James A. Hessler
Page 38
Butterfield is at Willards—He has not received permission from Genl. Halleck to come here & apprehends it will be refused—Allow me to suggest that, as in Birneys [sic] Case, he be subpoenaed regularly—He comes now only by request from Senator Wade.
It is very important that you have Brig. Genl. S. Williams Ast. Adjt. Genl. Army of the Potomac here with all orders & Communications bearing on the Gettysburg Campaign—original drafts & Copies as received at Head Quarters—this is all important for you to have before you when Butterfield is Examined—Then you will get the real history of the Campaign.31
So summoned, Butterfield requested on March 23 that Meade and Assistant Adjutant General Seth Williams provide the rough minutes of the July 2 war council, as well as “the originals of all dispatches, orders, &c., prepared by me.” Williams replied the same day, “As you are not now connected with the Army of the Potomac, the major-general commanding declines furnishing you with the records of said army.” After discussing operations under Hooker, Butterfield began his Gettysburg testimony on March 25.
Butterfield claimed that upon assuming command, Meade was indecisive over a course of action and that Meade directed the movement of the army essentially in accordance with Hooker’s plans. Butterfield, like Sickles, portrayed the Pipe Creek Circular as proof of Meade’s desire to avoid battle. In reading his own copy of the order to the committee, Butterfield emphasized Meade’s satisfaction that “the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz, the relief of Harrisburg, and the prevention of the enemy’s intended invasion of Philadelphia, &c., beyond the Susquehanna.” Butterfield omitted key passages, including Meade’s reasonable disclaimer that “Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions.” Butterfield testified that he thought such an order was “very bad” for morale and allegedly urged Meade to reconsider.32
Surprisingly, Butterfield’s version of George Meade was not completely timid. Although he told the committee that Meade did not think the Sixth Corps could arrive before “the matter is pretty well settled” at Gettysburg (implying a pessimistic view of Federal prospects), Butterfield admitted that Meade proposed “making a vigorous attack” early on July 2. Perhaps even more significantly, Butterfield let slip (inadvertently one suspects) that Meade issued orders during Hancock’s absence for the other corps “to move towards Gettysburg.” If the committee caught this point, then Butterfield was admitting that Meade had ordered the army to Gettysburg without awaiting Hancock’s advice. This was a point for Meade that even Hancock’s supporters had been unwilling to admit.33
However, it was Butterfield’s version of July 2 that really gave the committee its money’s worth. Butterfield testified that Meade “directed me to prepare an order to withdraw the army from that position.” This was potential dynamite, since as author Bill Hyde correctly pointed out, “Whereas Sickles’ and others’ testimony on this point had been hearsay, Butterfield claimed to have been personally involved in preparing an order to retreat.” Butterfield testified that the completed draft met with Meade’s approval, and that Meade summoned all of the corps commanders for the intended 3:00 p.m. meeting while the draft was being copied. This conference was aborted, however, by the audible sounds of battle along Sickles’ front.34 When the committee asked if Sickles’ “collision” with Longstreet prevented the retreat from being “executed,” Butterfield surprisingly stopped short of an all-out indictment on Meade:
It is impossible for me to state that, because General Meade had not communicated to me his intention to execute that order regardless of the opinions of the corps commanders, or whether he intended to have the order submitted to them. He merely directed me to prepare such an order, which I did. It is for him to say whether he intended to execute it or not. He may have desired it prepared for an emergency, without any view of executing it then, or he may have had it prepared with a full view of its execution.35
Since Sickles, Butterfield, and the committee had gone to such great efforts to accuse Meade of planning a retreat, why did Butterfield admit that Meade may not have intended to actually execute the order? Perhaps he truly didn’t know, and was unwilling to go on the record if the accusation was later conclusively proven false. Historian Edwin Coddington speculated that Butterfield’s “show of restraint” was designed to make his story actually sound more convincing. Or, as Bill Hyde has suggested, Butterfield might have been hedging so that he would not be completely out of favor should Meade not be removed from command. Upon examination, Butterfield admitted that he prepared the retreat order with the understanding that Meade intended to “consult with his corps commanders, and that it was a matter of precaution to have the order in readiness in case it should be decided upon to retreat.” Whether Butterfield liked it or not, he was depicting Meade as a general who was planning for multiple contingencies. This was a far cry from a man who was hell-bent on retreat.36
