Hancock’s chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Morgan, recalled that none of the observers initially thought Sickles was actually taking a new line. “The line he took up was a good one of itself,” Morgan wrote, “but bore no relation to the general line of battle. His right flank was nearly a mile in front of the Second Corps, and his left was still more unprotected…there can be no valid excuse for precipitating a battle in front of the general line, as was done at Gettysburg. It was very unfortunate that General Sickles moved onto the field by way of the Emmitsburg road for in riding along this Emmitsburg road one gets an exaggerated idea of the importance of the ridge on which the road lies, and underestimates the lesser ridge running from Cemetery Hill towards Round Top.” Morgan thought that Sickles’ critics ultimately dealt “very tenderly” with him due to his “known bravery, and the terrible wound he received on the field. He committed a great blunder.”26 Along with the remainder of the puzzled Second Corps officers, Lieutenant Frank Haskell wondered:
What his purpose could have been is past conjecture.… I suppose the truth probably is that Gen. Sickles supposed he was doing for the best; but he was neither born nor bred a soldier. But one can scarcely tell what may have been the motives of such a man,—a politician, and some other things, exclusive of the Barton Key affair,—a man after show, and notoriety, and newspaper fame, and the adulation of the mob! O, there is a grave responsibility on those in whose hands are the lives of ten thousand men.…27
On the other hand, many of Sickles’ Third Corps contemporaries viewed their commander as a man of action whose requests for support had been rebuffed at army headquarters. Lt. Colonel Rafferty argued that “no attention was paid to” Sickles’ concerns and “General Sickles had one sterling quality of a good soldier—he was equal to an emergency; and left as he now was to the exercise of his own judgment, he was prompt to act.” Strategically, the new line “would at once compel the enemy to develop his plan of attack, as our position there menaced any attempt he might make at turning our flank, and in fact compelled him to attack us, or suspend his movement and await our attack.” Although the verdict of history has demonstrated that Sickles’ movement did not “compel” Lee to attack, the new position did cause the Confederates to significantly modify their plans.28
Sickles’ artillery chief, Captain George Randolph, also approved of the move. He thought that the “low, unprotected” ground of the original position was easily commanded by the Emmitsburg Road ridge. Randolph thought the new position “notwithstanding the sharp angle in our line made necessary by the formation of the ground, to be a much more desirable one.”29 Not surprisingly, Henry Tremain also agreed. He wrote his family on July 10:
We knew where the battle would begin. I felt certain, for I told General Sickles on Wednesday night (as I had been over the ground more and had therefore better opportunities for knowing) that if the enemy attacked the army at all in its present position, it would be in certain localities on the left, which I designated and Thursday morning [July 2] he examined the topography and agreed with me. It was then he pressed on General Meade the necessity for changing his lines to meet such an anticipated attack. It was in that very locality, and by the roads I designated that the enemy did come and hurl upon us their tremendous force.30
By mid-afternoon, both Birney and Humphreys were now well in advance of Cemetery Ridge. On the left or southern end of the new Third Corps line was General Ward’s brigade of Birney’s division, fewer than 1,600 men anchoring the army’s left flank in the vicinity of Devil’s Den. Ward also had the support of Captain James Smith’s 4th New York Independent Battery. Smith wrote in his battery history that Captain Randolph “piloted” Smith’s guns to the steep and rocky Houck’s Ridge “about 1:00 p.m.” Unable to place all six of his guns on the ridge, Smith deployed four pieces there and the other two in Plum Run valley behind him. Although Ward’s left was anchored on the large rock formation, there remained the danger that any attacking forces could still move around Devil’s Den, flank his left, and penetrate the Plum Run valley in his rear. Aware of this danger, Smith’s two rear guns were deployed facing south to cover the entry to the gorge. Across the Plum Run valley, approximately 500 yards behind [east of] Ward rose Little Round Top. Except for Union signalmen, the rocky heights were unoccupied.31
Next in line was Regis de Trobriand’s brigade, which filed into a large wheatfield on Ward’s right. The twenty-six acre wheatfield was part of a larger tract of farmland owned by George Rose and run by his brother John. De Trobriand had fewer than 1,400 men immediately available, and was unable to solidly connect with either Ward on his left or Graham on his right. De Trobriand had the impression that his role was to support Ward and/or Graham, so he placed his regiments in column “ready to support either of the other two brigades according to circumstances.” De Trobriand attempted to connect with Graham at the Peach Orchard by placing the 3rd Michigan regiment in advance of his main line as a long skirmish line. The 3rd Michigan’s right connected with the left of the 3rd Maine at a right angle. The 3rd Maine had been placed as skirmishers by Graham to cover the southern flank of the Peach Orchard. De Trobriand’s position was supported by Captain George Winslow’s six-gun 1st New York Light, Battery D. Winslow’s position was fronted by Rose’s woods, and some of the supporting Union infantry later complained that the timber minimized Winslow’s effectiveness.32
