The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

by John W. Dean

  The someone was myself, for at 9:20 A.M. I had been summoned to Haldeman’s office, where I found Haldeman and Ehrlichman. To my surprise I was asked if I thought both Mitchell and Jeb Magruder should be removed from their posts at the campaign. I felt it presumptuous for me to pass judgment on Mitchell, but I explained why I thought both Mitchell and Magruder might be indicted for their roles in the conspiracy to break into and bug the DNC.12 While Haldeman did not mention my opinion to the president, when Nixon indicated that he understood the scope of the problem, Haldeman continued, “You could use this as a basis for Mitchell pulling out. That means we’re going to have to fix nearly everything all over [at the reelection committee] and at the same time start trying to put a new structure together.” Referring to Watergate, he added, “It isn’t going to turn the other off. So if Mitchell pulls out, he’s still the former attorney general, your former campaign manager, and they’re not going to let up on him just because he’s not the manager now. And then the only way you can do that is to hang him on it, say, well, he did it, and that’s why we have to get rid of him.”

  “I can’t do that. I won’t do that to him,” Nixon immediately protested. “I’d rather, shit, lose the election. I really would.” Haldeman countered, “You can’t do that. He won’t let you do that.” Nixon agreed with a somewhat philosophical “no,” and continued, “He [John Mitchell] was supposed to do everything he could to find out what was going on, you know what I mean. I must say, we know that.”

  “Apparently, with our limited resources in that area, he used the same people for a wide range of things,” Haldeman explained. “So you’ve got them all, you’ve got crossties, interweaving and all that. And if these guys were only on this thing, you could cut them loose and sink them without a trace.” It appears, based on later conversations, that Haldeman was not fully aware of the illegal activity sponsored by Ehrlichman’s special investigative unit, but he had sufficient information to warn the president there were problems. But either because he did not know or because he felt Nixon should not know, Haldeman remained less than explicit when pressed.

  “You mean they’ve been on ITT?” the president asked.

  “And other stuff,” Haldeman answered.

  “Black holes?” Nixon asked.

  “Apparently a lot of stuff. There’s stuff I don’t know anything about,” Haldeman said. “But I’ve been told that the lines run in various directions.”

  “Any other candidates?” the president asked.

  “Yeah. Apparently, this is part of the apparatus that’s been used for some of these surveillance projects and checking on various things. The trouble is, they’re tied into, in some remote way, the people that have been doing some of the anti activity and other campaign things during the primaries. Apparently there’s various lines of interlinkage in the whole damn business.”

  “What can we do, not to borrow trouble?” Nixon asked.

  “I don’t know,” Haldeman answered. “Nothing, there are no specifics.” Both men were very unhappy about having to deal with the president’s campaign with Watergate as an issue, since all else had gone so well.

  June 28, 1972, Wednesday, the White House

  The president did not arrive in the Oval Office until 10:35 A.M., telling Haldeman that he’d had insomnia and not fallen asleep until around 6:00 A.M. He spent much of the morning with Ziegler discussing logistics for his televised press conference, which was to be in the East Room at 9:00 the next evening. Both Nixon and Haldeman had concluded that Mitchell would have to leave as head of the reelection campaign. Haldeman’s diary shows that he had already begun to think about Mitchell’s replacement, and after discussions with others, the consensus was that former Minnesota Republican congressman Clark MacGregor, who then headed the congressional relations staff of the White House, should be given the position.13 According to Haldeman’s office log, he had already met with MacGregor, and they had undoubtedly discussed this possibility.14

  Haldeman joined the president in his EOB office at 11:16 A.M. and informed Nixon that Mitchell and Martha were traveling back to Washington.15 The fact that they were returning surprised the president, who was also “surprised at McGovern’s bad taste” in apparently making a disparaging crack about Martha. When Colson arrived early in the course of this conversation, the discussion turned to the press’s handling of the Mitchell situation. Haldeman did not think it was hurting the Nixon campaign, which had been Mitchell’s concern, because there had been “so many political divorces, or marital problems,” over the previous three months. Nixon noted that other people had these kinds of problems, to varying degrees, so most would simply think, “Oh, shit, it could be me.”

