James A. Hessler
Page 22
The far right of Hood’s divisional line was held by Evander Law’s Alabama brigade, which pulled away from the Emmitsburg Road as it headed east toward Big Round Top in pursuit of withdrawing U.S. sharpshooters. As Law moved toward the Round Tops, Jerome Robertson’s Texas brigade, on Law’s left, also abandoned the Emmitsburg Road, heading toward Ward’s line on Houck’s Ridge. Law’s sweep around Devil’s Den to the Round Tops demonstrated how easily Sickles’ position could be flanked. Captain James Smith had four of the six rifled Parrotts in his 4th New York battery posted directly on Houck’s Ridge. (His other two pieces were posted behind the ridge facing south to cover the opening into the Plum Run valley between Devil’s Den and Little Round Top.) Smith recalled that his guns “tore gap after gap throughout the ranks of the Confederate foe.” Robertson agreed, reporting that as his brigade advanced through the intervening fields, “for half a mile we were exposed to a heavy and destructive fire of canister, grape, and shell.” The Confederates also had to deal with fire “from the enemy’s sharpshooters… behind the numerous rocks, fences, and houses in the field.” Fighting on the defensive, Sickles’ infantry held an early advantage because Longstreet’s men had to cross largely open ground under fire to engage them.9
Ward’s brigade and Smith’s battery defend Devil’s Den against Hood’s attack (Law, Robertson, and Benning’s brigades.) Several of Law’s and Robertson’s regiments outflank Ward and head toward Little Round Top.
According to General Ward, his men held their fire “until the enemy came within the distance prescribed [200 yards], when the whole command fired a volley. This checked the enemy’s advance suddenly, which gave our men an opportunity to reload, when another volley was fired into them.” Sickles appears to have played no active role during this critical phase, but it was representative of his entire afternoon’s defense as Ward shuffled troops along Houck’s Ridge. All but one company of the 4th Maine moved into the gorge between Devil’s Den and Big Round Top, while Ward’s three right regiments (from right to left: the 99th Pennsylvania, 20th Indiana, and 86th New York) advanced between 50-150 yards to obtain a defensive position along a stone wall on the ridge. On Ward’s right, Birney had also ordered the 17th Maine from Regis de Trobriand’s brigade to enfilade Robertson’s left from behind a low stone wall on the Wheatfield’s southern boundary. The cauldron of fire pinned Robertson’s men down, and the colonel of his 1st Texas blamed it on “the failure of the troops that were assigned to the position on the left of this (Robertson’s) brigade to arrive promptly.” General Robertson sent a courier to General Hood (who by this time had been wounded and carried from the field) to complain that “General McLaws’ forces were not engaging the enemy to my left (which enabled him to move fresh troops from that part of his line down on me), and that I must have re-enforcements.”10
In the face of this heavy fire, Robertson’s right slowly pressed forward until the terrain finally began to work to their advantage. When Robertson’s men reached the stone wall at the base of the so-called “Triangular Field” below Houck’s Ridge’s western slope, Smith could no longer depress his guns sufficiently to hit the Rebels. Occupying the low ground and using boulders for cover, the Confederates began to pick off Smith’s gunners. Smith “saw it would be impossible… to hold my position without assistance” and fell back, effectively silencing the four ridge top guns for the remainder of the day. Smith ran “with all the speed in me” back into the Plum Run valley to put his two remaining rear guns into service, but the loss of artillery support was the beginning of the collapse of Sickles’ left flank.11
The battle for Houck’s Ridge dissolved into a series of chaotic attacks and counter-attacks. The 1st Texas regiment advanced toward the center of Ward’s line until it was pushed back by a charge from the 124th New York. The Texans reformed and fired a volley into the New Yorkers, “which seemed in an instant to bring down a full quarter” of the regiment. The 44th Alabama from Law’s brigade reached the field and helped drive the New Yorkers back up the ridge. In the words of their commander, the Alabamians perceived “that the enemy were giving way [and] sprang forward over the rocks, swept the position, and took possession of the heights” along with Smith’s abandoned guns. The 1st Texas charged in their wake and momentarily left the Confederates in command of Houck’s Ridge until a Federal counterattack by three of Ward’s regiments shoved the Confederates back and briefly recaptured the crest. By this time Smith was working his two remaining guns in the Plum Run valley, “firing obliquely through the gully, doing good execution” against Confederate attempts to work their way into the gorge.12
