by David Grier
Immediately after the army group’s isolation in Courland, many soldiers feared a second Stalingrad, and others believed they had been abandoned to their fate and already written off as lost. Yet following the defensive success of the First Courland Battle the men regained their self-confidence. In addition, the protracted defense of Sworbe and successful evacuation of its entire garrison further reassured the troops, who now realized that evacuation by sea was a real possibility.62 Schörner recognized that some of his men felt abandoned, and he issued several clever Orders of the Day intended to ease their apprehension. He explained that in the current phase of the war the Reich was a fortress. All fortresses possessed outworks, and Courland represented an outer bulwark of the Reich. The purpose of the Courland bastion was to serve as a breakwater, against which the Red Army would weaken before reaching the ramparts of Fortress Germany. Schörner added that, Soviet propaganda notwithstanding, the army group’s rear was free, because Germany controlled the Baltic. He claimed that Courland represented a bridgehead, not a pocket, citing the example of Britain, which he maintained had always conducted its campaigns from bridgeheads.63 Schörner also repeatedly emphasized that every Soviet soldier opposite Courland meant one less foe to attack the Reich.64 Other officers followed his lead and frequently stressed that the reason for Courland’s defense was to draw upon themselves as many Soviet divisions as possible, thereby easing the defense of Germany. If the Soviets were weak in one sector, they should be attacked there, to draw even more Russian troops to Courland. The army group’s goal was not only to tie down Soviet units, however, but also to smash them whenever an opportunity arose.65 National Socialist Guidance Officers back in Germany reported morale in the Courland divisions was excellent and that soldiers hung placards in bunkers proclaiming, “We relieve pressure on East Prussia,” “Every tank destroyed in Courland can’t go on to East Prussia,” and “In Courland we, too, fight for the Reich.”66
The army group introduced several measures to boost morale. Schörner requested OKH to spare no effort to ensure that all ships bound for Courland brought mail for his troops. He exempted military postal personnel in Courland from mandatory work digging defensive positions, so that soldiers could get their mail as quickly as possible.67 The construction of a deeply echeloned system of defensive positions continued until the end, intended both as a precaution against Soviet attacks and as a distraction from concern for the troops’ families in Germany. An illustrated weekly newspaper, the Courland Fighter (Der Kurlandkämpfer), was specially published for the army group. In addition, all soldiers in Courland received a special decoration. This award was a cuff band, inscribed with the word “Kurland” flanked by an elk’s head (Mitau’s coat of arms) and the coat of arms of the Grand Master’s order of knighthood.68
From mid-October to mid-November, National Socialist Guidance Officers carried out an intense indoctrination program emphasizing the importance of defending Courland.69 The army group also occasionally conducted minor offensive operations, to maintain the troops’ fighting spirit and to drive home that they did not merely react to the enemy’s initiatives. Furthermore, Schörner adopted the practice of rewarding individual soldiers who destroyed enemy tanks in close combat with twenty days of special leave to Germany.70 Obtaining leave from Courland was otherwise extremely difficult, but the Germans set up several rest and relaxation installations for troops.71
