned in March and launched in November 1922, she did not enter active fleet service until 1924 when she was transferred to the Pacific Fleet. She lacked any real operational potential until then Captain Joseph Mason Reeves assumed his position as Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, aboard her on 12 October 1925.

  Most of the early Navy carrier tactics were formulated during the presidency of Admiral William Sowden Sims at the Naval War College, 1919–1922, before the first carrier, USS Langley, entered the fleet.4 Thus tactics were developed to large extent before there was even a carrier with which to test the ideas on which they were based.

  Originally Langley had been USS Jupiter (Collier #3), from 1913 to 1920. Langley displaced 13,990 tons empty and 15,150 with a full load, was 523 feet in length and 65 feet 3 inches wide, with an above-water height of 22 feet 1 inch fully loaded and a speed of 15.5 knots. She could ultimately carry forty-eight aircraft and had one elevator and one catapult (with a second catapult added soon after she was launched).

  Interestingly, three of the most important players in the formulation of the aviation Navy received their groundings in very similar fashion at about the same time just shortly after Admiral Sims started consideration of naval carrier aviation in earnest at Newport. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz graduated with the Naval War College class of 1923—before entry of aircraft carriers into general fleet usage. He credits Captain R. C. MacFall, his classmate in both the U.S. Naval Academy class of 1905 and Naval War College class of 1923, with “devising the circular tactical formations used so successfully in World War II.”5 Reeves, a 1884 graduate of Annapolis, was in the class immediately following Nimitz and MacFall—the War College class of 1924.6

  Under Admiral Sims, war games were conducted to determine the utility of the aircraft carrier and her embarked aircraft in various roles at sea. While most of the senior officers in the Navy envisioned the carrier as best suited to provide surveillance and target locations, to serve as spotters for directing naval gunfire from battleships, to locate and attack surfaced enemy submarines, and possibly to screen ships for enemy battleship formations, Sims was among the first to envision the carrier as the new centerpiece of offensive naval weaponry. Thus he emphasized the carrier in the attack role and was responsible for many of the tactics for carrier operations. Two of the main elements of tactical operation emanated from this pre-carrier period. First and foremost, gaming at Newport led to the conclusion that the carrier that first laid ordnance on the enemy’s deck was invariably the victor—especially if the enemy carrier was hit while its aircraft were still on the deck. Second, the carrier that was able to get the most aircraft airborne in the shortest amount of time was normally victorious. This led to the refinement of sequencing the launch of aircraft of different types. Sims, his instructors, and students also addressed the three competing requirements for embarked air wings that were central to carrier operations: to defend the carrier(s) and screening ships in the formation against enemy attack; to apportion aircraft to search out and locate the enemy’s carriers; and to attack the enemy’s carrier(s) and other supporting ships.

  At the Naval War College, war games were played by the students to refine and hone their abilities to know the battle parameters of their weapons systems and to employ those systems in a combat environment, as well as to coordinate strategy and “tactics.” (Please note that we now refer to what was at that time called “tactics” as “operations.”)

  Opposing fleets were arrayed as miniature ship models on the checkerboard tiles of Luce (and later Pringle) Hall, and these fleets were concealed behind curtains so that the moves of the opposition were invisible to the students composing the opposing fleet. Tables were constructed to indicate the percentage of shell and bomb hits that could be reasonably expected at a given range from the enemy, based on real-world observations of the weapons systems they were constructed for. Similarly, tables presenting the expected lethality of these weapons systems were constructed so that faculty “umpires” could assess the amount of damage done under various conditions and ranges.7

  Though a good number of war games were played by each class at the War College during the eleven-month course of study, the most complex and challenging of these was probably the annual “Battle of Sable Island.” This battle, “constructively” played off Nova Scotia, was essentially an engagement based on the Battle of Jutland of World War I. However, east and west were inverted so that the U.S. fleet was in the British position and the British fleet was in the German position of that earlier battle. Also, the Canadian fleet was made available to the current British fleet composition for their conduct of “operations.”8

  It is interesting to note that extensive blueprints were made of the “Battle of Sable Island” game for later consideration. Recently uncovered in the War College Archives is a sample blueprint that consists of 128 pages of two-foot by three-foot detailed diagrams.9

  As with all games, the “Battle of Sable Island” stressed problem solving and development of a sound decision process that involved four essential steps:

  1.Estimating the situation at hand;

