A Private War

by Brenner, Marie

  In the early-morning hours, FBI agents picked up several suspects, including one referred to as “the drunk in the bar.” According to FBI sources, Louis Freeh himself got on the telephone to Barry Mawn. Freeh, a former FBI agent, was personally monitoring the initial investigation by means of a series of conference calls from the command post at FBI headquarters. He focused on “the drunk in the bar,” who had been making threats the night before, and within hours the information was leaked that the FBI had a suspect. From Atlanta, Barry Mawn contacted his superiors in Washington. “This suspect is not the bomber,” he reportedly said, according to a former high-level FBI executive. Freeh allegedly lost his temper and belittled Mawn’s professional abilities. He is said to have told Mawn that he “had handled this all wrong.” The words one hears characterizing Freeh’s telephone calls to the agents on duty in Atlanta are “abusive,” “condescending,” and “dismissive.” A story went around the command center that Freeh was already saying, “We have our man,” according to a source in the bureau.

  Freeh made a decision: However experienced Montgomery, Fuentes, and Mawn were, this investigation would be run by Division 5 of the FBI, the National Security Division, a former counterintelligence unit that has been looking for a purpose since the Cold War ended. Trained in observation, division members rarely made a criminal case—their strength was intimidation and manipulation rather than the deliberate gathering of evidence to be presented in court. The FBI promptly declared the bombing a terrorism case and placed it under the authority of Bob Bryant, head of the division. David Tubbs of Division 5 was sent to Atlanta to be the spokesman and to augment Woody Johnson, the Atlanta special agent in charge (SAC), who had been trained in hostage rescue and who was awkward in press briefings. Tubbs was not as experienced in criminal cases as Mawn or Montgomery, who returned to Newark and Quantico, respectively, “to get out of the line of fire,” according to numerous FBI sources. But Bryant and Freeh were reportedly micromanaging the SACs and, later, the case agents Don Johnson and Diader Rosario.

  * * *

  On the morning of the bombing, Watson Bryant’s alarm went off at six o’clock. He was going to the Olympic kayak competition on the Ocoee River with Andy Currie, a friend from his Vanderbilt University days. He learned of the bombing on the radio as he was getting ready to go to Currie’s house. “Whoever has done this should be skinned alive,” he told Currie. He spent the day in the country, and on Sunday he went out to run errands. When he got home, there was a message on his answering machine: “Watson, this is Richard Jewell. You may have heard that I found the bomb and people are calling me a hero. Somebody told me I might get a book contract.” It had been years since Bryant had spoken to Jewell, but he did not immediately return the call; he was busy finishing up some contracts so that he could take a few days off to enjoy the Olympics.

  In addition, Bryant was annoyed with Jewell. After Bryant had befriended him in their days at the Small Business Administration, Jewell had borrowed his new, $250 radar detector and never returned it. He had promised to pay him $100 for it, but he never had. In the meantime, Bryant’s life had changed; he had set up an office as a solo practitioner. Bryant despised corporate politics and had no gift for them. His penchant for taking on pro bono work for friends annoyed his wife, however. Bryant believed that Richard Jewell had attached himself to him years earlier because he lacked a father, but nevertheless Jewell could get on his nerves. By the summer of 1996, Bryant was preoccupied; his marriage had come apart two years earlier, and he was trying to sort out his life.

  When he finally returned Jewell’s phone call, he said, “Well, damn it, where’s my $100?” Jewell laughed uneasily and told him about discovering the green backpack that contained the bomb. “Didn’t you see me on the news?” Bryant reminded him that he rarely watched TV. “I am proud of you, Richard,” he said. “About this book contract, I think it’s far-fetched, but don’t sign anything unless I see it first.”

  In the Newsweek cover story detailing the bombing, published Monday, July 29, there was no mention of Richard Jewell. It said only that “a security guard” had alerted Tom Davis of the GBI. that no one had claimed the backpack under his bench. By the time Newsweek was on the stands, however, Jewell had been interviewed on CNN. The AT&T publicity department had booked him on TV and told him to wear the shirt with the AT&T logo. Jewell reluctantly agreed. “The idea of going on TV made me nervous,” he told me. “I was not the hero. There were so many others who saved lives.”