The greatest burden on the soldiers in Courland was concern for the safety of their homes and families in Germany from air raids, and later from the enemy advance into the Reich. Until January 1945 this was especially true for troops from the western part of Germany, after Allied armies reached the West Wall and the Rhine. Following the Soviet offensive of January 1945, men from eastern Germany certainly suffered even greater anxiety for the fate of their friends and relatives. Throughout 1945 news from Germany grew worse—and more sporadic. For troops in Courland knowledge of the outside world consisted almost exclusively of official bulletins, front newspapers, and lectures from National Socialist Guidance Officers. From these sources the soldiers learned of the destruction of city after city by Anglo-American bombers and of Soviet atrocities in East Prussia.72 Hoping to incite desertion, the Soviets initiated an intensive loudspeaker propaganda campaign by members of the NKFD but met with no success. The NKFD particularly targeted troops in Courland, and its members carried out reconnaissance and sabotage missions behind the front, appealing to soldiers to desert.73 Morale nonetheless remained good into April, even though the troops seldom received mail after the beginning of March 1945 and their knowledge of conditions in Germany became even less certain, which caused increased concern for families.74 Conditions for the average soldier in Courland were harsh. The troops were subjected to frequent enemy attacks, the weather was miserable, trenches were often partly filled with icy water, and men in the front lines rarely received warm food. These conditions sapped the troops’ strength, and constant exposure to damp weather caused an increase in illness.75
The first week of May 1945 was surely the most difficult time for German troops in Courland. On the first day of the month Russian loudspeakers proclaimed Hitler’s death and two days later the fall of Berlin. News of Hitler’s death came as a severe blow to many soldiers for whom Hitler had remained an idol to the very end. Despite many fantastic rumors—of fighting alongside the British or Americans or of Allied ships coming to rescue the Courland armies—the troops learned of the imminent surrender on the evening of 7 May.76
How did the men of Army Group Courland retain the fighting spirit required to repulse six major offensives? There are several possible explanations. The most obvious reason was simply self-preservation. The soldiers certainly did not want to die, and many men’s fear of Soviet captivity exceeded even their fear of death. Bonds of camaraderie also remained strong. From November 1944, after the soldiers’ confidence had been restored, most wounded troops sent back to Germany to recover requested to return to their units in Courland.77 But if self-preservation was a primary reason for the stubborn defense offered by Army Group Courland, in a sense the reverse was also true. The common soldier realized that every Soviet soldier pinned down opposite Courland meant one less Russian to harm his family. Goebbels’s propaganda machine skillfully preyed upon the troops’ fear of Soviet atrocities against civilians.78 In addition, soldiers recognized that if they ever were to be evacuated, they must hold their present positions, in order to permit freedom of movement to ports for embarkation. Finally, one must not ignore reasons of pride. At Germany’s capitulation the soldiers of Courland viewed themselves as the single German army group that had not been conquered in battle.79
Supply and the Navy
ONE OF THE MOST INTRIGUING, yet elusive, questions concerning Army Group Courland is how the Germans managed to maintain the army group’s supply until the end of the war. Once land contact with Courland had been severed, only air and sea routes remained. Germany’s critical shortage of aircraft fuel, the vulnerability of transport planes, and the increasing distance from Courland to the front in Germany rendered deliveries by air negligible. The problems involved with seaborne supply seemed scarcely fewer. Ships faced danger from mines and from Soviet aircraft and naval forces. Delays frequently occurred because of weather, lack of escorts, and fuel shortages. After January 1945, as the Soviets captured or isolated ports along Germany’s Baltic coast, the distance from supply bases to Courland more than doubled. Initially Gdynia, in the Bay of Danzig, served as Courland’s main supply port. Throughout 1945 the base shifted farther and farther to the west—to Stettin, Swinemünde, and finally to Lübeck. Furthermore, Soviet offensives in eastern Germany isolated additional Wehrmacht units along the Baltic coast, and the supply of these bridgeheads increased the strain on the navy’s resources. Considering the chaos in Germany’s production and transportation networks in the final months of the war, it is astonishing that a relatively steady flow of supplies to Courland continued until Germany surrendered.
