The Long Space Age

by Alexander MacDonald

  Although the discussion here has been confined almost exclusively to the national context of the United States, understanding the role that signaling has played in American space exploration expenditures is also helpful for understanding its role within an international context. While the signaling value of space achievements has been reduced for the United States relative to their peak value in the Cold War, it still remains strong—as evidenced by the national and international reaction to the landing of the Curiosity rover on Mars in the summer of 2012. It also remains strong for rising nations—in particular China, with its stronger conditions of relative information asymmetry across its population—that wish to signal that they have general economic and technological capabilities competitive with those of the United States. As each national space program, and the international spaceflight community as a whole, considers what exploration objectives to set and what partnerships to engage in to achieve them, planners and policy makers should consider these questions with the geopolitical and domestic signaling implications of each decision in mind. While a variety of political motives drive national space policies, an appreciation for the often overriding role that the signaling characteristic of space exploration has had in motivating expenditures can aid in defining programs and projects that find political purchase.

  Small satellites and emerging commercial spaceflight capabilities also now have the potential to offer space achievements at significant reductions in cost. Although under conditions of perfect information this would correspond to a commensurate reduction in their signaling value, in practice these achievements still retain much of their value due to imperfect information and general association with their more expensive predecessors and counterparts. Low-cost satellites and space probes thus present a cost-effective signaling opportunity for nations wishing to announce and demonstrate their capabilities. Similarly, we can expect that there will be at least some international demand for commercial human spaceflight capabilities, should they emerge: seven individuals have already paid tens of millions of dollars each to fly into space on the Russian Soyuz vehicle, and geopolitical conspicuous consumption alone may be enough to motivate some nations to purchase, rather than develop, their own space vehicles and maintain their own astronauts, provided that the costs are not prohibitive. The international demand for national signaling of technological and economic capability can be expected to continue to contribute to the global development of space exploration, and, indeed, national policies should consider both international space agencies and foreign private-sector space efforts as nodes that can interact with their own national space innovation networks.

  I hope this book also provides historical perspective on the question of who should pay for space exploration. It has been established that the private sector has paid for American space exploration for the majority of its history, although it was public-sector investments that realized the emergence of human spaceflight in the Cold War. We are now at a moment at which the private sector has reasserted some of its historic role, making foundational investments in the generation of new spaceflight capabilities and commercial companies. At the same time, it has been government support—in terms of technical expertise, tests facilities, and programmatic funding—that has allowed the most advanced of these capabilities to progress as rapidly as they have. Private-sector funding for space exploration has also been shown to be far from an unalloyed good. While there are important examples of genuine philanthropy in the history of astronomy, there are also examples of individuals who explicitly looked to use the positive publicity associated with space exploration projects to try to ameliorate some justly deserved negative reputations. Private-sector projects were also subject to many of the same budgetary and schedule overruns that have become familiar in modern government space programs. While some private-sector space exploration institutions contributed greatly to the expansion of our store of knowledge about the universe, others were bedeviled by problems and challenges of execution that greatly limited their contributions and effectiveness. Although I have argued that we must recognize the important and leading role that private-sector funding and initiative has had in the long history of American space exploration, that history also makes clear that neither the public sector nor the private sector has a monopoly on either technological innovation or on misguided efforts.

  How then should we balance the increasing role and initiative of private-sector American spaceflight capabilities with the responsibility of government investment to promote the public good? This is the critical question of American space policy for the early twenty-first century. From a public-policy perspective, it’s not only a question of how much the nation should give a federal agency like NASA to explore and develop space, but also how much the nation should provide in terms of support to American citizens and organizations that wish to explore and develop space. How much is it worth, collectively, to the United States of America, for some of its citizens to return to the Moon again, to fly by Venus, to orbit Mars, or, indeed, to develop settlements on Mars? It may not always be worth the amount that it would cost NASA to develop and operate such missions, but it may be worth supporting private endeavors, at some fraction of the total cost, in the form of public-private partnerships—much as John Jacob Astor IV had envisioned in 1894. Although such support might well be provided through NASA, asking the question in this way removes the focus from an individual institution of American space exploration and places the attention on the development of American spaceflight and space-development capabilities more broadly. The economic perspective presented here also suggests that we should recognize that the core desires for spaceflight and space exploration are intrinsic, personal motivations. This places the onus for further spaceflight development and space exploration firmly on those parts of the American citizenry who possess and share these interests. It is—in short—up to those with the resources, will, and capability to explore space to organize themselves and their materials so that they can do so. It is then up to the rest of the population, through the American political process and governmental administration, as well as through voluntary expenditure and contribution, to figure out how much to support these individuals and organizations—whether they are situated within the government or in the private sector—based on the amount of public and private good that is expected to result from their achievements.