Charles Graham’s brigade occupied the Peach Orchard on de Trobriand’s right. Graham was the only one of Birney’s brigades touching the Emmitsburg Road, but it did not have sufficient strength to cover his assigned front. The 3rd Maine was deployed as skirmishers to help cover the gap between Graham and de Trobriand. Graham’s main line formed a right angle at the intersection of the Wheatfield and Emmitsburg roads, with one wing facing south and the other facing west. Behind the skirmish line and on the north side of the Wheatfield Road, the 141st and 68th Pennsylvania regiments fronted south. To their right, fronting west along the Emmitsburg Road (moving left to right as the line extended north) were Graham’s 114th, 57th, and 105th Pennsylvania regiments. The 63rd Pennsylvania was skirmishing west of the Emmitsburg Road beyond the Sherfy house, and was supported by several companies of the 105th Pennsylvania “Wild Cats.” Judson Clark’s battery remained in the vicinity of the Peach Orchard, having been posted there earlier that morning.33
Graham’s right flank, comprised of the the 105th Pennsylvania, ended at the Trostle farm lane [modern United States Avenue]. The lane bisected the Emmitsburg Road between the Wentz and Klingle properties and ran roughly east toward Cemetery Ridge. Sickles set up his headquarters at the Trostle farm, on the north side of the lane roughly halfway between the Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge. Humphreys continued the Third Corps line along the Emmitsburg Road north of the Trostle lane. Since Burling’s brigade had been detached to support Birney, Humphreys had only two brigades remaining (William Brewster and Joseph Carr) totaling about 3,500 men. Humphreys initially placed only Carr’s brigade on the front line, and left Brewster (whose command included Sickles’ old Excelsior Brigade) in reserve. But Carr, who ran his line along the Emmitsburg Road from just south [left] of the Klingle house to several hundred yards south of the Codori farm on his right, also lacked the manpower to cover his entire front. A gap remained between Carr’s left and Graham’s right. Humphreys attempted to correct this by inserting Brewster’s 72nd and 71st New York regiments into the front line. Even worse was the fact that Carr’s right was completely in the air, unconnected with the left flank of Hancock’s Second Corps, which remained securely along Cemetery Ridge slightly less than one mile to the rear (east). Humphreys elected to keep four of Brewster’s regiments (the 70th, 73rd, 74th, and 120th New York) in reserve, leaving this important issue unresolved.34
For all of Dan Sickles’ many faults, he was correct on one key point: the primary Confederate attack would occur on his front. At Chancellorsville, he misread intelligence and assumed an enemy retreat. Now, two months
later at Gettysburg, he again misread intelligence, misinterpreted Meade’s orders, and overestimated the importance of the Emmitsburg Road to convince himself that Lee was massing against the Federal left. This time, Sickles was correct. And by moving forward into the Peach Orchard, he occupied one of the key objectives of the Confederate attack plan.35
Sometime around 3:00 p.m., Longstreet’s two divisions concluded their long countermarch. As Longstreet’s column began approaching Pitzer’s Woods and Warfield Ridge, Longstreet informed Lafayette McLaws: “There is nothing in your front; you will be entirely on the flank of the enemy.” What neither officer knew was that much had changed since Lee and Longstreet developed their plan of attack earlier that morning. “My head of column soon reached the edge of the woods,” McLaws reported, “and the enemy at once opened on it with numerous artillery, and one rapid glance showed them to be in force much greater than I had, and extending considerably beyond my right.” As his long column came online, McLaws rode forward to get “a good look at the situation, and the view presented astonished me, as the enemy was massed in my front, and extended to my right and left as far as I could see.…Thus was presented a state of affairs which was certainly not contemplated when the original plan or order of battle was given, and certainly was not known to General Longstreet a half hour previous.”36
Historians have long wondered where Lee presumed the Union left flank ended. The answer is essential to understanding Lee’s true plan of attack on July 2, 1863, and also helps appreciate the impact of Sickles’ occupation of the Peach Orchard. Unfortunately, Lee and Longstreet provide little guidance on this key question, primarily because their reports contain a murky mixture of information that was known both before and after the fact.
