In My Own Time

by Jeremy Thorpe

  This experience prompted me to advise David Owen, when he was Foreign Secretary, that when he was negotiating with Ian Smith he should get him to initial and agree the minutes of matters discussed and agreed on the previous day before starting a fresh day’s work. I was ready to fly back to Zambia, and the final drama was to be played out at the airport. An army of press men had tracked me down, and were waiting to converge on me at the main terminal building. I was anxious to honour my undertaking not to give a press conference, and was aware that if I had answered questions from the media I would be accused of having broken my word. Fortunately the Rhodesian Foreign Office representative who was accompanying me had a key to the side gate leading directly to the tarmac. Once we were through the gate we drove at immense speed towards the plane, and boarded it and drew the curtains. In what seemed only like a matter of three or four minutes we were taxiing down the runway and taking off for Zambia.

  Coincidentally, Roy Welensky was in Lusaka for his first visit since the end of the Central African Federation. As former Prime Minister of the Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, he had been deeply unpopular amongst African opinion in these countries which were seeking independence and majority rule. However, by this time Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as Zambia and Malawi, had achieved their independence one man, one vote, irrespective of colour – but it remained for Southern Rhodesia to follow suit. Roy had paid great tribute that evening to Zambia’s achievements since independence. By the time I arrived in Lusaka, Roy and Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, had established a firm rapport. Needless to say, we exchanged views on my day’s visit to Salisbury, Rhodesia – now Harare, Zimbabwe.

  Roy was to become a close and valued friend. He came in for some very rough treatment after UDI. Since the altitude of Salisbury was bad for his heart condition, he settled in the UK. The first Lady Welensky had died, but he happily remarried and started a new family, who were with him when he died in Dorset.

  Chapter Seven

  Europe

  Of the three major political parties, the Liberal Party alone has been consistent on the question of Europe.

  On 1 and 2 June 1955 the six founder countries, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, plus the UK, met at Messina. The object of the talks was to consider the possibilities of closer integration within Europe. Eden had refused permission for a minister – Anthony Nutting – to attend, and the UK was represented by an Under-Secretary from the Board of Trade, Mr Russell Bretherton. The Messina proposals were to prove the birth of the European Common Market. These proposals were subsequently studied in Brussels under the chairmanship of Spaak and the UK was again represented by Bretherton. In November 1955 Bretherton was withdrawn.

  The attitude of the government prior to Messina was borne out by the briefing which Bretherton was given by Peter Thorneycroft, the president of the Board of Trade, which laid down the guideline: ‘Be as helpful as you can, and don’t seem to want to make us want to stop things – but no commitments’. The real attitude of the Foreign Office was expressed by Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Eden’s Principal Private Secretary. In the course of an interview conducted by Michael Charlton in his book, The Price of Victory (1983), Shuckburgh says: ‘I think I probably said I don’t believe the French and Germans are really going to do it, or would not be able to bring it off, and we had better keep our options open and our hands clean’. It was generally thought – I think rightly – that this represented the views of Anthony Eden.

  At the time, the Liberals said that we should join the EEC and it would be better to do so as a founder member rather than as a latecomer. The six pressed on and signed the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957, giving effect to matters agreed upon at Messina. It set up the European Common Market – an economic grouping of nations with a total population of 60 million, to be developed in stages over fifty years. It aimed at free movement of people, goods and money among the member states. Tariffs were abolished. Rab Butler, thinking that the British electorate might regard this move as a Papist plot, said: ‘This is a Treaty of Rome, not with Rome!’

  As it was, successive British governments made increasingly hostile noises until the great somersault of Harold Macmillan, when he announced in the House of Commons in 1961 that we had applied to join the European Common Market, and negotiations would start. It is right to recall that eleven years earlier the Liberals, led by Clement Davies, had urged that Britain should join the European Coal and Steel Community. Liberals went on to back the proposed European Defence Community, which was effectively scuppered by the opposition of the British government. The French followed with their opposition but only because in their view the absence of the UK from the European Defence Community would give Germany an unacceptably predominant position. Liberals subsequently supported the Monnet plan to create a European Coal and Steel Community, which again was opposed by the government.

  When a Conservative and later a Labour government became converted to the prospects of full British membership of the European Economic Community, the Liberals backed the governments of both parties.

  European debates

  Two votes in the House of Commons that took place on the Common Market in 1959 and 1972, thirteen years apart, epitomise the consistency of the Liberal Party on this issue. On 14 December 1959, the Prime Minister (Harold Macmillan), with senior Cabinet colleagues, tabled a motion for debate: ‘That this House welcomes the resolution adopted at the ministerial meeting in Stockholm on 20 November and the action of Her Majesty’s Government in approving the Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association contained in Command Paper No 906’. In our view, EFTA was a very poor substitute for the political and economic integration of the six EFC members, and many regarded EFTA as an attempt to bypass the EEC. In practice, we could and should have been founder members of the EEC.

