James A. Hessler
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Less than charitable modern authors have since declared that it was now “time [for Sickles] to exact retribution” on Meade. Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles witnessed a conversation between Sickles and Abraham Lincoln on October 20. “I met General Sickles at the President’s today,” Welles recorded in his diary. “When I went in, the President was asking if Hancock did not select the battleground at Gettysburg. Sickles said he did not, but that General Howard and perhaps himself, were more entitled to that credit than any others. He then detailed the particulars, making himself, however, much more conspicuous than Howard.”50
What Welles overheard was that when Meade arrived at Gettysburg, he was “for abandoning the position and falling back.” Meade apparently called a council, at which Sickles was not present, “but [Sickles] wrote Meade his decided opinion in favor of maintaining the position, which was finally agreed to against Meade’s judgment.” Welles continued:
Allowance must always be made for Sickles when he is interested, but his representations confirm my impressions of Meade, who means well, and, in his true position, that of a secondary commander, is more of a man than Sickles represents him—can obey orders and carry out orders better than he can originate and give them, hesitates, defers to others, has not strength, will, and self-reliance.51
Criticism of Meade’s performance, always an occupational hazard for any army’s commander, had been appearing in the press throughout the summer and early fall. David Birney complained to a friend, “You are doubtless bewildered at our recent strategic movements! Why should you not be, all of us in the army are.” Such criticisms increasingly frustrated Meade, who told Lincoln and Halleck during a September meeting that “if they thought I was too slow or prudent, to put someone else in my place.” Meade was summoned to Washington on October 22 (two days after Welles witnessed the meeting between Sickles and Lincoln). He found Lincoln “as he always is, very considerate & kind. He found no fault with my operations although it was very evident he was disappointed that I had not got a battle out of Lee.” If not for the need to financially support his family, Meade told his wife, “I would resign today from this army.”52
The Mine Run campaign late that November did nothing to enhance Meade’s public status. Meade was unable to outmaneuver Lee along the Rapidan, and when Meade deemed it inadvisable to attack Lee’s entrenched position, the Army of the Potomac withdrew into winter quarters. The failure to once again corner Lee was blamed by some, such as Marsena Patrick, on the poor performance of the Third Corps under General French. Nevertheless, Meade knew where the ultimate blame would settle. “My head is off,” he told staff officer James Biddle. “I know that I shall be relieved, but I could not order an assault against my conscience.” Meade’s friends tried to assure the press that Meade’s winter objectives had been achieved, but newspaper rumors were circulating that Meade’s days were numbered, undoubtedly giving his enemies the impression that he was an easy target.53
The growing tensions escalated when General-in-Chief Henry Halleck filed his report in November. While Halleck based much of his report on input from Meade, he was much more explicit in his criticism of Sickles:
General Sickles, misinterpreting his orders, instead of placing the Third Corps on the prolongation of the Second, had moved it nearly three-quarters of a mile in advance an error which nearly proved fatal in the battle. The enemy attacked this corps on the 2d with great fury, and it was likely to be utterly annihilated, when the Fifth Corps moved up on the left, and enabled it to reform behind the line it was originally ordered to hold.54
As General Halleck saw it, not only was Sickles guilty of “misinterpreting” his orders, but it had been up to another corps to save the Third from likely “annihilation.” Halleck mildly censured Meade for allowing Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia to cross the Potomac River to safety at Williamsport, but left no doubt as to whom he credited for the victory: “to General Meade belongs the honor of a well-earned victory in one of the greatest and best-fought battles of the war.”55
“The Gettysburg report falls dead of us,” General Birney complained, “tame, lifeless it is a poor tribute.… The 3rd Corps is misrepresented, and its gallant conduct under me in the front line on the 3rd ignored although it lost 500 killed and wounded from its decimated ranks. However, we may be partial here, and await with some anxiety Sickles’ report which this attack will doubtless elicit.” Unfortunately for Gettysburg historiography, Sickles never filed his report on the campaign. He would, however, have plenty to say in other forums.56