Having nearly torpedoed Sickles’ retreat accusation, the examination now turned to councils of war and Pipe Creek. Butterfield claimed that Meade had ended the July 2 evening council by pronouncing Gettysburg “no place to fight a battle.” He also accused Meade of not making “a vigorous pursuit” on July 3, and of holding another council on July 4 because Meade needed “the earnest assistance and advice of every corps commander.” Butterfield initially refused to answer questions regarding the prudence of Pipe Creek, claiming that he did “not like to pass unfavorable criticisms upon a superior officer,” but eventually elaborated, “I do not think that circular was a judicious one. I do not think the position designated in that circular was a good one. And I think if we had gone back there it would have resulted in the destruction of our army.”37
Since Butterfield’s testimony regarding the July 2 retreat order was surprisingly weak, it was significant that the committee chose to close his testimony with emphasis on July 1 and Pipe Creek. Perhaps the committee realized by this point that it might have more success trying to prove that Meade never wanted to fight at Gettysburg in the first place. If Sickles was attempting to demonstrate that his July 2 advance had prevented Meade from retreating, then his friend Butterfield had utterly failed to substantiate his case.
General Gibbon, perhaps Meade’s friendliest witnesses, appeared on April 1. Meade and Gibbon had known each other since their Old Army service against the Seminoles in Florida. Gibbon told the committee that the Third Corps gave way upon attack, and that he had been forced to send several regiments in support, particularly because Sickles’ advance had threatened to cut “him off entirely from our line.” Gibbon was asked specifically whether Sickles’ line was a “judicious position.” Gibbon replied, “I should think it was not.” He explained that Sickles had “isolated” himself too far in advance to receive support from the remainder of the army. Contrary to protecting the left flank as intended, Gibbon thought Sickles actually “invited” a flank attack, which was particularly “disastrous” to less disciplined volunteer troops. Gibbon argued that the collapse of the Third Corps supported his argument.38
Without being prompted by further questioning, Gibbon elaborated on the charge that Meade planned to retreat. Gibbon admitted that he had been surprised when Butterfield showed him a draft of the order, which Butterfield identified as “an order for the army to retreat.” But, he added, Butterfield “did not say that General Meade did intend to leave; he merely said something to the effect that it was necessary to be prepared, in case it should be necessary to leave.” Gibbon considered the whole episode to be “remarkable” because he was convinced that Meade “had no idea of falling back from the position there.” Upon questioning from moderate Republican Daniel Gooch, Gibbon reiterated that Butterfield had called the retreat order “merely preparatory, in case we might be called upon to retreat.” It was the strongest testimony that had yet been placed before the committee in Meade’s favor.39
Meade knew it was necessary to refute Butterfield’s testimony and returned to the stand,
wearily one suspects, on April 4. “Now, indulging in the utmost charity towards General Butterfield, and believing that he is sincere in what he says, I want to explain how it is possible that such an extraordinary idea could have got into his head.” Invoking “the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath… I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies which the future should develop during the course of the day might render it a matter of necessity.”40
Meade further called the committee’s attention to the “absurdity” of a retreat. “Why was the order not issued, or if issued, why was it not executed? There was no obstacle to my withdrawing the army.” Meade read dispatches into evidence showing that he intended to attack along his right flank, until dissuaded by Slocum and Warren. Meade decided to await the arrival of the Sixth Corps, which would then permit the Fifth Corps to move to the left and, “if the enemy did not attack me, to make an attack myself from the left.” In refuting Butterfield’s accusations, Meade gave the committee his first inclination that he had actually considered making offensive movements from his left (i.e. along Sickles’ front.) Meade’s final appearance was brief but convincing, and he received favorable coverage in the papers for his effort.41
