American Crisis

by William M. Fowler Jr.

  Although Benson did not speculate on Carleton’s motives for delay, others were less reticent. Robert R. Livingston, the American secretary of foreign affairs, confided to Lafayette, who was then in Paris, that “some among us” believe that Carleton will not complete the “evacuation of New York … till the Tories are satisfied.”33 That, Livingston assured Lafayette, would “never be.” John Morin Scott, New York’s secretary of state, agreed, warning, “It is most certain We are not at peace with Great Britain.”34

  Benson and Livingston misjudged Carleton. Carleton had no desire to linger in New York nor to pry concessions out of the Americans. He was simply following orders. “His Majesty’s pleasure [is] that you proceed in the several arrangements necessary for withdrawing the troops, provisions, stores, and British artillery from all the posts under your command to which the seventh article of the provisional articles of peace … hath reference.”35 Without transport, however, Carleton could give no assurances on a schedule for evacuation.

  Unaware of Carleton’s constraints, Washington decided that the best way to proceed was to arrange a face-to-face meeting. He dispatched Colonel David Humphreys to invite General Carleton to meet with him on “the earliest Day that your Excellency can name.” As a precaution to prevent Carleton from using the occasion to drive a wedge between Washington and Clinton, the American commander added that “the Governor of this State, being particularly interested in Any Arrangement which respects the Restitution of the Post of N. York, will attend me, on this Occasion.”36

  Washington’s invitation put Carleton in a dilemma. If he refused the invitation, he risked antagonizing the Americans and inviting retaliation. He was still waiting, for example, for the return of his prisoners. On the other hand, since he was still operating with limited instructions, if he accepted the invitation, the meeting was likely to be a repeat of the Benson exchange. Nonetheless, he could not refuse the meeting, and on April 24 the commander in chief of His Majesty’s forces in North America answered “His Excellency General Washington,” proposing how he planned to come up the Hudson: “in a frigate as near Tappan as may be where I understand you mean to lodge. If I hear nothing from you to occasion an alteration I intend being up on the 5th of May.” Accompanying him, Carleton informed Washington, would be Lieutenant Governor Andrew Elliott and Chief Justice William Smith. The chief justice came reluctantly. He had warned Carleton that the Americans were only proposing the meeting so that they might “fish out secrets.” He also had a more personal reason. In the years before the Revolution George Clinton had been his law clerk. “It would not be grateful to me to treat with a Man who was once my Clerk and now assuming the station of a superior … might [bring us] to altercate.”37

  Not particularly anxious to confer with either Washington or Clinton, Carleton attempted to postpone the meeting, noting to Washington that he expected to be replaced shortly and that it might be appropriate to delay the meeting until his replacement’s arrival. “I am to apprize your Excellency that I have for some time expected Sir Charles Grey, who has been appointed to this command, and I have reason to think he has been detained only to bring out the final arrangement.” Under the circumstances, Carleton suggested that they “defer” the meeting until Grey landed.38

  News of Grey’s appointment raised hackles at American headquarters. Few British officers were more obnoxious to the commander in chief. Grey had served before in America, earning a reputation rivaling in infamy that of Banastre “No Quarter” Tarleton and Cornwallis. Tagged “No Flint Grey,” he had been responsible for the “Paoli Massacre” on September 21, 1777. According to the American side of the story, Grey led a night attack against General Anthony Wayne’s division near the town of Paoli just outside Philadelphia. In order to maintain security and prevent any muskets from discharging that might give warning of the attack, he ordered his soldiers to remove their flints. Shortly after midnight Grey’s men swept down onto the unsuspecting American camp. Within minutes Wayne’s men were retreating in all directions. Most of the American casualties were victims of the bayonet. Survivors claimed that the British executed some of the wounded while leaving others to die. American propagandists had a field day and dubbed the incident the “Paoli Massacre” with “No Flint Grey” as the chief villain. Nor did Grey’s behavior improve after Paoli. In 1778 he sacked and burned the port towns of New Bedford and New London and terrorized Martha’s Vineyard. He capped off the year with a ferocious and bloody attack on a detachment of Continental dragoons commanded by Colonel George Baylor at Tappan, New York—the “Tappan Massacre.”39 The prospect of sitting across the table from Grey simply stiffened Washington’s resolve to meet Carleton as soon as possible.