Lee filed three reports on Gettysburg. Each document was more detailed than the last as Lee received additional supporting information from subordinates. Lee’s first version was written from “near Gettysburg” on July 4. It simply says that the enemy “took up a strong position in rear of the town, which he immediately began to fortify, and where his re-enforcements joined him.” Lee’s second report was dated July 31: “The enemy held a high and commanding ridge, along which he had massed a large amount of artillery.…In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge.” Longstreet “was directed to endeavor to carry this position.”37
Lee’s final, and most detailed, report was not submitted until January of 1864. It reads, in part:
The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one southeast and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town, which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied.…It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy’s left, and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy’s left, which he was to drive in. General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy’s center, to prevent re-enforcements being drawn to either wing, and co-operate with his right division in Longstreet’s attack.38
Lee’s July 31 report can be interpreted two ways. He described two distinct Federal lines, one along the Emmitsburg Road “in front of Longstreet” and another line along Cemetery Ridge, “the more elevated ground beyond.” Certainly these two lines existed in the afternoon, after Sickles had moved forward and after Longstreet was finally in position. But except for skirmishers, cavalry, and some artillery, the dual line that Lee described did not exist in the morning, when the attack plan was presumably first formulated. An alternative scenario is that the terrain and poor reconnaissance fooled Lee into thinking that there was one Federal line with the ground “in front of Longstreet” along the Emmitsburg Road being an extension of the “more elevated ground” to the north (i.e. Cemetery Hill). Longstreet’s report, that the enemy had “taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the cemetery along the Emmitsburg road” would seem to support this scenario.39
Lee’s January 1864 report would clearly seem to settle the argument in favor of two Federal lines: “His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied. This ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills above mentioned as forming its northern extremity, and a third at the other end, on which the enemy’s left rested.” But this is clearly a description of Meade’s afternoon line after Sickles’ unauthorized advance. When Lee presumably developed his plan in the morning, it seems unlikely that the terrain could have fooled him into thinking that both the Emmitsburg Road and Little Round Top were occupied. In reality, the Emmitsburg Road was not occupied in force until later, and Captain Johnston’s morning reconnaissance had crossed over an undefended Emmitsburg Road (and he supposedly told Lee that Little Round Top was unoccupied). Thus the 1864 report probably can not be used as a window into Lee’s morning strategy development since it describes Federal positions that did not, and probably could not have appeared to exist, when Lee developed his morning plans.40
Longstreet’s July 27 report, which was dated prior to Lee’s second and third reports, favors a one-line scenario. The enemy “had taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the cemetery along the Emmitsburg road” [emphasis added]. This is also inaccurate, for Meade’s main line never stretched completely from Cemetery Hill along the road. But it seems reasonable that Longstreet’s report represents the best information available to the Confederates at that time (July 27). Viewing the ground today, one can easily see how the terrain might have given the Confederates such a misconception. If one looks east from Seminary Ridge (near the present-day North Carolina monument) toward Cemetery Ridge, the northeast to southwest axis of the Emmitsburg Road angles farther away from Cemetery Ridge as the road runs south. Combined with the rolling terrain, it is difficult to ascertain the distance between the road and Cemetery Ridge as the road passes in front of such landmarks as the Peach Orchard and Little Round Top. Looking from Seminary Ridge, the rolling countryside could have obscured Union troops positioned along southern Cemetery Ridge once the Federal line extended past the Codori farm or the modern Pennsylvania monument. This observation has led many historians to believe that Lee assumed Meade’s line ended on Cemetery Ridge somewhere near the site of the Pennsylvania monument, rather than on the road as Longstreet’s report indicates.41
Neither of Longstreet’s two division commanders, McLaws and Hood, filed a report following the battle. Both omissions are unfortunate. McLaws, however, wrote a detailed letter to his wife on July 7 that sheds some light on his activities:
[On July 2] we moved around Gettysburg towards the Emmitsburg road, to arrive at the Peach orchard, a small settlement with a very large Peach Orchard attached [sic]. The intention was to get in rear of the enemy who were supposed to be stationed principally in rear of Gettysburg or near of it. The report being that the enemy had but two regiments of infantry and one battery at the Peach orchard. On arriving at the vicinity of the Orchard, the enemy were discovered in greater force than was supposed…”42
Of McLaws’ four brigade commanders—Generals Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes, and Wofford—only Kershaw filed a report (Semmes and Barksdale were killed.) According to Kershaw, when his brigade reached the Pitzer schoolhouse near the Millerstown crossroad, Longstreet “directed me to advance my brigade and attack the enemy at that point, turn his flank, and extend along the cross-road [Millerstown], with my left resting toward the Emmitsburg road.”43 Sometime about 3:00 p.m., the head of Kershaw’s column reached Warfield Ridge, giving Kershaw his first view of Sickles’ line:
I found him [the enemy] to be in super
ior force in the orchard, supported by artillery, with a main line of battle intrenched in the rear and extending to and upon the rocky mountain to his left far beyond the point at which his flank had supposed to rest [emphasis added]. To carry out my instructions, would have been, if successful in driving him from the orchard, to present my own right and rear to a large portion of his line of battle.44
McLaws and Kershaw are consistent on two points. They moved to the attack under the misconception that the Federal line did not extend as far south of the town as it in fact did. “The major assumption of this plan was that the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge was short,” explained historian Douglas Southall Freeman. (Freeman was partially correct: the Confederates believed the line to be short, but it is arguable whether they thought it was on Cemetery Ridge.) They also believed the orchard would only be lightly defended, but more Union forces were discovered than expected. Significantly, Sickles had refused Birney’s division line back toward Devil’s Den, rather than ending his line on the Emmitsburg Road, for the very purpose of disrupting a flank attack by Lee up the Emmitsburg Road. Sickles was successful because Kershaw could not execute his orders to turn the Federal flank since it would expose his right and rear to the far left of Sickles’ line.45
Confederate artillery reports are frustratingly brief. In Porter Alexander’s case this brevity is especially surprising given his large volume of postwar analysis.46 The report of Captain Basil C. Manly, commanding Company A of the First North Carolina Artillery, however, explicitly confirms that the Confederates had miscalculated the location of Meade’s left flank and that their desired objective was now held in strong force by Sickles:
James A. Hessler Page 18