  2.Formulating orders for the actions of units of the fleet;

  3.Maneuvering the fleet to engage the enemy;

  4.Critiquing the three items above.10

  Captain Harris Laning, Head of the Tactics Department from 1922, when he graduate
d from the War College, to the graduation of the class of 1924, provided a pamphlet, “The Naval Battle,” that was a useful study of modern naval tactics including the rudiments of aviation tactics.11

  One of the most significant conclusions to emerge from the game board concerning the use of aircraft during that first year (1923) was the need for the fleet’s aircraft carriers to strike their counterparts in the enemy fleet as soon as they came within range. It was essential that they immediately strike the enemy carriers with as many attackers as possible in order to gain air superiority over the enemy fleet.12

  As Laning put it, “The first step of any air plan should be to get control of the air.”

  Captain Reeves had so impressed Laning and Rear Admiral Clarence S. Williams, the serving President of the Naval War College (3 November 1922–5 September 1925), that while Reeves was a student they selected him as Laning’s successor as Head of the Tactics Department. Reeves, who had learned that concentration of force was essential during his studies, applied what he had learned to the aviation asset of the Battle Fleet. In doing so, he rightfully established himself as the “Father of Carrier Aviation.”

  During his war gaming as a student, Reeves came to understand that the British battleships opposing his American force had superior lethality: the guns on the U.S. battleships lacked the ability to be elevated sufficiently to match the British in plunging fire. While a member of the faculty, he strove to make his superiors aware of this problem. Ultimately, he was tasked to testify before Congress on the matter, where he produced a graphic that vividly depicted the problem.

  Though Congress nevertheless failed immediately to allocate funding to modify the fleet’s existing battleships, Reeves had established himself as an expert on ordnance and gunnery.13 His concentration on the aircraft carrier as a means of striking the capital ships of the enemy, thus nullifying their superior firepower, resulted in the refinement of carrier and air-strike tactics during his tenure as Head of the Tactics Department. All advances in aviation theory and tactics while Reeves was in this position, it should be remembered, took place before the first American carrier entered the fleet in 1924.

  COMMANDER, AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS, BATTLE FLEET

  At the completion of his instructor tour at the Naval War College, Reeves was detailed to proceed, via the Bureau of Aeronautics—of which Admiral William A. Moffett was the chief—in Washington, D.C., to Pensacola for training as a Naval Aviation Observer. Since by law all aviation squadrons had to be commanded by aviation officers, and since only one aviation-trained officer had as yet risen to the rank of captain, the Naval Aviation Observer course was a way to get Reeves and other more senior officers indoctrinated in aviation matters so they could be assigned to command. Reeves graduated from the Naval Aviation Observer course on 3 September 1925 and received orders from the Bureau of Navigation (which then issued all officer orders for duty) to assume command as Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet. He proceeded to Mare Island, California, to board his flagship—the carrier Langley—which he had commanded before it was converted from the collier USS Jupiter—and then proceeded to North Island in San Diego where the two squadrons of observation planes (VO-1 and VO-2), two squadrons of fighter aircraft (VF-1 and VF-2), and a single squadron of torpedo planes (VT-2) were located.

  It was as Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, from 12 October 1925 until 3 May 1929 that Reeves defined carrier aviation.

  Reeves’ first observation was that “[this command] lacks a coordinated set of fleet-plane tactics and has no conception of the capabilities and limitations of the air force.”14 Reeves immediately set out to change that. When he took command, Reeves was appalled to learn that USS Langley could put only six aircraft in the air at one time. Because, while a student and instructor at the Naval War College, he had helped to establish that the only way to defend a carrier successfully against air attack was to put as many fighter aircraft in the air as possible in the shortest time, Reeves’ first challenge was to increase Langley’s sortie rate and decrease the time interval between takeoffs. The limiting factor in doing so was that only seven aircraft could be placed on deck at a time with the current procedures for launching them, and others had to be brought up from the hangar deck and readied for takeoff—a time-consuming process—before launching more. Moreover, with both arresting wires and longitudinal cables to keep the planes in line with the carrier’s deck (planes had no steering or brakes), landing of the two groups of aircraft launched took almost an hour. Reeves and his senior pilots decided to have all launched aircraft make right turns immediately after leaving the carrier’s deck to eliminate the prop vortex, and came up with the oval pattern for aircraft arriving for landing so as to have a continuous flow as soon as the last plane to touch down had been moved out of the way.

