Meade still had the authority to issue orders directly to Sickles (rather than going through Reynolds the wing commander), but Sickles had different orders from Reynolds. Issued from Moritz Tavern on June 30, Reynolds directed Sickles to “camp upon Cat Tail Branch with your command, and for you to also send a staff officer to these headquarters… [and] to face toward Gettysburg, and cover the roads leading from Gettysburg.” Meade’s orders superseded Reynolds’ instructions, but given Sickles’ inexperience and lack of confidence in dealing with Meade, the latest orders simply confused him. He sent a request (written from Third Corps headquarters at Bridgeport) to Williams asking for clarification:
GENERAL: Inclosed please find communication from Major-General Reynolds. It is in accordance with my written orders, received from headquarters Army of the Potomac at 1 p.m., but in conflict with the verbal order given me by the general commanding while on the march. Shall I move forward? My First Division is about a mile this side of Emmitsburg.35
The episode probably did not increase Sickles’ confidence in Meade’s ability to issue clear and decisive instructions; nor would it have increased Meade’s confidence in Sickles’ ability to receive them. Not only did Meade bypass the wing commander, but he also gave orders directly to Sickles’ newest division commander, Andrew Humphreys, whose Second Division had reached Taneytown on the 29th. Around mid-day on the 30th, Humphreys received orders to march toward Emmitsburg. He also received an order to report to Meade’s headquarters before departing. When he reached Emmitsburg, explained Meade, Humphreys was to examine the ground “and see whether it would do to fight a battle there.” At this point, Meade was still considering any number of potential contingencies.36
Weary from the last forty-eight hours of exertion and the conflicting orders from Meade and Reynolds, Sickles sent a message to Reynolds at 7:45 p.m. indicating that he had gone into camp at Bridgeport along the Monocacy River, about five miles southeast of Emmitsburg and roughly halfway between Emmitsburg and Taneytown. The Third Corps march of June 30 had been a short one. Charles Mattocks in the 17th Maine wrote that the corps departed Taneytown at 1:00 p.m. and halted “near” Emmitsburg at 6:00 p.m. “By direction of the general commanding,” Sickles notified Reynolds, “I have gone into camp here [Bridgeport], countermanding a previous order to go to Emmitsburg, and am to await here further orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac.” One suspects that Sickles probably longed for Joe Hooker’s command as he settled down for the night.37
Headquartered that evening at Gettysburg, John Buford sent late word (after 10:30 p.m.) that A.P. Hill’s corps “is massed back of Cashtown, 9 miles from this place. His pickets, composed of infantry and artillery, are in sight of mine.” Buford also reported the nearby roads “terribly infested with roving detachments of cavalry. Rumor says Ewell is coming over the mountains from Carlisle.… ” Unsure of what Lee intended, Reynolds decided to advance his First Corps toward Gettysburg in the morning to support Buford and find out. Sickles and the Third Corps, as part of Reynolds’ wing, would presumably follow Reynolds to Gettysburg.38
Chapter 5
The Third Corps Marches in the Right Direction
In the wake of assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, George Meade had skillfully managed to both advance into Pennsylvania and maneuver his army to cover Baltimore and Washington. By daylight of July 1, 1863, John Buford was in Gettysburg and his cavalry videttes were positioned west of town, having made arrangements for “entertaining” the enemy “until General Reynolds could reach the scene.” Oliver Howard’s and Dan Sickles’ corps were close enough to lend support, if needed. General Henry Heth’s Confederate division departed Cashtown for Gettysburg (to “discover” what was out in front) about 5:00 a.m. Sometime after 7:00 a.m., Heth’s advance collided with Buford’s cavalry outposts near Marsh Creek. A smatter of small arms fire broke the peacefulness of the early summer morning. The battle at Gettysburg was underway.1
In Taneytown, meanwhile, Meade instructed his engineers, including Chief Engineer Gouverneur K. Warren and Chief of Artillery Henry Hunt, to “look about and select some general ground…by which, in case the enemy should advance on me across the South mountain, I might be able, by rapid movement of concentration, to occupy this position and be prepared to give him battle upon my own terms.” His engineers discovered just such a location in Maryland along Pipe Creek between Middleburg and Manchester. Meade issued an order from Taneytown to his corps commanders on July 1 (known as the Pipe Creek Circular) outlining a plan to fall back to this line if the army was attacked.2