  Although this analysis has highlighted the long-run importance of independent groups of Americans and private-sector funding in the economic narrative of American space exploration, it has also shown that the financial scale on which these groups have operated is far smaller than the scale at which government spaceflight programs have been funded. Though independent groups of Americans are increasingly channeling the long-run forces of American space history to advance their spaceflight projects, the public funds that have propelled government-led space exploration programs are well over an order of magnitude larger. In many respects, Ormsby MacKnight Mitchel has been proven right when he declared in the 1840s that “under a republican form of government, the people must hold, with respect, to all great scientific enterprises, that position of patrons which in monarchial governments is held by Kings and Emperors.”3 In the United States, despite the rising importance of private-sector individuals in spaceflight funding, it is still in fact the American people—through taxes and public institutions such as NASA—that remain by far the largest patrons of space exploration. This might seem like a paradox at the heart of the American history of space exploration: it is the efforts and resources of individuals and independent groups that have the longest history in American space exploration, and yet it is the federal government that has provided the resources and political motivation for the largest and most-recent projects. There thus seem to be two conflicting trends governing the development of space exploration in this country: a long-run, moderate private-expenditure trend, and a short-run, major government-expenditure trend. I argue that the moderate resources of ind
ependent groups of Americans have been the leading force over the long history of American space exploration; but I also recognize the strength of the antithesis, that it has been government funding and institutions that have provided the principal economic impetus to the largest and most-recent space exploration projects.

  The strength of both the thesis and the antithesis, however, suggests the potential strength of a spaceflight program that achieves a synthesis of these two historical forces. Might there be a space policy that could synthesize these forces and provide renewed momentum for the nation’s efforts to explore the solar system? Examining the long-run history of American space exploration suggests that an effective synthesis of these forces might emerge in the form of a national strategy that coordinates the efforts of NASA and the intrinsically motivated individuals that are funding and driving the most effective private-sector space exploration projects. If private funders, individual virtuosos, and independent groups of Americans have been the long-run historical drivers of American space exploration, it would be wise for government policy to, in some instances, focus on the areas of private-sector initiatives and expertise that have garnered the most support in terms of independent financing and use the unrivaled resources and funding of government agencies to amplify and accelerate those independent efforts that are deemed to have technical merit and to be in the national interest. In other instances, it would be wise for government policy to ensure that those areas where public-sector institutions have retained the most relevant technical expertise, and in areas that require decades-long commitments and consistent funding unlikely to be provided for by the private sector, remain robust and capable nodes in the network of public and private entities that make American space exploration possible. Policy makers and space program executives should be mindful both that nonprofit, private-sector funding for space exploration has been an important source of major projects of space exploration in the United States, but also that it was only when the American people became the most generous patrons of space exploration in history through their taxes that Americans first began to fly into space and to land on other worlds. Rather than suggest that there is a particular optimal policy path to be pursued with regard to the balance between public and private institutions, the history of the Long Space Age should serve as a reminder that the social and economic circumstances that have supported American space exploration are contextual, complex, and changing.

  Above all, the Long Space Age should serve as a reminder to maintain a long historical perspective when considering such epochal events as the extension of humanity into the solar system. There is an understandable sense of urgency in the efforts of modern space exploration advocates, fanned by the fear of losing the institutional momentum provided by the Apollo program, by the changeable winds of national politics, and by the earnest personal desires to be part of the exodus from the cradle of Earth. And yet, the long-run history of space exploration shows it to be an endeavor more robust in its support than often thought. The history of the Long Space Age is thus also an encouragement to be patient and to prepare for the long run rather than the short sprint. The long tradition of American space exploration is a reminder that spaceflight stands today on roots that are centuries old. We would be wise to embrace these roots and to focus on strategies for the development and exploration of the solar system that are suited to the fundamental drivers of our movement out into the cosmos and that have in them the seeds for further growth and evolution over centuries and millennia.

  NOTES

  Introduction

  1. The Economist, “The End of the Space Age,” cover article, June 30, 2011; S. J. Dick and R. Launius, eds., Critical Issues in Spaceflight (Washington, DC, 2006).

  2. Bonestell, C., and Ley, W., The Conquest of Space (New York, 1950), p. 95.

  3. Zahavi, A., and Zahavi, A., The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of Darwin’s Puzzle (New York, 1999); Zahavi, A., “Mate Selection: A Selection for a Handicap,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 53 (1975), pp. 205–14; Grafen, A., “Biological Signals as Handicaps,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 144 (1990), pp. 517–546; Johnstone, R. A., “Sexual Selection, Honest Advertisement and the Handicap Principle: Reviewing the Evidence,” Biological Reviews 70 (1995), pp. 1–65.

  4. Veblen, T., The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (New York, 1899), p. 68.

  5. Ibid., p. 86.

  6. Offer, A., “Lecture Notes on Economic and Social History,” Michaelmas term, Oxford University, 2007.

  7. Malone, T. W., and Lepper, M. R., “Making Learning Fun: A Taxonomic Model of Intrinsic Motivations for Learning,” in Aptitude, Learning, and Instruction: III. Conative and Affective Process Analysis, ed. R. E. Snow and M. J. Farr (Hillsdale, NJ, 1987), pp. 223–253.