If Longstreet’s attack was intended to be a progressive en echelon assault, the strategy had thus far served the Confederates poorly. The rough and rocky terrain hampered coordination between Hood’s regiments and thrusts had repeatedly stalled as units advanced without support on their flanks. Excluding Gettysburg, Longstreet’s offensive record suggests he preferred powerful concentrated attacks. At Second Manassas in August 1862, his massive attack swept everything before it and drove the Union army from the field. Two months after Gettysburg at Chickamauga in September 1863, Longstreet enjoyed perhaps his greatest success when he deployed eight brigades into a deep assault column and attacked a narrow segment of the Union front. By attacking in depth, one brigade behind another, he dented the enemy’s line with the first wave and drove through with succeeding waves. Sickles’ extended front, however, coupled with the difficult terrain, did not offer an opportunity for Longstreet to stack Hood’s and McLaws’ eight brigades into a narrow column. Instead, Longstreet settled for an attack depth of just two brigades. At first glance this strategy appears to have worked well at Devil’s Den. The successful capture of that rocky eminence by Longstreet’s “second line,” however, was almost entirely accidental.13
Henry Benning’s brigade was intended to support Law’s brigade during its advance from Warfield Ridge. During the advance Benning could see Robertson’s line “about 400 yards in our front” but mistook the men as Law’s brigade. If Benning had been behind Law, he would have supported Law’s assault on Little Round Top. But Benning could see that the troops ahead of him “would not be able alone to carry” Houck’s Ridge, “so I advanced without halting.” Ward’s Federal line had been depleted by the afternoon’s hostilities and was stretched dangerously thin, a common side effect of Sickles’ extended front. Benning added some 1,400 comparatively fresh Georgians to the Confederate side of the ledger, and his 15th and 20th Georgia united with Robertson’s 1st Texas to sweep onto the ridge and finally overwhelm Ward’s exhausted brigade. Ward, “with a bullet hole through his hat,” withdrew his regiments off Houck’s Ridge from right to left. Although there were no substantial reinforcements in sight, some posited that Ward believed he was being officially relieved by men from the Second and Fifth corps, a commonly held misconception in Sickles’ Third Corps that afternoon.14
View of Little Round Top, circa 1890s, looking east across Plum Run Valley from Devil’s Den. Sue Boardman
General Birney had earlier detached the 6th New Jersey from Burling’s brigade and the 40th New York from Regis de Trobriand’s brigade into the Plum Run valley “to cover the gorge” against Confederate attempts to flank Devil’s Den. The effort is tactically illustrative of Birney’s successive attempts to patch up his divisional line. The two regiments fought gamely in support of Smith’s two guns in the valley, but Ward’s retreat from Houck’s Ridge forced the regiments and Captain Smith to also fall back. Although Smith was able to carry his two rear guns off the field, he was bitter about the three that had been captured on Houck’s Ridge. Despite the frustration and embarrassment of his battery’s capture, Smith still thought Sickles’ actions had been for the best. When he published his battery history in 1892, Smith “noticed that those who shed their blood, or who fought in the ranks of this gallant and well-tried old Corps, on the advanced line, have found no fault with their Corps Commander. They know that they were never
ordered forward while he remained in the rear.”15
Sickles had moved his Third Corps forward because he feared that his left would be out-flanked if he remained on Cemetery Ridge. If that was a primary reason for the move, the battle along Houck’s Ridge proved that the advance did not cure this defect. Ward’s brigade, with modest reinforcements by Birney, had been overrun by portions of three of Hood’s brigades. Subtracting for regiments that were detached elsewhere on Sickles’ line, Ward began the battle with approximately 1,650 men, while Birney’s reinforcements from the 40th New York and 6th New Jersey added another 640 Union troops. The four Confederate regiments from Law and Robertson’s brigades that initially hit Ward also totaled about 1,650 men, and Benning added another 1,400 men to the Confederate total. In sum, the Confederate infantry outmanned the Federals defending the Devil’s Den area by about 3,000 to 2,300. The Federals, however, had the added weight of Smith’s battery and were defending a rugged and elevated position. The Confederates’ numeric advantage was real, but it did not exceed the 3:1 odds (or even 2:1 odds) often needed to capture a position during the Civil War. Despite difficult terrain and a stubborn Federal defensive effort, Longstreet’s men collapsed Sickles’ left flank. Fortunately for the Union cause, by the time Benning commanded Devil’s Den it was no longer the left flank of Meade’s army. While the Third Corps was defending its line, Union reinforcements were racing to occupy the high rocky hill 500 yards east of Devil’s Den, where Meade had intended his left flank to be all along.16
To a generation of Gettysburg students who grew up on the novel The Killer Angels and the motion picture Gettysburg, the Union defense of Gettysburg’s second day is the story of Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th Maine saving Little Round Top. Sickles and George Meade, by way of contrast, are mere footnotes to the high drama. Colonel Strong Vincent’s Fifth Corps brigade, of which Chamberlain’s 20th Maine belonged, performed heroic service for the Union cause that day, but the full story is more complex than the actions of a single brigade or a single regiment from Maine.