All things considered, Meade felt “satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz, the relief of Harrisburg, and the prevention of the enemy’s intended invasion of Philadelphia, &c., beyond the Susquehanna.”It was no longer Meade’s “intention to assume the offensive until the enemy’s movements or position should render such an operation certain of success.” If Lee assumed the offensive, Meade would “withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe Creek.” If the move became necessary, Reynolds’wing, which included Sickles’Third Corps, would “deploy toward Middleburg.”Henry Slocum was given command of two corps with the intent of deploying in the middle of the line between Reynolds (on the left) and John Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps (on the right) at Manchester. Hancock’s Second Corps would be “held in reserve in the vicinity of Uniontown and Frizellburg, to be thrown to the point of strongest attack, should the enemy make it.”In the event of this action, the army’s “trains and impedimenta will all be sent to the rear of Westminster.” Significantly, Meade was leaving every option on the table: “The time for falling back can only be developed by circumstances.…Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions.… ”3
Subsequent events would prevent any of this order from being fully executed. Nevertheless, the existence of the Pipe Creek Circular caused Meade untold consternation. Meade’s enemies, including but not limited to Dan Sickles, manipulated the orders to support their premise that Meade never intended to fight at Gettysburg and was unworthy of credit for the victory. “The army was to fall back,” Sickles would tell the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War in 1864,“and not to follow up the enemy any further; the general regarding the objects of the campaign to have been accomplished, and considering Washington, Baltimore, and Pennsylvania to have been relieved. The circular indicated a line of retreat.” Meade, however, testified the order was a “mere contingent…intended only to be executed under certain circumstances.”4
The Pipe Creek Circular never reached Reynolds, nor did he receive another message that Meade also dictated that morning. In the latter message, Meade noted that he “cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating.”Asking for Reynolds’view, Meade thought that if “the enemy is concentrating to our right of Gettysburg, that point would not at first glance seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army. If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg or to the left of it, the general is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character for either an offensive or defensive position.”Meade gave Reynolds the option to utilize General Humphreys at Emmitsburg to help evaluate the terrain’s potential for defensive or offensive operations.5
View from old Emmitsburg Road looking toward Emmitsburg.
Emmitsburg Historical Society
Sometime before daybreak on July 1, Sickles ordered Henry Tremain to locate General Reynolds and obtain the wing commander’s orders for the Third Corps. Sickles had moved from Bridgeport to Emmitsburg early that morning. The Excelsior’s 72nd New York regimental history notes that the men arrived in Emmitsburg about 8:00 a.m. Sickles was still under the impress
ion that the Third Corps was to remain near Emmitsburg. Tremain left for Gettysburg on horseback to seek out orders. As he approached the town along the Emmitsburg Road, he “heard a gun, then another. It was artillery.”Tremain found Reynolds and his staff below the town with James Wadsworth’s First Corps division rapidly approaching from the south. In his memoirs, Tremain claimed to have overheard Reynolds involved in some sort of an internal debate about where to form his men. When he met Wadsworth, Reynolds pointed to the west and instructed his division leader,“you had better turn off here.”The sounds of gunfire were increasing northwest of town.6
