James A. Hessler
Page 31
By July 5, it is arguable whether Sickles had the opportunity to develop a sophisticated counterattack against Meade. His very survival was still in doubt, and that would have been of more immediate concern to him. His later battle against Meade would be primarily fueled by Meade’s refusal to return him to command, coupled with critical battle reports penned by Meade and Henry Halleck. However, these events had not occurred yet. Sickles’ tactic would center around the supposition that Meade had wanted to retreat from Gettysburg, which Sickles would later claim he learned from Butterfield on the morning of July 2. Since Sickles was grievously wounded and removed from the battlefield only hours later, and Butterfield himself was wounded the following day, it is unlikely the two men had the opportunity by July 5 to develop an extensive assassination of Meade’s reputation. Sickles’ physical condition, coupled with the amount of time he had spent traveling to Washington, makes this unlikely. Sickles instead probably presented Lincoln with a general portrait that he had fought aggressively and that Meade had paid minimal attention to the critical left flank until it was nearly too late. If so, neither statement was completely inaccurate.
The historical importance of the topic lies in the fact that Sickles has been blamed by some for poisoning the Lincoln-Meade relationship. Some have even written that it was Sickles’ “planting the seed” that caused Lincoln to sap Meade’s confidence and that, by extension, Sickles adversely affected Meade’s performance for the remainder of the campaign. A reading of the historical record indicates that, although Sickles may indeed have “planted the seed” with Lincoln, there were a number of other reasons why Lincoln became dissatisfied with Meade.11
On July 4, Meade issued General Order No. 68 congratulating the army on its Gettysburg victory. He added, “Our task is not yet accomplished, and the commanding general looks to the army for greater efforts to drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader.” Although Meade had included the qualifier, “Our task is not yet accomplished,” when Lincoln read the announcement he famously exclaimed, “Drive the invaders from our soil! My God! Is that all?” and “Will our generals never get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil!” Subsequent dispatches from Generals French and Pleasonton added to Lincoln’s impression that the Army of the Potomac was failing to aggressively block Lee’s retreat: “These things all appear to me to be connected with a purpose to cover Baltimore and Washington, and to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision, and they do not appear connected with a purpose to prevent his crossing and to destroy him.” Whether Lincoln’s impression was justified or not, and ironic since he previously considered covering Washington and Baltimore a major priority, the fact is that the army’s own actions helped “plant the seed” in Lincoln’s mind.12
Meade was still unsure of Lee’s intentions, and delaying actions by Lee’s rearguard slowed Meade’s own movements out of Gettysburg. On the night of July 4, Meade called another war council with his generals and, as he had done two days earlier, posed a series of questions, including “Shall we pursue the enemy if he is retreating on his direct line of retreat?” The majority agreed to stay put until Lee’s intentions were ascertained, and then to pursue primarily with cavalry. (David Birney represented the Third Corps again and voted against the pursuit question.) Brigadier General Herman Haupt, who had been working on the railroad logistics necessary to supply Meade’s army, arrived on July 5. Haupt came away from the visit believing that Meade was unduly resting the army while Lee was being allowed to escape. Haupt wasted little time heading to Washington to tell Lincoln that Meade was moving slowly, and that Lee’s army could be damaged if only Meade would act more forcefully.13
Sickles’ critics have sometimes suggested that proof of his poison can be found in the dispatches that passed between Meade and Washington following Sickles’ July 5 meeting with Lincoln. Presumably, the increased pressure that was being placed on Meade to bring Lee to battle north of the Potomac River was at least partially the result of Sickles’ criticism of Meade. In fact, despite the Sickles meeting, General Order 68, and General Haupt’s worries, surviving correspondence contains the same mixed bag that usually passed between Lincoln/Halleck and the Army of the Potomac’s commander. What must be understood is that Lincoln believed there was no better opportunity to destroy Lee’s army than to catch it while wounded and still above the Potomac River. Whether this desire was realistic or not was irrelevant, because whoever commanded the army would have had to deal with Lincoln’s pressure to bring about a climatic victory on Northern soil—particularly following General George McClellan’s earlier failure to finish the Army of Northern Virginia during the 1862 Maryland campaign. Sickles might have helped reinforce this perception in Lincoln’s mind, but to suggest that he created it is an exaggeration.14
On July 7, Halleck wired that Meade had been promoted to brigadier general in the Regular Army “to rank from July 3, the date of your brilliant victory at Gettysburg.” But later that evening, Washington began to pressure Meade once again. At 8:45 p.m., Halleck told Meade to give the enemy another “stunning blow … before he can reach the Potomac.… There is strong evidence that he is short of artillery ammunition, and, if vigorously pressed, he must suffer.” Halleck passed along a message from Lincoln. Vicksburg had surrendered to General Grant, and “if General Meade can complete his work, so gloriously prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee’s army, the rebellion will be over.”15
The following day, July 8, Meade tried to temper Halleck’s expectations. “I expect to find the enemy in a strong position, well covered with artillery, and I do not desire to imitate his example at Gettysburg, and assault a position where the chances were so greatly against success. I wish in advance to moderate the expectations of those who, in ignorance of the difficulties to be encountered, may expect too much.” Halleck responded promptly: “The opportunity to attack his divided forces should not be lost. The President is urgent and anxious that your army should move against him by forced marches.” Tempers cooled slightly over the next few days. Halleck cautioned, “Do not be influenced by any dispatch from here against your own judgment. Regard them as suggestions only.” On July 10, Halleck suggested that Meade withhold from further combat until additional reinforcements reached the army. The communications between July 8 and July 12 are alternatively supportive and critical. If Sickles was sinisterly manipulating events in the background, as some believe, then his influence is not reflected in the official records.16
