James A. Hessler
Page 36
Did Meade retain the army’s confidence? “There is no enthusiasm for him. I think he is rather liked by them; but, so far as I know, they have very little confidence in him as a military leader.” Although he offered that the “general opinion is that he lacks decision of character,” Birney did not follow the committee’s lead and blame Meade’s indecisiveness on pro-McClellan politics: “I have never known an instance when they have not carried out the orders which they have received.” The committee pressed Birney with several follow-up questions along this line of inquiry, but to his credit the Third Corps officer deftly side-stepped the issue. He wouldn’t blame Meade’s performance on traitorous McClellan sympathies, but he still thought the army was “disheartened.…Its history, since the battle of Gettysburg, has been a succession of useless advances and rapid retreats…our army has, in every instance, after seeking it, avoided a general engagement.”54
The day after Pleasonton and Birney testified, Meade complained to his wife on March 8 of “a conspiracy” in which Sickles and Doubleday were the committee’s “agents.” The timing of these attacks compounded Meade’s stress. He was convinced that the imminent arrival of Ulysses S. Grant would shorten his own professional lifespan, for he pragmatically realized that Grant may desire “his own man in command.” The March 8 issue of the New York Tribune did nothing to assuage Meade’s anxiety. The paper repeated the assertion that Meade intended to retreat on both July 1 and July 2, and “that the battle was precipitated by Gen. Sickles.” The paper also called Birney and Alfred Pleasonton’s testimonies “very damaging.”55
Meade finally decided to take some action. He contacted Generals Birney and Pleasonton “as your superior officer” and requested a “succinct statement of your evidence.” Birney may have realized that since Sickles was no longer serving with the army, it was prudent to mend fences with Meade. His somewhat contrite reply was that newspapers were doing “great injustice to the character of my testimony, and were penned by some person ignorant of it.” Birney assured Meade that his testimony was “confined almost entirely to the operations of the division and corps whilst under my command. My opinion as to the movements of the army and its conduct was given only in reply to direct questions.… In my opinion, there is nothing in my testimony that should alter the personal and official relations existing between us.” Birney went on to decline Meade’s request to replay his own testimony, however, explaining that it was under the committee’s ownership. “I will with pleasure give you, at any time you may desire,” he concluded, “my recollections, reports, and views on the same points.” Privately, Birney was considerably less conciliatory toward the commander of the Army of the Potomac. “Meade is a fraud,” he told a friend, and an “old granny” who “only claimed to be from Pennsylvania” because “he married the daughter of a Philadelphian.”56
Pleasonton was even less cooperative. “I desire to inform the major-general commanding that he is mistaken in supposing I have given a succinct statement of my evidence before the war committee to anybody.” He admitted that “the evidence was taken down by a stenographer,” but he had not since seen it and could not transcribe it from memory. “I am perfectly willing that the major-general commanding should have a copy of my evidence, but as I consider it is now the property of the Government, I will forward a copy of his letter to the chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with the request that it may be furnished him.” Pleasonton forwarded the request on to his friend Chairman Wade, who replied that he saw no reason to depart from the committee’s practice of not releasing testimony. Put another way, Meade was officially denied the opportunity to examine the testimony against him.57
Gouverneur Warren appeared next as the first pro-Meade witness. Warren, Meade, and Humphreys represented what citizen-soldier David Birney sarcastically called the “engineer clique.” Birney thought Warren “ambitious as the devil…but he is a very good fellow.” Warren told the committee on March 9 that upon taking command Meade kept the army “moving forward as rapidly as possible, for the purpose of hitting Lee’s army with something, no matter what it was, so as to bring him into line and bring on a battle.” Regarding Sickles’ unauthorized advance on July 2, Warren, like Meade, failed to mention the planned 3:00 p.m. meeting of corps commanders. Warren testified that he had fortuitously ridden with “Meade to examine the left of our line, where General Sickles was.” Warren firmly disapproved of Sickles’ position: “His troops could hardly be said to be in position.”58
Warren “felt very well satisfied that General Sickles could not hold his position against the force brought against him” and that it had required combined portions of the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps to hold the line. Warren also explicitly contradicted Sickles by stating (correctly) that Little Round Top had been left unoccupied, and that it had been left to Sykes’ Fifth Corps, which arrived “barely in time,” to save the hill. Although Warren’s testimony shed light on Sickles’ performance, the committee wasn’t interested in that aspect of his appearance. Instead, it steered the questioning to the issue of whether any councils of war were held during the battle. Warren tap danced around the subject: “I do not know that there was; not what I would call a council of war. I think it probable that General Meade asked the opinion of all his officers about what they thought of their position.” Warren did admit, however, that the campaign’s “lost opportunities” occurred on the evening of July 3 (“we should have advanced”) and July 12 at Williamsport.59
As a professional soldier, Warren clearly had little respect for Sickles. The engineering officer specifically mentioned Reynolds and Hancock, but not Sickles, among the losses of “a great many of our most spirited officers.” When he was asked specifically about Sickles’ loss to the army, he replied: “I do not think that General Sickles is as good a soldier as the others; but he did the best he could, and with the corps he had he managed very well. His corps was composed of a little different material from the others.”
