Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814
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The engineers played no part in the battle, being employed removing or destroying the siege stores. Fletcher, who was at Jerumenha on the morning of 16 May, heard of the battle and rode with Rice Jones, arriving after the battle was over. The two of them spent an uncomfortable night out in the open and waited the next day with Beresford to see what Soult intended to do next. On the 18th Rice Jones followed the retreating French with the Allied advance guard and was used as a messenger between the Spanish cavalry and Beresford. Realising that Soult was indeed retreating, Beresford ordered Hamilton’s Portuguese division and Madden’s cavalry brigade to re-invest Badajoz. That night the engineer officers retired to Olivenza and ‘procured good quarters’, their thoughts going back to the challenge of besieging Badajoz.81 In the period since the siege had been raised Phillipon, the governor, had worked hard to make repairs. He also ordered the soil to be removed from the area where the batteries would be sited for any subsequent attack on San Christobal.
The Second Siege of Badajoz
Wellington arrived at Elvas on 19 May 1811, having ridden from the north after defeating the French under Masséna at Fuentes del Oñoro. While Beresford followed Soult south, he took control of the plans for a second attempt on Badajoz. He ordered Dickson to collect the necessary siege materials. Jones believed that it would take around eleven days to have the guns ready, primarily because the carriages used to transport the siege pieces needed significant repairs after the first siege.82
Timeline for the Second Siege of Badajoz
19 May 1811
South side of Badajoz invested by Hamilton
25 May 1811
North side of Badajoz invested by 7th Division
25 May 1811
Flying bridge installed at the mouth of the Caya
27 May 1811
3rd Division joined investment on south side
29 May 1811
Work started on false attack against Pardaleras
30 May 1811
Work started against San Christobal and Picurina
3 June 1811
Guns opened fire on both sides
4 June 1811
Seven guns moved forward to new battery on night 4/5 June
5 June 1811
Seven guns opened from Battery No. 6, south side
6 June 1811
1st assault on San Christobal, night 6/7 June
7 June 1811
Three guns opened from Battery No. 7, south side
8 June 1811
Ten guns opened from Battery No. 7, south side, including six iron 24-pounders which had arrived from Lisbon
9 June 1811
2nd assault on San Christobal, night 9/10 June
10 June 1811
Siege raised and guns removed by that evening
It was not until 29 May that the convoy set off from Elvas. During this ten-day delay, Allied reinforcements had also arrived to replace the losses at the Battle of Albuera. The 7th Division arrived on 25 May and re-invested the northern bank of the Guadiana, once again completely cutting off the fortress. General Picton arrived with the 3rd Division on the 27th and took up a position on the southern bank. Wellington was in no doubt that this siege would also have to be conducted against the clock. Although Soult and Masséna had been temporarily repulsed, it quickly became apparent that the French were preparing once again to come to the aid of the fortress. As early as 23 May, Wellington noted the movement of reinforcements to the south which would give the French 50,000 troops to use against him. Whilst the French still held Ciudad Rodrigo to the north, Wellington could not bring enough troops south to face this force. Consequently, when Soult advanced, Wellington would once again be forced to raise the siege unless the fortress could be taken by that time. Fletcher also reported that ‘it seems highly probable that our siege may again be interrupted’.83
Wellington now considered the plan to be followed for the second attempt, Jones noting that ‘After much consideration, [he] determined … to follow the plan … for the last attack’.84 This infers that the plan that the engineers actually followed for the first siege was known to Wellington, even though it was not documented, as discussed above. The plan was for attacks against the San Christobal and Picurina outworks (which would ultimately become the attack against the castle), with a false attack against the Pardaleras outwork. Some changes were made to the overall plan, to increase the number of guns available, to set up counter-battery fire and to start both attacks simultaneously. There was one major boost to the planning, in that the stores that Wellington had ordered from Lisbon in April 1811, for the first siege, had eventually arrived at Elvas and were now available for use. But there were still not enough tools for the planned activities as 1,000 more picks and shovels were ordered from Lisbon on 22 May.85
The siege train that Dickson put together comprised thirty 24-pounder and four 16-pounder guns, and eight 8in and four 10in howitzers. As before, these were all supplied from Elvas and were of the same age and poor quality as those used previously. To bolster these limited resources, orders were sent to expedite the arrival of the six iron guns that had been ordered from Lisbon around 10 April and also to assign a company of British artillerymen to support the Portuguese artillerymen. Wellington, clearly still had no intention of using the new battering train that was at Lisbon. As early as 14 May, he was arranging for it to be moved north for the planned siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Fletcher also requested that Beresford assign 250 soldiers to the engineers and that the assistant engineers who volunteered for the first siege would be made available again.
All the officers knew that this was going to be another race against time, Dickson, writing on 29 May, said ‘Reinforcements are on their march from Masséna’s army to the south, so that we must soon take Badajoz, or we probably will be interrupted again’.86 Similarly, Jones’ view was ‘anything to be undertaken against Badajoz, must therefore be of a rapid nature’.87 As with the first siege, collecting men and material together with the limited resources that were immediately available proved time consuming and it was not until 30 May that everything was in place to start the attacks.