When the army group had been cut off in Courland the logistical situation was already critical. Many of its supply dumps had been captured or destroyed during the retreats in September and October. Schörner reported that his main concern was the shortage of weapons, which was so serious that he could not even arm replacements arriving in Courland. The army group also lacked fuel, ammunition, and spare parts for tanks. In its first month of isolation Schörner repeatedly protested to OKH that deliveries of ammunition were woefully inadequate.80 But by the middle of November the flow of ammunition had improved, and the army group was better prepared for the difficult trial of the Third Courland Battle. In order to alleviate the supply situation, Army Group North received orders to evacuate all nonessential personnel, animals, and equipment to Germany. Naval vessels bearing supplies to Courland took on board people and equipment for the voyage back to the Reich.81 Each unnecessary person, horse, and vehicle removed from Courland meant more food and fuel for those remaining. By evacuating refugees the Germans not only eased the supply situation but gained desperately needed workers for the Reich. More important, units scheduled for evacuation to Germany usually left behind much of their equipment to replenish that of divisions remaining in Courland.82 However, although Army Group Courland’s supply status had improved by the end of 1944, the melioration proved temporary. The onset of winter brought increased demands for boots and warm clothing. From late February 1945 until the end of the war German forces in Courland repeatedly complained of shortages of ammunition, replacements, and especially aircraft fuel.83
By April the army group’s pleas for supplies had grown more frequent and more diverse. Hilpert complained that maintenance of tanks, artillery, and other weapons, as well as repairs to Courland’s railroads, required immediate delivery of carbide. Moreover, coal shortages would soon force the shutdown of Courland’s power stations. This would halt virtually all production in Courland and affect the army group’s communications and transportation network. Hilpert also appealed for delivery of seed, warning that if it did not arrive soon farmers could not plant their spring crops.84 At the end of April OKW estimated that German troops in Courland had sufficient supplies for only three weeks.85 Courland’s economy and its ability to support German forces in Latvia were on the verge of collapse in April 1945.
Naval vessels conveying supplies to Courland also brought replacements, but seldom in the quantity desired. The army group’s casualties during the fierce fighting in the retreats in September and October had by no means been made good.86 In mid-November Natzmer insisted that delivery of personnel must have top priority, and he reminded Guderian that with their backs to the sea, the Courland armies could not give any ground. The inadequate number of replacements, coupled with the reduction in strength due to unit evacuations, placed the army group in a steadily worsening situation. Divisional strengths sank to alarming levels; at the end of November Schörner alerted OKH that one division had a combat strength of only 315 men.87 Schörner attempted to reverse this trend by obtaining additional combat troops from rear units and superfluous Luftwaffe personnel, but even his draconian measures could not halt the decline.88
During the bitter fighting of the Courland Battles, commanders begged for more men, on occasion reporting that casualties incurred in a few days exceeded replacements for a month.89 Yet Germany was hard pressed on every front and could not replace the losses suffered in the Courland Battles. Particularly after January 1945, replacements failed to reach Courland in sufficient numbers.90 Initially there was a serious shortage of noncommissioned officers, the backbone of all fighting divisions, but in the first months of 1945 a surprisingly large number of officer replacements arrived in Courland.91 The army group was fortunate to lose relatively few soldiers en route to Courland. But after the Soviets sank two vessels carrying replacements within a week during February 1945, Vietinghoff requested the dispersal of men and important supply goods among all ships in convoys.92 Despite continually deteriorating conditions in the Reich, the navy continued to ship replacements to Courland until very near the end of the war.
While the navy could bring ammunition and equipment to Courland, the army group could not count on the delivery of food for all its men or fodder for its horses. A few days after the Soviets had isolated the army group, German supply services concluded that they must obtain as much of their provisions as possible from Courland itself. The Germans ordered the seizure of cattle, potatoes, grain, and other goods from local inhabitants. It was particularly important to procure as much fodder as possible, because its bulk prohibited extensive deliveries from Germany.93 The practice of securing provisions from Courland proved quite successful. The army group obtained large quantities of food and fodder from Latvian farmers, thereby freeing shipping space to deliver more ammunition and weapons. The army group also obtained tons of fish from local fishermen to feed its troops.94
By the end of 1944, however, food shortages began to occur, despite Guderian’s order for the army group to have two months’ supplies laid in by 31 December. In December the army group began to draw provisions from stores set aside for the fortresses of Libau and Windau to endure a siege, and by February troops were regularly receiving food from this source.95 In the final months soldiers and Courland’s inhabitants alike suffered from lack of food. Troops received little fresh meat, and many horses reported killed by enemy fire had in fact been slaughtered by soldiers for food. At the beginning of May the army group described the food scarcity in urban areas as serious.96 In view of the army group’s supply situation, by the capitulation it clearly could not have continued to fight for any length of time in any case.