In fact, contrary to popular widespread belief, Meade’s army did initiate a pursuit that brought about nearly two dozen skirmishes and small battles in the days following Gettysburg. The action began at Fairfield Gap, Monterey Gap, and Emmitsburg on July 4, and continued through July 12 at Ashby’s Gap. The heaviest fighting occurred at Hagerstown on July 6, where the Federals reported 263 casualties and Confederate losses were probably comparable. In total, through the final action at Williamsport on July 14, the Army of the Potomac reported an additional 1, 004 casualties. Meade did indeed pursue Lee, but not in enough force or enthusiasm to prevent Lee from reaching the Potomac.17
Meade received one piece of good news during this period when Andrew Humphreys agreed on July 8 to replace Butterfield as chief of staff. Humphreys was bitter about the way in which his division was used during the battle. “Had my division been left intact, I should have driven the enemy back, but this ruinous habit (it don’t deserve the name of system) of putting troops in position and then drawing off its reserves and second line to help others, who if similarly disposed would need no such help, is disgusting.” His brief tenure under Sickles had soured the ambitious Humphreys. “[M]y mortification at seeing men over me and commanding me who should have been far below me has destroyed all my enthusiasm and I am indifferent,” he continued. “Had I been left alone I should have maintained my position and inflicted severe losses on the enemy. It incenses me to think of it.” Still, Humphr
eys longed for a field command and accepted the position of chief of staff “as temporary, that is until I can get command of a Corps; less than that I cannot stand.” Humphreys would never learn to be happy in this new role, but for now Meade had a much closer ally than Butterfield had been. Meade broke the news to Butterfield on July 14, “in view of the suffering you seemed to experience from your wound, and the probability of the length of time you might be kept from the army, together with my knowledge of the fact that the position you occupied was not altogether one of choice, I deemed it proper to appoint a successor.”18
By July 12, Lee’s back was against the flooded Potomac near the town of Williamsport. Lee later asserted that he “would have crossed the Potomac at once,” but the river was too swollen to do so. Instead, he constructed a line six to eight miles long with heavy earthworks and inner defenses to protect his army against a vigorous attack. It was a strong position, and many historians have compared it to “Gettysburg in reverse,” which is not exactly accurate since Lee’s army was weaker and his line longer than what Meade enjoyed on Cemetery Ridge. While Lee did “not stop specially to invite” Meade into an attack, he “would not have been sorry” if Meade had done so.19
As the Army of the Potomac lumbered into position east of Lee’s line, Meade wrote his wife on the 12th that Lee “appears to be getting into a strong position, where he can act on the defensive. I shall be prudent and not act rashly.” That same day, Meade told Halleck that he would attack on the following day “unless something intervenes to prevent it.” Lieutenant Ranald Mackenzie of Warren’s staff warned that the Potomac was falling and that the fords were now crossable for Lee’s infantry. Meade told Humphreys that he intended to order a reconnaissance in force, which would be converted into a real attack should the opportunity offer. In a move that would be heavily criticized, Meade called another council of war on the evening of July 12, ostensibly to give instructions to the corps commanders and also to receive any intelligence that had been collected during the day. Of the seven present corps commanders, only James Wadsworth (representing the First Corps in place of an ill General Newton) and Oliver Howard favored an attack. The other five infantry corps commanders, notably his two most senior commanders—Sedgwick and Slocum—opposed the idea. According to Wadsworth, Meade told the assemblage that he “favored an attack” and did not see any valid reason for not attacking, but “could not take the responsibility of bringing on a general engagement against the advice of his commanders.” Meade decided to postpone (or “defer” as Humphreys called it) the attack for another day until a more proper reconnaissance of the enemy lines could be conducted.20
Meade and Humphreys reconnoitered the front on July 13. Apparently they learned nothing to dissuade Meade from his original intent, for he ordered Humphreys to draw up plans for a reconnaissance in force again the following day: “[T]he enemy’s pickets, supports, and guards will be driven in until a distinct view of his position, defensive works, force, and its arrangements can be had. If it should be necessary to obtain this information, and should be practicable, the enemy should even be made to display his line of battle.” Humphreys admitted that this was “similar in most respects” to what Meade had intended for the 13th. Because Meade had reverted back to his original idea, this decision opened him to criticism that he had unnecessarily allowed his corps commanders to delay his attack for one critical day. Lee, meanwhile, notified Longstreet on the 13th that the water had receded sufficiently to allow the Army of Northern Virginia to cross into western Virginia.21
Orders were given to move forward “punctually” at 7:00 a.m. on July 14, but before the advance began General Horatio Wright of the Sixth Corps and Oliver Howard of the Eleventh Corps reported that the enemy had withdrawn from their fronts. Wright pushed skirmishers ahead and discovered the enemy entrenchments empty. Meade ordered a general pursuit at 8:30 a.m., but by 11:00 a.m. all of Lee’s army except for Heth and Pender’s divisions were on the far bank. Although the Federals had some success against Lee’s rearguard at Falling Waters, Meade was forced to notify Halleck at 11:00 a.m.: “On advancing my army this morning, with a view of ascertaining the exact position of the enemy and attacking him if the result of the examination should justify me, I found, on reaching his lines, that they were evacuated.”22
The information angered Washington officials. “I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee’s army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President,” replied Halleck, “and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore.” Meade was so incensed by this accusation that he offered to resign, but unlike he had with Joe Hooker, Lincoln refused. Anger and frustration at the news of Lee’s escape was widespread. Lincoln complained, simplistically and rather unrealistically, “We had them within our grasp. We had only to stretch forth our hands & they were ours.”
