The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

by John W. Dean

  Nixon still thought it weak, as did Kleindienst, who told the president he had said to Gray: “So suppose that this very statement that you gave us, that you made public tomorrow. You just got the press in and said, this is what happened. What would that do with respect to your ability to manage the Federal Bureau of Investigation?” Gray admitted, “It would be a disaster,” but Kleindienst said Gray was resisting resigning: “He feels that for him to resign, it’s an admission of guilt of some kind.” Kleindienst and Petersen were working on Gray to step down, but they recommended that nothing be done until the following day, because Gray “knows he’s got to resign.” They now turned to Watergate and me. Like Nixon and Petersen, Kleindienst worried about what I might say about his handling of Watergate: “[Dean] has put himself in the position in opposition to me, you, the government of the United States, everybody he’s associated with. John Dean will find himself in a very, very—” before Kleindienst could finish his sentence, Nixon added, “And that’s the point. He’s going to, you know, as I told you, he will strike a king.”

  As this conversation proceeded, the president mentioned that Henry Petersen “hated” Ehrlichman and had told Nixon that it was Ehrlichman who had ordered Gray to destroy the Hunt documents. “I don’t want Petersen to mislead me like that,” Nixon complained. “Petersen doesn’t hate Ehrlichman,” Kleindienst protested, and told the president how, the previous summer, while Kleindienst was on vacation, Ehrlichman had called Petersen “in a very intemperate way, gave him instructions with respect to what he ought to do in this God damn matter. That really rubbed Henry the wrong way.” Nixon now backed down, saying, “I like Petersen, I mean, myself, you know what I mean?” Kleindienst said that if the president trusted him, he should trust Petersen. Nixon said, “Of course,” he trusted Kleindienst. (Within seventy-two hours Nixon would force Kleindienst to resign.)

  April 27, 1973, the White House

  The president called Haldeman to the Oval Office at 7:50 A.M., before the morning staff meeting, to ask for an update, but Haldeman had nothing new.140 When the president noted that the Gray story had made the front page of the New York Times, Haldeman pointed out that the FBI or Justice Department had gotten their story to the Times while the president was talking with Petersen and Kleindienst about what Gray was going to say. Haldeman did not believe that I had instructed Gray to destroy the documents by saying they “should not see the light of day.” After briefly discussing the Times story, Haldeman said, “Then there is that other story, also a Dean story,” referring to an account on the front page of The Washington Post, which the president had ignored.141 Haldeman said, “That, you know, we met on the twentieth and we all agreed to go down with the ship or something.” Nixon asked, “What was that?” Haldeman said, “I don’t know,” and then noted, “Well, I think that maybe there was a meeting on the twentieth when we said he should give you a complete bill on the thing that is quite possible.” The Post in fact had the date and substance wrong: I thought I had had a tacit understanding with Haldeman and Ehrlichman to tell the truth, regardless of the consequences, when we had spoken without the president on the afternoon of March 21,142 and Nixon spent the rest of this conversation fixated on this conversation. Haldeman reminded the president that he had to go run the staff meeting, though Nixon wanted to discuss Ruckelshaus’s becoming temporary acting FBI director, stating, “I don’t want Felt.” As the meeting ended, Nixon asked Haldeman what he thought of John Connally or Bill Rogers becoming attorney general. Haldeman did not know about Connally, but thought “Rogers would be superb.”

  At 8:49 A.M., accompanied by Haldeman and Ehrlichman, the president flew to Mississippi. While they were en route, Pat Gray called to resign. Larry Higby took the call. It was “John Stennis Day” in Mississippi, with thousands turning out to greet the president, First Lady and Senator Stennis. At the podium, Stennis praised the president: “You don’t panic when the going gets rough.”143 Privately Stennis told Nixon that time was running out on Watergate, and he made “the point that down their way they have a saying that the rain falls on both the just and unjust, and when the rain falls on people, they’ve got to go, whether they’re just or not.”144 Flying back to Washington, the president discussed with his aides the appointment of Ruckelshaus as acting director. Haldeman called Ruckelshaus to request he come to the White House at four o’clock, after they returned. During this trip back they also discussed how to deal with the Ellsberg break-in matter, for just as Nixon had feared and predicted, Watergate and the Ellsberg break-in had merged through Liddy and Hunt and exploded in the news.