  Washington left Newburgh by barge on Saturday morning May 3 for his rendezvous with Carleton. As host, Washington selected the De Wint House at Tappan, a spot halfway between Newburgh and New York City. He knew the house well, having signed Major John Andre’s death warrant there in September 1780 following Benedict Arnold’s treachery.

  As Washington’s party made its leisurely passage south on the Hudson, Carleton’s barge pulled into the stream on Sunday the fourth, carrying the general and his staff to the frigate Perseverance.40 Chief Justice Smith and Lieutenant Governor Elliott accompanied him on the smaller twenty-eight-gun Greyhound.41 Forced to claw against the current and a shifting tide, Carleton did not reach Tappan until late morning on May 5.42 To explain his delay and give warning of his approach, Carleton sent his intelligence officer Major George Beckwith ahead in a “whaleboat” with a flag of truce.43 Beckwith met with the Americans and returned to Perseverance bearing an invitation from Washington for the general to dine with him the next day.

  On Tuesday morning May 6 side boys mustered on deck to salute Carleton as he departed the frigate to head ashore. With rhythmic discipline the crew of the captain’s barge rowed the general and his entourage toward shore. Carleton and Smith stepped from the barge, to be welcomed by Washington and his three aides, Colonels Trumbull, Cobb, and Humphreys.44 Formalities concluded quickly. Washington and Carleton climbed into a “Chariot” and sped away toward De Wint House. “Horses were offered to the rest.” Chief Justice Smith and Lieutenant Governor Elliott elected to walk.45

  The rooms at De Wint’s came alive with color and conversation as redcoats, bluecoats, and elegantly attired civilians milled about. According to Smith, “an hour was spent in Congratulations and seperate [sic] chat.”46 But then, at a signal, “the two generals took a room.” “We all seated, Washington opened the business.”47

  Present were the two commanders and their staffs, Governor Clinton, New York secretary of state John Morin Scott, Attorney General Egbert Benson, Elliott, and Smith.48 Addressing Carleton, Washington told the general he had three items on his agenda which he wished to discuss.

  1. The preservation of property from being carried off, and especially the Negroes

  2. The Settlement of the Time for Evacuation of Newyork [sic]

  3. The extending the government of the state of Newyork [sic] as far as might be convenient before the intire [sic] Evacuation took place.49

  According to Smith, the American commander spoke “with great Slowness” and in “a low Tone of voice.”50 It was his position that the preliminary treaty, although yet to be finalized and ratified, was in fact a treaty and its provisions were binding, particularly article 7.

  His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets from the said United States, and from every post, place and harbor within the same.

  On the matter of evacuation Carleton told Washington that he would move “with all possible Expedition, but it must of Necessity take Time.” What he did not reveal, however, was that since he still had no definitive orders from London, “Time” remained undefined. He then acknowledged that he had already dispatched six thousand “Souls” to
Nova Scotia and that among them were a number of “Negroes.” Although Washington almost certainly knew from his spies that this was the case, he “affected to be startled” by this information and exclaimed, “Already imbarked!” He then pointedly reminded Carleton of the unambiguous wording of article 7. By shipping away “Negroes,” Washington charged that Carleton had violated the “treaty.”

  The issue of shipping away Negroes was not new. When evacuating Savannah the previous July, the British, by their own count, had taken more than three thousand slaves—men, women, and children. Although most were probably the property of fleeing loyalists, a significant number were escaped slaves who had sought refuge and freedom behind British lines. A similar scenario played out at Charleston in December when British transports carried away more than five thousand slaves.51

