Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814

by Mark S. Thomson

  Building the rope suspension bridge at Almaraz also freed up the pontoon train and Lieutenant Piper was ordered to move it to Salamanca as soon as the replacement bridge was in place. This order looks like planning for his intended retreat from Burgos and ensuring that he had the ability to cross rivers during the movement back towards Portugal. Piper was put in command of the pontoon train, a position he held until the end of the war. The pontoon train at this time was located at Elvas and Piper had a number of challenges keeping it ready for use. On 10 December, he reported that a large number of the bullock drivers had deserted through not being paid. In the same letter he reported that the pontoons were rusting badly.

  Lieutenants Hulme and Marshall spent several months working on improving the navigation of the Douro. They were working to improve both the river bed and the towing paths on the river banks.43 Hulme reported the difficulty of keeping even the ‘poorest class of peasant’ employed due to the lack of money to pay them and their having to seek work elsewhere as a result.

  December 1812 saw an incident which, I believe, is unique during the Peninsular War: Wellington asked for two engineer officers to be removed. Both were new to the Peninsula, having arrived earlier in the year. Captains Henderson and Slade had been assigned to complete the repairs at Badajoz. Henderson arrived first at Badajoz during the summer and Slade arrived on 5 December. A few days after Slade’s arrival, Henderson wrote to Fletcher informing him that due to Lieutenant Pringle RE being too ill to stay at Merida and based on information that the enemy were advancing on that place, he had decided to go there to make arrangements to blow the bridge. This appears to have been done without reference to any authority and looks like an officer seeking his moment of glory. When his letter arrived at headquarters he was ordered to return immediately to Badajoz. Unfortunately for the two officers, Wellington happened to pass through Badajoz a few days later on his way to Cadiz and was clearly not happy, writing to Fletcher:

  I am by no means satisfied with either Captain Henderson, whom I have not seen, but who is gone to Merida to destroy the bridge without orders that I know of; or with Captain Slade, who appears to me quite incapable of executing such a trust as that of the charge of the works of this place. I beg therefore that both may be relieved from hence without loss of time, and that you will send here an officer on whose judgement and discretion you can rely to execute the trust reposed in him.44

  Captain Slade was probably the unlucky partner in this incident. Having just arrived at the fortress, he was probably unprepared to answer the knowledgeable questions of Wellington and, in the absence of his superior officer Captain Henderson, faced Wellington’s anger alone.

  The winter of 1812/13 saw changes in the engineering command and some internal friction. In early December, Fletcher was granted leave to return home for a short period. His eventual successor Howard Elphinstone gossiped that he was looking for a wife and would not return to the Peninsula. Fletcher’s wife had died in 1809 and his six children had been looked after by relations since then. Dickson’s brother, Admiral Archibald Dickson, also commented that Fletcher was to be married to Eliza Carter on his return to England and he was ‘a man in love’.45 Elphinstone had a slightly different view based on letters from his wife claiming that Miss Carter was less enthusiastic, as marrying Fletcher would also include the care of his children.

  In the meantime, Captain Henry Goldfinch was confirmed as temporary CRE on 11 December but only after Burgoyne had asked Wellington to rule on whether Corps or Brevet rank took precedence. It is surprising that Burgoyne challenged this as Fletcher had clearly identified Goldfinch for the command.46 The timing suggests that Burgoyne waited until after Fletcher left headquarters and then directed the question on seniority to Wellington. His question should have been directed to the Board of Ordnance, not Wellington, but they would have rejected his claim out of hand and Burgoyne knew that. I believe this late change of command was because Howard Elphinstone was supposed to have taken over from Fletcher. Elphinstone had been ordered to come out in November 1812. He was at Portsmouth on 12 December but did not arrive in Lisbon until 3 February 1813. Writing a few days after his arrival in Lisbon, he told his wife he had been ordered to report to headquarters, but said he was not moving from Lisbon for several days as it was raining. Then he planned to review the lines of Torres Vedras, return to Lisbon to rest his horses and then set out to see, as he put it, ‘The great man’. He did not arrive at headquarters until 4 March, over three months after he was ordered out! During the period when Elphinstone was sightseeing, Fletcher had been to England and returned, arriving back at headquarters on 13 April. Elphinstone was sent back to Lisbon the next day. I am sure this was due to displeasure at Elphinstone taking so long to arrive.

  1812 had been a year of contrasts. The successes at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz followed by the Battle of Salamanca led to a feeling of hope in the Allied camp. The failure at Burgos and the disastrous retreat that followed tarnished Wellington’s reputation. However, the French in the Peninsula were firmly on the back foot. Whilst Madrid was back in their hands, the siege of Cadiz had been raised and the whole of Portugal and southern Spain was now free. Wellington’s difficulties were completely overshadowed by the destruction of Napoleon’s army in Russia. Despite their recent setbacks, the Allies looked forward to 1813 with considerable optimism.

  Chapter 8

  1813 – The Road to France

  Wellington, having made a trip to Cadiz to discuss his role as commander of the Spanish Army, had returned to his headquarters at Freneda to start planning his next campaign. This was going to very different from previous years, in that the Allied army would be moving into new parts of Spain. Communications, both roads and bridges, would now be extended into these new areas. The barriers of the Tagus, Douro and Guadiana were less important, as they were not now on the front line.

  There was extensive correspondence through the winter about the availability and condition of pontoons, as 1813 would be the first time that Wellington would move a pontoon train with the army. On 20 December 1812, he wrote to Lieutenant Piper RE asking him to obtain details of the number of pontoons and carriages at Lisbon and also to do the same with the equipment at Elvas, and for Piper’s report to be ready in ten days’ time.1 Following receipt of the report, Wellington ordered Dickson to organise the large pontoon train at Lisbon ‘until the arrival of Mr Pakenham’ the Bridge Master.2 Once the pontoon train was complete, the intention was to ship it up to Abrantes, and on 28 January 1813 Dickson applied for twenty-five large river boats to be made available to ship the thirty-four pontoons, carriages and equipment.3

  Planning continued through the early weeks of 1813. A unit of Portuguese seamen was attached to the pontoon train in Lisbon and two companies of Portuguese artificers, with their engineer officers, were attached to the army.4 A small siege train of 18-pounders was also put together to travel with the army, there being a number of larger siege guns available at Almeida and Elvas if required.5 Orders were also issued to put the rope bridge back in place at Almaraz.6 Lieutenant Wright RE was ordered to fully destroy Fort Napoleon and the fort at Miravette near Almaraz and was then sent to build a bridge over the Alagon at Galisteo.

  On 27 April, Lieutenant Harry Jones, who was attached to the 5th Division, was ordered by Murray, the QMG, to report on the means of passing ‘troops, horses or artillery’ over the Douro at Peso da Regua ‘and what can be done towards increasing the means of passing the river’. Jones reported back two days later that 13,000 troops could cross in ten hours, a brigade of artillery in five hours and 1,000 dragoons in the same time. He went on to describe in some detail the work required to collect the boats and prepare the river banks, also commenting on the impact of the river level rising and proposing alternative crossing-points. When the 5th Division crossed the river at this point on 14 May, Harry Jones crossed with them and two days later was employed repairing the roads to make them passable for the divisional artiller
y.7 Jones remained with the artillery for the next few days, working with the artillery officers to get the guns up and down the steep inclines. About the same time as Jones received his orders to report on the crossing-point for the 5th Division, Burgoyne received a similar order to do the same for the 3rd Division. Travelling with Lieutenant Hulme RE, they prepared crossing-points at Collegio and Villarinho. Part of the 3rd Division crossed here on 18 May.

  In early May, Wellington wrote to Colonel Fisher, commanding the Royal Artillery, informing him that 264 horses were to be taken from Cairns’ artillery brigade and from the reserve artillery to equip the pontoon train that was made up of forty-four pontoons. This will have been extremely unpopular with the artillery but Wellington clearly wanted the pontoon train to be as mobile as possible and felt it necessary to swap the bullocks for horses.8 It will have been some consolation that this was a temporary measure until replacement horses arrived from Lisbon. Cairnes commented that ‘Although perhaps considered necessary by his Lordship unavoidable and essential to the service, [it] has mortified and vexed me beyond all possible expression … His Lordship was. I hear, pleased to express his regret at knocking up my Brigade.’9 Cairns went down to deliver the horses personally and remarked that he was unconvinced that the replacement of the oxen would improve the poor progress made by the pontoon train. His view was that the carriages were too light and unwieldy and the substitution of horses would make the situation worse as ‘nothing but the slow steady pull of the ox prevents it either from upsetting or breaking something’.10

  Wellington’s plans for the campaign were delayed due to the difficulties in getting the pontoon train to the army. He wrote to Bathurst on 11 May informing him of his plans to establish a bridge over the Douro near Zamora but the pontoon carriages had suffered many breakages on the way and this had slowed its progress. On the 14th, Wellington rode to inspect the pontoon train himself. Writing to Fletcher, he said it would be two days before it would be ready to move and that he had asked for twenty pairs of wheels to be supplied by the Royal Artillery, making it clear that the pontoon train’s needs were in his opinion greater than those of the artillery. Wellington had asked Fletcher to personally check the road that was planned to be used by the pontoon train and make sure it was passable.11 A few days later, Wellington wrote to Bathurst enclosing a report from Fletcher on the condition of the pontoon train and asking that ‘good carriages constructed as proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Sir R Fletcher’ were sent out to Corunna (see Appendix 4 on military bridging for more details).

  By mid-May nearly everything was ready for the advance. Essentially, the plan was for the Allied army to move in two columns, one up the main road to Salamanca and the other to sweep round the French flank to the north. In Wellington’s instructions for movement, issued to Sir Thomas Graham on 18 May, he informed him that ‘Captain Mitchell [QMG Department] is now employed in the examination of the fords and other passages of the Esla’. He also informed him that he intended to

  lay the bridge of pontoons at the Barca de Villal Campo, about a mile below the junction of the Esla with the Douro, where it is expected to arrive on the 30th … the object of these movements is first to turn the enemy’s positions on the Douro and next to secure the junction of the right of the army with the left, as far up the river as may be practicable.12

  If all went to plan, around 30 May the two wings of the Allied army would arrive at the junction of the Esla and the Douro on the same day that the pontoon train arrived to connect the two forces. The first of the Allied columns set off on 20 May, with Wellington leaving his headquarters at Freneda two days later. Concerned that the two wings of the army could be vulnerable to a French attack, having a river between them, he decided to split the pontoon train and make an earlier crossing at Espadacintra until the main crossing-point on the Douro/Esla was established. Whilst there were some delays, the Allies moved forward, with Hill’s corps nearly catching the French at Salamanca as they delayed their retreat, trying to obtain accurate information on the forces moving against them. The bridge at Alba de Tormes was captured intact, Lieutenant Wright RE describing the French repairs to the bridge a few days later.13

  Orders to lay the pontoon bridge over the Douro at Barco de Villal Campo were given on 28 May 1813 but two days later Wellington wrote to Hill saying the order had been countermanded as he needed the pontoon bridge over the Elsa, where the river had risen and the fords become impassable, Harry Jones noting ‘I attempted to cross on horseback, but was very near being carried away; water above horse’s chest.’ This sudden rise in the water level caused a day’s delay until the pontoon bridge was put in place.

  Initially the French believed that Hill’s force was the only one advancing and it was several days later before they realised their mistake. The French had to hurriedly evacuate Zamora and retire towards Burgos, Wellington leaving a small Spanish garrison and Lieutenant Hulme to repair the defences there. Anticipating the French retreat, Wellington continued his flanking movement and Burgos was also evacuated on 13 June, the French destroying the fortress that he had failed to take the previous year. Fletcher and Dickson examined the damage the same day, even though the French were still close by, and following their report Wellington believed that he thought ‘it was possible to put in a state of repair for a reasonable expense’.14

  Wellington’s flanking manoeuvre continued to be successful and the French retired again, their forces concentrating at Vitoria from 19 June to protect the retreating baggage train containing the fruits of six years of plunder. Wellington, following closely, realised that he was stronger than the French and launched a co-ordinated assault on the morning of the 21st. Overwhelmed and outflanked, the French were comprehensively defeated and King Joseph’s army disintegrated and fled to the north. Following a trend of bad behaviour that had been growing throughout the war, the Allied army now also degenerated into a mob looting the French baggage train, any though of pursuing the French lost amongst the riches to be gained. Officers were as guilty as the rank and file. It was the following morning before an organised pursuit began, but the French had a head start and, with some skirmishing, retired across the Bidassoa, leaving garrisons in the major fortresses at Pamplona and San Sebastian and the minor fortress of Pancorbo. The Spanish General O’Donnell was ordered to take the latter and Lieutenant Stanway was ordered to assist him. Pancorbo was invested on 25 June, the lower fort was stormed on the 28th and the place surrendered two days later, although this was more due to lack of water than the threat of assault.

  Wellington, with the bulk of the army, continued to press the French and Fletcher remained with him. Hill was dispatched to Pamplona with Henry Goldfinch RE in attendance and Graham was sent to San Sebastian with Charles Smith RE. Wellington needed to take these fortresses to capitalise on his success. The French had retreated into the Pyrenees and if Wellington could take the fortresses, he had a much better chance of holding the line of the mountains against any future French advance.

  The Blockade of Pamplona

  Four days after the Battle of Vitoria, Lieutenant General Hill closely blockaded Pamplona, the original intention being to lay siege to the place. Wellington ordered Major Augustus Frazer RA to ride to Santander and divert to Deba the siege train that was waiting in transports on the north coast of Spain. He also made arrangements for twenty-four 12-pounders captured from the French to be sent there. On 28 June, Wellington wrote to Hill ordering a close blockade of the place and Hill reported that ‘I shall do my utmost to fulfil your Lordship’s wishes relative to the blockade of Pamplona. Major Goldfinch is now out examining the place, with the view of carrying into effect your instructions.’15 Two days later, Hill sent Wellington Goldfinch’s report on the defences, and on the same day, Frazer reported that the siege train was at Deba and unloading had started. Wellington’s original plan had been to attack Pamplona, but he now decided to attack the weaker fortress of San Sebastian and blockade Pamplona into submission. This also gave Welli
ngton the advantage of shorter distances for the siege train to travel from the northern coast. John Jones suggested that this decision was based on a reconnaissance by Wellington and Fletcher on 1 July where they realised that Pamplona was too strong to take with the resources at hand,16 but this does not appear to match Wellington’s correspondence. Writing to Graham on 26 June, he said ‘I therefore propose to blockade the place rather than lay siege to it. We shall get the place at a later period.’17 Wellington ordered the blockade to be taken over by the 6th and 7th Divisions under Lord Dalhousie until O’Donnell’s Spanish army arrived, and for nine redoubts to be built to surround the fortress. Fletcher remained to oversee the construction of these with other engineer officers including Goldfinch, Burgoyne and Pitts. Writing to Dalhousie on 2 July, Wellington said:

  I am anxious to establish a strict and close blockade of Pamplona … and to arrange the details with Colonel Fletcher, who has received my instructions on the subject … redoubts should be constructed on certain favourable spots which Colonel Sir R Fletcher will point out, at a distance of 1,000 and 1,200 yards from the place.18

  The strict blockade also included cutting off the water supply, shooting at anyone approaching the river, and removing or destroying any crops in the fields in the vicinity of the fortress. The redoubts were built by Spanish peasants under the direction of the engineer officers and a small number of artificers. Lieutenant Thomas Pitts RE remarked ‘Pasley’s sappers are most valuable and generally extremely zealous’. These will have been some of the first ‘trained’ artificers to have gone through Pasley’s School of Military Engineering at Chatham. The redoubts were armed with French field guns captured at Vitoria. Over the coming weeks a number of buildings were turned into strongpoints and a signalling system was set up to provide rapid communication between the redoubts.