  * * *

  In Demorest, Ray Cleere, the president of Piedmont College, was home on Saturday, July 27, watching CNN. Cleere had at one time been Mississippi’s commissioner of higher education, but he was now posted at the rural Baptist mountain school. He was said to feel that he had suffered a loss of status in the boondocks, where he was out of the academic mainstream. He called Dick Martin, his chief of campus police. Shouldn’t they call the FBI and tell them about Richard Jewell? he asked. Cleere had had a strong disagreement with Jewell when one of the students was caught smoking pot. Jewell wanted to arrest him; Cleere said no. Cleere, Brad Mattear recalled, “worried constantly about the image of the college.” According to Mattear, “Cleere loved the limelight. He wanted public attention”—the very trait he reportedly ascribed to Richard Jewell.

  Dick Martin, who was fond of Jewell, suggested a compromise, according to Lin Wood: He would call a friend in the GBI. Cleere then called the FBI hotline in Washington himself. Wood says Cleere later complained that no one had seemed to want to listen to what he had to say about Richard Jewell. But his telephone call would trigger a complex set of circumstances in Habersham County, where FBI investigators fanned out over the hills, attempting to uncover evidence that could lead to Jewell’s arrest. “The FBI took his word, and what it actually did was get them both in a bunch of trouble,” Mattear said. (Cleere has declined to comment.)

  * * *

  For Richard Jewell, Tuesday, July 30, would become a haze in which his life was turned upside down. “The hours of the day ran so fast it is hard to remember what all happened,” he told me. He started the day early at the Atlanta studio of the Today show. He was tired; the evening before he had had his friend Tim Attaway, a GBI agent, over for dinner. He had made lasagna and had drawn Attaway a diagram of the sound-and-light tower. Jewell had talked into the night about the bombing; only later would he learn that Attaway was wearing a wire.

  Despite the late evening, Jewell was excited at the thought of meeting Katie Couric and being interviewed about finding the Alice pack in the park. His mother asked him to try to get Tom Brokaw’s autograph. “He was a man my mom respected a great deal,” he said.

  When he got back to the apartment, he was surprised to see a cluster of reporters in the parking lot. “Do you think you are a suspect?” one asked. Jewell laughed. “I know they’ll investigate anyone who was at the park that night,” he said. “That includes you-all, too.” Jewell did not turn on the TV, but he noticed that the group outside the door continued to grow. At four that afternoon, Jewell received a phone call from Anthony Davis, the head of the security company Jewell worked for at AT&T. “Have you seen the news?” Davis asked. “They are saying you are a suspect.” Jewell said, “They are talking to everybody.” According to Jewell, Davis said, “They are zeroing in on you. To keep the publicity down, don’t go to work.”

  Within minutes, Don Johnson and Diader Rosario knocked on Jewell’s door. They exuded sincerity, Jewell recalled. “They told me they wanted me to come with them to headquarters to help them make a training film to be used at Quantico,” he said. Johnson played to Jewell’s pride. Despite the reporters in the parking lot and the call from Anthony Davis, Jewell had no doubt that they were telling the truth. He drove the short distance to FBI headquarters in Buckhead in his own truck, but he noticed that four cars were following him. “The press is on us,” Jewell told Johnson when they arrived. “No, those are our guys,” Johnson told him. This tactic would contin
ue through the next eighty-eight days and be severely criticized: Why would you have an armada of surveillance vehicles stacked up on a suspected bomber?

  It was then that Jewell started to wonder why he was at the FBI, but he followed Johnson and Rosario inside. Rosario was known for his skills as a negotiator; he had once helped calm a riot of Cuban prisoners in Atlanta. Johnson, however, had a reputation for overreaching. In Albany, New York, in 1987, he had pursued an investigation of then mayor Thomas Whalen. According to Whalen, the local U.S. attorney found no evidence to support Johnson’s assertions and issued a letter to Whalen exonerating him completely, but Whalen believed it cost him an appointment as a federal judge.

  As Jewell sat in a small office, he wondered why the cameraman recording the interview was staring at him so intently. After an hour, Johnson was called out of the room. When he returned, he said to Jewell, “Let’s pretend that none of this happened. You are going to come in and start over, and by the way, we want you to fill out this waiver of rights.”

  “At that moment a million things were going through my head,” Jewell told me. “You don’t give anyone a waiver of rights unless they are being investigated. I said, ‘I need to contact my attorney,’ and then all of a sudden it was an instant change. ‘What do you need to contact your attorney for? You didn’t do anything. We thought you were a hero. Is there something you want to tell us about?’ ” Jewell grew increasingly apprehensive and later recalled thinking, These guys think I did this.

