Given the many uncertainties, before leaving for Gettysburg Sickles decided on a more prudent course than simply abandoning Emmitsburg. At 3:25 p.m., he addressed another note to Seth Williams informing him that he was leaving two brigades and two batteries near Emmitsburg. Given his doubts over Meade’s preference, this was a wise (and for Dan a surprisingly conservative) decision. Sickles considered the smaller force at Emmitsburg “ample” to protect that position since he now believed the enemy’s main body was in his front toward Gettysburg. Holding Emmitsburg were Regis de Trobriand’s and George Burling’s brigades, accompanied by James Smith and George Winslow’s batteries.20
At 3:30 p.m., David Birney received orders to report to Howard at Gettysburg. Sickles accompanied Birney, two First Division brigades (Graham and Ward), and two artillery batteries as the column moved toward Gettysburg along the main Emmitsburg Road. Somehow, no one bothered to notify General Humphreys that the majority of his division was also departing. Humphreys, who had been absent fulfilling Meade’s request to examine the terrain, returned about 4:00 p.m. and “perceived that some of the troops had left the ground. In my absence orders had been sent to march up to Gettysburg at once. I immediately followed on as rapidly as I could, and when I got to the head of the column I found that orders had been received between three and four o’clock to march at once.” Since Birney and Sickles were moving on the main Emmitsburg Road, Humphreys’ division (Carr and Brewster’s brigades), together with Seeley’s artillery, traveled on a parallel road about two miles to the west.21
Sickles later told Congress, “I therefore moved to Gettysburg on my own responsibility.” Many historians credit Sickles with, if nothing else, “marching to the sounds of the guns.” In later decades Sickles himself frequently claimed that he decided on his own hook to march to Gettysburg in defiance of Meade’s orders. Dan told an audience in 1890 that his orders from Meade “were to hold Emmitsburg at all hazards…based on the supposition that the enemy’s point of concentration would be at or near Emmitsburg, but no enemy was near…The situation of Howard, so pressed by superior numbers, was hard to resist. Why stay here in idle security, in formal obedience to orders?” Sickles made his decision and, “It must be said, at least, that the Third Corps marches in the right direction—toward the enemy.” Such talk created the image of an aggressive Sickles heading to Howard’s rescue, ignoring Meade’s orders to hold a position in the rear.22
Many Third Corps veterans accepted this aggressive portrayal. Thomas Rafferty of the 71st New York, for example, wrote this:
Here was a dilemma which might have perplexed a weaker man. In fact, another of our corps commanders, and one of the best of them, too, on receiving the same dispatch, refused to move his corps without an order from General Meade. [An apparent reference to Henry Slocum.] However, it did not trouble Sickles long. He obeyed the dictates of common sense, and at once hurried his corps forward to place it where it would do the most good…thus flatly disobeying the orders of his commander.
Sickles partisans admired their man’s apparent fighting spirit and most historians have followed suit by praising Sickles for moving toward Gettysburg. Modern historian Stephen Sears, for example, acknowledged that Sickles “was the one nonprofessional soldier in the quartet of Meade, Howard, Slocum, and Sickles who displayed the one spark of soldierly initiative in this situation.” It came too late in the day, “but at least he showed the initiative.”23
But does Sickles deserve such praise? Probably about three hours passed after Sickles received Reynolds’ order and before he began marching toward Gettysburg. Both Sickles’ and Tremain’s accounts were just vague enough to hinder accurate identification of the precise time Tremain delivered Reynolds’ order. David Birney’s report claims that Sickles ordered him to Gettysburg at 2:00 p.m.—or nearly ninety minutes earlier than he actually received his orders. Was the error an honest one or intentional?24
An even more cynical interpretation assumes that the entire portrayal of Sickles’ agonizing over the orders was, as another historian termed it, “pure theater.” Bill Hyde noted that the rapidly changing situation should have caused Reynolds’ orders to supersede any previous instructions, but then weakens his own argument by admitting, “it did not, of course, negate Meade’s previous order.”25
Sickles’ confusion was justified by a late afternoon order General Meade sent the Third Corps commander instructing him not to abandon Emmitsburg. When Meade learned of Howard’s order to send Sickles to Gettysburg, Meade had Butterfield fire off a note to Sickles at 4:45 p.m.:
The major-general commanding has just learned that General Howard has ordered you from Emmitsburg up to Gettysburg. General Hancock has been ordered up to assume command of the three corps—First, Eleventh, and Third. The general does not wish the approaches through Emmitsburg left unguarded, as they cover our left and rear. He desires you to hold on until you shall hear from General Hancock, leaving a division at Emmitsburg, as it is a point not to be abandoned excepting in an extremity. A copy of this will be transmitted to General Hancock. Please put yourself in communication with him.26
Unfortunately for Meade, Sickles had already departed for Gettysburg more than one hour earlier. Neither Reynolds nor Howard had suggested leaving a covering force at Emmitsburg. Unsure of Meade’s wishes, it was Sickles who had prudently left two brigades behind (which was only slightly less than the full division that Meade ordered.)