Turning his attention to Tremain, Reynolds instructed, “Tell General Sickles I think[emphasis in original] he had better come up.” There were no further instructions. As Tremain put it, “1,000 scenarios”raced through his mind. Frustrated that Reynolds did not provide more details, Tremain rode back to seek out Sickles near Emmitsburg. What Tremain did not know was that Buford’s troopers were fighting a dismounted delaying action against A. P. Hill’s advancing infantry and were slowly being pushed back toward Gettysburg. By 10:00 a.m. Reynolds was in process of committing his First Corps into battle on McPherson Ridge, a low ridge line west of the Lutheran Theological Seminary.7
Sickles’Third Corps, meanwhile, continued to concentrate near Emmitsburg. Humphreys met up with Sickles to determine whether the corps should remain there. When Humphreys was given the impression that “we should probably remain there some hours,”he left to to examine “the ground thoroughly in every direction,” as Meade had ordered him to do. His task would take some time, but when he finished, Humphreys was “not satisfied with the ground at all.”8
Around 11:00 a.m., Hancock’s Second Corps arrived at Taneytown, where Hancock reported to Meade’s headquarters. Meade explained what little he knew to Hancock, at best a general overview of the unfolding situation. According to Hancock, Meade “had made up his mind to fight a battle on what was known as Pipe creek…and that he was then preparing an order for that movement.” About thirty minutes later, Meade received his first positive intelligence of the Confederate movement on Gettysburg.9
About 11:30 a.m., one of Reynolds’ aides rode into Taneytown with an urgent verbal message from Reynolds: “the enemy are advancing in strong force, and that I fear they will get the heights beyond the town before I can.” Rather than planning for a withdrawal, Reynolds intended to “fight them inch by inch, and if driven into the town, I will barricade the streets and hold them back as long as possible.” Shortly thereafter, Meade received another dispatch from cavalryman John Buford (penned about 10:10 a.m.) indicating that A.P. Hill’s forces were driving “my pickets and skirmishers very rapidly.” Meade implied to Hancock that Reynolds’ presence at Gettysburg “was really a mask” to allow the Pipe Creek line to be occupied in the rear. But it turned out that the enemy started to march down…a little earlier than anticipated.” Buford and Reynolds delayed the enemy, in Hancock’s words, “until the commander of the army should come to some decision.”10
Major General John Reynolds
National Archives
At 12:30 p.m., Meade had Chief of Staff Butterfield draw up orders for Hancock. Fearing the “possible failure of General Reynolds to receive the order to withdraw his command by the route through Taneytown, thus leaving the center of our position open,” Meade directed Hancock to march
his corps to Gettysburg and cover Reynolds’ withdrawal. That plan changed abruptly about 1:00 p.m. when Meade received news that Reynolds had been killed early in the fighting. Hancock was already briefed on his plans, so Meade directed him to ride to Gettysburg and “assume command of the corps there assembled, viz, the Eleventh, First, and Third, at Emmitsburg. If you think the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up.” It was 1:10 p.m.11
As Meade later pointed out, not only was Hancock “fully aware” of Meade’s plans, but Gettysburg was “a place which I had never seen in my life.” The army commander needed an examination of the ground performed to determine if there was a more advantageous position in the “immediate neighborhood” for the army to concentrate. Since Meade was still unsure where the army would ultimately concentrate, Hancock was given the momentous latitude to determine if Gettysburg was a better position than Pipe Creek.12
Launching Hancock toward Gettysburg raised the sticky matter of seniority. At that time, Hancock was junior in rank to every infantry corps commander except George Sykes. Even Dan Sickles, the ultimate amateur, outranked Hancock. When the Second Corps leader reminded Meade that both Howard and Sickles were his seniors, Meade assured him that the situation demanded as much: Hancock was acquainted with Meade’s views, and the army commander had the authority to appoint anyone to command as deemed “expedient.” Personally, the assignment did not trouble Hancock because he was “an older soldier than either of them [Sickles and Howard]. But I knew that legally it was not proper, and that if they chose to resist it, it might become a very troublesome matter to me.” Butterfield, who was also aware of the potential for trouble, instructed Hancock that Henry Slocum would take command when he arrived on the field. Hancock left Taneytown for Gettysburg around 1:30 p.m. He rode in an ambulance for the first two or three miles in order to review maps and acquaint himself with the country and, significantly, the proposed Pipe Creek geography.13
