James A. Hessler
Page 25
Tremain and Favill’s accounts are so radically different that they are impossible to reconcile. Tremain’s memoirs have a tendency to place himself in the middle of momentous occasions, and the Zook episode is no different. If Favill’s story is accurate (and Zook had time to ride to Third Corps headquarters and then return to his command), why didn’t Zook use that time to try and locate General Caldwell, his own commanding officer? Whichever version is correct, Birney’s report confirmed that it was Tremain who guided Zook’s brigade into battle. “Major Tremain … soon appeared with a brigade of the Second Corps, which behaved most handsomely, and, leading them forward, it soon restored the center of my line, and we drove the enemy from that point.”25
As Zook’s column moved through Trostle’s Woods toward the Wheatfield, it passed Tilton and Sweitzer’s brigades reforming there after their retreat from Stony Hill. Given the noise, smoke, flying projectiles and general chaos, it would not have been unusual if Barnes’ men temporarily slowed Zook’s progress. Instead, as will be discussed later, Zook’s passage through Trostle’s Woods created a memorable post-battle opportunity to heap more insults on Barnes’ division. However, the official reports filed from Zook’s regiments indicate only that the brigade moved rapidly forward and that nothing unusual occurred.26
According to Lieutenant Favill, once the brigade arrived near the Wheatfield it advanced in two lines and, “shortly received a tremendous fire from the front … the tumult became deafening … no word of command could be heard, and little could be seen but long lines of flame, and smoke and struggling masses of men.” The brigade advanced several hundred yards at a run and was in what a New York major called “a deplorable state of confusion; men from every regiment in the division were intermingled with ours in one confused mass.” Zook’s men may have looked like “one confused mass,” but Colonel de Trobriand cheered the brigadier’s performance: “They did not lie down behind us [emphasis in original].” General Zook fell with a wound in his stomach while leading his men and died on the next afternoon. His death prevented him from answering post-battle questions regarding how his brigade entered the battle, or the behavior of Tilton and Sweitzer’s men as he passed them en route to the front.27
Colonel John Brooke of Caldwell’s Fourth Brigade took over, and with Zook’s brigade on his right drove the Confederates out of the Wheatfield. “It was evident to me,” Colonel Brooke later wrote, “sometime before our division was sent to that part of the field that the 3d Corps was being worsted in the fight.” Brooke’s brigade splashed across the western branch of Plum Run, climbed the bluff on the creek’s western bank and halted near the Rose woods fronting the Rose farm buildings. Although Brooke’s counterattack appeared successful, he had outrun any possible support, and remnants from G. T. Anderson’s, Kershaw’s, and Paul Semmes’ brigades prevented any further movement to his front. The Confederates opened a “withering fire” against Brooke’s men, who planted their colors on the crest and returned it. Although it looked for a time as if Zook’s and Kelly’s brigades were about to secure Stony Hill, Zook’s right was unsupported. The Stony Hill position would again become untenable if the Confederates took control of the Wheatfield Road.28
After some of the hardest fighting of the war, the Federals held, albeit tenuously, the Wheatfield and Stony Hill. Fewer than 1,300 men from the Third Corps had defended the field. Regis de Trobriand had started with 955 men (excluding the detached 40th New York), and was supported by another 321 from Burling’s 8th New Jersey and 115th Pennsylvania. Ignoring the Fifth Corps’ minimal assistance, it had taken the addition of Caldwell’s 3,200 bodies (a whopping 246% increase in manpower) to clear Anderson, Kershaw, and Semmes. Of the three zones (Devil’s Den, the Wheatfield, and the Peach Orchard) occupied by Birney’s division of slightly fewer than 5,100 men, the Wheatfield was strategically the least important of the three, yet it took the equivalent of 63% of Birney’s total manpower (in the form of Caldwell’s division) to temporarily drive the Confederates out of the field. The fighting in the Wheatfield offers additional proof that Sickles lacked adequate strength to defend his position.29
For all the faults inherent in Sickles’ position, Longstreet had thus far made little progress in driving in the Federal left. His attack was degenerating into a series of uncoordinated frontal assaults across open fields, under both Federal artillery fire and a broiling sun, while many of his subordinate commanders complained about a lack of support. In exchange for heavy casualties in the fighting for Devil’s Den and the Wheatfield, Longstreet had captured ground that offered the Confederates little in the way of tactical value. Sickles’ line had effectively acted as a “buffer,” but Sickles and the reinforcements sent to support him had suffered their own heavy losses in the process. The extended Third Corps line forced Meade to haphazardly juggle troop dispositions, which left holes on Cemetery Ridge when organizations such as Caldwell’s division were yanked out of line. Thanks in large part to Sickles, and with help from Longstreet’s execution of the attack, the situation was proving to be a bloody mess on both sides.30
Although the Federals were in command of the Wheatfield, events unfolding at the Peach Orchard would once again threaten Meade’s Cemetery Ridge line.
