The 900 Days

by Harrison Salisbury

  Rogov sent a strong group of propagandists to lecture to the Black Sea Fleet during their maneuvers. The group was headed by Vice Admiral I. I. Azarov. The Party line was to warn the sailors of the threatening situation with Germany. On the very day Azarov spoke before the personnel of the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, Tass denounced war rumors as a provocation.

  Captain A. V. Bushchin came to Azarov and said: “Comrade Commissar, you will have to speak again before the command and tell them whom to believe. Are those who talk of the nearness of war provocateurs or not?”

  It was a difficult moment for Azarov, but he held to his position, telling the men the Tass communiqué was solely for foreign consumption.

  Throughout the Black Sea maneuvers alarming naval reports came in. The Danube flotilla commander advised that Nazi military engineering work was being pressed night and day on the west bank of the river. Deserters said that military action was expected by month’s end. Marine units were seen at Rumanian ports and German officers along the Danube. Daily calls from the Baltic commanders told of German ship and plane movements.

  The NKGB reported to Stalin personally June 11 that the German Embassy in Moscow had on June 9 received instructions to prepare to evacuate its quarters in the course of seven days. There was evidence that the embassy was burning documents in the basement. Five days later the NKGB reported that German troops concentrated in East Prussia had been ordered to occupy take-off positions for attacking Russia by June 13. Then the date was changed to June 18.

  By this time rumors had begun to circulate among high staff officers of warnings which Stalin had received from Churchill and Roosevelt. Tension in the Defense Commissariat was high.10 Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky told a questioner June 18: “Things will be all right if Germany doesn’t attack in the next fifteen or twenty days.”

  On what did Vasilevsky base this remark? In part, certainly, on the movement of reinforcements to the west, which was now, belatedly, under way on a fairly large scale. There had been a steady build-up of Soviet forces, roughly parallel to that of the Germans.

  The German troop movement had been carried out in three stages. About thirty divisions were sent to East Prussia and Poland in the fall of 1940. This force was built up to seventy divisions by mid-May. In the same period Soviet forces in the west were increased to about seventy divisions, but with the difference that the Soviet divisions generally were not at war strength nor disposed in frontier positions.

  The Germans began heavy troop movements May 25, sending in about one hundred military formations each twenty-four hours. The Soviet reinforcements, ordered in mid-May, soon began to arrive in the west. These movements were carried out on an urgent basis, troops being moved without equipment and arms. They were concentrated on the line of the western Dvina and the Dnieper from Kraslava to Kremenchug. This was the destination of Konev’s troops from the north Caucasus and Lukin’s Trans-Baikal army. They were assembling at Shepetovka, southeast of Rovno. But only slowly were the frontier troops advanced to border positions.

  The movement of troops from the interior was to be completed only in the second half of July—the critical period to which Vasilevsky referred.11

  By June 21, 1941, the Soviet had deployed about 2.9 million troops in the Western defense districts against an estimated 4.2 million Germans. The total strength of the Soviet military establishment had been strongly expanded from the 1939 level—up to 4.2 million in January, 1941, against 2.5 million in January, 1939. The total stood just below 5 million June 1. The air force had been tripled and land forces increased 2.7 times. The army had 125 new rifle divisions.

  But the numbers were deceptive. The army had only 30 percent of the automatic weapons provided by the table of organization; only 20 percent of the planes were of new modern types and only 9 percent of the tanks. When General S. M. Shtemenko took over the 34th Cavalry Division in July, 1941, he found it had no arms whatever. He finally got some 1927 vintage cannons but was unable to obtain enough rifles or ammunition to equip his troops. There were no antitank guns—nothing but Molotov cocktails (gasoline bottles with wicks). He got twelve antitank guns, but not until October, 1941.

