by David Grier
By far the greatest actual menace to the Courland convoys came from Soviet aircraft. In Admiral Eastern Baltic’s operational area during 1944 the Germans lost eight vessels (warships and merchant vessels) sunk and eleven damaged to mines, and four ships sunk and one damaged by Soviet submarines. In contrast, enemy aircraft accounted for fifty-eight vessels sunk and 112 damaged.107 Despite all these perils, however, the percentage of German shipping lost in the Baltic was quite low.108
Air reconnaissance over the Gulf of Finland remained essential to determining the whereabouts of the Soviet fleet, but lack of fuel and Soviet air superiority impeded the fulfillment of this vital mission. The Skl requested the Luftwaffe to rectify this situation and also ordered increased patrols by naval vessels. In doing so the navy demonstrated its anxiety about the potential threat from Russia’s surface fleet. The Skl feared that by utilizing cover of darkness during long winter nights, Soviet warships could make surprise appearances in coastal areas or on convoy routes as far west as the Bay of Danzig, jeopardizing Courland’s supply.109 The navy had to continue to rely upon its own vessels for scouting, because the air force did not fly a single reconnaissance mission in the months of November 1944 and January 1945.110 Air reconnaissance or no, the Baltic Fleet never budged from Kronstadt. Soviet sources maintain that the primary reasons for its failure to sail were the presence of mine barrages and the Germans’ destruction of port installations as they retreated from the Baltic States.111 Thus only Russian submarines, torpedo boats, and fleet aircraft attempted to halt convoys to Courland. With these forces the Russians disrupted—but they, as noted, by no means prevented the delivery of supplies to Courland.
The Baltic Fleet’s inactivity came as a pleasant surprise to Kummetz, who regarded the Soviets’ caution as incomprehensible.112 He asserted that raids against German convoy routes and submarine training areas, even if only by Russian destroyers, would have thrown his forces into disarray. German naval officers assumed that the Baltic fleet’s hesitance to leave port was due mainly to fear of mines in the Gulf of Finland and the lack of training, because Soviet warships had been bottled up near Leningrad since the autumn of 1941.
If the reason for the Soviet fleet’s inactivity remains a mystery, the Russians’ failure to conduct landings on Courland’s coast is even more perplexing. Considering the impressive Soviet success in capturing the Baltic Isles and their repeated failure to crack German defenses on the mainland, it is puzzling that the Soviets never attempted even a minor assault on Courland’s coast. If nothing else, such a feint could have drawn off German reserves during an offensive. Following the Soviet amphibious assault on Ösel on 5 October, protection of Courland’s coast became increasingly urgent. Even before the loss of Sworbe, the Germans felt that they had to guard against landing attempts in the army group’s rear. At the end of September and the beginning of October, Army Group North ordered parts of three weakened divisions and as many rear-area units as possible transferred to coastal areas to defend against possible enemy landings. Admiral Eastern Baltic reported that although swampy terrain behind Courland’s northern coast would hinder the Soviets’ ability to form deep bridgeheads, it would also impede the movement of Germans reserves to threatened sectors.113 After the loss of Sworbe the Skl recognized that the Soviets had gained an excellent springboard for operations against Courland’s northern shores, as well as valuable flank protection for landings on the eastern coast of Latvia. Schörner warned OKH that the Russians could put troops ashore at any time. German defenses were insufficient to repulse even weak landing forces, yet he could spare no additional troops from the land front.114 The army group was particularly apprehensive about an amphibious assault once weather conditions improved in the spring, especially since the navy could not lay enough mines to protect the coast. This was an excellent opportunity to break the deadlock on the land front, an opportunity that the Soviets failed to exploit.
Evacuations
ARMY GROUP NORTH HAD OVER five hundred thousand men when it went over to the defense in Courland, but by the beginning of April 1945 its strength had decreased by half.115 This enormous reduction in strength did not result solely from combat losses, for during its isolation the army group gave up nearly half its divisions to other formations. Although in the beginning evacuations were somewhat limited, starting in January 1945 Hitler ordered large-scale troop withdrawals to shore up other sectors of the Eastern Front.