  An amendment to the proposed motion was tabled in the names of Grimond, Clement Davies, Wade, Bowen, Holt and Thorpe. We sought, in the first line of the government’s motion, to substitute ‘Regrets the failure of Her Majesty’s Government to associate Great Britain with the countries comprising the European Economic Community’. The names listed represented the sum total of the Parliamentary Liberal Party of the day. The amendment was not selected for debate, but as evidence of our disapproval we forced a division on the Prime Minister’s motion. Jo Grimond was grounded in his constituency of Orkney & Shetland and so there were only three Liberals in the lobby, plus two acting as our tellers. The Labour Party abstained and we were defeated by 185 Tory votes to three Liberals. The result was treated with derision. Although it was not recorded in Hansard, in the general hubbub Arthur Holt shouted out to the Tory front bench: ‘What you should be doing is to make application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome for negotiations to join the Community’. I was to hear this repeated two years later, on 31 July 1961, by Harold Macmillan to a tense House when he announced that we had applied to join the Common Market, and would now negotiate terms under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome!

  Before dealing with the 1972 vote, I must mention the vote on Europe on 28 October 1971, on a motion: ‘That this House approves Her Majesty’s Government’s decision in principle to join the European Communities on the basis of the arrangements which have been negotiated.’ The Prime Minister (Edward Heath) announced that there would be a free vote on the Tory side. When the vote was cast, thirty-three Conservative MPs voted against the government, with three abstentions. The Labour opposition were similarly split and no less than sixty-nine Labour MPs voted in the government lobby, with three abstentions. The House of Commons, by a decisive majority of 112, cutting across party barriers, including all but one of the Liberal Members, had declared themselves in favour of the principle of joining the EEC on the basis of the terms negotiated.

  The 17 February 1972 vote was for the second reading of the European Communities Bill, to give effect to joining the Common Market, which of course had already been agr
eed in principle. However, the Labour opposition, disregarding their own prior position, decided that in view of the likely Conservative defections there was an opportunity of bringing down the government and causing an election. Accordingly, Labour Members were bound by a three-line whip to vote against the second reading.

  At this stage, it was clear that the Liberal vote could be crucial. The Liberal Party, with the exception of Hooson, was ready, willing and enthusiastic to vote for the second reading of the Bill. My colleagues and I were not, however, prepared to vote for the motion if it was claimed to be a vote of confidence in the government or the Prime Minister. If that was the issue, at best we would be compelled to abstain, and some of us would have wished to vote against the government. Given a straight vote on Europe, the party could deliver four votes for and one against.

  On the day of the debate David Steel, who was Chief Whip, set off to see Francis Pym, Government Chief Whip, whilst I went to talk to Willie Whitelaw, then Leader of the House. In my view, it was necessary that there should be an agreed passage in the Prime Minister’s closing speech, and I put up a suggested draft. This was to the effect that: ‘in October 1971, this House, by a large majority, decided in principle to join the Common Market. Today, that same House of Commons is being asked to give legislative effect to that decision. If the House of Commons defeats the means to achieve the end they had endorsed by a majority of 112 last October, this parliament cannot sensibly continue.’ As the Prime Minister reached this passage in his speech, Willie Whitelaw gave me the thumbs up, and I did likewise. The reference to a vote of confidence in the government did not feature. I told my colleagues that I felt that all hell might break loose after the vote as far as we were concerned, if the Labour Party failed to defeat the government. I therefore asked my colleagues to remain in their places to face whatever music was going to be played. My instinct proved correct. Heath obtained a majority of eight, with fifteen Tory MPs voting against, and five abstentions. The entire Labour Party voted against, with five abstentions, gallantly led by Christopher Mayhew.

  If the Liberals had abstained, Heath would have had a majority of four or less; if we had voted against, at best there would have been a tie, and more probably a defeat not only for the government but for the European cause as well.

  All hell broke loose. Labour MPs swarmed round the Liberal bench, jeering and shouting. A usually mild-mannered Labour MP, James Hamilton (Bothwell), grabbed the lapels of my jacket and pummelled me. Lena Jager nearly deafened me as she was shouting in John Pardoe’s ear – God knows what it must have sounded like to him! Bob Mellish, Opposition Chief Whip, rushed into the fray, seeking to restore order. Obviously carried away, he bitterly commented: ‘They are a gutter party, these Liberals’. It was a very ugly scene.

  After the division I put out a statement:

  This is not a matter of arithmetic, but one of principle. This is not the first time we in the Liberal Party have borne the brunt of Europe, nor will it be the last. The Liberal Party is not concerned with the bitterness displayed by sections of the Labour Party at the conclusion of tonight’s vote.

  What was tragic was that the failure by the Tory Party to convert sufficient of their followers to joining the EEC led the Labour Party to indulge in arithmetical exercises, which ignored the principles which were also involved.

  The fact that men like Roy Jenkins, Michael Stewart and George Thomson – who voted for Europe on 28 October 1971 – should choose to stand on their heads on 17 February 1972 is a matter for them. But there is no reason why they should expect the Liberals to do likewise.

  The Liberal Party pioneered the movement towards European unity in this country, and it is a sign of the cynicism to which politics has now sunk that we should have been expected to throttle it tonight.

  We are proud once again to have been the spearhead of the movement towards Europe and of consistency in politics.

  What a sea change between the Liberal votes in December 1959 and February 1972! The three Liberal votes on the first occasion produced a mocking reaction from the Tory and Labour Parliamentary Parties. The four Liberal votes on the second reading of the bill released a furious response from the Labour benches and relief on the Tory benches. The principle was unchanged: we should be full members of the EEC.

  It is only fair to say that Roy Jenkins and George Thomson went on to serve the EEC with conspicuous skill: George as a commissioner and Roy as president of the Commission.

  The French veto

  Successive British governments, with justification, have been haunted by the spectre of the French veto of our application to join the European Community. When the government under Macmillan finally decided to apply to join in 1961, President de Gaulle exercised Frances veto in January 1963, and the first application was aborted. It may therefore be of interest to know how the UK became aware of the French intention to lift the veto at the time of the second application by the UK to join, in the autumn of 1969.

  In the first week of November 1969, I visited Paris to address a luncheon hosted by the French diplomatic press. The suggestions I made in my speech were thought to be very avant-garde. I called for the convening of a new Messina Conference that would discuss matters which had not been dealt with by the Treaty of Rome, but which were, nonetheless, essential to the unity of Europe. The conference should take place at the same time as negotiations were held on the completion and broadening of the Common Market to accord membership to the United Kingdom and the other applicants. The conference should bring together the original six, the candidate countries and, perhaps with the status of observers, representatives of the neutral countries of Western Europe. They should consider the creation of a common European currency and the revival of the European Defence Community which would make it possible to formulate a common policy towards Eastern Europe – ‘the precondition of a real relaxation of tension’. Such a Defence Community should be non-nuclear. I also suggested a Franco-British treaty along the lines of the Franco-German Treaty, so long as it was understood that through such a Franco-British understanding the broader objective of European unity was in fact assisted.

  During my visit I stayed at our magnificent embassy, with Christopher and Mary Soames, who elegantly and effectively discharged their duties as ambassador and ambassadress. During the morning of 7 November 1969, Christopher and I visited the French Foreign Minister, M. Maurice Schumann, at the Quai d’Orsay. Christopher Soames, in his usual forthright manner, came straight to the point and said: ‘Well, Maurice, on what issue or issues are you going to veto our new application to join the EEC?’

  To which Schumann replied that, as far as France was concerned, she had no intention of exercising the veto. ‘What you mean’, said Christopher, ‘is that this calls for real optimism about our application to join the enlarged Community?’ ‘That is correct’, said Schumann. After the meeting Christopher rightly assessed this to be a vitally important landmark. It was the first indication we had that France would do nothing to obstruct our application, and we returned to the embassy, where the staff were called in to the Duff Cooper Library when Christopher and I debriefed ourselves. Christopher immediately drafted and dispatched a telegram to the Foreign Secretary in London. France was as good as her word and I felt that we had both been in on a historic moment in the cause of European unity.

  As a parting shot, Maurice Schumann, who incidentally spoke fault less English, told me that during the war he belonged to my club, the National Liberal Club in Whitehall, a club which ‘overlooked the river and its food!’ I was able to assure him that the food had improved and the river was cleaner.

  Trouble with George

  During the EEC renegotiations set in train by the Labour government – in 1974 – the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, invited the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of the existing six members of the EEC to come, country by country, to London to discuss outstanding problems. There were the usual Downing Street dinners and to these Ted Heath and myself w
ere invited, enabling Wilson to say, with truth, that all three political parties in the UK backed the European ideal.

  One nearly fatal incident occurred at the dinner given for the Belgian Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary and their wives at No. 10. George Brown was sitting on the left-hand side of the Belgian Foreign Minister’s wife. George had wined well – rather too well – and to my horror I saw his right hand moving relentlessly towards the left breast of the unfortunate lady. I could visualise a fearful scene, with her remonstrating either forcibly or by word of mouth; her husband storming out in protest; the future of Britain and the Common Market would lie in ruins. ‘Thorpe’, I said to myself, ‘act quickly and decisively’. Fortunately, George’s wife, Sophie, was close by and I called out: ‘Sophie, look, act quickly!’ ‘George’, said Sophie, ‘stop it’. ‘All right’, said George, and his hand fell back into place. I said to myself: ‘Thorpe, you have saved Europe!’

  Treaty of Accession – January 1972

  On Saturday, 22 January 1972, Ted Heath, as Prime Minister, signed the Treaty of Accession in Brussels by which the UK, along with Ireland and Denmark, became full members of the EEC. The Prime Minister invited an all-party delegation to accompany him. The passengers were Harold Macmillan, who when Prime Minister had made the original application for membership of the EEC; Alec Douglas Home, Foreign Secretary; Geoffrey Rippon, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in change of the negotiations; Duncan Sandys, an indefatigable worker for European unity; George Brown, who, following the rejection of an invitation extended to Harold Wilson to come on board, nominated himself as the representative of the Labour Party; and myself, representing the Liberal Party. Ted had gone ahead of us to receive in West Germany the Charlemagne Prize and we were to meet up in Brussels.