It is extremely difficult to determine precise figures for the amount of supplies delivered to Courland. The Skl war diary states that the navy delivered an average of 2,600 tons per day during October 1944. Available evidence indicates that supply convoys maintained approximately the same tonnage at least until mid-January 1945.97 A sharp decrease occurred in February, when an average of slightly less than 714 tons of goods reached Courland daily. This is not surprising, considering that Soviet advances along the Baltic coast resulted in the dislocation of naval forces and the emergence of a need to supply troops cut off in East Prussia.98 Nevertheless, it did not bode well for Army Group Courland in the long run.
The task of protecting convoys to Courland fell to the navy’s Ninth Escort Division, commanded by Capt. Adalbert von Blanc. Blanc’s forces, whose operational area extended from Courland to the Pomeranian coast, faced a number of obstacles—weather, mines, and Soviet aircraft and submarines all posed a threat to the Courland convoys. Due to the danger from Soviet aircraft and naval forces, ships entered and departed Courland’s ports only under cover of darkness. Traveling near the coast offered the greatest protection from submarines but increased the threat from aircraft and mines. Kummetz ordered convoys to follow coastal shipping lanes, to sail at night as much as possible, and to alter routes frequently so that the Soviets could not easily locate them.99 Delays in shipping supplies to Courland were unavoidable and occurred from beginning to end. Relatively few convoys were held in port due to weather, but lack of escorts and danger from mines often prevented ships from sailing. Delays due to lack of escorts were the norm during the battle for Sworbe. This was especially troublesome because at the time the army group was in the midst of the Second Courland Battle and urgently required fuel and ammunition.100 Other reasons for delays included insufficient port capacity at Libau, lack of repair facilities in Courland, and the transfer of supply ports in Germany farther to the west due to Soviet advances in eastern Germany. After the shifting of Courland’s supply port to Stettin, delays occurred primarily because the Germans had trouble delivering supplies by land to Stettin to be transshipped over the Baltic.101
Lingering in Libau, however, provided no guarantee of a safe haven. Soviet aircraft repeatedly bombed the city, damaging ships and port installations. Massive air raids in mid-December 1944 sank or damaged ove
r a dozen vessels, reducing the tonnage allotted for Courland’s supply by 25 percent. Furthermore, both the city and harbor of Libau came under artillery fire from Soviet railroad guns in February 1945.102 At sea, mines posed a serious threat to convoys in the Baltic. Anglo-American pilots stepped up mining operations in the Baltic throughout 1944, concentrating on the Bay of Danzig, waters off ports, and along convoy routes.103 Soviet aircraft and submarines also mined German shipping lanes at an increased rate. Light Russian naval forces also operated against convoys to Courland. In January 1945 the Germans evacuated the Memel bridgehead, and the Soviets based motor torpedo boats near Memel. These vessels first attacked traffic to Courland on 17 February. Although this raid damaged no German vessels, the attack set off alarm bells in Courland. In response to an appeal from the army group, OKH requested the navy to provide additional forces for convoy escorts and to mine waters off Memel regularly, and it asked the Luftwaffe for more fuel for fighters to offer greater protection to convoys.104
Soviet submarines potentially posed a more serious threat. During most of the period under consideration, German naval intelligence estimated, three to six Russian submarines operated in the Baltic at any time. Dönitz’s fears about the presence of Soviet submarines in the Baltic proved unjustified, however. Although Russian aircraft doggedly attacked German vessels, their submarines did not display such determination. The Germans reported that enemy submarines usually fired salvoes of torpedoes and withdrew, whether or not their targets had been hit, and they invariably failed to pursue convoys.105 Nonetheless, once Soviet submarines had gained the Baltic, Kummetz requested reinforcements, claiming he needed at least two antisubmarine flotillas. After reviewing the availability of forces in all theaters, the Skl concluded that only Commanding Admiral, Submarines, had vessels suitable for this task. The Skl refused to detach warships from the U-boat arm, because it would hamper submarine testing and training, which Germany’s naval leaders considered unacceptable to the overall conduct of the war.106 For this reason there was virtually no organized effort on the part of the Germans to seek out and destroy Russian submarines in the Baltic in 1944 and 1945.