  The chiefs of the Soviet Air Force and the air construction industry were hastily summoned to the Kremlin in early June and denounced for failure to develop a system of camouflaging Soviet planes. Stalin had learned, through a letter from an aviator, that air force planes along the Western border were parked in parade formation at the airdromes, gleaming in aluminum, beautiful targets for attack. No one had ever given the question of camouflage the slightest thought. The Air Construction Commissariat was ordered to come forward with a comprehensive plan for camouflage within three days. The plan was submitted in early June but had not been carried out, except in part, by the time the attack started.

  Thus some precautions, even though sluggish, were being taken.

  Is it credible in the face of all the evidence that Stalin genuinely believed Germany would not attack—or that he could stave off the attack by a diplomatic maneuver?

  It seems not only possible but certain. In mid-June Major General A. A. Korobkov of the Soviet Fourth Army on the Bug River told his commanders that the higher-ups in Moscow were inclined to interpret the German concentrations as a blackmailing maneuver, designed “to strengthen the argument of Germany in the decision of some political discussions” with the Soviet Union.

  The Soviet historian A. M. Nekrich observed that if this represented Stalin’s view, he had no real idea of what was going on in the world.

  This seems to have been the case. Marshal Voronov is certain that Stalin persisted to the end in believing that war between Russia and Germany could only arise as a result of provocations, not by Hitler, but by “military revanchists.” In other words, Stalin trusted Hitler but not his generals!

  There were some final efforts by field commanders to take the necessary steps before it was too late. General M. P. Kirponos, the commander in Kiev, became convinced a week or so before June 22 that war was coming. He sent Stalin a personal letter asking permission to evacuate from frontier regions along the Bug River 300,000 civilians, to prepare defense works and set up antitank barriers. To this the reply was the same as all the others: This would be a provocative act. Do not move.

  There is a possibility that Stalin thought he had an ace in the hole. Beginning about mid-May there circulated in both Moscow and Berlin rumors that Russia and Germany were exploring the possibility of reaching a new economic and political accord. Grigore Gafencu, the Rumanian Minister in Moscow, thought there might be substance to the reports. He heard that the Germans had made very stiff demands—the right to exploit the Ukraine, the turning over of all Russia’s airplane production and other proposals which sounded outrageous. But some felt Stalin was ready to pay an extremely high price to avoid war.

  Ulrich von Hassell, the famous German diplomat and diarist, in Berlin heard much the same thing. There were, he noted in his diary, “whispers everywhere that Stalin will make a kind of peaceful capitulation.” Von Hassell was skeptical of this, and so, he noted, was Weizsäcker. Von Hassell was certain Hitler was going to carry out his campaign against Russia.

  But as time passed, as German preparations for war mounted at an ever-faster tempo, the rumors did not die. They grew. Von Hassell again took note of them, just after the fateful Tass communiqué of June 13. His entry for June 15 reported: “With astonishing unanimity come rumors—in the opinion of ‘knowing men’ spread for propaganda (why?)—that an understanding with Russia is imminent, Stalin is coming here, etc.”12

  Was this Stalin’s ace in the hole? Did he plan, if worse came to worst, if Hitler was really preparing to attack, to make the pilgrimage himself? To emulate Ivan Kalita (Moneybags), the medieval Czar, who solidified his power by making the submission to the great Tatar Khans, by accepting the yarlik? Did he harbor the intention of going to Berlin at the last moment and buying his way out of the cul-de-sac into which his policy had led his country and h
imself?

  Some curious evidence points in this direction.

  On June 18 Ambassador Dekanozov in Berlin asked to see Weizsäcker. The Soviet Ambassador was received, but, according to one account, “nothing important resulted” because Weizsäcker had no instructions.

  Weizsäcker’s own report stated that Dekanozov brought up only “a few current matters.” He described Dekanozov as chatting “with complete un-constraint and in a cheerful mood” about such trivialities as Weizsäcker’s recent trip to Budapest and the situation in Iraq. He got into no detailed discussion of Soviet-German relations.

  On June 20 Haider placed a cryptic note in his diary: “Molotov wanted to see the Fuhrer on June 18.”