  8. Maslow, A. H., “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943), pp. 370–396; Maslow, A. H., Motivation and Personality (New York, 1954).

  9. U.S. Congress, Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Scientists’ Testimony on Space Goals, Hearings, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963), p. 51.

  1. Piety, Pioneers, and Patriots

  1. A good general resource for discussion and calculation of relative value can be found online at www.measuringworth.com, which was used to calculate the GDP-ratio and PWC-ratio equivalent values in this paper in November 2016.

  2. Krisciunas, K., Astronomical Centers of the World (Cambridge, 1988).

  3. The source references for the costs can be found in the text descriptions of each project. The then-year costs of the projects are represented with as much accuracy as can be determined from the sources used. The 2015 GDP-ratio equivalent values have been rounded to two significant digits. The base year for the calculation of the 2015 GDP-ratio equivalent value is made from the year of commitment of funds, except in the cases where the specifics of funding are known over a number of years or in observatories with long development times, in which case the equivalent values of each year’s costs are used and summed as outlined in the reference or a midpoint in the observatories’ development is chosen. Ideally, the individual annual expenditures on the projects would be determined, the 2015 GDP-ratio equivalent value of those expenditures calculated and then summed over the entire program. Annual expenditure records for these projects, however, are not readily available, and significant further research will be required to achieve these more-accurate estimates (if the data is even available to achieve them). The current estimates, do, however, present an appropriate order of magnitude.

  4. Johnston, L. D., and Williamson, S. H., “Sources and Techniques Used in Construction of Annual GDP, 1790–Present,” MeasuringWorth, 2008, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/GDPsource06.htm; Officer, L., “Characteristics of the Production-Worker Compensation Series,” https://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/uswage/pwcsessay.php.

  5. McCray, P., Giant Telescope: Astronomical Ambition and the Promise of Technology (Cambridge, 2004), p. 3.

  6. NASA, Cost Analysis Data Requirements (CADRe) Database, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.

  7. John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous—Frequently Asked Questions,” 1998–2000, http://near.jhuapl.edu/intro/faq.html.

  8. Miller, H., Dollars for Research: Science and Its Patrons in Nineteenth-Century America (Seattle, 1970); Kealey, T., Sex, Science and Profits: How People Evolved to Make Money (London, 2008); Kealey, T., The Economic Laws of Scientific Research (London, 1996).

  9. Yeomans, D., “The Origins of North American Astronomy—Seventeenth Century,” ISIS 68, no. 1 (1977), p. 415.

  10. Tolles, F., “Philadelphia’s First Scientist James Logan,” ISIS 47, no. 1 (1956), p. 22.

  11. Greene, J., “Some Aspects of American Astronomy, 1750–1815,” ISIS 45, no. 4 (1954), p. 340.

  12. Fithian, P. V., Journal & Letters of Philip Vickers Fithian, 1773–1774: A Plantation Tutor of the Old Dominion, ed. H. D. Farish, Williamsburg Restoration H
istorical Studies, no. 3 (Williamsburg, 1943), p. 117.

  13. Greene, “Some Aspects of American Astronomy, p. 339.

  14. Bell, W., “Astronomical Observatories of the American Philosophical Society, 1769–1843,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 108, no. 1 (1964), p. 7.

  15. Loomis, E., “Astronomical Observatories in the United States,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 13 (June 1856), p. 26.

  16. Hindle, B., The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill, 1956), p. 165.

  17. Musto, D., “A Survey of the American Observatory Movement,” Vistas in Astronomy 9, no. 1 (1968), p. 88.

  18. Hindle, The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America, p. 170.

  19. Bernard Cohen, I., Some Early Tools of American Science (Cambridge, 1950), p. 157.

  20. Jefferson, T., “Notes on Virginia,” in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, ed. A. E. Bergh (Washington, DC, 1907), p. 95.

  21. Hindle, The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America, p. 337.

  22. Bell, “Astronomical Observatories of the American Philosophical Society,” p. 8.

  23. Paullin, C., “Early Movements for a National Observatory, 1802–1842,” Records of the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, DC, vol. 25 (1923), pp. 40–43.

  24. Bell, “Astronomical Observatories of the American Philosophical Society,” p. 11.

  25. Jefferson, T., and Cabell, J., Early History of the University of Virginia (Richmond, 1856), p. 189. GDP-ratio equivalent and unskilled-labor-wage-ratio equivalent values in this chapter have been calculated using measuringworth.com: Johnston and Williamson, “Sources and Techniques Used in Construction of Annual GDP,” and Williamson, S. H., “Sources for the Unskilled Wage,” MeasuringWorth (2009), https://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/uswage/source.php; and Margo, R., Wages and Labor Markets in the United States, 1820–1860 (Chicago, 2000), p. 117.