On 20 October, when Schörner received the command to defend Courland, Hitler ordered the army group to prepare to withdraw two infantry divisions, plus portions of several formations from Third Panzer Army that had been separated from their parent units then in Memel and East Prussia. Within a week the army group received instructions to prepare to evacuate an additional infantry division, an armored division, and the staff of Sixteenth Army. Schörner protested that he could not give up so many units and that he desperately needed Sixteenth Army’s staff, offering the staff of Army Detachment Grasser in its place. He also pointed out that the divisions OKH had requested were his strongest units. As had happened often in the past, Hitler gave in to Schörner’s arguments. The staff of Sixteenth Army remained in Courland, and the army group sent only one infantry division and the detachment staff to Army Group Center.116
The army group gave up two more infantry divisions by the end of the year, but Schörner managed to retain most of his strength. This situation changed dramatically, however, after Schörner’s departure and the Soviets launched their Vistula-Oder offensive in January 1945. The collapse of Army Groups A and Center compelled Hitler to order massive troop withdrawals. Goebbels referred to Courland as a “large reservoir” from which one division after another had been evacuated. At the beginning of February Vietinghoff protested that since early December the army group had given up, or was in the process of shipping out, nine divisions, a brigade, and numerous smaller units, which had reduced the army group’s strength by over 87,000 men. Vietinghoff did not share Schörner’s success in changing Hitler’s mind. In the following month OKH ordered the evacuation of a corps staff, an assault gun brigade, and three further infantry divisions.117 It was not an easy time for the army group to release these units, because the evacuations coincided with the Fourth and Fifth Courland battles. Vietinghoff pleaded for permission to send units already awaiting embarkation to aid in the defensive struggle, but Hitler refused.118 After the beginning of March orders to withdraw additional divisions ceased. That the army group managed to hold its front in Courland is all the more surprising in view of the evacuation of nearly half its strength. The Soviets, of course, by that time had withdrawn a large number of their units from Latvia as well.
In May 1945, after becoming Hitler’s successor, Dönitz attempted to evacuate as many troops from Courland as possible. On 7 May Hilpert received word of Germany’s surrender, along with orders to ship out as many men as possible before the surrender took effect.119 All ships had to leave Courland’s ports by midnight on 8 May. Hilpert received instructions to evacuate all sick and wounded soldiers;120 the army group decided to send back also its reserves plus one officer and 125 men from each division. Of these troops, priority for evacuation went to soldiers with children in Germany. Thousands of men, many of whom would find no place on board, waited patiently in Courland’s ports while loading continued throughout the afternoon and evening of 8 May. A General Staff officer sent to Courland on 8 May to ensure the army group had received the capitulation order reported that not only was discipline unbroken but that the attitude of troops there was “fabulous,” “sober,” and “composed.”121 A total of four convoys left Libau with approximately 14,400 troops in sixty-five vessels. Two convoys sailed from Windau, carrying about 11,300 men in sixty-one ships. As the last convoy left Libau, advance Soviet forces arrived and fired on the ships, capturing two tugs loaded with soldiers.122
With the convoys left the last glimmer of hope. Although discipline had been maintained during the loading process, after t
he ships’ departure there was widespread panic. Soldiers seized practically anything that would float and attempted to escape by sea. Some reached the convoys and were taken on board, others landed in Sweden and were later turned over to the Russians, but many drowned in vessels never intended for use at sea.123 For the rest, on 8 May over 200,000 men of Army Group Courland laid down their arms and entered Soviet captivity.124
Several possible reasons for Hitler’s decision to defend Courland will be examined in the final chapters of this work. Yet the extent of Hitler’s interest in Courland deserves comment. For example, on 17 December 1944, the day after launching the Ardennes Offensive, upon Dönitz’s request Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to withdraw fighter aircraft from the Reich to protect Libau.125 At the end of February 1945 Hitler feared the Soviets might destroy Libau’s port facilities to deprive the army group of supplies; as a precautionary measure, therefore, he instructed the navy to build improvised piers at Libau and Windau. As a final example, at the end of March 1945 Hitler proposed the use of submarines to transport supplies to Courland.126 Dönitz replied that U-boats could not carry enough cargo for this to be practical, but the idea illustrates Hitler’s interest in Courland.