  Carleton rejected Washington’s charge. “No Interpretation could be put upon the Articles inconsistent with prior Engagements binding the National Honor which must be kept with all Colours.” To prove his point, Carleton reminded the Americans that in November 1776 Lord Dunmore, royal governor of Virginia, had issued a proclamation declaring all “Negroes … free that are able and willing to bear Arms. They joining His MAJESTY’S Troops.” What Dunmore did in 1776, Sir Henry Clinton repeated three years later when he issued his own proclamation declaring that no one could claim any “Right” over any “NEGROE” who was once “the Property of a Rebel” and who took “Refuge with any Part of this Army.” General Clinton had gone on to offer those who escaped “full Security to follow within these Lines, any Occupation which he shall think proper.”52 Carleton would not budge. “Delivering up the Negroes to their former Masters would be delivering them up some possible to Execution, and others to severe punishments.” Such action would be “dishonorable.”53 He would not betray those who had sought the protection of the king. In partial mitigation he did announce that three weeks earlier he had issued orders establishing a military commission to ensure that any property (including slaves) being shipped out of the port was legitimate and legal.54 This commission, he assured Washington, was keeping a careful list of all Negroes so that after all matters had been settled adjustments might be made “by Commissioners to be hereafter appointed by the two nations.”55

  Washington was unsatisfied and was also invested personally in this dispute. As a Virginia planter and major slave owner, he had a significant financial stake at risk. Although he could not give an exact number, he was convinced that several of his slaves had in fact escaped to New York.56 Carleton’s pledge to keep a register of Negroes sent away was meaningless, Washington argued. Escaped slaves were most likely to give false names, and so tracking ownership would be near impossible. Furthermore, he pointed out, information contained in the register would be useless in ascertaining the worth of a slave since the value of the bondsman was in his “Industry and Sobriety.”57 Having made his public stance, in private Washington confessed “that the Slaves which have absconded from their Masters will never be restored.58

  On the other main issue, removing troops, Carleton continued to be evasive but a bit more agreeable. He assured Clinton that at his request and within a few days he would withdraw to the south side of the Harlem River, but retreating from Long Island would have to wait as “he saw too many Difficulties.”59 What troubled him most was the “evil” that would arise should his troops leave before Clinton’s forces took effective control. In such a vacuum “animosities” might be let loose, resulting in “disorder.”60 In sum he feared the havoc an uncontrolled patriot mob might wreck on any of the king’s sympathizers unfortunate enough to be left behind.

  The tone of the discussion intensified. John Morin Scott in particular took a sharp stance, insisting that the British evacuate quickly. Carleton continued to evade any firm commitment, but he did agree to allow Washington to send a three-man American commission to observe the evacuation. Since the commissioners would have no power other than simply to observe, the concession was virtually meaningless.61 Sensing that nothing more might be accomplished, “Washington pulled out his Watch, and observing that it was near Dinner Time offered wine and bitters.”

  Following the preprandial libations the guests “walked out” to enjoy a “plentiful Repast under a Tent.”62 To prepare and serve the “Repast,” Samuel Fraunces had come up from New York City. “Black Sam” Fraunces was the city’s best-known tavern keeper.63 Reputedly a Whig, Fraunces had deftly navigated the shoal waters of politics during the long British occupation well enough that the king’s authorities allowed him to keep his business open and were wont to patronize it themselves. Good food and drink outranked politics. The dinner party sat at table until early evening, when Carleton and his men took their leave and ferried back to Perseverance and Greyhound.

  Having bid farewell to his guests, Washington retired to consult Governor Clinton. The meeting, “diffuse and desulory [sic],” had yielded virtually nothing.64 Undeterred, the governor and general decided to press the British in writing. Since Carleton had invited them to dine the next day aboard Perseverance, they prepared formal letters setting out an agenda for the meeting. Clinton asked for clarification about Carleton’s schedule for evacuation, with particular notice of Long Island, and whether the general would permit vessels to travel up the Hudson to Albany. Washington repeated his concerns about the “large number of Negroes [which] had been carried away.”65

  As the barge carrying Washington and Clinton came alongside the next day, Perseverance fired a seventeen-gun salute acknowledging Washington as commander in chief, the same rank held by Carleton.66 This was the first time the British had offered a public salute to their enemy.67 The parties retired to the captain’s cabin to dine and continue discussions, but Carleton was missing. He was confined to his bed “under a very severe Fit of the fever and Ague.”68 There would be no immediate answer to the American letters.69 Carleton managed to rise from his sickbed long enough to say good-bye to his guests.70 The next day Perseverance returned downriver to New York.