  When Colson departed, the president wondered if he’d be asked at the press conference about “crap on the bugging and Martha.” Haldeman observed, “Some shit’s going to lob in the bugging thing.” The president then asked, “What’s your honest opinion on the Mitchell thing, do you think he should resign?” When Haldeman said he did, Nixon instructed, “Okay. You and Mitchell talk about it.”

  Haldeman then explained, “Mitchell’s come to the same conclusion.” Haldeman said he had been told [by either LaRue or Moore] that Mitchell realized that he could no longer be fully effective, and he did not want to be in a position that in any way jeopardized the full effectiveness of the campaign. “Incidentally,” Haldeman added, “the more I’ve thought about it, I think that maybe it’s all a very good move.”

  The president then suggested rotating the secretaries at Camp David; not only did they enjoy going up to the retreat, but it was a nice way to reward the top secretaries, along with trips to California. Haldeman liked this idea, too. The president observed admiringly that Terry Decker, who had traveled to Camp David the previous weekend, was “the most beautiful girl in the White House. She could be in the movies.” Haldeman added that she had a great figure as well, not to mention “spectacular legs.” The president felt that they had many skilled secretaries, and none more reliable than Rose Mary Woods, but noted, “Nobody can do better than Shelley.” He was referring to Shelley Scarney, the West Wing receptionist, who later became Mrs. Patrick Buchanan. Nixon instructed Haldeman to have people like Shelley, who were “good looking” and with “good personalities out front.” And as for “the ones who are not quite so pretty, like Rose and Marge Acker and the rest,” they should be kept working out of sight.

  Returning to the subject at hand, Haldeman reported that Mitchell seemed to think he could control the Martha situation, which explained their return to Washington, but what could not be passed over was the Watergate investigation: “I think there’s also lurking down, way behind, there is the question of his involvement in the Watergate caper and the fact that—” Haldeman began, but Nixon interrupted to ask, “And that he does know about it?” Haldeman continued, without addressing the president’s question, “We’ve got a lid on it, but it may not stay on, and his getting out might just be a good move on that, because supposedly it goes to him.”

  “But I don’t, I think, as I understand it, and I don’t want to know, because I’ve got to answer at a press conference,” the president again advised. “But as I understand it, John did not know specifically about this crazy thing.”

  “As I understand it, that’s right,” Haldeman agreed.

  “As far as you know. I mean, if people down the line, the Cubans and others working for us, working for some asshole, and they do something stupid, we can’t be responsible for that.” Nixon had another matter he wanted to raise. “I was glad to see that Kevin Phillips or somebody [brought out] the fact that we were tapped. You know, Lyndon Johnson tapped us, because he told us later.”

  “He tapped Mrs. what’s her name,” Haldeman confirmed, not recalling Anna Chennault’s name, but noting a discovery during the 1968 campaign that Nixon believed placed the Watergate bugging in a proper and better context.

  “With John Mitchell returning this afternoon,” Haldeman continued, “we�
��ll want to talk about this, but my view would be to encourage him to resign, on the basis of, it’s a beautiful opportunity. He’ll gain great sympathy.The Martha fans will think, isn’t that a wonderful thing, that the man has given up, you know, it’s kind of like the Duke of Windsor giving up the throne for the woman he loves, this sort of stuff. This has a little of that flavor to it. The poor woman hasn’t been well and all, and he’s going to be by her side, and all of that.”

  “And we would leak out the fact that she’s not well, very strongly,” Nixon said, and emphasized, “We’d have to.” He soon added, “Incidentally, he can still do some inside jobs.” Nixon could see the potential of Mitchell’s operating even more effectively by not having to run the entire campaign. “Then you use him for the kinds of things he is indispensable for,” Haldeman agreed. “The Rockefeller, Reagan, Buckley, the Middlebury people, putting the deal together in Missouri, and that kind of stuff.”

  Haldeman soon mentioned another positive in getting Mitchell out of the campaign: his record as attorney general. “Well, John’s carrying a lot. He’s tarred with Carswell;* he’s tarred with the failed Berrigan trial;* he’s tarred with the failed Angela Davis;* he’s tarred with the Ellsberg case, that’s going to fail;* he’s tarred with the Watergate caper, in a sense, indirectly, and we know it’s more than that; and he’s tarred with the ITT case and the Kleindienst business; he’s tarred with the Martha Mitchell problem, which is an issue, and there’s just a lot of stuff there—”

  “But we don’t lose him, that’s the point,” Nixon noted, and they discussed keeping Mitchell on in an unofficial capacity. After a conversation with Ehrlichman about the press conference, the president, joined by the First Lady, flew to Camp David, where he would continue preparing for the event.

  June 29, 1972, Thursday, the White House

  The president returned from Camp David at 2:32 P.M., and went shortly thereafter to his EOB office, where Haldeman joined him. While waiting for Henry Kissinger, the president asked, “What is the latest with the deal on Mitchell, and the discussion?”16

  “He came in, said he wanted to see me,” Haldeman reported. “And he gave me a very detailed synopsis of his whole situation. It’s a very serious situation. And he said the net result is, there’s no question in his mind, the only thing he can do is step out as campaign manager, because Martha’s very serious, and not solvable.” As soon as Kissinger departed, after a ten-minute discussion about Vietnam, the president returned to the subject of Mitchell, anxious to hear the rest of Haldeman’s report.

  “It’s both mental disorder and alcohol, an enormous consumption of alcohol. She’s not an alcoholic. But she gets very, very drunk. The alcohol comes with the mental disorder. It isn’t the cause of it. At least, I think that’s what John thinks. He says she drinks an enormous amount, and she becomes violently irrational, as we know. And she’s past the point of no return. He’s afraid she’s suicidal, and he also has enormous respect for her ability to do what she decides to do and turn out [unclear]. She is devoted to you—”

  “Incidentally, is she aware of Watergate?” Nixon asked.

  “No,” Haldeman reported, referring to any advance knowledge of her husband’s role, and the fact that it involved people from the CRP. “That’s part of what caused his problem, is that she found out. John didn’t tell her that weekend about the fact that it was out in the papers, and after he left, she found it on television and read about it in the papers, and she blew her stack about that. That was what caused the tantrum, and she started drinking Kahlúa, putting her hand through a window in the hotel, cut her hand all up. They did call a doctor, and they did throw her down in the bed and stick a needle in her ass, because they had to, she was demolishing the hotel. Then they had a couple take her to New York, these friends of his, and he went up and spent the Saturday, he said there’s no way I can do this. And I said, what about putting her where you had her before? I played this all, I saw where he was going, so I went the other way.”

  “Absolutely. So it doesn’t appear we’re driving him out,” Nixon said approvingly. Haldeman assured him, “He doesn’t think that at all. He can’t, ’cause I argued the other side.” Nixon was pleased that Martha supported him, and Haldeman continued, “[Mitchell said] the one way we can solve this for now is for the president to call Martha, and say, ‘I know of all the problems and sacrifices, but John is the one indispensable man here, and I’ve got to have him.’ But [Mitchell] said, ‘I don’t want him to do that, it won’t solve the problem long term, and there’s no way of knowing when the next thing will come up, and it’s bound to within a matter of days.’”

  “Really?” Nixon was surprised.

  “Yeah. And he said there’s no point in trying. [Mitchell] said, she’s told me she’s going to jump off the balcony at the Watergate. Well, you know, I can’t be sure she won’t.”

  Haldeman added that Mitchell was very upset, very calm about it all and obviously tired and wrung out. “Martha told him, John you don’t need this. You’re out front, and they’re blaming you for all these things that happened, and I can’t take that. They blame you for breaking into the Watergate, and all this stuff, and she said, we just don’t need it. And you could be just as much help to the president consulting, and help him on the sidelines.”

  “That’s pretty good,” Nixon responded.

  They went on to discuss how they needed Mitchell for the big plays during the campaign, particularly New Jersey, where the Department of Justice had indicted a number of state officials. As for Mitchell’s departure and Watergate, the president made several points: “We have two things this accomplishes, which is, first, it gets rid of, frankly, a liability, it’s with John, it’s hard to carry John on this. We know it’s not his fault. I frankly believe that if it had not been for Martha, he probably wouldn’t have let this Watergate thing get out of hand.”