Hitler’s constant changing of the army group’s commanders in 1945 is another subject requiring analysis. Hitler demonstrated his desire to retain Courland by leaving Schörner, whom he considered one of his best generals—if not his very best—in command until the beginning of 1945. Once the Soviet attack in Poland threatened Upper Silesia’s industry, Hitler called upon Schörner to reestablish Army Group A’s front. He replaced Schörner with Rendulic, another avid Nazi and a supposed defensive expert. Then the situation in East Prussia, vital for its shipyards and as an integral part of the Reich, required a firm hand and Hitler recalled Rendulic from Courland almost as soon as he had arrived. In his place came Vietinghoff, who had proven his capability in defensive battles in Italy. By the time Rendulic returned to Courland the situation in East Prussia had stabilized, although the lull proved illusory. Rendulic’s stay in Courland again was brief, but who was better suited to defend Vienna than an Austrian? Only at the beginning of April did Hitler appoint a relatively unknown general, Hilpert, to command the army group. At this time, with the Russians at the gates of so many of the Reich’s most important cities, Hitler needed the services of his top generals at home. Hitler changed commanders in other army groups on the Eastern Front in the course of 1945, but nowhere else did he do so as often as in Courland. At first glance this appears to indicate that Hitler did not quite know what to with Courland. In fact, the opposite is true. He always ensured that Courland had, in his eyes, a commander of the first rank, and he brought them from as far away as Norway and Italy for that purpose.
CHAPTER 6
Memel, Prussia, and Pomerania
WHILE THE SOLDIERS OF Army Group Courland struggled to hold their positions, the Soviets did not remain idle elsewhere. Stalin launched a massive offensive in January 1945 in which the Red Army advanced from the Vistula to the Oder. In the course of this operation most of Army Group Center was forced back against the shores of the Baltic. When the Soviets severed East Prussia’s land contact with the rest of the front, Hitler refused to allow the troops there to break through to German lines. He insisted they hold their ground to defend Baltic ports. Hitler’s attempt to retain possession of the Pomeranian and West Prussian coast with the newly created Army Group Vistula also failed, and by March several of its divisions had their backs to the sea in bridgeheads around key ports. Although some of these bridgeheads, such as the ones at Elbing and Kolberg, held out for only a few days, tens of thousands of German soldiers still defended coastal sectors east of the Oder River when Germany surrendered.
Memel
THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE OF 5 October 1944, which isolated Army Group North in Courland, dealt a blow to German troops in Lithuania as well. As they surged toward the Baltic coast, the Russians shattered Third Panzer Army. Some German units fought their way south to East Prussia, others were pushed north into Courland, and one corps withdrew to a bridgehead around Memel, Hitler’s last peacetime territorial acquisition.
Already on 7 October the Soviet breakthrough threatened XXVIII Corps, defending the sector between Schagarren and Schaulen, with encirclement from both north and south. The corps commander, Gen. Hans Gollnick, had to decide whether to retreat toward Libau or Memel. Gollnick regarded Memel’s defense as more important and withdrew toward that port. Gen. Erhard Raus, Third Panzer Army’s commander, appointed Gollnick commandant of Memel on the 9th and insisted the city be held to the end.1 Gollnick had the remnants of three divisions at his disposal. To augment his forces, the Germans for the first time called out their militia, the Volkssturm, to protect the Kurische Nehrung, a narrow strip of land behind the city.2 On 10 October the Soviets reached the shore of the Kurisches Haff south of Memel and the Baltic coast north of the city at Polangen, severing the corps’s contact with both Army Group Center in East Prussia and Army Group North in Courland.