  Whether Carleton read the letters immediately or passed them to his clerk for later action is uncertain, but he cannot have been surprised by their contents. Washington requested a written timetable for evacuation and an end to the “carrying away [of ] any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants.”71 Clinton’s shorter letter reiterated the request for a timetable for evacuation as well as permission for American vessels to enter New York Harbor.72

  Three days later, as agreed upon at Tappan, American commissioners Egbert Benson, Lieutenant Colonel William Smith, a member of Washington’s staff, and Daniel Parker, a New York merchant and army contractor with whom Washington had worked, arrived in the city to “superintend all Embarkations.”73 There was, however, little for them to observe. Departures from the city were few as Carleton waited for Grey to arrive and relieve him of the tiresome business.

  On June 2 the packet from Falmouth arrived, bringing the news of “a new ministry. The Shelburnes are all out.”74 The wheels of British politics had once again ground against Sir Guy Carleton. His patron Shelburne had resigned, and the king had called for a new coalition government to be led by Lord North and Charles James Fox. A change in government, however, even with North at the head, did not mean a change in course. Peace was still the goal, and the new government would continue to support the Preliminary Articles of Peace. Under these circumstances North determined a change in leadership in America would be unwise and requested that Carleton remain in New York.75 Carleton, ambitious for honors, and fully aware that his future rested in the king’s hands, had little choice but to agree. To keep matters calm in New York, Carleton assured his American friends “that not a soldier should stir till he had taken care of the Loyalists.”76 Admiral Digby wrote Secretary at War Thomas Townshend, “Nobody you could send here can do as much for the King’s service or for the poor inhabitants as Sir Guy Carleton.”77

  Martha had come north to be with her husband and was at Hasbrouck House to welcom
e him back on the evening of May 9. As he settled back into the routine of life at headquarters he realized that his chief duty had shifted from keeping an army together to disbanding it in a peaceful and orderly fashion. He had already begun the process of demobilization by furloughing soldiers. That pleased the men bound for home but left those in camp angry and uncertain. Only with great “difficulty,” Washington informed Lafayette, were the remaining men “kept under due Subordination.”78 Knox was not so fortunate. From West Point came disturbing news from Knox that soldiers had turned “highly mutinous.” They were behaving in ways “totally repugnant to discipline … huzzaing and yelling indecent expressions.”79

  When he heard about the soldiers’ behavior Major John Armstrong was nearly gleeful at Washington’s distress. Having watched his schemes swept away by Washington’s deft moves at Newburgh, Armstrong had resigned from the army in a huff and returned to Philadelphia to be appointed secretary of the Pennsylvania Council. To Gates, by then retired to Virginia, he wrote, “The soldiers are loud and insolent, the officers broken dissatisfied and despondent.”80 His friend Christopher Richmond, still on duty at Newburgh, went so far as to suggest that the officers, “pimping fellows” he called them, who had failed to support “stronger measures” in March had “let slip the best opportunity which could have represented itself to obtain that justice their services certainly merited.”81

  Desperate to be rid of troublemakers as quickly as possible, Washington told Knox, “If there are any Non Commissioned officers or Soldiers whose mutinous dispositions appear to arise from their anxiety to be discharged from the Army you have my full permission to give them Furloughs.”82 Knox was only too happy to comply. While the American army melted away, at the public building the paymaster’s staff poured through piles of paper. Despite the fact that all they had to give the furloughed soldiers were “vague promises,” the clerks recorded carefully what was owed so that those “promises” might someday be fulfilled. In the same building Quartermaster Pickering and his staff were busy sorting through a blizzard of confused accounts. Recognizing that the end was near, local farmers hastened to press overdue bills for “firewood, forage and carting” as well as numerous claims for damage done by soldiers who had cut down fences, destroyed property, taken away livestock, and stolen personal property.83