As the tumultuous year of 1863 drew to a close, Meade anxiously waited for any word from Washington regarding his future. In addition to Williamsport and Mine Run, Gettysburg still remained squarely in the news. “I see the Herald is constantly harping on the assertion that Gettysburg was fought by the corps commanders and the common soldiers, and that no generalship was displayed,” complained Meade. “I suppose after awhile it will be discovered I was not at Gettysburg at all.” The Radical Republicans in Washington began calling for Meade’s removal in favor of the reinstatement of Joe Hooker. Although it is not exactly clear when Sickles began working with the Radicals in Congress, by that December he was back in Washington. Sickles, Birney, and Regis de Trobriand traveled to the capital via New York, with Sickles announcing to his companions unexpectedly that a fourth person would join them on the final leg of the train journey: Mary Todd Lincoln. Traveling in a reserved coach, the group arrived in Washington on the evening of December 8. “Sickles wasn’t in good health with his crutch,” recalled de Trobriand. “He was not able to accompany Madame Lincoln. It was me who took the advantage to offer her my arm when we got out of the car.”57 General Marsena Patrick recorded in his diary entry for December 16:
Col. [G. H.] Sharpe came down [from Washington] yesterday.… He tells me that Sickles openly announces his intention to fight the battle with Halleck, who has made more serious & damaging charges against him than Meade did. He will ask for, either a Court of Inquiry, or a Committee of Investigation in Congress. It is probable he will succeed in flooring both. He is all powerful at the White House & is the Gallant of Mrs. Lincoln, going there at all times, Although the President is sick—too ill to see persons on business, he (Sickles) is said to call on him at any time.”58
According to Sickles, he felt “keenly of the injustice” done by Halleck and Meade: “I asked President Lincoln to grant me a court of inquiry for the purpose of correcting the serious errors contained in the reports of the battle made by General Halleck and General Meade.” Lincoln, however, denied the request, allegedly responding, “Sickles, they say you pushed out your men too near the enemy, and began to fight just as that council of war was about to meet at 2 o’clock in the afternoon of the battle. I am afraid what they say is true and God Bless you for it. Don’t ask us to order an inquest to relieve you from bringing on the battle of Gettysburg. History will set you all right and give everybody his just place.” When such talk reached the Army of the Potomac, officers such as Frank Haskell were outraged. “It is understood in the Army that the President thanked the slayer of Barton Key, for saving the day [emphasis in original] at Gettysburg. Does the country know any better than the President, that Meade, Hancock, and Gibbon, were entitled to some little share of such credit?”59
“I furthermore hear that General Sickles asserts that Hancock selected the position,” Meade wrote on December 28, “and that he (Sickles), with his corps did all the fighting at Gettysburg. So, I presume, before long it will be clearly proved that my presence on the field was rather an injury than otherwise.” Meade’s words would prove prophetic. As 1864 dawned, Meade’s adversaries within the army and the government escalated their efforts to deny him credit for the Gettysburg victory. Sickles would soon discover that it was unnecessary to call a Court of Inquiry, as there was already an investigative body in place to do the job for him. The politically inexperienced Meade would appear to be no match for the forces arrayed against him.60
> Chapter 14
Subsequent Events Proved My Judgment Correct
When Congress convened in December 1863, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs and a friend of Dan Butterfield, referred a joint resolution thanking and singling out several officers1 for the victory at Gettysburg:
A RESOLUTION expressive of the thanks of Congress to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, and the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the gratitude of the American people, and the thanks of their Representatives in Congress, are due, and are hereby tendered, to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, and the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, for the skill, energy, and endurance which first covered Washington and Baltimore from the meditated blow of the advancing and powerful army of rebels led by General Robert E. Lee; and to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, and the officers and soldiers of that army, for the skill and heroic valor which, at Gettysburg, repulsed, defeated, and drove back, broken and dispirited, beyond the Rappahannock, the veteran army of the rebellion.2