Chapter 11
The Line Before You Must Be Broken
West of the Peach Orchard and Sherfy farm, Federal artillery shells continued bursting around Lafayette McLaws’ waiting infantry. Being targets of enemy artillery produced a “natural feeling of uneasiness” among the men. An impatient General Barksdale harassed both McLaws and Longstreet, “I wish you would let me go in, General.” Longstreet never fully explained how he timed his order for Barksdale’s advance, nor did he specify why he allowed Kershaw to attack without Barksdale’s support. In his memoirs, Longstreet implied that the delay was due to McLaws’ “caution to hold his ranks closed.” McLaws, however, claimed the delays were due to the confusion caused by the artillery that Longstreet had placed in his front. Whatever the cause, Colonel Alexander (while neglecting analysis of his own shortcomings) complained about the committing of “four partial attacks of two brigades each [in Hood and McLaws’ divisions], requiring at least an hour and a half to be gotten into action; where one advance by the eight brigades would have won a quicker victory with far less loss.”1
Once Longstreet finally gave the order, Barksdale called his regimental commanders together. “The line before you must be broken—to do so let every officer and man animate his comrades by his personal presence in the front line.” It was probably near 6:00 p.m. when the 1,400 Mississippians let loose with the Rebel yell and sprang forward. The brigade formed with the 21st Mississippi on the right, followed by the 17th, 13th, and finally the 18th on the left. Barksdale remained mounted and rode in front of the 13th Mississippi, his hat off and the remnants of his long thin white hair flowing freely. When the brigade front cleared Pitzer’s Woods, the order was given “Double-quick, charge!” Heavy Federal artillery fire, admitted a member of the 17th Mississippi, “knock[ed] great gaps in our line. Then we would fill up the gaps and move on.” One witness remembered that Barksdale “threw forward his Mississippians in an unbroken line in the most magnificent charge I witnessed during the war.” To Sickles’ troops in the Peach Orchard there was little to consider “grand” or “magnificent” about Barksdale’s charge. It was simply one more assault against their exposed salient position.2
Barksdale advanced along a front approximately 350 yards wide. His three Mississippi regiments on the left moved north of the Wheatfield Road heading toward the Sherfy farm buildings. South of the road, Colonel Benjamin G. Humphreys directed his 21st Mississippi toward the Sherfy Peach Orchard and the 68th Pennsylvania’s front. Like Kershaw’s South Carolinians before them, the Mississippians rushed forward unsupported on either flank. However, the advanced salient of the Peach Orchard gave Barksdale less ground to cover than Kershaw, leaving the Federal artillery with less time to break up the attacking formations. By essen
tially hitting the Federal line head-on at the orchard, Barksdale did not present an exposed left flank to the Federal artillery as both G. T. Anderson and Kershaw had done before him. Barksdale’s was basically a frontal assault.3
The 63rd Pennsylvania in Graham’s brigade was probably withdrawn from the Federal skirmish line west of the Peach Orchard during Kershaw’s earlier attack. It is not clear which, if any, unit replaced the Pennsylvanians (the 5th New Jersey most likely did so), but the lack of Federal skirmishers must have emboldened Barksdale’s Mississippians to think they were truly sweeping everything before them. Lieutenant John Bucklyn’s Battery E, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, and two guns from Captain James Thompson’s Pennsylvania Light Batteries C and F fronted west between the Wheatfield Road and Trostle Lane. With Barksdale’s three left regiments approaching them, the artillerymen were getting understandably skittish. Captain Randolph took the liberty of ordering the 114th Pennsylvania to advance and save Bucklyn’s battery. The Pennsylvanians charged across the Emmitsburg Road while Bucklyn limbered up and moved to the rear. “My battery is torn and my brave boys have gone, never to return,” lamented Bucklyn, who was wounded when case shot sliced through his shoulder during the withdrawal. “Curse the rebels.” Bucklyn’s battery had the unwelcome distinction of suffering the highest losses out of any Third Corps battery: thirty casualties out of a strength of 108 (27.8%) and forty horses lost.4
With Barksdale’s Mississippians approaching, Captain Randolph ordered the 57th Pennsylvania, another of Graham’s regiments, to also advance across the Emmitsburg Road. The 57th did as ordered, taking advantage of the cover afforded by the Sherfy buildings and trees. Once in position, the Pennsylvanians opened fire. A detail of fifteen men from the 57th entered Sherfy’s house and fired at Barksdale from its west windows. Captain Edward Bowen remembered “the enemy advancing in force” and ordered the 114th’s right wing to advance to the rear of the Sherfy house. Bowen attempted to form a line with the 57th. “I was but partially successful,” he recalled, “as the enemy had already advanced so quickly and in such force as to gain the road.” A sharp but brief firefight ensued between the Pennsylvania and Mississippi regiments. Barksdale’s 13th and 17th Mississippi reached a rail fence about 100 yards away and poured “a murderous fire” against the 114th’s flank, throwing “the left wing of the regiment on to the right in much confusion.” Seeing their front blocked by the 57th, a third Pennsylvania regiment, the 105th Wild Cats, charged across the road and took position on the 57th’s right. “Having gained this position,” wrote the 105th’s Colonel Calvin Craig, “the fire from the enemy being very severe, we immediately opened fire.”5
Barksdale’s brigade attacks Graham’s brigade at the Peach Orchard. The 68th Pennsylvania withdraws and creates a gap in Graham’s line. Third Corps batteries at the Peach Orchard and along the Emmitsburg Road begin to fall back under pressure.
While Barksdale’s left faced temporary resistance near the Sherfy buildings, his right regiment, Colonel Humphreys’ 21st Mississippi, continued moving toward the Peach Orchard and Colonel Andrew Tippin’s waiting 68th Pennsylvania. Tippin’s regiment fronted west along the Emmitsburg Road, with the 2nd New Hampshire in its left rear and fronted south. Since these two regiments formed a right angle, they were truly the salient in Sickles’ line. Tippin ordered his men to hold their fire until the Mississippians stepped into killing range. When they did, “a destructive fire was opened, the enemy halting and dropping behind a fence.” The 21st Mississippi paused at the fence and probably waited for the 17th Mississippi to close up on its left. An alarmed Tippin watched while what looked to him to be “re-enforcements” joined the approaching enemy. “[With] heavy masses of his infantry coming down on our right, I ordered my command to fall back to the position in the rear of the batteries, which was done in good order.” Colonel Tippin’s decision to fall back not only encouraged the 21st Mississippi (to Colonel Humphreys it appeared he had “broke[en] the first line”) but exposed the right flank of the 2nd New Hampshire and the other regiments still holding the Peach Orchard. Tippin’s withdrawal had inadvertently opened Sickles’ salient. The approach of the strong line of battle (both the 21st and 17th Mississippi) had spooked the colonel; veterans later remembered that heat, fatigue, and the demoralizing impact of enemy artillery also played a factor in his decision.6
Whether or not Tippin’s retreat was justified, the incredulous men of the 2nd New Hampshire knew their exposed right was now in serious trouble. According to the 2nd’s regimental history, the 68th “withdrew up the slope before the impact came [emphasis added], and immediately after, the 3rd Maine also fell back.” The 3rd Maine was on the 2nd New Hampshire’s left, and although there were accusations that the Maine regiment prematurely evacuated, they had already had a particularly long day that began with helping Berdan’s sharpshooters flush Cadmus Wilcox’s rebels out of Pitzer’s Woods. Colonel Moses Lakeman reported that he “saw a large force marching round to cut me off, and ordered my regiment to retire, and while doing so we received a most distressing fire, which threw my command into much confusion, and mixing them up with a portion of the First Brigade, which was also falling back.” The 141st Pennsylvania was on the left of the recently departed 3rd Maine. Colonel Henry Madill complained that the regiments on both sides of him, along with the surrounding artillery, abandoned him, and “I found myself alone, with a small regiment of about 180 men.” On Madill’s left, the 3rd Michigan also found its flanks threatened and joined the mass exodus from the Peach Orchard. With Union infantry support crumbling, Captain James Thompson’s artillery also pulled out. If Watson’s Battery I, 5th U.S. Artillery ever actually reached the Peach Orchard, then they too probably also retreated at this time. 7
Earlier, between 5:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., General Graham had made an appeal to Sickles for reinforcements. Henry Tremain bore the message to Sickles at his Trostle farm headquarters. (According to Tremain, this occurred prior to his leading Zook’s brigade to the Wheatfield.) Sickles directed Tremain to find General Humphreys, with a request to detach one regiment. Things had been relatively quiet along Humphreys’ Second Division front. Humphreys had already cannibalized much of Burling’s Third Brigade to support Birney, but he apparently had little time to chew on this latest request. At that moment, Humphreys received word that the enemy was driving in his pickets and was advancing in two lines. Despite his pending problems, Humphreys dispatched one of Sickles’ former Excelsior regiments, the 73rd New York, to Graham’s support. “[A]t the same time” Humphreys ordered an aide to find General Hancock, “with the request that he would send a brigade, if possible, to my support.” Around 5:30 p.m., Tremain personally led the 73rd into its new position, placing the regiment “in line of battle facing the highway,” near the location of the present-day regimental monument. Unsure whether the regiment should stay there, Tremain rode to find Graham and ask for orders. Graham told Tremain to leave the regiment where it was. As Tremain departed for Sickles’ headquarters, Graham shouted to his friend, “We’re giving them hell!” Unfortunately for the men of the 73rd, recalled Tremain, “The regiment, it seems, was driven from this position shortly after I had posted it.”8
The 73rd’s Captain Frank Moran wrote that “we were hurried at double-quick to a point directly in rear of the [Sherfy] barn where the 114th Pennsylvania (Collis Zouaves) though fearfully exposed on that deadly crest, were bravely disputing the ground with the Mississippi Brigade.” Barksdale’s men “came swarming up the slope, yelling like devils.” The 73rd apparently took an early volley, but for “a few impatient minutes, our regiments were unable to return a shot.” The 114th was unfortunately still in its front west of the Emmitsburg Road, “about forty yards ahead of us, so that it was impossible to fire upon the enemy without shooting our friends in the back altogether, we stood in a shower of bullets from front and a merciless storm of bursting shells from Longstreet’s batteries on our left.”9
While Barksdale’s right rolled into
the Peach Orchard, his left regiments began driving Federal opposition out of the Sherfy buildings. A “murderous fire” threw the left flank of the 114th Pennsylvania into “much confusion.” Captain Bowen noted that the enemy was “already on our left and in our rear” as the Federal regiments on his left had been “swept away.” Concerned about being surrounded, Bowen poured one last volley into Barksdale’s Mississippians before attempting to rally the 114th across the Emmitsburg Road, “but could not succeed in doing so.” Barksdale was “advancing so rapidly and my men falling in such numbers as to prevent my succeeding in doing so. I succeeded, however, in rallying a number around the colors, and brought them off.” Of the 114th’s numerous wounded who had been left behind on the field, some sought refuge in Sherfy’s barn, a decision that was later to have tragic consequences.10
The retreat of the 114th exposed the left flank of the 57th Pennsylvania. Sergeant E. C. Strouss, posted near one of Sherfy’s large cherry trees on the north side of the house, “learned that the enemy had broken through the angle at the peach orchard, and were swarming up the road in our rear. It was evident that if we remained at the house, we would all be captured, so we were obliged to fall back.” A squad from the 57th continued shooting at the Confederates from inside the Sherfy buildings, with some in “an old cellar” that might have been the foundation of an earlier structure. Determined to retrieve the men from inside the Sherfy buildings before the regiment retired, Captain Alanson Nelson and a handful of others raced into the house, where the noise was so deafening that he had to shout directly in the men’s ears. “I ran up the stairs and from one room to the other, and started them to the rear as fast as I could get them to understand what I wanted of them. I then started downstairs to notify those in the lower part of the house.” Nelson looked out a window toward “the left, where the enemy first broke through our lines” and was horrified to see the Confederates advancing through the yard less than fifty feet away. The Rebels ordered him to surrender, but he outran his would-be captors, jumped the fence surrounding Sherfy’s yard, and raced toward the remainder of the regiment. Not everyone was so lucky or fleet-footed. Sergeant Strouss lamented that they could not make many of the men “understand the situation,” and more than fifty fell into the hands of Barksdale’s Mississippians.11