Between 30 May and the morning of 3 June, the batteries and trenches were formed for the attacks against San Christobal and the castle. The attack against San Christobal suffered the same problems as before, through the lack of soil and the incessant bombardment from the French. Due to the limited number of workmen available on the south side, the parallel was not as long as proposed and on the night of 31 May 1811 it was decided to prepare the main battery at the end of the current parallel rather than wait a further twenty-four hours for the parallel to be extended nearer to the walls. The decision was made to accept the extra distance for the sake of speed.88 The batteries were completed and opened fire on the morning of 3 June 1811.
There was an impressive increase in the number of guns brought forward. Compared with the first siege, three times the number of guns were available on the morning the firing commenced. On the north side, there were four batteries in action. On the south side all the guns were initially placed in one large battery. Fletcher had written to Wellington on the evening of 3 June, stating that as ‘the guns employed are so uncertain in their effects it may become necessary to push yet further forward’.92 He told Wellington that he had ordered work to be started that night on the second parallel and a new battery that would bring the range to the castle walls down to 650 yards. This work was completed and seven guns opened fire on the morning of 5 June. Again that night, the parallel was extended further to the right and another battery was started at 520 yards from the castle. This battery opened with three guns on 7 June, and that night the six iron 24-pounders, which had eventually arrived from Lisbon were installed with one other gun, bringing the battery up to ten guns on the morning of the 8th.
The table above shows the number of guns that were available each morning. The old brass guns continued to exhibit all the problems that had been apparent during the first siege. Most were ma
de inoperative through use rather than through enemy action. Both Jones and Dickson remarked on the improvements when the first iron guns became available on the morning of 8 June.
As predicted by the engineers, the wall of the castle was quickly destroyed on the first day of firing. However, what was not expected was that the wall was actually just a facing for the ground behind which refused to collapse and peeled off in sheets leaving a near-perpendicular slope. This was battered incessantly until 10 June, and it was only at this point that there was some hope that the breach might be practicable. Captain Mulcaster reconnoitred the Rivellas stream on the night of 5 June, and identified two fords where troops could cross near the proposed breach.93 Captain Patton was mortally wounded making a further reconnaissance of the Rivellas stream and the castle walls on the night of 8 June 1811.94
The fire against San Christobal was also more successful than it had been during the first siege. The breach was declared practicable following a reconnaissance of the breach on the night of 5 June by Lieutenant Forster RE. An assault was ordered for midnight on the 6th, led by Lieutenant Forster. Writing to the Earl of Liverpool on that day, Wellington said ‘I have strong hopes that they will not be able to keep us out of the place [i.e. Badajoz]’.95 His optimism had gone by the following morning, and it seems it had been for public consumption only. Cocks recalled overhearing him talking to Dickson the day before, saying ‘If we succeed with the means we have it will be a wonder’.96
The assault failed, primarily due to the prompt action of the French who had cleared away the rubble from the breach between dusk and midnight when the attack was made. The attacking party made valiant attempts for nearly an hour to find a way in, but eventually retired with losses of twelve killed and eighty wounded. Jones noted that ‘the storming party, I am afraid, did not march until midnight’, which suggests that the engineers thought the delay before the assault was too long.97
The siege batteries recommenced firing the following morning and battered the walls of the fort for a further two days, when the breach was once again declared practicable. To reduce the time for the French to clear away the rubble, the assault was scheduled for 9 p.m. The size of the assault force was increased but a similar result occurred, with the garrison showing great energy in clearing the rubble from the breach and blocking the breach itself. The leader of the assault, Major McGeechy, and Lieutenant Hunt RE, who was guiding the party, were both killed in the first minutes of the attack. Casualties this time were fifty-four killed and eighty-five wounded.98 Squire, writing just before the second assault took place, showed that despondency was creeping in:
This night Fort Christobal will be again assaulted. On the last occasion we lost one of the bravest and finest young men in the Corps of Engineers. He was a real hero, he lived and died like a Roman in the best ages of their glory. In this unfortunate attack I have now buried three of my comrades – two of them, Dickinson and young Forster, I knew intimately and I sensibly feel their loss. I have called our attack unfortunate because of our miserable means. In every other aspect we have done well and the Corps of Engineers have at least endeavoured to deserve an honourable distinction – Our guns are infamous all Portugueze – and two or three became useless every day – I think a practicable breach may possibly be made tomorrow evening in the castle. Captain Patton of the Engineers was severely wounded yesterday.99
Two days later, he updated the situation:
On the night of the 9th, the assault of Fort Christobal was again attempted, and a second time it failed although I am persuaded if success had been possible, we should have succeeded. The enemy made a most noble and obstinate defence they had cleared away the rubbish from the foot of the breach and filled the ditch with 5½ inch shells, hand grenades, light balls etc. When our ladders were planted the enemy rolled down upon our men large stones or rubbish or pushed them into the ditch with poles. They cried out from the parapet Venez Monsieurs Anglais, Venez Portugaise. The Portugueze amidst all this fire behaved as nobly as the English. We lost 130 men killed and wounded; amongst the killed Lieutenant Hunt of the Royal Engineers, who was the first man shot on the occasion. Our losses on this side have indeed been severe. I have certainly suffered great anxiety but my calamity is now at its height for we must raise the siege, time and means completely failing us. In a day or two a large French Army will be collected in this neighbourhood; our breach in the castle will not be practicable for three or four days and to take Christobal we must go to the crest of the glacis. We have neither time nor means. Our guns are most infamous, nearly half of them have been disabled by our own fire. The artillery is Portugueze most of the vents of the guns are now 1 ½ inch in diameter! We have had no mortars whatever.100
At noon the following day, 10 June 1811, Wellington called together his officers and told them he was raising the siege. The guns and stores were removed over the following two days. The comprehensive reasons Wellington gave for his decision were:
• The poor quality of the siege guns.