Major General George Sykes assumed command of the Fifth Corps when Meade was elevated to army command on June 28, 1863. Sykes arrived at Gettysburg “about 8 a.m.” on July 2 and took position in support of Slocum’s Twelfth Corps on the right of the Union line. “While thus situated, I was directed to support the Third Corps, General Sickles commanding, with a brigade, should it be required.” Sykes apparently intended to use Brigadier General Stephen Weed’s brigade for this purpose. Unfortunately, Sykes’ report does not indicate the time he received these directions to support the Third Corps, but his morning deployment near Rock Creek is consistent with the idea that the army’s reserve would be needed to support activity on the Union right. Sykes also reported that while he “and other corps commanders were conversing” with Meade at the quickly aborted 3:00 p.m. meeting, “the enemy formed, opened the battle, and developed his attack on our left. I was at once ordered to throw my whole corps to that point and hold it at all hazards.” Although Meade ignored the afternoon meeting in his report, he did confirm that upon the Sixth Corps’ afternoon arrival, “I immediately directed the Fifth Corps to move over to our extreme left, and the Sixth to occupy its place as a reserve for the right.”17
David Birney claimed in his report that Sickles had promised Fifth Corps support at the time his division was ordered forward. “He [Sickles] also informed me that a division from the Second and one from the Fifth Corps had been ordered to be in readiness to support me.” If this is accurate, then Birney was probably referring to the lone brigade (not division) that Sykes referenced in his report. Birney reported that he was not fully in position until 3:30 p.m. when he “immediately sent an aide to Major-General Sykes asking for the division promised to support my left.” Although Birney was not happy with the overall support rendered by the Fifth Corps, he did acknowledge that at least “Major-General Sykes reached my left opportunely, and protected that flank.” Sickles’ aide Henry Tremain made a similar claim in his memoirs. After the Peach Orchard conference between Sickles and Meade, Sickles sent Captain Moore of his staff to urge the Fifth Corps into position. Tremain commented acidly that “nobody had yet reported their presence in the battle.”18
Tensions between the Third and Fifth corps had already surfaced by the time Sykes penned his Gettysburg report on the last day of July. Meade’s order that the Fifth Corps bolster the Union left, Sykes took pains to note, “of course, relieved my troops from any call from the commander of the Third Corps. En route to the position thus assigned the Fifth Corps, various staff officers from General Sickles met me, and, in the name of that officer, asked for assistance. I explained to them that it was impossible for me to give it; the key-of the battle-field was entrusted to my keeping, and I could not and would not jeopardize it by a division of my forces.”19
As noted earlier, when Gouverneur Warren reached Little Round Top and spied Longstreet’s approaching battle lines, he dispatched two requests for reinforcements. One message was addressed directly to Meade, and the other to Sickles. Lt. Ranald Mackenzie delivered the message to Sickles. Both Mackenzie and Sickles later agreed that Sickles declined Warren’s request. “I have none to spare,” was how Sickles framed his response, “needing every man, and more, on my front. I advise[d] him to send to the Fifth Corps, already on the march toward us.” On at least one occasion, Sickles told a postwar audience that he personally sent Weed’s Fifth Corps brigade to Warren on Little Round Top “just in time.” Although he had left the hill unoccupied, Sickles’ tale rearranged the facts to show that he had somehow managed to save it. The fact that he would often lie following the battle about his role indicates that even he must have realized his blunder in leaving Little Round Top empty.20
After Sickles declined Warren’s request, Mackenzie rode to locate Sykes near the Wheatfield. Sykes was reconnoitering the terrain while an aide guided his Fifth Corps toward the field. Perhaps Mackenzie sought out Sykes on Sickles’ suggestion, as Sickles would have us believe. Regardless, Sykes agreed on the necessity of occupying Little Round Top and sent an aide toward Brigadier General James Barnes, the 61-year-old commander of the First Division of Fifth Corps, with orders to send reinforcements.21
Today, Barnes’ role at Gettysburg is best remembered through the successful defense of Little Round Top by Barnes’ Third Brigade under Colonel Strong Vincent. But the performance of Barnes’ other two brigades, Colonel William Tilton’s small First Brigade of approximately 655 men and Colonel Jacob Sweitzer’s Second Brigade of 1,010 effectives, became lightning rods for some of Gettysburg’s (and Sickles’) most memorable post-battle criticism. Barnes’ division had been moving from Rock Creek toward the “left and front” with Strong Vincent’s brigade in the lead. Colonel Vincent had temporarily halted on Cemetery Ridge; theories vary on exactly where, when (as tradition has it) he intercepted the message from Sykes to Barnes. Vincent demanded to know the message’s contents and immediately understanding the risks associated with allowing the Confederates to occupy the highest defensible point on the Union left, promised to lead his regiments to “yonder hill.” Barnes’ report differed considerably with this accepted version. Barnes said that he and Sykes were together reconnoitering the field when Warren personally delivered the request, and it was Barnes himself who detached Vincent. Vincent’s standard-bearer, Oliver Wilcox Norton, later wrote a classic history of Little Round Top that perpetuated the Vincent-as-decision-maker scenario. According to Norton, Barnes’ report was “pure fiction.” Whether accurate, inaccurate, or something in between, history has preferred Norton’s version over Barnes’. However the order was delivered, Strong Vincent, Joshua Chamberlain, and the rest of the brigade marched off to meet their destiny on Little Round Top.22
Following the war, Evander Law blamed the Confederate defeat on the notion that General Lee “made his attack precisely where his enemy wanted him to make it and was most fully prepared to receive it.” Certainly as far as Little Round Top was concer
ned, this thesis was entirely inaccurate. Thanks to Sickles’ movement, Little Round Top was occupied by Vincent’s brigade only minutes before the first Confederate infantry arrived. Vincent posted his line from left to right as follows: 20th Maine, 83rd Pennsylvania, 44th New York, and 16th Michigan along Little Round Top’s western and southern slopes and threw out skirmishers. Colonel James Rice of the 44th New York, who later took command of the brigade after Vincent was mortally wounded, reported that the brigade “had scarcely formed line of battle and pushed forward its skirmishers when a division of the enemy’s forces, under General Hood, made a desperate attack along the entire line of the brigade.” Vincent’s successful defense of Little Round Top against portions of Law and Robertson’s brigades is best remembered for Chamberlain’s face-off with William Oates’ 15th Alabama on the far left of the Federal line. Partially due to the collapse of Sickles’ line on Houck’s Ridge and the retreat of his support in the Plum Run valley, the attacking Confederate left also extended beyond Vincent’s right, causing the 16th Michigan’s position to collapse and its men began to flee uphill toward the summit. It was while trying to rally his breaking line that Vincent was mortally wounded by a Confederate ball and died a few days later.23
Meanwhile, according to Third Corps staff officer Captain Alexander Moore, Sickles ordered him (pursuant to the belief that Sickles was empowered to draw upon the Fifth Corps) to “return to General Sykes and bring up a brigade immediately.” Moore reached General Sykes’ headquarters but found him absent. Sykes’ adjutant had authority to detach a brigade from Brigadier General Romeyn Ayres’ Second Division and Moore quickly led Brigadier General Stephen Weed’s brigade toward Birney’s embattled line. As Weed’s brigade marched from its position east of Little Round Top, crossing the Taneytown Road and heading toward the front, Moore and Weed rode ahead to meet with Sickles at the Trostle farm headquarters. What words transpired between Sickles and Weed is unclear, but a signal officer also arrived from Little Round Top and told Sickles (as if he was possibly still unaware of the fact) “that the enemy was advancing in great force, with the evident design of carrying that position, thus flanking General Birney’s lines.” Sickles directed Moore again “to go for further reenforcements from the Fifth Corps.”24