  “That’s quite possible,” Haldeman agreed.

  “And actually, I really don’t think he knew about this, I really don’t.” Nixon then mentioned the conversation, which was not recorded, that he’d had with Mitchell on the evening of June 20, 1972. “John said to me, one of the lower guys told [him], we’re preparing to get information. He said, well, don’t tell me anything about it, you know, that’s the way you do. Thinking probably they were going to do it the way you always do, by planting a person on the other side, which everybody does. But these assholes were going around bugging people, or whatever it was, I don’t know.” The president paused, thinking about it. “My view on that is that that pretty well kills Watergate. I mean, I mean, as far as I’m concerned, it doesn’t cover Watergate.”

  “Which is another good thing, and John raised that, he said, if this thing escalates, I think it would be very good if I’m out of the place now, and you could say, well, there’s an all-new team over there,” Haldeman reported, then added, “They fired Liddy.”

  “The guy who did it?” Nixon asked. “How? On what grounds? He going to blow the fact he did it?”

  “Nope,” Haldeman reassured. “He won’t. Part of the plan to fire him, he agreed to be fired.”

  “We agree to take care of him some way?” Nixon asked. Haldeman’s response is inaudible, and Nixon pressed for more information. “On what ground did they fire him? They’re going to say that he had some, in the event, it comes out that he did have contact with—”

  “Yeah. They’re not making any fuss about it. Nobody will ask why they fired him unless he becomes identified. The FBI [does] have a line to him. They have questioned him, and he didn’t cooperate. He answered certain questions, and then they got into other areas, and he said, ‘If you’re going to get into that kind of area, then I request to have an attorney here.’ The FBI said, ‘Well, if you have an attorney, he’ll tell you not to answer the question.’ Liddy said, ‘Well then, I’ve got to take that advice,’ and the FBI dropped it.”

  “What were the questions?” Nixon asked.

  “Name what other
people [were] involved,” Haldeman answered. “The thing that bothers me about [the FBI’s investigation] is that it’s a time bomb. They can investigate until they get something else, and then lob it out whenever they feel like it.”

  “Yeah. Well, what do we do, then?” Nixon asked.

  “I don’t know. I don’t think there’s a damn thing we can do, except follow it.” In a very soft voice the president again inquired about Mitchell’s role, and Haldeman had no additional information to share. But he did speculate that if Mitchell confessed, it might end the investigation, but it would require that Mitchell make an unequivocal statement to the effect, “I was running the thing at the time, and I should have known what was happening, I’m sorry I didn’t.”

  “But he didn’t know it,” Nixon said, and Haldeman continued with his assessment of what Mitchell would have to say, something to the effect that he “was diverted by some personal problems,” which was also why he resigned from the campaign. Nixon next asked, “How do you think the resignation goes in terms of timing?”

  “The resignation is going to be a positive story,” Haldeman advised. As for timing, “It’s going to hang totally on Martha.” The conversation turned to the mechanics of Mitchell’s departure from the reelection campaign. The president wanted to send both Clark MacGregor and Fred Malek from the White House to run the day-to-day operations, but because MacGregor had a heavy load with his White House congressional relations office, there would be a slight delay, so he could finish up those assignments.

  “A great load will be lifted” for Mitchell, the president thought aloud. “Then he’ll come in as an adviser, something like Connally,” referring to John Connally, the former secretary of the treasury. Except, the president noted, “Connally’s likely to be better than Mitchell.”

  At 8:55 P.M., Nixon and Ron Ziegler went to the East Room for the live radio and television press conference. From 9:01 P.M. until 9:44 P.M. the president took questions from the press but was not asked a single question about Watergate or the Mitchells. Afterward the president spent two hours in the Lincoln Sitting Room of the residence in his post–press conference ritual—taking calls from his cabinet, staff, family and friends offering their congratulations. In his diary Haldeman reported that Nixon had been effective, because while he was well prepared, “he wasn’t so completely programmed. More relaxed, some good quips, no nervousness.”17