  When the agents took a break, Jewell asked to use the phone. “I called Watson four times. I called his brother. I told his parents that I had to get hold of Watson—it was urgent. I was, like, ‘I have to speak to him right now.’ What was going on was that Washington was on the phone with Atlanta. The people in Washington were giving them questions.” Jewell said he knew this because the videotapes in the cameras were two hours long and “Johnson and Rosario would leave every thirty minutes, like they had to speak on the phone.” The OPR report, however, would assert that no one at headquarters knew about the videotaping or the training-film ruse. Lying to get a statement out of a suspect is, in fact, not illegal, but clearly Johnson and Rosario were not making decisions on their own. Even the procedure of having a fleet of cars follow a suspect was an intimidation tactic used by the FBI. Later, according to Jewell, Johnson and Rosario would both tell him privately that they believed he was innocent, but that the investigation was being run by the “highest levels in Washington.”

  Within the bureau, the belief is that during one of the telephone calls Freeh instructed Johnson and Rosario to read Jewell his Miranda rights. Freeh is said to have learned of Johnson’s history from a member of his security detail who had worked in Atlanta. He told Freeh that “Johnson had a reputation for being obnoxious and a problem.” In addition, a week after Jewell’s interview, Freeh reportedly received a call from Janet Reno, who had learned about the ruse from Kent Alexander, the local U.S. attorney, and Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. Freeh wondered aloud how it was that, of all the agents in Atlanta, Johnson had been selected to work on the Jewell case. Like Jewell, Johnson had wound up in Atlanta because of his overzealous behavior—according to an FBI source, the Whalen episode had resulted in a “loss-of-effectiveness transfer,” an FBI euphemism. (Johnson declined to respond.)

  * * *

  On that same Tuesday, Watson Bryant and Nadya Light closed the office early and went to Centennial Park. Light, thirty-five, a Russian immigrant, had never met Radar, Bryant’s old friend, and wanted to buy him a celebratory meal. Killing time until Jewell came on duty, they went into the House of Blues and then bought some hot sauce. Walking toward his car, Bryant saw newsboys hawking the afternoon edition of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. “It was like out of a cartoon. They were all yelling!” he recalled. “I caught the headline out of the corner of my eye.” The headline read: “FBI Suspects ‘Hero’ Guard May Have Planted Bomb.”

  Bryant borrowed fifty cents from Light to buy the paper and began to read: “ ‘Richard Jewell, 33 . . . fits the profile of the lone bomber.’ I could not believe it.”

  At that moment, Bryant’s brother, Bruce, who was on his way to the diving competition, got a call from Jewell. “Where is Watson?” As Bruce Bryant walked past a Speedo billboard with a TV screen, he saw Richard Jewell’s face filling the screen. “Oh, my God,” he said to his wife. At the same moment, Watson was in his car a block away on Northside Drive when he, too, noticed the Speedo screen. He could not get back to his house—the streets were blocked off for the cycling competition. From his car he called FBI headquarters and demanded to speak to Jewell. “He is not here,” the operator said. From his home phone, he picked up his messages and heard Jewell’s low, urgent tones. “He didn’t leave a number,” Bryant told Light. “Call Star 69,” she said. The number came back: 679-9000, the number for FBI headquarters, which he had just dialed. Within minutes, Bryant had Jewell on the phone. Jewell told him he was making a training film. “You idiot! You are a suspect. Get your ass out of there now!” Bryant told him.

  * * *

  Before the Atlanta Journal-Constitution broke the story of Richard Jewell, there had been a debate in the newsroom over whether to name him. One block away, CNN’s Art Harris and Henry Schuster had alerted the network’s president that Jewell was targeted, but they held the story, because they understood its potential magnitude. At the AJC, Kathy Scruggs, a police reporter, who had allegedly gotten a tip from a close friend in the FBI, got a confirmation from someone in the Atlanta police. According to the managing editor, John Walter, the first edition of the paper that Tuesday had a brief profile of Jewell. It was dropped in later editions as Walter questioned whether the paper had enough facts to support the scoop. Because of the voice-of-God style, the paper ended up making a flat-out statement: “Richard Jewell . . . fits the profile of the lone bomber.”