While all of this was transpiring, A. P. Hill and Richard Ewell’s Confederate corps crushed the Federal First and Eleventh corps and drove them off the fields north and west of Gettysburg. Sometime between 3:30 p.m. and perhaps as late as 4:30 p.m. (estimates of the exact time vary widely) Hancock arrived on Cemetery Hill where, together with Generals Howard, Warren, and Buford, he began rallying the defeated Union infantry and artillery on the high ground south of town. According to Captain Halstead of Abner Doubleday’s staff, the consensus was unanimous that Cemetery Hill was a “very strong position.” Hancock allegedly announced, rather dramatically if true, “Very well, sir, I select this as the battlefield.”27
After chasing the Federals through town, the Confederates did not continue on to Cemetery Hill. Nor did they launch an attack that evening on Culp’s Hill to the right of Cemetery Hill. Uncertain of the enemy’s strength or disposition, General Ewell read his discretionary orders from Lee accordingly and declined to continue the battle that evening. Whether the Confederates could have captured the high ground will never be known, but Hancock and Howard formed a defensive line there of perhaps 7, 000 infantry and cavalry, together with forty-three pieces of artillery.28
That evening, Lee and General Longstreet, commander of the Confederate First Corps, conferred on Seminary Ridge. According to Longstreet’s published postwar accounts, he proposed to “throw our army around by their left, and we shall interpose between the Federal army and Washington” and await an attack. Lee, however, surprised Longstreet when he responded decisively: “No, the enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there.” Although the day had been a stunning Confederate tactical victory, Lee found himself in something of a dilemma. The victory notwithstanding, he had allowed himself to be drawn into a major battle about ten miles east of South Mountain, which had successfully screened his army and protected his tenuous supply and communication lines stretching back into Virginia. Maneuvering in the presence of the enemy without most of Jeb Stuart’s invaluable cavalry to screen his flanks and front posed considerable dangers. Lee understood this dilemma when he determined that “A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day…it was thought advisable to renew the attack.” It was a calculated risk that, after considering all options, Lee thought best to adopt. The only question was where to “renew the attack.”29
Meanwhile, General Hancock worked to strengthen the Union position. His immediate concern was the ground to the right of Cemetery Hill (Culp’s Hill and what later became
known as Stevens Knoll), which he reinforced with artillery and First Corps infantry. Around 4:00 p.m., Hancock dispatched a rider with a verbal message for Meade that Cemetery Hill could be held until nightfall. To Hancock’s relief, Henry Slocum and his tardy Twelfth Corps finally began trickling onto the field after 5:00 p.m. Dan Sickles had not been the only Federal corps commander confused over how to react on July 1. Oliver Howard had sent repeated messages to Slocum to bring up his corps, which was only some five miles away near Two Taverns. Only now, after 5:00 p.m., was he reaching the front.30
At 5:25 p.m., Hancock sent Meade a written message indicating concern that the line’s left could be turned by way of Emmitsburg. “Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right, which will protect the right. But we have, as yet, no troops on the left, the Third Corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, its flank march will in a degree protect our left flank.” With Cemetery and Culp’s hills relatively secure, Hancock had to deal with the army’s nebulous left flank. “[T]he immediate need of a division on the left was imperative,” he told Brigadier General John Geary, whose Twelfth Corps division arrived ahead of Slocum. General Geary reported, probably not accurately, that the enemy “was reported to be attempting to flank it, and cavalry were already skirmishing in front of that position.” Geary extended his First and Third Brigades “to a range of hills south and west of the town, which I occupied with two regiments of the First Brigade. These hills I regarded as of the utmost importance, since their possession by the enemy would give him an opportunity of enfilading our entire left wing and center with a fire which could not fail to dislodge us from our position.”31