The next day Schörner informed Gollnick that Hitler had issued an explicit order to hold Memel at all costs. OKH ordered XXVIII Corps attached directly to Army Group Center as of 12 October, a provision that scarcely appealed to the army group’s commander, Gen. Hans Reinhardt.3 From 10 to 12 October the Soviets attempted to seize Memel on the march, but they could not pierce the German defenses. On the morning of the 14th the Russians launched a prepared assault but again achieved no major success. The German Navy’s Second Task Force repeatedly shelled Russian troop concentrations poised to storm the city, thereby playing a key role in preventing the Soviets from capturing Memel. The Russians then shifted their attacks to Courland and East Prussia. Memel’s defenders dug in and prepared for a siege in positions on an arc approximately seven kilometers from the city.4 In late October German intelligence reported that the Soviets had withdrawn their armored units from the Memel front and replaced them with infantry, indicating the crisis had passed. Guderian, mainly concerned with blunting the Soviet thrust into East Prussia, ordered the withdrawal of two infantry divisions from Courland to relieve the two mobile divisions cut off in Memel. When Gollnick learned of this he protested that his present forces barely sufficed to hold their positions against the ten Soviet divisions he estimated besieged the city.5
The situation in East Prussia, threatened by a Soviet thrust northeast of Goldap, clearly had priority. In the course of November OKH ordered the withdrawal of both mechanized divisions from Memel, replacing them with a single infantry division. Although the front at Memel remained quiet, Gollnick fretted about his ability to defend the bridgehead during the winter months, when the Haff, southwest of the city, froze. Once this occurred he feared the Soviets would cross the ice to the Nehrung, over which his forces received most of their supplies. Reinhardt passed on Gollnick’s concerns to Guderian and agreed that the withdrawal of the two divisions from Memel had made it unlikely that the corps could hold its positions if the Soviets launched a major attack.6 The Soviets probably would coordinate an attack on Memel with an offensive against Army Group Center, he assumed, and this would prevent him from reinforcing Memel.7 Memel’s defenders awaited the onset of winter with a sense of foreboding.
East Prussia
ALTHOUGH REINHARDT DID what he could to defend Memel, protecting East Prussia was his top priority. Despite its limited gains, the Soviet offensive in East Prussia in mid-October rattled the Germans. The army group halted the Russian advance by the end of the month and then counterattacked to drive the Soviets from German soil. By early November the Germans had recaptured Goldap, leaving the Soviets with only a small strip of East Prussian territory. But no one doubted that the Soviets would strike again. The Germans constructed an elaborate series of defensive positions between the Vistula and Oder rivers and gathered reserves to counter the expected blow. By the beginning of December Army Group Center, consisting from north to south of Third Panzer, Fourth, and Second armies, had a
massed a powerful mobile reserve. With these troops Reinhardt believed he could repulse a Soviet offensive, provided that none of his units were withdrawn.8 Yet by the beginning of January Reinhardt’s reserves had dwindled to insignificance. Hitler ordered several divisions transferred to Hungary, and the units the army group received in return in no way compensated for those taken away. Reinhardt repeatedly protested to Guderian, and at the beginning of 1945 he warned that he could no longer guarantee that his forces could hold their sectors.9
On the eve of the Soviet offensive, the Germans were in a dangerous position. Against Army Group Center’s three armies, with about 580,000 men, 8,200 artillery pieces, 515 aircraft, and 700 tanks and assault guns, the Soviet Second and Third Belorussian fronts had massed fifteen armies, with over 1.6 million men supported by 24,000 artillery pieces, 3,000 aircraft, and 3,800 tanks and assault guns. The Soviet offensive in East Prussia envisaged isolating Army Group Center, pushing the Germans back against the sea, and then splitting up and destroying the Nazi formations. Marshal Konstantin Rokossovskii’s Second Belorussian Front was to attack from bridgeheads over the Narev River north of Warsaw and drive northwest toward the Baltic coast midway between Elbing and Danzig. This would sever Army Group Center’s land contact with the rest of the front. At the same time I. D. Cherniakovskii’s Third Belorussian Front would strike at the junction of Third Panzer and Fourth armies, then advance on Königsberg.10