The resolution was approved January 28, 1864. Meade was “highly honored” to have “my name associated with General Hooker,” he wrote sarcastically. “Why they confined the including of my predecessors to Hooker I am at a loss to imagine. He certainly had no more to do with my operations and success at Gettysburg than either Burnside or McClellan.” According to John Gibbon, Meade’s friends “could see no propriety in connecting, even remotely, Hooker’s name with the battle of Gettysburg.” Nevertheless, Lincoln approved the resolution and the public record now validated the perception that Hooker shared responsibility for the victory.3
It has been suggested that Dan Sickles and his supporters had attempted to replace Meade’s name on the resolution with Sickles’. The one-legged general was still a prominent Democrat, however, and the Radical Republicans were only interested in allying themselves with his unsavory reputation up to a certain point. (Some members of the Committee would actually criticize Sickles for irregularities in his quartermaster department.) James Wilson Grimes, a Republican Senator from Iowa, had asked for Howard’s inclusion as credit for selecting Cemetery Hill. No direct evidence has yet to confirm that Sickles directly contributed to Howard’s inclusion. But as Navy Secretary Gideon Welles witnessed during the previous fall, Sickles claimed that both he and Howard were jointly responsible for the victory. Did such talk indirectly help elevate Howard’s contributions? Although Sickles was undoubtedly disappointed to be excluded from the resolution, he certainly must have been pleased to see Hooker elevated over Meade. Perhaps Hooker would be returning to the army after all. If so, Sickles’ return to Third Corps command could not be far behind.4
Many Gettysburg students presume that Dan Sickles was obsessed with moving the powerful Congressional machinery in order to extract revenge upon George Meade’s head. What the actual historical record does clearly show is that Sickles was determined to return to duty. He wanted to contribute to the war effort, and was probably embarrassed when his name was among a lengthy list of generals sent to the Senate who were without commands (and still drawing $445 per month pay along with the services of staffers Tremain and Alexander Moore.) The Times called the list “formidable to taxpayers and odious to soldiers who live in the front.” Had events transpired more expediently, Sickles might not have even been in Washington while the Second Battle of Gettysburg was fought in the spring of 1864.
In late January, while recuperating in New York, Sickles assured the President that “I have been quite successful” in learning to use an artificial limb. “I can walk without crutches, my health is so far reestablished as to make me anxious for employment.” He also told Lincoln:
“The Times” [sic] of today mentions a rumor that I am to be assigned to the Command of the Dep’t. of Washington—I hope there is good foundation for the statement—I can be useful in that post. Stationed at Washington, with duties ostensibly Military & appropriate to my rank and in a position where I can Communicate easily with the influential people who will be in Washington this year—I can be most useful in the other aspects about which we have Conversed.
There is another field in which valuable service could be rendered by an officer of rank and ability—occupying half of his time at the Capital & the remainder South. A Military Commissioner, giving his whole attention to the subject, could contribute powerfully to increase and organize the elements of disaffection toward the rebel authorities in North Carolina, Georgia, and elsewhere—and at the same time Contribute largely to the work of reconstruction in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi & Tennessee. The Commissioner should be a man of tact & Address—well acquainted with the Southern people… familiar with political movements and the Military situation and the Characters of the Military and political leaders at the South, and the motives which influence them.5
Lincoln had another idea. He replied by telegram on January 29, asking if Sickles could “immediately take a trip to Arkansas for me?” An eager Sickles sent a response the same day, “I am ready to go at once.” But by February 2, Lincoln had not responded and Sickles was waiting impatiently in New York for word of his diplomatic mission to the Trans-Mississippi Theater. He reminded the President that he was “ready to go” and was “making good use of my time in learning the use of my artificial limb.” He also reminded Lincoln of his preferred assignment. “My first [emphasis in original] wish is to resume command of my Corps—next to that, the command of Washington—but I shall be entirely satisfied to undertake any duty which you think I can be most useful to the Government.”6