  Nixon was back at the White House by 3:30 and went first to the East Room to say nice words about his secretary, Rose Mary Woods, who was hosting a National Secretaries Week gathering, and then to the Oval Office to meet with Bill Ruckelshaus, whom he simply told that he had a crisis at the FBI and he needed help.145 Nixon pressed Ruckelshaus to take the job on an interim basis, saying flatly, “Mitchell will undoubtedly be indicted,” and assuring Ruckelshaus that he would not have any interference from the White House. Not long into their meeting Kleindienst called and said, “In view of Pat’s resignation, Mr. President, it would be my recommendation that you permit Mark Felt—”146 Nixon cut him off, “No, I tell you, I don’t want him. I can’t have him. I just talked to Bill Ruckelshaus, and Bill is a Mr. Clean,” he said, as Ruckelshaus sat across from his desk, listening. “I want a fellow in there that is not part of the old guard, and that is not part of the infighting in there.” Nixon explained. “[Ruckelshaus]’ll do it as acting director until we get a full director.” Kleindienst thought it “ideal” and reminded Nixon that the attorney general had the legal responsibility to make the appointment, so Nixon should direct him to do so. By 4:30 P.M. the president had a new acting FBI director.

  At 4:31 P.M. Henry Petersen called with an urgent matter: “I just wanted to give you a report on that Dan Ellsberg case. Judge Byrne had opened [the information] last night, and he was inclined to the view that disclosure to him as sufficient, and then apparently, overnight, he changed his opinion and read the memorandum from Silbert to me in open court, indicated that the defendants were entitled to a hearing on it, and requested the disclosure of the source, which I have authorized, and asked for all the information the government has. We don’t have anything, you know?” Petersen added that he had asked that the FBI interview me and Ehrlichman to see “if they know anything about it.”* Also, Petersen added, they would try to locate Ellsberg’s psychiatrist to see whether or not there was a report of a burglary. After briefly reporting how upset FBI officials had been regarding Gray’s behavior, Petersen said he felt that Gray “in my judgment’s another unwitting victim.” “Unwitting victim,” Nixon echoed. “There are quite a few in this, Henry. Quite a few.” “Now, Mr. President,” Petersen continued, “when you asked me for something”—at which point Nixon interrupted, “Yeah, a piece of paper, if I could get it”—“And I don’t think I can produce.” He explained that the material Nixon wanted was grand jury information. Nixon was annoyed; Petersen was cutting him off, or more likely, Silbert was cutting Petersen off before the entire case against Haldeman and Ehrlichman was corrupted, as Shaffer had warned them. “Now where does the Dean thing stand?” Nixon asked, and Petersen said, “Well, no place.” Petersen said I had been served to appear in New York in “the Vesco thing,” and Petersen had no idea whether I would take the Fifth Amendment there or not. As for the Watergate investigation, “Our negotiations with him are just no place.” For this reason, Petersen said, he was no longer requesting the president take no action regarding my resignation. As Petersen put it, “I think the longer you wait, the worse it gets.” Nixon thanked Petersen, and the call ended.147

  When Haldeman arrived with Ziegler in the Oval Office late in the afternoon for a brief conversation, the president immediately announced that Petersen was now claiming he could not provide information about their case; Haldeman was initially not nearly as annoyed with P
etersen as Nixon.148 “When you’re free,” Ziegler said, “there are some developments I should discuss with you.” Nixon urged him to speak, but Ziegler resisted and said he thought it better they be addressed later. “Well, listen,” Nixon said, moving on, “Have you got any more from Dean? Have you talked to him?” Ziegler said he was waiting for a call back, and when he departed, the president turned to the matter of “firing Dean,” and his concern that, if he did so, he would set me off against everyone. Nixon made clear to Haldeman that he and Ehrlichman would have to depart soon, which Haldeman thought best, but he acknowledged that Ehrlichman did not agree. They discussed the running of the White House without Haldeman, who suggested his aide Fred Malek could serve as a staff administrator but not chief of staff.