General Daniel E. Sickles and staff. Henry Tremain is on the far left. Note Sickles’ missing leg. Library of Congress
According to Henry Tremain, Lincoln’s visits to Sickles were “frequently repeated” during this period. “At one of them the face of the President was marked with sadness. It was just after Lee’s army had crossed the Potomac into Virginia, and the news of it was fresh in all minds.” Tremain claimed that an intensely disappointed Lincoln told Sickles that Lee’s escape was “the greatest disaster of the war!”23
Among all of the post-battle criticism directed at George Meade from enemies such as Dan Sickles, Lee’s Williamsport escape might have been the hardest to live down. “I have every reason to believe,” Meade concluded, “the attack would have been unsuccessful, and would have resulted disastrously.” Meade formed his opinion after examining Lee’s vacated works. Many other Union officers later backed Meade’s opinion. Humphreys testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that “subsequent information” obtained from inspecting Lee’s entrenchments “showed that the enemy had a very strong position, and indicated that had we made an attack we should have suffered very severely.”24
Meade’s supporters have since argued that an attack would have resulted “in the needless sacrifice of soldiers,” and that Meade showed moral courage in not ordering a “senseless attack.” Meade staffer James Biddle assured Annals of the War readers: “Had he assaulted, he would certainly have been defeated.” At least one historian has recently written that such an attack “would have replicated the Battle of Gettysburg, but in reverse.” Still, Meade and Humphreys had both spent the 13th scouting the lines, and both came to the same conclusion that an advance, or at least a reconnaissance in force, was still justified. Only through information obtained afterward did they convince themselves that the assault would have been a disaster. Ignoring “what if” and speculative scenarios, however, it is simply a matter of history that Lee escaped to fight another day and Meade, rightly or wrongly, was censured by Washington for not preventing it.25
Most Gettysburg historians believe that Lincoln was being unrealistic in his expectations of destroying Lee’s army, and that Meade performed well in delivering a crucial victory despite having only been on the job for a few short days. Sickles’ contribution to Lincoln’s expectations needs to be put into context. Blaming Sickles for the criticism that Lincoln heaped on Meade ignores a significant portion of the historical record. Sickles likely did help “plant the seed,” as most believe, but it is a stretch to surmise, as at least one author has done, that “Had this idea not been planted, perhaps Lincoln would have given Meade the support he deserved. By extension, Meade would have been a different commander … if Lincoln had not treated him so poorly and sapped his confidence.” Sickles had more than his share of blame to shoulder as far as Gettysburg was concerned, but enough happened outside of his influence to suggest that he was responsible for Meade’s later performance.26
Unlike Meade, Sickles was unburdened by public and official disappointment. He
could play the roles that politicians play best: critic and second-guesser. He was “the recipient of a great deal of attention” in Washington. Henry Tremain was kept “more than busy replying to letters of sympathy and receiving the visitors who call to enquire.” Sickles was under medical orders to “hardly see any one,” although the President “frequently” violated this order. Sickles was already concerned with the fate of his beloved corps. As the army was chasing Lee back toward the Potomac, Lincoln assured him, “I understand you are troubled with some report that the 3rd Corps has sustained a disaster, or repulse. I can only say that I have watched closely, and believe I have seen all the despatches [sic] at the Military Telegraph Office … and I have heard of no such disaster or repulse.”27
Tremain told his family that the Third Corps had “as usual, bore the brunt of the fight.” There was much worrying about Charles Graham’s fate, until they finally confirmed on July 10 that Graham was alive, albeit a wounded prisoner. “This news quite relieves Mrs. Graham,” wrote Tremain, adding cryptically, “I could tell you many interesting things about Meade’s and Hooker’s campaigns until I left, but must postpone it for the present.” Like most of Sickles’ inner-circle, Tremain was no admirer of George Meade. The aide credited the Union victory to “providence … for I saw no evidence of towering military genius displayed by our commanding general.” Ironically, Tremain also dismissed most of the accusations directed at Meade. He cautioned his family that another Union victory would not have ended the war.28