According to Sickles biographer W. A. Swanberg, “A week later he [Sickles] hurried off to the capital, where he must have explained to the President the importance of his remaining long enough to testify before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.” In reality, Lincoln told Sickles on February 10 to “come at your earliest convenience, prepared to make the contemplated trip for me.” Sickles replied immediately: “Will go on tomorrow afternoon.” The discussed trip west never materialized, because Arkansas officials did not want him there. Both the department commander and the provisional governor urged Lincoln not to send Sickles. “[C]oming here would only be an annoyance and will do no good,” Governor Isaac Murphy informed Lincoln.7
Instead of Arkansas, the President proposed on February 15 yet another diplomatic mission, a tour “principally for observation and information.… You will call at Memphis, Helena, Vicksburg, New-Orleans, Pensacola, Key-West, Charleston-Harbor.… Please ascertain at each place what is being done, if anything, for reconstruction.… Also learn what you can as to the colored people.”8
As late as February 25, Lincoln was saying that Sickles “probably will make a tour down the Mississippi.” But Sickles didn’t depart for his trip. The Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War was nearly ready to begin calling witnesses on Gettysburg. Presuming that Sickles decided to stay in Washington and willingly testify, which seems a logical assumption, then his decision to remain and cooperate was probably made as late as February 15, when the Arkansas trip was officially killed. Had events moved faster when Lincoln extended the Arkansas invitation on January 29, Sickles might not have even been in Washington to open the Gettysburg portion of the hearings.9
The Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War was a “committee of inquiry into the general conduct of the war,” specifically created to investigate the Union’s inability to score battlefield victories. The committee consisted of three senators and four representatives, and was controlled by “Radical” Republicans who favored a merciless punishment of the South. Since Southern Democrats had led the charge to secession, the Republicans increasingly linked Union battlefield defeats with the presence of Democrats in the Northern army’s leadership and distrusted West Point as
a breeding ground of these traitorous Democrat generals.10
The committee was chaired by Ohio Republican Senator Benjamin Wade, who proclaimed West Point “the hot-bed from which rebellion was hatched and from thence emanated your principal traitors and conspirators.” Senator Wade was a confrontational and fiery opponent of slavery who followed the maxim that the “South has got to be punished and traitors hung.” Wade and Michigan Senator Zachariah Chandler dominated the committee. Their self-proclaimed purpose was to “obtain such information…as would best enable them to advise what mistakes had been made in the past and the proper course to be pursued in the future.” More than a fact-finding body, they also thought it necessary to provide Lincoln “with such recommendations and suggestions as seemed to be most imperatively demanded.” Summoned witnesses were allowed no cross-examination and were not allowed to confront their accusers. While Gettysburg students tend to remember the committee for its role in collecting the testimony related to the battle, the body investigated a wide variety of events. But the crushing defeat at Chancellorsville and Meade’s widely criticized inability to prevent Lee’s escape back to Virginia convinced the committee that Democrat Copperheads still controlled the Army of the Potomac.11
In February 1864, the committee began calling witnesses related to the Army of the Potomac’s operations under Hooker and Meade. The committee’s ultimate and rather ironic objective was to replace Meade (who had won the battle of Gettysburg) with Hooker (who had been defeated at Chancellorsville). The committee’s intent demonstrates the extent to which Meade’s failure to bring Lee back to battle overshadowed his Gettysburg victory. Politically, Hooker was a Democrat and another untrustworthy West Pointer, but he was deemed more suitable to the Radical agenda since he promoted the image of wanting to conquer the South. Meade’s post-Gettysburg performance convinced some members that he was another uncommitted West Point Copperhead Democrat. Meade also had a past history with Chandler. While in Detroit after Fort Sumter, Meade had drawn Chandler’s ire by refusing to attend a public rally and renew his loyalty oath to the United States. (Meade objected on the grounds that the attending local authorities had no right to demand such an oath.)12 What Meade did not yet realize was that the committee was out to prove the following: