James A. Hessler
Page 14
About 10:00 p.m., Meade departed Taneytown for Gettysburg. His party included his son, Captain George Meade, Henry Hunt, and an engineer from Warren’s staff, Captain William H. Paine. The group arrived on Cemetery Hill between midnight and 1:00 a.m., where they met a party that included Sickles, Howard, Slocum, and Warren. “Is this the place to fight the battle?” Meade asked Howard. According to Howard, he and Slocum were conferring with Meade near the cemetery gatehouse when Sickles, who had been lying down nearby,“piped up: ‘It’s a good place to fight from, Sir!’.” Meade was pleased that his generals were all in agreement on the position’s strength. “I am glad to hear you say so, gentlemen. I have already ordered the other corps commanders to concentrate here and it is too late to change.”44
When the meeting ended, Meade set out on a nighttime examination of Cemetery Ridge. His reconnaissance party included Howard, Hunt, and engineer Paine. Captain Paine sketched a map in the darkness and while in the saddle (apparently something he was good at), and marked the positions that Meade intended for each corps in the line. Meade ordered Paine to distribute the map to his corps commanders, and also instructed General Hunt to see that the artillery was properly placed. Hunt said that the moonlight inspection covered the Union line “so far as then occupied.” Howard recalled, “It was a very beautiful scene, but Gen. Meade did not see it. He was planning— planning.” Just north of Little Round Top, the officers turned around and headed toward Culp’s Hill.45
Robert Carter of the 22nd Massachusetts later pointed out the incredibly difficult situation within which Meade found himself at the close of July 1. He had never seen or been to Gettysburg, and the “very near-sighted” general had made this first examination in dim moonlight. New to command, Meade was “exhausted, mentally and physically, by the terrible strain which he had been under.” The reconnaissance was as thorough as one could expect, but it also poses questions as far as the Sickles controversy is concerned. How thorough an examination could have been conducted at approximately 2:00 a.m. by exhausted men in pitch darkness? Since Meade’s party did not ascend Little Round Top, how much of Geary’s position did they actually see? Did the Paine map physically place Sickles on Little Round Top? A surviving copy in the National Archives (if it is a battlefield copy) places the Sixth Corps on the far left of the Union line in front of the Round Tops, with Sickles’ corps to its right.46
Thanks to the skillful pre-battle maneuvering of his army, Meade also ended the day with a command that was either on the field or (with the exception of the still-marching Sixth Corps) would be within supporting distance about sunrise. The long and historic day was not yet over, for Andrew Humphreys and his two brigades were still en route from Emmitsburg. As discussed previously, Humphreys was moving from Emmitsburg to Gettysburg on a road that ran about two miles west of the main route Sickles and Birney had used. The division departed Emmitsburg without Humphreys about 4:00 p.m. When Humphreys caught up with the head of his column, he met the corps inspector general, Lieutenant Colonel Julius Hayden, and a local doctor who “acted as a guide for the route that General Sickles wished me to take.” The guides were a welcome insurance even though earlier that morning Humphreys had purchased a local map that included all of the surrounding roads.47
Sickles had not forgotten Humphreys’ division. In addition to Hayden’s presence, Humphreys apparently received at least two messengers from Sickles while en route. Sometime “about dusk, a staff officer from General Sickles gave me directions from him to take position on the left of Gettysburg when I got up.” Then when “about half way to Gettysburg,” Humphreys later testified,“I received a note from General Sickles, which had been written to him by General Howard, telling him to look out for his left as he moved up (on the main road I suppose was meant) from Emmitsburg.” This must have imbued Humphreys with extra caution since he was already two miles to the left [west] of the road that Sickles had marched along. “Just after this I met a person who had conducted a portion of the first corps up in the morning, and he told me that there were none of our troops on the west side of the Emmitsburg road.” When his vanguard reached a fork in the road that branched off to the right and united with the Emmitsburg Road, Humphreys decided to take it. Colonel Hayden, however, insisted that Sickles wanted Humphreys guided in by the way of the Black Horse Tavern, which was on the road from Fairfield and well west of the Emmitsburg Road.48
A skeptical Humphreys directed his brigades to close up and continue marching quietly through the darkness. According to one version, Humphreys rode ahead toward the tavern with a small staff. The innkeeper, Mr. Bream, told the party that thirty-six pieces of Rebel artillery had been seen on a nearby hill just before sundown, and he pointed out Confederate pickets. In his report, General Carr claimed his men marched within 200 yards of the enemy pickets without being discovered. In another more colorful version, Thomas Rafferty of the Excelsior’s 71st New York claimed the error was discovered only because “one of the bummers of my own regiment (I must admit we had our share of them) had been straggling from the line of march on a foraging expedition” and captured a “rebel bummer, who was on the same errand.”49
Humphreys later boasted that the enemy was “not aware of my presence, and I might have attacked them at daylight with the certainty of at least temporary success.” Choosing the wiser course of action, the wayward brigades retraced their steps and headed back from whence they had come. The exhausted men trudged along in the hazy moonlight until they could finally see the “extensive smoldering fires of some troops.” Humphreys had finally reached Union lines, and Sickles’ assistant adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel Orson Hart, arrived to guide his men into position. When Humphreys informed Sickles of the “circuitous route by which I had come,” Sickles assured him that Hayden had been mistaken in guiding the division via Black Horse Tavern. “It shows what can be done by accident,” explained the division commander.
It was about 1:00 a.m. when Humphreys’ men fell asleep in the shadow of a rocky hill that would one day become known as Little Round Top.50
Postwar view of the Sherfy house, taken from the Emmitsburg Road (in the foreground) looking southwest.
Sue Boardman
Chapter 6
In Some Doubt as to Where He Should Go
The morning of July 2 started early for the two Third Corps brigades and artillery that had remained at Emmitsburg. The men had settled in for the night with instructions to be prepared for an early morning march to Gettysburg. Around 2:00 a.m., Regis de Trobriand received Meade’s orders to move to Gettysburg forthwith. Burling’s brigade, however, was well scattered to better protect nearby roads and, given the darkness, could not not be fully assembled until nearly 4:00 a.m. De Trobriand claimed it was “daylight” before they started, and the men hit the road without breakfast, with only ten-minute halts at the end of each hour to make coffee. “It was a weird night march,” wrote a member of the 2nd New Hampshire. “The consciousness of impending battle had by some subtle influence taken possession of the minds of the men.”1
John Buford’s cavalry division, along with Lieutenant John Calef’s artillery battery, had been posted during the night of July 1 along the Emmitsburg Road on the Union left. Buford’s specific location remains unclear, partially because a cavalry line was considerably more fluid and mobile than a static infantry line, but at least a portion of Colonel Devin’s brigade occupied the Sherfy Peach Orchard. (The 6th New York Cavalry’s battlefield monument says that they bivouacked in the orchard.) The reports of Pleasonton, Buford, and Devin all simply referred to a posting on the extreme “left” of the Union line. Colonel Devin wrote that on the morning of July 2 he “was engaged reconnoitering in rear of the enemy’s right,” meaning that he moved west of the Emmitsburg Road. A detachment from the 9th New York Cavalry ended up west of Pitzer’s Schoolhouse, and later claimed to discover Longstreet’s approaching column, but the acquisition of any significant intelligence is not reflected in reports filed by Buford or D
evin.2
For that portion of the Third Corps already on the battlefield, Henry Tremain wrote that the Third Corps “had simply gone into bivouac, pretty much in the gloom of the evening [of July 1]” and that “neither the batteries nor the infantry were occupying any special posts selected for defense or offence. That awaited the light, and was now to be done.” The 141st Pennsylvania’s regimental history recorded that Humphreys’ division was posted “just north of… George Weikert’s house.” Birney’s division was to the left, “Graham’s brigade on the right of the division bivouacked in column by regiments, on a knoll in a field south of George Weikert’s house.… Ward’s brigade went into bivouac to the left and a little in front of Graham.” The 105th Pennsylvania’s historian recorded that when the sun rose on July 2, the left of Birney’s division rested “at the foot of Round Top.”3
The sunlight offered Sickles’ men ample opportunity to familiarize themselves with their new surroundings. Pickets were sent forward to the Emmitsburg Road, and Tremain noted that the “enemy’s pickets, too, were discovered to be stronger and nearer to us than had been supposed.” The 63rd Pennsylvania of Graham’s brigade spent the morning on picket duty on line with the Emmitsburg Road. Major John Danks wrote that they were initially placed onto the line at 10:00 p.m. on July 1, along the road with their left flank covering the Wheatfield Road. Danks reported that a concentrated picket firing began early the next morning against the right of his line. Sometime during the morning, the 63rd was pushed forward (west) to a fence that ran in rear of the Sherfy house parallel to the Emmitsburg Road. Between 11:15 a.m. and noon, several companies of the 105th Pennsylvania were also ordered onto the skirmish line in support of the 63rd, “which was keeping up a brisk fire on the skirmishers of the enemy.” The 105th also reported that the “fire from the enemy’s sharpshooters was severe.” Private Alfred Craighead, 68th Pennsylvania, also recalled, “Skirmishing commenced about nine o’clock on the morning of July 2, and gradually increased in severity until the battle opened in earnest.”4
The Joseph Sherfy farm sat at the intersection of the Emmitsburg and Wheatfield roads. Sherfy built the family’s two-story brick farmhouse, still standing today at the intersection’s northwest corner, in the early 1840s. Sherfy’s farm was considered average size for the area, approximately fifty acres, and had several outbuildings on the property. Sherfy was typical of many local farmers who were required by the hard and rocky Pennsylvania soil to supplement their farming incomes. His occupation in the 1860 census was listed as “Fruit Dealer” rather than “farmer.” The fruit resulted from a peach orchard Sherfy owned and operated on his farm. A young peach orchard directly across the Emmitsburg Road (east) from the farmhouse had been planted in a six-acre lot the previous year. The trees were not yet producing fruit, unlike Sherfy’s more mature four-acre lot directly at the Emmitsburg and Wheatfield Roads intersection. It was this mature lot that would forever become known as the Peach Orchard.5
Postwar view of the Sherfy Peach Orchard looking toward the Round Tops.
Sue Boardman
Several properties were in proximity to Sherfy during the summer of 1863. Roughly west and south of Sherfy were the Warfield and J. Snyder farms. Warfield was a free black who owned a farm on the south side of the Millerstown Road, which ran perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road and cut through Seminary Ridge just south of Sherfy’s land. Snyder was directly across from Warfield on the north side of the road. North and west of Sherfy were the farms of Jean Staub and Henry Spangler. Across the Emmitsburg Road, northeast of Sherfy was the farm of Daniel Klingle. Sherfy’s closest neighbor, directly across (on the east side of) the Emmitsburg Road at the northeast corner of the Wheatfield Road intersection was the elderly John Wentz. The original buildings disappeared long ago, but in 1863 the Wentz house stood approximately seventy-five feet north of the Wheatfield Road. Locals later remembered the home as being made of logs and weatherboarding. It was probably a one-and-one-half story structure, similar in size to the existing Leister or Bryan houses. Two outbuildings sat approximately 120 yards north of the house. The Sherfy’s less mature peach orchard ran about 250 yards north and about 150 yards east of the Wentz buildings.6
Given Sherfy’s location on the Emmitsburg Road, Union troops, including Sickles’ Third Corps, had passed by the property in large numbers on July 1. But it was the terrain surrounding the Sherfy and Wentz farms that interested both armies on July 2. The Sherfy farm sits atop an unnamed ridge intersecting the Emmitsburg Road. Sherfy’s peach orchard was about 580 feet above sea level, compared to Plum Run (near the base of Little Round Top) which is about 520 feet above sea level. (By way of contrast, Little Round Top is approximately 650 feet above sea level.) The Emmitsburg Road’s ridge was roughly halfway between, and somewhat parallel to, the Confederate line of battle on Seminary – Warfield ridges and Meade’s intended line on Cemetery Ridge. It was this elevation surrounding the Sherfy farm that would eventually catch Dan Sickles’ attention later that morning. He would eventually reach the conclusion that the position would offer the Confederates a potential artillery platform from which they could pummel the Union lines.7
In addition to the elevation’s potential artillery benefits, the terrain offered another advantage that was not lost on Third Corps officers. The Emmitsburg Road itself was one of only three major roads into Gettysburg that were still under Union control following the fighting of July 1. The other two roads, the Taneytown Road and Baltimore Pike, were of greater importance because they were behind Meade’s lines and thus served as potential supply and communication routes leading south. But the Emmitsburg Road had served as a means for the Union’s First, Third, and portions of the Eleventh Corps to arrive on the battlefield. The detachment of Sickles’ Third Corps left in Emmitsburg would be arriving on this same road later in the morning. Strategically, the road helped to cover Meade’s left flank and Union occupation of the Emmitsburg Road could potentially control the Confederates’ approach should Lee attempt to turn the Union left. With the exception of the occasional farm buildings and fences, the area leading from the Third Corps positions on Cemetery Ridge up to the road was generally open, allowing room for troops and artillery to maneuver.
Tremain’s July 1 role as messenger between Reynolds and Sickles had given him an opportunity to see the ground in daylight. In addition to the elevation along the Emmitsburg Road, Tremain expressed concern to Sickles about the Millerstown Road “that intersected the Emmitsburg highway, near Humphreys left picket; and I was ordered to tell General Birney to picket that road…as far toward the enemy as practicable and to keep [Sickles] fully informed.” Tremain eventually received a message from Birney that there were, as yet, no enemy forces on his left. Tremain passed the report on to Meade.8
While the Third Corps officers and men familiarized themselves with their corner of Pennsylvania, Meade positioned his army. The Second Corps, temporarily under the command of John Gibbon, moved up the Taneytown Road behind the Round Tops and began arriving on the field between 5:30–6:00 a.m. Meade initially ordered Hancock to place these new arrivals behind Cemetery Hill to support the Union right. It wasn’t until 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. that he ordered the Second Corps to form a line running approximately one mile south along Cemetery Ridge, with the Taneytown Road behind it. Gibbon was apparently told that, once his men were in position, Sickles would be on his left.9
Brigadier General James Barnes’ First Division of Fifth Corps had camped during the night only a few miles outside Gettysburg. His men reached Gettysburg about 7:00 a.m. Major General George Sykes, commanding Meade’s former Fifth Corps, reported that he “took position on the right of our line” and subsequently massed near a bridge over Rock Creek on the Baltimore Pike, “and within reach of the Twelfth Army Corps.” Sykes further reported that “while thus situated” he was “directed to support the Third Corps…with a brigade, should it be required.” At this time, only two of Sykes’ divisions, (Generals Barnes and Ayres) were on the field
.10
In addition to Graham’s Third Corps detachment, which was still on the march from Emmitsburg, other elements of Meade’s army were still converging on Gettysburg as the morning hours ticked away. John Sedgwick’s large Sixth Corps was on a forced march from Manchester via the Baltimore Pike and would not arrive until later that afternoon. Meade’s artillery was also still coming together. According to Captain John Bigelow, commanding the 9th Massachusetts Battery, the Union Artillery Reserve left Taneytown at “early dawn” on July 2 and thought that it was “about eleven in the forenoon” before it arrived at Gettysburg “and was parked in the rear of Cemetery Hill.”11
While the army was concentrating, Henry Tremain claimed that the “Third Corps troops, except as to their picket lines, were yet unposted. They were in large part reclining where they had spent the night; and their location proved to be on low ground, easily commanded by the land in front, and running off to the left.” According to Tremain’s postwar memory, the men of the Third Corps “would be at the mercy of the occupants of the ‘high ground’ at the rear of the extreme left, as well as the possessors of the elevated land at the immediate front of the extreme left, i.e. the Peach Orchard. Indeed, this could easily be perceived when the morning mists had arisen.”12
In contrast to Tremain’s perceived inactivity, Henry Hunt wrote that “the morning was a busy and in some respects an anxious one; it was believed that the whole Confederate army was assembled, that it was equal if not superior to our own in numbers, and that the battle would commence before our troops were up.” Some demonstrations on Ewell’s front, along with the relatively short distance between Confederates in town and Federals on Cemetery Hill, suggested an attack against the Union right. Meade, in fact, entertained the idea of launching his own offensive from the Union right. “Early in the morning it had been my intention,” he later explained, “as soon as the 6th Corps arrived on the ground…to make a vigorous attack from our extreme right upon the enemy’s left.” Slocum would command the attacking column, which would have included his Twelfth Corps, along with the Fifth and Sixth Corps. Slocum and Warren, however, “reported that the character of the ground in front was unfavorable to making an attack,” and combined with the fact that the Sixth Corps would not arrive until early afternoon, Meade “abandoned my intention to make an attack from my right.” As Henry Hunt later wrote, with the proposed attack abandoned, “Meade postponed all offensive operations until the enemy’s intentions should be more clearly developed.”13