  When I asked John Walter about the lone-bomber sentence, he said, “I ultimately edited it. . . . One of the tests we put to the material is, is it a verifiable fact?” One editor added, “The whole story is voice-of-God. . . . Because we see this event taking place, the need to attribute it to sources—FBI or law enforcement—is less than if there is no public acknowledgment.” John Walter indicated that he had not seen a lone-bomber profile. I asked him, “Whose profile of a lone bomber does Richard Jewell fit? Where is the ‘says who’ in this sentence?” Walter said that he felt comfortable with the assertion.

  The page-one story had a double byline: Kathy Scruggs and Ron Martz. Walter had told these two early on that they would be the reporters assigned to any Olympic catastrophe. Martz, who had covered the Gulf War, had been assigned the security beat for the Olympics; Scruggs routinely covered local crime. Scruggs had good contacts in the Atlanta police, and she was tough. She was characterized as “a police groupie” by one former staff member. “Kathy has a hard edge that some people find offensive,” one of her editors told me, but he praised her skills. Police reporters are often “dictation pads” for local law enforcement; recently the American Journalism Review sharply criticized the AJC for the scanty confirmation and lack of skepticism in its coverage of Jewell.

  The newsroom atmosphere resembled that at FBI headquarters; there was a frenzy to be first. Kent Walker, a newsroom intern, published a story in the same edition, with a glaring mistake in the headline: bomb suspect had sought limelight, press interviews. Since Ray Cleere’s tip to the FBI, the “hero bomber” theory had been circulating among Atlanta law-enforcement officers. Maria Elena Fernandez, a reporter, was sent to Habersham County on July 29. By coincidence, William Rathburn, the head of security for the Olympics, had been at the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 when a fake bomb was found on a bus—left by a policeman who sought attention.

  On the surface, the story had an irresistible newsroom logic: Jewell was clearly looking for recognition. Bert Roughton, the city editor, had answered the telephone when a representative from AT&T called to ask if the
paper would like a Jewell interview. According to Walter, Roughton himself typed a sentence in the Scruggs-and-Martz piece: “He [Jewell] also has approached newspapers, including the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, seeking publicity for his actions.” But he hadn’t. Walter explained, “There was nothing wrong with that sentence. That’s journalistically proper. It is not common practice, to my knowledge, to ask someone you are interviewing . . . ‘Are you here of your own free will?’ ” Jewell had not contacted the paper—a fact that would have been easy enough to check. Walter became snappish when I described the sentence as “a mistake.” “It was not a mistake,” he said angrily. Scruggs and Martz quoted Piedmont College president Ray Cleere as backup. According to Cleere, Jewell had been “a little erratic” and “almost too excitable.”

  There was no doubt raised by the AJC about the value of Cleere’s information or the fragility of the FBI’s potential case. On Tuesday morning, July 30, Christina Headrick, a young intern on the paper, was sent to Buford Highway to stake out Richard Jewell’s apartment. She phoned in that there were men doing surveillance. By deadline, John Walter had made a decision: He would tear up the afternoon Olympics edition and lead with Jewell.

  * * *

  Several states away, Colonel Robert Ressler was watching CNN when the AJC extra edition was shown. Ressler, who was retired from the behavioral-science unit of the FBI, had, along with John Douglas, developed the concept of criminal-personality profiling. He was the coauthor of the Crime Classification Manual, which is used by the FBI. He had interviewed Ted Bundy, Jeffrey Dahmer, and John Wayne Gacy, and as he watched the TV report, he was mystified. “They were talking about an FBI profile of a hero bomber, and I thought, What FBI profile? It rather surprised me.” According to Ressler, the definition of “hero homicide”—a person looking for recognition without an intent to kill—perhaps emerged as “hero bomber.” “There is no such classification as the hero bomber,” he told me recently. “This was a myth.” Later he said, “It occurred to me that there was no database of any bomber who lived with his mother, was a security guard and unmarried. How many hero bombers had we ever encountered? Only one that I know of, in Los Angeles, and his bomb did not go off.” Ressler knew that something was off; profiles are developed from a complex set of evidence and facts derived only in part from a crime scene. The bomb had been deadly, which was not consistent with the “hero complex.” Furthermore, he wondered, where did they get the information to put the profile together that fast? He asked himself, What came first here, the chicken or the egg? Was the so-called profile actually developed from the circumstances, or was it invented for Richard Jewell?