  Was this subject raised in the Dekanozov meeting on the eighteenth? Was there an eleventh-hour effort to arrange a Hitler-Stalin meeting? The Italian Ambassador in Berlin, L. Simoni, heard rumors of a Stalin trip for the purpose of making last-minute concessions.

  This hypothesis is given support by the fruitless efforts of Molotov and Dekanozov to get into meaningful discussions with the Germans on the evening of June 21, when the preparations for attack could hardly have been overlooked by a ten-year-old child.

  As good a portrait of Stalin in these days as is available is that drawn by Admiral Kuznetsov. In the Admiral’s view, Stalin unquestionably expected war with Hitler. Stalin regarded the Nazi-Soviet pact as a time-gaining stopgap, but the time span proved much shorter than he anticipated. His chief mistake was in underestimating the period he had available for preparation.

  “The suspiciousness of Stalin relative to England and America made matters worse,” Kuznetsov concluded. “He doubted all evidence about Hitler’s activity which he received from the English and Americans and simply threw it to one side.”13

  The suspiciousness of Stalin complicated matters in other ways. It was not ordinary suspiciousness, but what Kuznetsov called the “sick suspicious-ness peculiar to [Stalin] at that time.” And under its influence Stalin not only rejected the plain evidence before him but refused to share with anyone whatever plans he had for the conduct of war should it break out.

  “I did not know in that time [the eve of the war] whether we had any kind of operative-strategic plan in case of war,” observed Marshal Voronov, one of the highest officers in the Soviet Army. “I only knew that the plan for artillery and combat artillery tactics had not yet been approved, although the first draft had been worked out in 1938.”

  It was not possible for responsible commanders in the General Staff or the High Command to take even ordinary precautions. They had no war plans —except offensive plans for carrying war beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union. They had no contingency plans for liaison between staffs. They had no prepared schemes on which to fall back in event of sudden Nazi attack because Stalin had decreed that there would be no Nazi attack. If a dictator decrees that there will be no attack, an officer who prepares for one is liable to execution as a traitor.

  The men around Stalin were so dominated by him that when the crisis came, in Admiral Kuznetsov’s words, “they could not take in their hands the levers of direction.”

  “They were,” he noted, “not accustomed to independent action and were able only to fulfill the will of Stalin standing over them. This was the tragedy of those hours.”

  General Tyulenev, commandant of the Moscow area, and Marshal Voro-shilov met in the Kremlin on the morning of June 22 a few hours after the German attack.

  “Where has the combat command post been prepared for the Supreme Command?” Voroshilov asked.

  Tyulenev noted that the question “considerably embarrassed me.”

  And with good reason. No underground bomb shelter for the Supreme Command existed. None had ever been provided. No orders had been given to Tyulenev. Neither Stalin nor his associates of the Politburo nor his top generals had lifted a finger to prepare for this simple eventuality. Admiral Kuznetsov had provided a concrete shelter for the Navy Commissariat. But he did so without orders and at his “own risk and fear.”

  In the end Tyulenev gave to the Supreme Command his own Moscow District Command underground headquarters.

  An even stranger circumstance: On Tuesday, June 24, a group of naval political workers arrived at Kronstadt from Moscow. These men had been studying in the Military Political Academy in Moscow. They heard about the war on June 22 while eating their Sunday midday meal. Two hours later they were assembled by the director of their courses, a battalion commissar, in a building on the Bolshaya Sadovaya. They were told to collect their things and meet at 6 P.M. at the Leningrad railroad station. They were being sent to the front.

  Each man was told to pack a white uniform, starched shirt and collar, and complete parade paraphernalia. They were told that victory would be forthcoming very soon and they must be prepared for the celebration.

  The men, following instructions, arrived with their parade uniforms. It was a long time before they had a chance to use them.

  What possible motivation could there have been for these orders? Whence did they come?

  Stalin’s authority was so great that it went unchallenged until a fortnight or so before the attack. Only then did some officers begin to speak cautiously, questioning what was happening. But it was too late. And there were still too many commanders who took the attitude: since there are no orders from Moscow to prepare for war, there will be no war.

  Thus it went to the end, Stalin trying in the final hours to stave off attack by ordering his armed forces not to fire at German planes, not to approach the frontiers, not to make any move which might provoke German action.

  He held this conviction so stubbornly that (as Khrushchev was to point out) when the firing started on the morning of June 22, Moscow still ordered the Soviet forces not to return it. Even then Stalin sought to convince himself that he was only contending with a provocation on the part of “several undisciplined portions of the German Army.”

  Between 7:15 A.M. of June 22, when the Defense Commissariat first officially advised the armed forces to resist the German attack, and the speech to the Russian people at noon by Molotov informing them that war had started, Stalin was still trying to stave off war.14

  Russian historians make several allusions to the fact that even after the attack Stalin was casting about for diplomatic means of averting the fatal collision. “Only when it became clear that it was impossible to halt the enemy offensive by diplomatic action” says Karasev, one of the most precise of Soviet historians, “was the government announcement about the attack of Germany and the start of war for the Soviet Union made at noon.”

  What was this “diplomatic” action? There is a clue in the Haider diary, which notes under date of June 22:

  “Noon. Russians have asked Japan to act as intermediaries in the political and economic relations between Russia and Germany and are in constant radio contact with the German Foreign Office.”15

  The evidence is overwhelming that the Nazi attack came as a total surprise and shock to Stalin. Describing Stalin’s reaction to the events of June 22, Nikita Khrushchev pictured him in collapse, thinking “this was the end.”

  “All that Lenin created we have lost forever,” Stalin exclaimed. In Khrushchev’s words, Stalin “ceased to do anything whatever,” did not for a long time direct military operations and finally returned to activity only when the Politburo persuaded him he must because of the national crisis.

  Ivan Maisky paints a similar picture. From the moment of the Nazi attack, he says, Stalin locked himself in his office, refused to see anyone and took no part in the affairs of government. For the first four or five days of the war Ambassador Maisky in London was without instructions from Moscow, and “neither Molotov nor Stalin showed any signs of life.”16

  Why was Hitler’s assault such a stunning surprise to Stalin?

  The real question, as Marshal Andrei Grechko puts it, was “not so much one of suddenness as of evaluation.”

  “Probably,” Marshal Bagramya
n remarks dryly, “certain figures among Stalin’s entourage shared this evaluation.”

  The record strongly suggests that Stalin, Zhdanov and his associates were living in a world turned inside out, in which black was assumed to be white, in which danger was seen as security, in which vigilance was assessed as treason and friendly warning as cunning provocation. Indeed, had anyone in the inner circle suggested to Stalin that his estimate of the situation was mistaken, he would, in all probability, have been ordered to the firing squad.

  * * *

  1 This reconstruction of Stalin’s speech was obtained by Alexander Werth from Soviet sources. It coincides clÖsely with several other evaluations of Stalin’s attitude. For example, Stalin told Lord Beaverbrook in October, 1941, that he never doubted that war would come but hoped to hold it off for six months or so. Margaret Bourke-White, who was in Moscow in May, 1941, heard that the theme of Stalin’s talk was: “Germany is our real enemy.” She found gossip about the speech general in Moscow. The Soviet censorship killed dispatches on the topic, and one correspondent, she said, was expelled within a week for smuggling out the story. The suggestion of a “new compromise” was contained in a version of the remarks obtained by the German DNB correspondent and forwarded to Berlin by the German Embassy June 4. Some Soviet commentators suggest that the flight of Rudolf Hess from Germany to England on May 8, 1941, tended to disorient Stalin, reinforcing in some manner his Anglophobia. (Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945, New York, 1965, pp. 122–123; Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies, New York, 1953, p. 330; Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, Washington, 1948, p. 337; Henry C. Cassidy, Moscow Dateline, Cambridge, 1943, p. 2; Margaret Bourke-White, Shooting the Russian War, New York, 1942, p. 31; Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XII, p. 964.)