Meade, meanwhile, sent Hancock a message of his own at 6:00 p.m.. “I thought it prudent to leave a division of the Third Corps at Emmitsburg, to hold in check any force attempting to come through there. It can be ordered up tonight, if required. It seems to me that we have so concentrated, that a battle at Gettysburg is now forced upon us, and that if we can get up our people and attack with our whole force, to-morrow, we ought to defeat the force the enemy has.” Meade notified Henry Halleck about the same time that the army was concentrating at Gettysburg.32
Within the next ninety minutes, Meade ordered the Fifth Corps, Sixth Corps, and the remainder of the Third Corps forward. A dispatch was sent at 7:30 p.m. to “Commanding Officer at Emmitsburg: The major-general commanding directs that the division of General Sickles’ corps ordered to remain at Emmitsburg move up to join their corps at the field in the vicinity of Gettysburg with the greatest dispatch.” Meade expected “the division to be up by daylight to-morrow.” At the same time, Meade also sent orders to bring up John Sedgwick’s large Sixth Corps, which had earlier been redirected toward Taneytown, “Your march will have to be a forced one to reach the scene of action, where we shall probably be largely outnumbered without your presence.” Meade’s army was not “largely outnumbered,” but this misconception would bring on the campaign’s most memorable forced march and influence Meade’s strategy throughout the battle.33
Some time during this period, Sickles’ staff officers began to arrive on Cemetery Hill. Captain Alexander Moore had departed Emmitsburg at about 2:00 to open communications with Reynolds. When he reached Gettysburg, he learned that Reynolds was dead, and instead met Howard, who was “anxious” to learn when the Third Corps would be up. Moore then raced back toward Emmitsburg, and met up with Birney leading his division forward, somehow missing both Tremain and Sickles who were ahead of Birney and already looking for Howard.34
Having apparently bypassed Captain Moore, Henry Tremain next arrived on Cemetery Hill. Tremain also didn’t record his arrival time, but was in advance of the Third Corps to notify Howard of Sickles’ approach. Tremain noticed “numerous stragglers” as he relayed Sickles’ message to Howard and Hancock. Tremain then sent an orderly back to conduct Sickles forward. “In due time a group of horsemen appeared with whom I soon recognized the standard indicating Third Corps headquarters.” It must have been near 7:00 as Tremain then rode out to guide Sickles in to Generals Howard and Hancock.35
“I made a forced march,” Sickles later claimed, “and arrived there about the time that General Howard had taken position on Cemetery Hill. I found his troops well posted in a secure position on the ridge. The enemy in the meanwhile had not made any serious attack upon him during my march. The arrival of my force seemed to reassure General Howard in the security of his position.” Given that Howard had spent much of the day awaiting both Sickles and Slocum’s arrival, Howard was probably relieved to see any help. Nevertheless, Howard’s gratitude at this arrival would become just one of the many favorite Gettysburg tales that Sickles would spin in later years; he would often imply (falsely) that his arrival saved the day for the Union cause. Someone was sent back to guide Birney and his two brigades into the lines. When he arrived, Birney massed his men in the rear between Cemetery Ridge and the Taneytown Road, but some straggling regiments (such as the 141st Pennsylvania) did not go into camp until “about dark.”36
With Slocum finally on the field, Hancock turned over command about 7:00 p.m. and began heading back toward Taneytown. According to Sickles, Slocum ordered the Third Corps to be “massed on the left of Cemetery Ridge.” Sickles was still interested in resolving his earlier conflicting orders from Meade, unaware that Meade had ordered the remainder of the Third Corps to come up from Emmitsburg. He was acutely aware that he had come to Gettysburg without Meade’s approval and undoubtedly felt some anxiety about his awkward relationship with his new commanding officer.37 At 9:30 p.m., Sickles decided to justify his actions, and also offer Meade a suggestion or two:
Before the receipt of your dispatch (dated 4:45 p.m.), four brigades and three batteries of my corps had advanced to the support of General Howard, and reached Gettysburg. I left two brigades and two batteries at Emmitsburg, assuming that the approaches through Emmitsburg toward our left and rear must not be uncovered. General Hancock is not in command—General Howard commands. My impression is, if I may be allowed to make a suggestion, that our left and rear are not sufficiently guarded. Nothing less than the earnest and frequent appeals of General Howard, and his supposed danger, could have induced me to move from the position assigned to me in general orders; but I believed the emergency justified my movement. Shall I return to my position at Emmitsburg, or shall I remain and report to Howard? If my corps is to remain in position here, I hope my brigades at Emmitsburg (and batteries) may be relieved and ordered to join me. This is a good battle-field.38
Over the ensuing years, when Sickles was again fighting the battle in various public forums, he repeatedly claimed that the intention of his message was to urge Meade to concentrate at Gettysburg. He also boasted that his march from Emmitsburg had been “against orders.”39 When testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Sickles claimed that his note had been prompted by a difference in opinion between the assembled corps commanders as to whether they should remain at Gettysburg:
I wrote to General Meade…begging him by all means to concentrate his army there and fight a battle, stating in my judgment that it was a good place to fight; that the position of General Howard was an admirably chosen one, and that the enemy would undoubtedly mass there in great force, and that in my judgment it would be most destructive to the morale of the army to fall back, as was apparently contemplated in his order of that morning.40
In reality, even a cursory analysis of Sickles’ message reveals that his primary goal was to justify his actions. Not only did Sickles not “urge” the concentration of Union forces, he actually offered to return to Emmitsburg if Meade disapproved of his move to Gettysburg. Ironically, even at this hour, Sickles’ observation that “our left and rear are not sufficiently guarded” revealed anxiety over the position that Sickles would fatefully occupy on the following day.
Around 11:00 p.m., still unaware that Meade wanted his entire corps at Gettysburg, Sickles and Birney orde
red Charles Graham to return to Emmitsburg and assume command of those troops left behind. Graham’s instructions were as follows: “The position is of the utmost importance, as it covers the left and rear of this army, and must be held at all hazards.” Graham was also reminded to give special care to the corps ammunition and headquarters trains. If unable to hold Emmitsburg, Graham was told to retreat toward Taneytown. Graham departed Gettysburg in the darkness, but when about one mile from Emmitsburg, he was met by one of Meade’s aides with new orders to assemble the troops and “march to Gettysburg without delay.”41
Sickles received a late, and probably unplanned, dinner that night. On Cemetery Hill, the Evergreen Cemetery’s caretaker Elizabeth Thorn (her husband Peter was away in the service) was hiding in the gatehouse basement with her elderly parents and children. Sometime around sundown, a soldier entered and asked if she would make supper for General Howard. Thorn prepared the meal, assuming Howard would arrive shortly. Howard didn’t arrive until nearly midnight, however, and when he did he had Sickles and Slocum with him. Thorn seemed the most impressed with Howard’s presence, but with three generals in her company, she did not speak while they ate. After the meal was finished, Thorn returned to her basement. The family remained there until daylight, when Howard sent orders for them to leave.42
General Hancock, meanwhile, rode back to Taneytown and met with Meade about 9:00 p.m. In Hancock’s version of events, Meade had determined to fight at Gettysburg based “upon the representations I had made, and the existence of known facts of the case.” Hancock had also taken the precaution of ordering John Gibbon to halt the Second Corps “two or three miles behind Gettysburg, in order to protect our rear from any flank movement of the enemy” against Cemetery Ridge’s worrisome left flank.43
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