Meanwhile, Oliver Howard arrived in Gettysburg ahead of his Eleventh Corps and, when notified of Reynolds’ death, assumed command of both the field and the left wing. In one of the battle’s pivotal decisions, Howard “came to the conclusion that the only tenable position for my limited force was the ridge to the southeast of Gettysburg, now so well known as Cemetery Ridge. The highest point at the cemetery commanded every eminence within easy range.” At 1:00 p.m., Howard sent identical messages to both Sickles and Henry Slocum (whose Twelfth Corps was only five miles distant near Two Taverns) informing them of the engagement with Hill’s corps, and that Richard Ewell’s Second Corps was advancing toward Gettysburg from the north. Sickles was directed to forward Howard’s dispatch to Meade. At 1:30 p.m., about the time Hancock was leaving Taneytown, Howard sent his brother, Major Charles Howard, with another more direct message for Sickles: Reynolds was dead and Sickles should “move up to Gettysburg as rapidly as possible.”14
After his unsatisfactory meeting with Reynolds, Sickles’ aide Henry Tremain probably reached Emmitsburg between 11:30 a.m. and noon. He found Sickles resting his corps. As Sickles later put it, his men “had been severely marched for many days, and a great many of them were barefooted.” Tremain relayed Reynolds’ earlier order that the Third Corps should move forward. Sickles, however, did not immediately order his corps to move out. The politician- turned-general was still struggling mightily with Reynolds’ wing commander assignment, and was torn between seemingly contradictory orders from Meade and Reynolds. Sickles had never been in serious action before without the friendly oversight of Joe Hooker. His lack of independent experience was showing, and he was nearly paralyzed with indecision over what to do next.15
Tremain briefly departed to refresh himself. During his absence, Sickles decided to send another staff officer, Captain Alexander Moore, to Gettysburg. According to Moore, he departed Emmitsburg around 2:00 p.m. with orders to “communicate with General Reynolds.”Tremain, meanwhile, returned to find Sickles “pacing”and “reticent, having asked few questions.”The inactivity troubled the staffer. As Sickles saw it, he had received at least three conflicting orders from Meade and Reynolds. Was Sickles to hold Emmitsburg, be prepared to execute the Pipe Creek Circular, or rush to Reynolds’ support? The deadlock was broken shortly after 3:00 p.m. when Major Charles Howard arrived with the news that Reynolds was dead and that General Howard wanted the Third Corps marched to Gettysburg. “I, of course, considered the question very anxiously,”16 Sickles later told the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War:
&n
bsp; My preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg [Emmitsburg] were to go there and hold that position with my corps, as it was regarded as a very important flanking position, to cover our rear and line of communication. Then on the other hand was this order of General Meade which I had received that morning, contemplating another and entirely different line of operations. Then there was this new fact which I assumed was not known to General Meade, who was ten miles or so distant. I therefore determined to take the principal part of my corps and move as promptly as possible to Gettysburg.17
According to Sickles’ 3:15 p.m. reply, this may have been the third communication he had received from General Howard (the record is ambiguous). “I have at this moment received a communication from an officer of your staff, and also two written communications, dated at 1 and 1.30 p.m. I shall move to Gettysburg immediately.” Sickles ordered Tremain to ride ahead and notify Howard. In line with Howard’s instructions, Sickles notified Meade of his movement.18 Still conflicted about the proper course of action, Sickles sent the following note to Meade’s Assistant Adjutant General, Seth Williams, at 3:15 p.m.:
A staff officer from Major-General Howard and a communication from him (dated Gettysburg 1.30 p.m.) has just reached me. A large force of the enemy has engaged him in front of Gettysburg. General Reynolds was killed early in the action. General Howard requests me to support him, and I shall march with my corps toward Gettysburg immediately, moving on two parallel roads. I shall be found on the direct turnpike road from Emmitsburg. I inclose communication from General Howard.19
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