Question: You considered him a man of resolution and courage, and one that would bring his corps into a fight well?
Answer: Yes, sir, he did very well. I do not think that General Sickles would be a good man to fight an independent battle, which a corps commander would often have to do. I think if he had been educated a soldier he might have stood very high. But when you come down to all the details of a battle, General Sickles has not had the same experience which others have had. The knowledge of those details do not make a soldier, but he should be possessed of them as much as he is of his own language.60
Warren’s swipe at the entire Third Corps was probably a reflection of the fact that the corps had only one West Pointer (Humphreys) commanding a division or brigade at Gettysburg—the only infantry corps in Meade’s army to hold this dubious distinction. Warren’s opinion on Sickles accurately reflected the gulf between Sickles and many of his peers. Many considered him a good and aggressive fighter, but his lack of military education precluded his ability to exercise sound military judgment independently. Sickles, of course, was not the only non-professional in the army, but he was the highest ranking nonprofessional, and as a corps commander he could be required to fight and act without supervision.61
Newspaper reports dated March 10 cheered Meade, who observed, “I note the Tribune now says that no charges were preferred against me by General Sickles or Doubleday.” He had also sent a note to attendees of the July 2 war council, requesting “your recollection of what transpired at the council” and whether he “at any time insisted on the withdrawal of the army from before Gettysburg.” Generals Sykes, Newton, Sedgwick, and John Gibbon all replied unequivocally that they had never heard Meade consider a retreat.62
Generals Grant and Meade received an invitation to dine with Lincoln in Washington on March 12. Grant was unable to attend, but Meade accepted. The dinner conversation must have been fascinating because (according to the New York Tribune) Sickles, Halleck, and Stanton were also in attendance. Knowing
that he would be in Washington for the scheduled dinner, Meade took advantage of the opportunity to ask the committee’s permission to present more evidence on March 11. Meade may have been a political novice, but he appeared to be learning the game quickly. So it was that a much better prepared Meade appeared again with thirteen orders dated from June 30 and July 1, “a careful perusal of which, I am sure, will satisfy every member of this committee that there was no intention on my part to withdraw my army from the position at Gettysburg.” Given his “great exertions” to concentrate the army, Meade testified that “to any intelligent mind… it must appear entirely incomprehensible that I should order it to retreat… before the enemy had done anything to require me to [retreat].”63
More good news rolled in for Meade. He met again with Edwin Stanton, who informed him that Wade was now quite satisfied with Meade’s explanations. Meade also learned that several committee members were actually friendly to his cause, and he received favorable newspaper coverage from The Round Table, “A Weekly Record of the Notable, the Useful, and the Tasteful.”64 An editorial in the March 12 edition accused Sickles of leading the movement against Meade, “a high-minded gentleman and a thorough soldier”:
Whether General Sickles intentionally disobeyed or unintentionally misinterpreted his orders, was not distinctly stated [in Meade’s report]. But one thing is certain, that the fact that General Sickles lost a leg in the engagement saved him from removal from the army. We honor General Sickles for the devotion to the cause of his country; we honor him for the untiring energy and personal bravery he has displayed in its defense; and when the war shall be ended and the roll of honor made out, we shall not be the last to claim for General Sickles no mean place on it. But we cannot blink the fact that General Sickles is quite as much a politician as a soldier. We know that he has accomplished more by personal address, adroitness, and cunning management of newspaper correspondents, than by actual display of military ability.65
Unfortunately for Meade, a letter appeared in the same day’s New York Herald that essentially relegated The Round Table’s editorial to the scrap heap of forgotten history. The Herald published an “important communication from an eye-witness” to Gettysburg as Sickles responded with his most memorable salvo during the Second Battle of Gettysburg.66
A Matthew Brady photo of Major General Sickles, taken circa 1864-1865. Library of Congress
Chapter 15
My Only Motive is to Vindicate History
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG – IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION FROM AN EYE-WITNESS–HOW THE VICTORY WAS WON AND HOW ITS ADVANTAGES WERE LOST – GENERALS HALLECK’S AND MEADE’S OFFICIAL REPORTS REFUTED, ETC.
To the Editor of the Herald:
The battle of Gettysburg is the decisive battle of this war. It not only saved the North from invasion, but turned the tide of victory in our favor. The opinion of Europe on the failure of the rebellion dates from this great conflict. How essential, then, that its real history should be known. Up to this moment no clear narrative has appeared. The sketches of the press, the reports of Generals Halleck and Meade, and the oration of Mr. Everett, give only phases of this terrible struggle, and that not very correctly. To supply this hiatus, I send you a connected, and, I hope, lucid review of its main features. I have not ventured to touch on the thrilling incidents and affecting details of such a strife, but have confined myself to a succinct relation of its principal events and the actors therein. My only motive is to vindicate history, do honor to the fallen, and justice to the survivors when unfairly impeached.1
The author of this letter, who dubbed himself “Historicus,” provided the Herald’s readers with a point-by-point duplication of Sickles’ testimony. According to Historicus, on July 1 Sickles had assumed “the grave responsibility of moving to” the relief of the First and Eleventh corps “without orders.” Historicus “saw several copies” of Meade’s Pipe Creek Circular “stating that his [Meade’s] advance had accomplished all the objects contemplated, namely, the relief of Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and that he would now desist altogether from the offensive.” Historicus found it “strange that General Meade should make no mention in his report of this singular and most important fact,” that he issued a plan “directing his whole army to retire and take up the defensive on Pipe Creek.”2
As the narrative progressed to July 2, and quoting from General Lee’s battle report, Historicus noted that General Longstreet was ordered to carry a Federal “position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond.” To Historicus, it was “plain enough that Lee regarded the point where our left was posted as the key to our position.… It is not to be supposed that General Meade refused to see this; but as he makes no mention of it in his report, I propose, for the sake of the future historian of the battle, to tell what I know about it.”3 He continued:
Near this important ground was posted the valiant Third Corps, and its commander, General Sickles, saw at once how necessary it was to occupy the elevated ground in his front toward the Emmitsburg road, and to extend his lines to the commanding eminence known as the Round Top, or Sugar Loaf hill. Unless this were done, the left and rear of our army would be in the greatest danger…Receiving no orders, and filled with anxiety, he reported in person to General Meade, and urged the advance he deemed so essential. “O,” said Meade, “generals are all apt to look for the attack to be made where they are.” Whether this was a jest or a sneer Sickles did not stop to consider, but begged Meade to go over the ground with him instantly; but the commander-in-chief declined this on account of other duties.4
Historicus repeated Sickle’s testimony practically verbatim. Artillerist Henry Hunt, he explained, “concurred with Sickles as to the line to be occupied… but he declined to give any orders until he had reported to General Meade, remarking, however, that he (General Sickles) would doubtless receive orders immediately.” However, Sickles never received such orders: “It has since been stated, upon unquestionable authority, that General Meade had decided upon a retreat, and that an order to withdraw from the position held by our army was penned by his chief of staff, General Butterfield.” Meanwhile, as “the enemy’s columns were moving rapidly around to our left and rear,”5 and with no response from headquarters…
The critical moment had now arrived. The enemy’s movements indicated their purpose to seize the Round Top hill; and this in their possession, General Longstreet would have had easy work in cutting up our left wing. To prevent this disaster, Sickles waited no longer for orders from General Meade, but directed General Hobart Ward’s brigade and Smith’s battery (Fourth New York) to secure that vital position, and at the same time advancing his line of battle about 300 yards, so as to hold the crest in his front, he extended his left to support Ward and cover the threatened rear of the army.6
If Historicus was not Sickles, then he was someone intimately familiar with the general’s movements on July 2. Historicus’ version of the Meade-Sickles Peach Orchard meeting corroborated versions given by both Sickles and Tremain. Meade promised support from the Fifth and Second corps, as well as to “Send to the Artillery Reserve for all you want.” After Meade rode away, according to Historicus, “Sickles received no further orders that day.”7
Historicus did address one common complaint of Sickles’ critics: “that Sickles’ line was too much extended for the number of troops under his command.” He rationalized it by adding: “[B]ut his great aim was to prevent the enemy getting between his flank and the Round Top alluded to. This was worth the risk, in his opinion, of momentarily weakening his lines… for the object of Lee, as he states, was ‘to carry’ the ground which Sickles occupied, and which both generals evidently regarded as of the highest importance.”8
Regarding the touchy subject of Fifth Corps reinforcements, the Third Corps “fought like lions, against tremendous odds, for nearly an hour before the Fifth Corps” came up and were “immediately put in position by General Sic
kles.” Historicus saved his most memorable passage for the fate of Barnes’ Fifth Corps division. As Barnes “suddenly gave way,” Birney sent an order to get Barnes back into line. “‘No’ he [Barnes] said; ‘impossible. It is too hot. My men cannot stand it.’”9 Historicus continued:
Remonstrance was unavailing, and Sickles dispatched his aides to bring up any troops they met to fill this blank. Major [Henry E.] Tremain, of his staff, fell in with General Zook, at the head of his brigade (Second Corps), and this gallant officer instantly volunteered to take Barnes’ place. When they reached the ground, Barnes’ disordered troops impeded the advance of the brigade. “If you can’t get out of the way,” cried Zook, “lie down, and I will march over you.” Barnes ordered his men to lie down, and the chivalric Zook and his splendid brigade, under the personal direction of General Birney, did march over them and right into the breach…10
According to Historicus, it was the Third Corps’ “good fortune in preserving our position on the left gave us the victory at Gettysburg” and yet Meade “disregarded the repeated warnings of that sagacious officer, General Sickles.” After essentially relating the entire battle from only Sickles’ perspective, the author relied exclusively on second-hand accounts to criticize Meade’s Williamsport performance. It is apparent that Historicus was no longer with the army by the time it reached the swollen Potomac River.11