  Haldeman returned to the fact that Petersen was cutting the president off from further information: “Well, on further consideration, that Justice Department thing bothers me, though. And I have to agree with John [Ehrlichman]. I think you’re being had by Petersen.” Haldeman pointed out that the president was not asking for grand jury testimony but rather “for his evaluation of the charges.” Nixon, sounding frustrated, said to Haldeman in a tone of despair, “Just pray to God that we live through this thing.” “We will,” Haldeman assured him,

  Nixon indicated that he was going to start drafting a Watergate speech, and Haldeman read language he recommended regarding himself and Ehrlichman, and explained what might happen if someone in the White House was charged. “Bob, we need to make a move,” Nixon said, but he became tongue-tied as he continued. “We really have to have to, as I’ve said, we’ve got to move so that we aren’t, I mean, the way it goes, and they’ll say, you know what I mean? I think, I just think you and John are, gosh, you know, it kills me. It’s like cutting off both of my arms.” Haldeman said that when they departed he was going to still need them for a transitional period with whoever took over their responsibilities.

  Haldeman also thought that, once they were out of the White House, he and Ehrlichman could make statements attacking me. “Weigh carefully what you say,” Nixon cautioned, and Haldeman proceeded to report a story that Ehrlichman had told him, falsely claiming that while I was at Camp David working on a Dean report, I had told Larry Higby, “I can’t do a damn thing on the report, but I’ve got sixty pages of working out my own defense, and it’s beautiful.” But while Haldeman had doubts about the truth of the account (as his own notes revealed), he said that, if it was true, it demonstrated that I had hit “rock bottom.” And if true, “then you have no more compunction about destroying him, so you go all out on a total basis to destroy Dean, which should be done anyway.”

  After yet another review of the March 21 conversation, they discussed the fact that Ray Price had sent Haldeman a “long memo” urging him to resign, which, as Haldeman explained to the surprised Nixon, “Yeah, it’s a totally asinine memo about purgation and abolition.” But Haldeman, trying to remain an honest broker for the staff, advised Nixon that it was something he ought to have a look at. “He may have some good ideas on some of it,” Haldeman acknowledged, and he recast it as a “soul-search letter.” The conversation ended with Haldeman’s offering to talk to Ehrlichman about their departure. He understood that they had to leave and would try to lighten Nixon’s load with Ehrlichman.

  Nixon asked Ziegler to return to the Oval Office, and after providing guidance for the Ruckelshaus announcement, asked, “What else do you have to report?”149 Ziegler had new and more serious rumors and inquiries. He had learned that Sy Hersh was a “good friend” of Bill Bittman’s, and Hersh had told Bittman that “they have information which would take this matter to a new level.” The underlying fact was that “Dean in his testimony or statement is reported to have implicated the president,” though Ziegler noted that I, in fact, had not testified anywhere. The second element of Ziegler’s report was that Bob Woodward, a college friend of David Gergen, who ran Nixon’s speechwriting office, had called several people at the White House “to milk them,” hinting that the Post had “very serious reports coming in today, stories revealing again a new dimension, a new plateau,” one suggesting that someone was “implicating the president, and the other one suggesting that the vice president’s going to resign.”

  “Jesus Christ,” Nixon said. “Okay,” and he went over the rumors with a clearly concerned Ziegler. Ziegler departed as Henry Petersen was ushered in.150 Ziegler’s report had put Nixon on high alert, and in Petersen he had the very person who would know what had and had not been told to the prosecutor about the president’s activities. As Petersen seated himself, Nixon told him that it had come to his attention that reports were circulating in the press that they had to “head off at the pass,” because they were untrue and bad for the presidency. After he shared the gist of the rumors, Petersen insisted that no information had come from me implicating the president, for Petersen had spoken with the prosecutors involved, Silbert, Glanzer and Campbell. “Do you mind calling them right now?” Nixon asked. “No, sir,” Petersen said. He added that there had been “a kind of crisis of confidence, the night before last [April 25],” so he had met with the prosecutors in his office. The issue had been whether or not his prosecutors were at ease with his reporting to the president, and Petersen thought he had cleared the air on that issue by laying into U.S. attorney Harold Titus. (Clearly this distrust in the U.S. attorney’s office had resulted in the cutting off of information about Haldeman and Ehrlichman.)

