The primary advantages of Meade’s Cemetery Ridge position, as it continued to develop that morning, rested in the line’s shape and the fact that elevations were available to protect both the left and right flanks. After Hancock and Howard occupied Cemetery Hill the previous afternoon, Hancock wisely ensured that Culp’s Hill to the right was also occupied in order to protect against enemy movements in that direction. Since the fledgling Union line was still vulnerable to an attack at that time from the west and south (possibly via either the Emmitsburg or Taneytown roads), Hancock—and later Meade—curved the line south along Cemetery Ridge from Cemetery Hill toward Little Round Top. Chancellorsville was still fresh on everyone’s mind. Only two months earlier, Stonewall Jackson had collapsed an exposed Union flank. A successful defense of both Little Round Top on the left and Culp’s Hill on the right would be needed to prevent a repeat of that at Gettysburg. Meade’s position famously came to take the shape of a giant fishhook (the hook roughly consisting of the line from Culp’s Hill to Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge). In addition to geographic anchors on each flank, the fishhook’s most redeeming feature was that it allowed Meade the advantage of interior lines. Meade could reinforce, communicate with, or coordinate movements from one end of the line to the other more quickly and easily than could General Lee, whose army would soon occupy a longer exterior line position. General James Wadsworth later explained the Union position’s benefits: “Every man in the army was available. The whole army was concentrated on about three miles square; the reserve was within thirty minutes’ march of any part of the line.” Meade’s troop movements further benefitted from use of the Taneytown Road and Baltimore Pike in the rear. Although neither army commander was absolutely confident of his enemy’s strength, we know today that Meade ultimately had more men arrayed on a shorter front than Lee. This was a significant, and perhaps the deciding, factor in the battle’s outcome.14
Although Meade devoted much of his attention to the right flank and rightcenter portions of his line (Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill), he did not neglect his left flank. Elements of Brigadier General John Geary’s Twelfth Corps division had been posted on the Union left flank, to the left of Sickles’ Third Corps, since about 5:00 p.m. the previous evening. Geary reported that he occupied a line “to a range of hills south and west of the town” until he rejoined the remainder of the Twelfth Corps on the Union right “at 5 a.m. on the 2d, having been relieved by the Third Army Corps, in obedience to orders from Major-General Slocum.” Colonel John Patrick of the 5th Ohio in Geary’s division reported that he had been ordered on July 1 “to the extreme left of our line, and occupied a hill covered with trees.” The 147th Pennsylvania was also placed under Patrick’s command in order to extend and increase their frontage. Patrick’s command remained there “until the following morning, when we received orders at 5 o’clock to return to the brigade.”15
If Geary and Patrick’s reports are accurate, then the Third Corps was ordered to replace them on Little Round Top sometime around 5:00 a.m. Meade didn’t yet realize that potential trouble was brewing on his left when he reported, “by 7 a.m…The Second and Third Corps were directed to occupy the continuation of the Cemetery Ridge on the left of the Eleventh Corps.”16 Sickles later told the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War:
At a very early hour on Thursday morning [July 2] I received a notification that General Meade’s headquarters had been established at Gettysburg, and I was directed by him to relieve a division of the Twelfth Corps, General Geary’s division I think, which was massed a little to my left, and which had taken position there during the night. I did so, reporting, however, to General Meade that that division was not in position, but was merely massed in my vicinity; the tenor of his order seemed to indicate a supposition on his part that the division was in position.17
David Birney’s report supported Sickles’ account: “At 7 a.m., under orders from Major-General Sickles, I relieved Geary’s division, and formed a line, resting its left on the Sugar Loaf Mountain [Little Round Top] and the right thrown in a direct line toward the cemetery, connecting on the right” with Humphreys’ Third Corps division. Birney also placed a picket line “in the Emmitsburg road, with sharpshooters some 300 yards in advance.”18
“Birney had relieved the troops of Geary’s division and formed his line with his left resting near Little Round Top,” Captain George Meade later wrote. “The corps, as thus placed, was, with the exception that Little Round Top was not occupied, posted comfortably to General Meade’s instructions.” The exact details of Meade’s orders, the time they were delivered, and whether they were verbal or written, are unclear. Captain Meade was unsure, so he presumably did not deliver the original, and he later wondered if Sickles had received his orders when General Meade arrived on Cemetery Hill the previous night. “I had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles…directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the 2d corps,” General Meade explained to the Committee on the Conduct of the War.19 “I had indicated to him in general terms, that his right was to rest upon General Hancock’s left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it.”20
Sickles, however, claimed that he was unsure of where he was to go because Geary was allegedly “massed” and did not occupy a specific line. Sickles’ critics, on the other hand, argue that he must have known Geary’s position, and was only inventing the claim that he was unsure of the position. Either Sickles was simply lying (as most parties assume) or there must be an explanation for the variance. The regimental historian for the 141st Pennsylvania compared the differing times reported by Geary (5:00 a.m.) and Birney (7:00 a.m.) and offered a potential explanation for the confusion. “Geary had moved about five o’clock in the morning, and Sickles did not receive his orders until an hour later, when being ignorant of the position Geary had held, and no officer being left to direct him, the order was imperfectly carried out.” However, General Meade claimed that Geary had sent a staff officer to Sickles, and that Geary only departed after “his patience was exhausted” by Sickles’ failure to relieve him. Private Robert Carter of the 22nd Massachusetts (who did not support Sickles’ actions) also believed Geary’s departure “misled” Sickles into not understanding Geary’s position, but added that one of Geary’s staff officers had “pointed it out to him.”21
With the Third Corps stretched south along Cemetery Ridge, at least to the foot of Little Round Top, Birney’s First Division held the left (south) and Humphreys the right (north). Lt. Col. Thomas Rafferty of the Excelsiors’ 71st New York thought the terrain in Birney’s front “was so faulty that it was impossible to occupy with any prospect of being able to hold it.” The low ground “was quite springy and marshy, and was covered thickly with a growth of stunted bushes…and masked by the woods and the broken and rocky ground in our front, affording most excellent positions and covers for the rebels to take possession of without risk, and attack us with every advantage in their favor.” Rafferty may be added to the list of men concerned that the Emmitsburg Road dominated this low ground, though he also admitted that the road itself “was overlooked and commanded by both the Round Tops.” Rafferty did not believe that Meade had personally inspected the position that Sickles was now ordered to occupy. “We were now on the original line which Meade says ‘he had designed us to occupy.’ How he came to design it I don’t know, as neither he nor any of his staff had ever seen it.”22
There is a possibility that Meade chose Sickles to guard the left flank because he considered it to be the least likely to receive an attack. Hooker had placed Howard on the right flank at Chancellorsville partially because he lacked confidence in the Eleventh Corps and believed that flank immune from an assault. Was Sickles deployed on the left at Gettysburg for the same reason? In later years, Sickles liked to tell the story that he had warned Meade of the left flank’s dangers and that Meade had supposedly responded, “Well, Sickles, do you think that the l
eft is a vulnerable and dangerous place? Suppose you go over there and look after it.” Sickles’ assignment may simply have been “the luck of the draw,” a function of corps position at the close of July 1. But Meade certainly believed his right flank was most likely to see heavy combat, either offensively or defensively; he made sure that Slocum’s corps was reunited there and that both the Second and Fifth corps were nearby to reinforce Slocum. Meade probably thought the Third Corps was the least likely of his corps to do battle, at least on July 2, and with the exception of the Eleventh Corps, he probably preferred it that way.23
Sometime between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m., General Meade spoke with Captain George Meade, his staffer-son, outside army headquarters at the widow Lydia Leister’s farmhouse. The general instructed the captain to visit Sickles “to indicate to him where the general head-quarters [sic] were, to inquire of him if his troops were yet in position, and to ask him what he had to report.”24
Captain Meade rode down the Taneytown Road about one-half mile to Third Corps headquarters “in a small patch of woods on the west side” of the road. There, Captain Meade found only Captain George Randolph, chief of the Third Corps artillery brigade. Randolph told Meade that Sickles was worn down from the prior day’s exertions and was resting in a nearby tent. Randolph carried the message to Sickles and returned a few moments later to inform the captain that “the Third Corps was not yet in position, that General Sickles was in some doubt as to where he should go.” The staff officer presumed from Sickles’ response that the “previous instructions had evidently been sent and received.”25
At that moment, Captain Meade later wrote, he did not have precise knowledge of his father’s orders to Sickles, so he was unable to provide Randolph with any further clarification. Instead, he quickly rode back to the Leister house and reported to his father, who told him “in a sharp, decisive way” to return and tell Sickles to position the Third Corps “on the left of the Second Corps; that his right was to connect with the left of the Second Corps; that he was to prolong with his line the line of [Second] Corps, occupying the position that General Geary had held the night before.”26
Returning to Sickles a second time, the captain found Sickles’ tents “about to be struck, the general just mounted” and surrounded by several of his staff officers. This time, Meade spoke directly to Sickles, who informed him that “his troops were then moving, and would be in position shortly, adding something as to General Geary’s not having had any position, but being massed in the vicinity. He then rode off in the direction of the front.” As Captain Meade was about to depart, Randolph requested that General Hunt be sent out to review “some positions he had selected for artillery.” Meade set spur to horse and returned to army headquarters.27
Around 9:00 a.m., the remaining Third Corps brigades began to arrive from Emmitsburg under General Graham’s direction. The men left Emmitsburg sometime after 4:00 a.m. It took an unimpressive four or five hours to cover just nine miles. Graham claimed that as they approached Gettysburg, local citizens warned “that the enemy were advancing in heavy force on my flank.” As they neared the Sherfy peach orchard, Captain James Smith noticed that nearby fences had been cleared away and “the pickets and skirmishers were uneasy and kept up a desultory fire, little puffs of thin blue smoke dotting the plain before us, indicating quite distinctly the respective lines of the two greatest armies on earth.” After passing Sherfy’s, they turned off into the fields to the right, “towards the foot of” Cemetery Ridge where they reported to Sickles. According to Colonel Regis de Trobriand, he reported to Birney at 10:00 a.m. and was placed in line between Ward and Graham’s brigades. Burling was sent on to Humphreys’ division, where his men massed in columns rather than line and rested until nearly noon. Colonel Charles Merrill of the 17th Maine also noted that “already the pickets of both armies were busily engaged,” as did Lt. Col. Rafferty of the 71st New York. The skirmishing helped keep the tension high.28
Modern view looking south from Birney’s morning bivouac. Photo taken near George Weikert farm. Little Round Top is visible on center horizon.Author
Rafferty later remembered that the ground between the western slope of Cemetery Ridge and the Emmitsburg Road was “divided into fields by stone fences, which we immediately proceeded to level all the way down and clear across to the Emmitsburg Road, so that we had a clear declivity all along the front of our division.” General Humphreys said that the order to clear the fences originated with Sickles. Humphreys seems to have done a thorough job clearing his front, but some have questioned whether Birney’s division was as active. Portions of fence near the Emmitsburg Road were not leveled because they were potentially within range of enemy pickets. Captain A. W. Givin of the 114th Pennsylvania later explained that fences remained near the north end of the Sherfy buildings because “Our pioneers were sent out to remove the fence and had partly chopped it down when they were compelled to desist by the heavy picket firing.”29
Captain Judson Clark of the First New Jersey Battery B reported that at “about 9.30 a.m.” Randolph ordered his battery “placed in line on the rise of ground midway between General Sickles’ headquarters [Trostle farm] and the peach orchard, on the Emmitsburg road, where we remained until about 2 p.m.” It is unclear why this movement was ordered, but one scenario is that Clark was ordered up to support the skirmishers along the Emmitsburg Road.30
Around 11:00 a.m. Sickles rode to army headquarters, where he finally met with Meade personally. “Not having received any orders in reference to my position,” Sickles later told Congress, he claimed that “conclusive indications” of an enemy attack on his front necessitated the meeting. “I went in person to headquarters and reported the facts and circumstances which led me to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders.” Sickles, however, “did not receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters.” Even worse, he continued, “I was satisfied, from information which I received, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg.” Sickles elaborated that Meade’s “demeanor” gave him the impression that “he did not intend to fight the battle at Gettysburg if he could avoid it. General Butterfield…told me that orders were being then prepared for a change of position to Pipe Clay Creek.”31
Modern view of the low ground north of Little Round Top that Sickles disliked. This view looks north toward Cemetery Hill (far horizon), with Cemetery Ridge on right. The woods on left block the view toward the west. Author
Sickles’ and Meade’s versions on these points differ sharply. Meade later claimed he gave Sickles orders at this 11:00 meeting. But Meade’s response, as recorded by his own son, raises doubts as to whether Meade actually had firsthand knowledge of Geary’s position. Captain Meade wrote that his father told Sickles “that he [Sickles] was to occupy the position in which he [Meade] understood that General Hancock had the night before placed General Geary” [emphasis added]. According to Meade, Sickles replied that “Geary had no position,” so Meade spelled it out once again: extend Hancock’s line and place his left on the hill later known as Little Round Top. After noting there was very good artillery positions “in the vicinity” and requesting assistance in posting his guns, Sickles asked if he had discretion to post his men according to his judgment. Meade replied, “Certainly, within the limits of the general instructions I have given you; any ground within those limits you choose to occupy, I leave to you.” According to Sickles, “I asked General Meade to go over the ground on the left and examine it. He said his engagements did not permit him to do that.” Sickles then asked for chief engineer Warren, but as he was also busy, it was agreed that General Hunt, the army’s chief of artillery, would accompany him. Meade later said that he thought Hunt’s role was to “examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give General Sickles the benefit of his [Hunt’s] judgment.”32
Henry Hunt had spent much of the mo
rning inspecting Union lines. When he returned to headquarters, “General Meade told me that General Sickles, then with him, wished me to examine a new line, as he [Sickles] thought that assigned to him was not a good one, especially that he could not use his artillery there.” Hunt’s inspections had covered both the Union left and right flanks. “I had been as far as Round Top that morning, and had noticed the unfavorable character of the ground,” recalled the gunnery officer. Hunt noted in his report that Little Round Top itself offered a “natural termination of our lines, [but the] broken character of the ground in front of the southern half of our line was unfavorable to the use of artillery.”33
According to Meade, Sickles needed assistance in posting his artillery. Contrary to Meade’s recollection, Sickles claimed the goal of having an officer from headquarters accompany him was to make “a careful reconnaissance of the whole position on the left, in reference to its topography and the best line for us to occupy.” Hunt’s account is a hybrid of the two. He wrote that he was to “examine a new line” in particular for artillery use. Hunt’s account, combined with Sickles’ request to have Warren (the chief engineer) accompany him, would seem to suggest that more was discussed than simply the posting of artillery.34
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