  DT-2 taking off from USS Langley, circa 1925.

  Here too Reeves improved procedures by modifying equipment so that planes would not have to be individually lowered by elevator below decks before the next plane could land. He accomplished this by adding additional arresting wires, doing away with the longitudinal aircraft directing wires, and inventing a safe but flexible barrier so that arrested aircraft could be moved in front of it and others could land behind it without fear that they would collide with those already safely on deck. By the time of “Fleet Problem VI” (the sixth of twenty-two Fleet Problems that were scheduled between 1919 and 1941)—February 1926—Reeves had enabled ten aircraft to be launched in a single sortie.15

  Another major advance was the way in which Reeves and the Langley’s Executive Officer, Commander John H. Towers, organized deck operations. Special “crews” of men, distinguished by shirts or vests of several identifiable colors, were assembled to handle such things as spotting (yellow) and moving aircraft (blue), handling fueling (purple) and arresting gear (green), ordnance (red), and serving as plane captains (brown). Thus confusion was greatly reduced and safety enhanced. Also, a sense of pride developed that enhanced morale, and the better coordination and sense of competition engendered led to a faster tempo of flight-deck operations. A flight control officer was tasked to launch aircraft at safe intervals, and hand signals were devised to expedite movements and actions because noise precluded audible cues. By early August 1926, Reeves had set a new record of 127 launches and landings in a single day. By September Reeves and his crews had reduced landing intervals to just one minute and seventeen seconds. The records would continue as time progressed.

  AVIATION TACTICS AND DOCTRINE

  Just as with deck operations, Reeves schooled his pilots in aerial maneuvers and tactics. He made great use of extended periods—that he called “concentration periods”—at North Island and the surrounding San Diego area to work out details of operations and doctrine that would be necessary to have the right answers to and execute correctly in combat.

  With his strategy [for developing aircraft tactics and doctrine] decided on, [Reeves] filled the San Diego auditorium with the officers of his command, and gave them a lecture that is still remembered; it was, in effect, a statement of the principles on which the air force was to be developed.

  First of all, Reeves declared that what he had seen in the last six weeks had proved the complete lack of coordinated fleet-plane tactics, and had shown as well that there was no conception of either the capabilities or limitations of the air force. There followed a formidable series of questions. “What is the most efficient method of launching planes from the ‘Langley’, and of handling them after they have landed?” . . . “How should our fighters attack other aircraft?” . . . “What formations should be used in aerial spotting, and what position should these spotters take?” . . . “How should an aircraft torpedo attack be made, and how can it be most effectively repelled?” . . . “What is the maximum interval to be taken between the planes in a scouting screen; what is the best method of procedure in such scouting?”

  After a score of such problems, Reeves startled his audience with a bold and
unexpected declaration: “I do not know the answers to these questions and dozens like them any more than you do, but until we can answer them, we will be of very little use to the fleet. That means that we must become a school before we can become an air force.”16

  Reeves set out during his “concentration periods” to test in the air the theoretical answers to practical questions in his mimeographed pamphlet that he called his “One Thousand and One Questions.” It contained a list of the information that Reeves had decided must be gathered before his command could function effectively.17

  In the air his pilots would attack such problems as tactics and doctrine for dealing with air contacts. Specific task areas were assigned in Reeves’ “Employment Schedule, for Study and Practical Development of Aircraft Tactics,” such as the one promulgated for the 12 June–11 September 1926 “concentration period”:

  1.When should “Control of the Air” be undertaken?

  2.How far and in what manner should efforts to gain control of the air extend?

  3.How proceed [sic] if “Control of the Air” is gained? If not gained?

  4.Considering the vital importance of “Control of the Air,” does our present Basic Air Organization provide sufficient fighting planes?

  5.Can we deny enemy planes Tactical Scouting?

  6.How can aircraft best aid surface craft during this phase?18

  Other major obstacles to operational success had to be overcome through innovation. Concerned that their extended time over target would make his bombers vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, Reeves and Lieutenant Commander Frank D. Wagner, the Commanding Officer of his fighter wing, devised what subsequently came to be known as “dive-bombing.”19

  Reeves knew from his own experience at Pensacola that high-altitude bombing could be effective only under ideal conditions and over a defenseless target. In his pamphlet of questions, he had pointed out the inadequacy of the bombsight, the difficulty of estimating air currents and density, and had asked, “How can we bomb more effectively?”