• The even poorer quality of the gun carriages.
• The resistance of the castle wall. He was ‘astonished’ by it.
• Failure to take the fort of San Christobal.
• The expected arrival of French relief forces.
• The depletion of the ordnance stores at Elvas to a point where it would not be able to defend itself; the lack of replacement stores from Lisbon and the lack of transport to deliver replacement stores.
• The depletion of provisions to the point where there were less than a fortnight of supplies for Elvas.
• The need for the transport used at the siege of Badajoz to replenish the ordnance stores and provisions at Elvas.101
The two sieges of Badajoz were dismal failures. The reasons need to be re-evaluated with emphasis on the performance of the engineers rather than on the events themselves.
There are some common threads running through both sieges:
• They were carried out against time pressures.
• There were limited resources available: manpower, materials and guns.
• There were transport problems.
• The choice of point of attack was strongly criticised both at the time and later.
The two most significant English writers on the war, Oman and Fortescue, are highly critical of the sieges, blaming the engineer officers and to a lesser extent Wellington. Myatt generally takes the same line, but he is more sympathetic to the problems that the Allies faced.102 In the analysis below both sieges will be treated as one, because they were effectively the same siege, undertaken twice.
Both Oman and Fortescue criticised the decision to attack San Christobal in the strongest terms. Whist criticism with hindsight is always easy, the views of the experts who were making decisions at the time must be considered. On two separate occasions the engineers advised that there was insufficient time to carry out a regular approach. The admittedly high-risk attack on San Christobal and the castle was the only possible solution they could see to meet the time limits.103 Wellington and Beresford approved their plan on both occasions. Dickson, the senior artillery officer, expressed no concern about the strategy before, during or after the sieges. On both occasions, the siege was raised because of an approaching army. Oman, when commenting on the second siege, stated that Wellington had four weeks to take Badajoz. The fact is that Wellington only had ten days from opening the trenches to raising the siege. He had even less time in the first siege, just four days. The remainder of the time that the Allies had available was taken up arranging guns and stores or sorting out communications across the river Guadiana. If the plan chosen was believed to be the fastest, then there was absolutely no chance of an attack on the south side succeeding. The French took seven weeks to take Badajoz and that was by surrender, not assault. It is difficult to understand why most writers believe that Wellington could achieve the same in seven days.
D’Urban stated in his diary that the breach in San Christobal was never pr
acticable and noted on 10 June that a French sapper who had deserted said that the castle wall could never be breached at the point chosen as it had solid rock behind (which was shown to be untrue). D’Urban thought the engineers had chosen the wrong point of attack and should have attacked the south side.104 He reserved more serious criticism for the overall strategy, in that he believed that Wellington should have focussed on destroying Soult’s army first and then turned on Badajoz at his leisure. There is also an interesting comment by George Ross RE who wrote that Beresford believed that the siege of Badajoz should not have been undertaken.105
The two assaults on the fort of San Christobal need further consideration. It was a small but very strong fort, each side being around 100 yards long. The first assault used less than 200 men and the second a few more. During the first assault, the French had less than 200 troops in the fort and probably not more than 400 during the second assault. Oman and Fortescue both commented that the storming parties were too small.106 There was no reason why they could not have been larger. With the forces Wellington had available, he could have made an attempt to overwhelm the fort. Brute force may not have led to any greater casualties, as the losses were caused by these small groups spending up to an hour trying to get into the fort. Ladders could have been used at different points as well as at the breach. At no time did the French have enough troops in the fort to defend all the faces at the same time. When Wellington finally took Badajoz in 1812, it was the secondary attacks that succeeded, not the main one. A similar approach, attacking at multiple locations, should have been used in the assault on San Christobal in 1811, particularly due to Wellington’s strong desire to re-take Badajoz quickly.