  “You never heard anything like that?” the president asked regarding the rumors Ziegler had heard. “No, sir,” Petersen said. “You’re certain?” “Absolutely,” Petersen assured him. When Nixon asked, “You swear to God?” Petersen responded by repeating what he had told Harold Titus: “We are responsible for enforcing federal law. We have no mandate to investigate the presidency. We investigate Watergate, and I don’t know where that line’s drawn clearly all the time.” Nixon, however, was not satisfied with his answer: “Well, if Dean has implicated this presidency, we’re going to God damn well find out. Because let me tell you, the only conversation we ever had with him was that famous March 21 conversation I told you about” and he proceeded to give Petersen another abbreviated and skewed version.

  Because Nixon wanted assurance that I had not implicated him, he suggested Petersen use the telephone in the Cabinet Room to call his prosecutors, and he was taken there at 5:43 P.M. At 6:04 P.M. Petersen returned to the Oval Office and reported, “Well, like all things, some substance, some falsity. Last Monday [April 23] Charlie Shaffer was in the office, and the continuation of the negotiations. Charlie Shaffer is the lawyer. Charlie is a very bright, able, bombastic fellow. And he was carrying on as if he was making a summation in a case. And he was threatening, ‘We will bring the president in, not this case, but in other things.’ What other things are, we don’t know what in the hell they are talking about.”151 Other things did not trouble Nixon, though, who said, “Don’t worry,” and Petersen continued, characterizing Shaffer’s remark as similar to his earlier threat that he would “try this administration, Nixon, what have you.” Nixon clearly was not interested when Petersen began discussing information unrelated to the president, so Petersen concluded, “There’s no more on that, other than I’ve just told you.”

  “Why hell can’t we stop the paper, Hersh?” Nixon asked. “To think that, to bring the president in with a thing like, good God Almighty. Let me say this, if it were in with the grand jury, I want to know that, too. That I have to know, as president, understand. Good God almighty.” He was giving Petersen a new directive, and added, “You’ve got to believe me, I am after the truth, even if it hurts me. But believe me, it won’t. Just like it won’t hurt you. We are doing our job. And somebody was in here the other day, and they were saying, ‘Well, Dean is going to blackmail you because of something you’re supposed to have told me.’ And I said, ‘Screw him.’ I said, ‘You have a right to tell me what is going on.’” In response, Petersen further elaborated on materi
al purportedly being leaked by me: “Now Shaffer says it’s McCandless that is leaking this stuff to the press,” who Petersen explained “was another lawyer that Dean has retained.”

  With this information in hand the president called Ziegler to the Oval Office and explained that I had not in fact testified, but at best these rumors were a negotiating tactic by my attorney. Petersen described Shaffer’s statement to Ziegler as “an emotional statement,” though the president insisted it was “crap” and was annoyed that it was being held over their heads, whatever it referred to. Petersen agreed and explained, “That was one of the reasons that was so important, to disclose [the Ellsberg information], because they could’ve hung that over our heads.” Ziegler agreed that it sounded like bargaining by my lawyer, and then added, “I had occasion to talk to Dean a few minutes ago. He’s in a very good frame of mind. It was a very quick conversation. He said, ‘Ron, I am issuing no statements.’ Incidentally, he said, ‘I got a telephone call—’”

  “A telephone call from the president,” Nixon said, cutting Ziegler off midsentence. “You know, Henry, that shows you what a prick he is. I called, you know, to say some nice things. I called six people [on Easter], members of my staff. I called Ron, Henry Kissinger, I called Bob Haldeman and Ehrlichman and Rose, my secretary, and John Dean. You know what I mean. I just go down the list of people, and I just say ‘I want to wish you happy Easter.’ That’s all I did, and it was all over the press!” “Well, you know, we got a report,” Petersen said. “Again I got it through Charlie Shaffer that he was pleased and elated and reassured. And you know, as he’s a human being—” at which point Nixon began talking over Petersen, “I don’t want to hurt John Dean, believe me, I’d like to help him.” Ziegler then finished what he had started to say: that I had gone out of my way to say that I had not leaked to the press that the president had called me on Easter, but I thought I knew who had done so from among the few I had told.