Henry Hunt appeared later that same day. Although Hunt was highly competent as an artillery officer, Meade was playing with potentially dangerous allies, since Hunt was a friend of George McClellan. Around 11:00 a.m. on July 2, Hunt testified, Meade ordered him to accompany Sickles on an examination of “his line, or the line that he wanted to occupy.… I think he [Meade] added that General Sickles had no good position for his artillery.” This contradicted Meade’s claim that he was completely unaware of Sickles’ intention to move to a new position. But countering Sickles’ testimony that he had advanced with Hunt’s approval, Hunt told the committee that he warned Sickles not to move without further orders from Meade. Hunt claimed that he notified Meade that “taken by itself, it was a very good line; but before putting any troops on it, or occupying it, I would advise him to examine it for himself.”42
On the issue of whether Meade was preparing to retreat, Hunt answered that he did “not think that any order involving the movements of troops could have been given without my knowing it, for the simple reason that the first thing to be provided for in falling back was the movements of heavy trains of ammunition and the reserve artillery.” In fact, Meade’s ordering of the artillery reserve to Gettysburg seemed to prove that retreating was the last thing on his mind. Congressman Loan cross-examined Hunt extensively on whether he could be sure that he was privy to all orders (even “private orders”) issued by Meade, but Hunt held firm. Hunt simply did not accept that such an order could be successfully hidden from the army’s chief of artillery.43 When Hunt was asked whether Sickles’ advance was “judicious… and did advantage or disadvantage result to us from the adoption of that line by him?”, he answered:
That would depend upon circumstances. If the battle was to have been a purely defensive one, based upon the almost certainty that the enemy must attack us, I suppose our policy would have been to have taken up a strictly defensive line. In that case the line should have been extended, as it was ordered, from Cemetery ridge direct to Round Top, along the crest. If there was fear of our left being turned, our line might have been thrown forward to prevent the attempt, but that should have been done by placing it in echelon instead of changing the direction of the line by throwing forward the right flank, as was done of Sickles’ corps. I suppose the occupation of that advanced position compelled the enemy to attack us there, even if they had started to turn our left flank. I do not know enough about the numbers of the troops we had there on our left… to judge what would have been the result of the enemy turning our position… I know it led to a very severe and bloody battle. And it gave great advantages to the enemy on General Sickles’ right flank, for they occupied the wood in front, which I said to him must be in our possession, or at least not occupied by the enemy.
On the whole, I cannot say whether it would have been better or not for him to have remained behind. Excepting on that right flank, it was probably as well to fight there as anywhere else. It would have been well, however, if the general commanding had known of it sooner, so as to dispose of troops behind.44
Historicus, who had the uncanny habit of appearing whenever George Meade took the stand, reappeared in the Herald to answer his critics on April 4. Reminding readers that his “only motive was to aid the future historian,” he dredged up the now familiar list of complaints. Meade had “left [Sickles] without orders” because Meade was “entirely engrossed with the plans for a retreat.” Claiming that “nothing was easier than to force Lee’s whole army to an unconditional surrender at Williamsport,” Meade was accused of “inglorious failure… to profit by his victory in pursuing and destroying the enemy.” Historicus also asserted once again that the Third Corps “was posted on the Little Roundtop.… This is a mere quibble and unworthy of the gravity of the subject.” As evidence that Zook’s brigade had tramped over Tilton and Sweitzer’s prone men, Historicus quoted from “a private letter from General Birney, which he will not object I am sure, to my using.” More importantly, the access to a private letter from Birney surely seemed strong proof that Sickles was pulling Historicus’ strings, and perhaps actually operating his pen. Meade was sure that the recipient of this letter could not have been “anyone but Sickles.” Although Meade remained disappointed that Lincoln had “avoided” his request to confront Sickles, he felt confident that his own April 4 testimony proved that he never intended to retreat. Meade also believed that he had a supporter in General Grant, who “talked very freely and properly about my particular friends Hooker, Sickles, and Butterfield.”45
Despite the committee’s best efforts, Meade still had an army to run. What had been rumored for weeks became reality on March 23 when the War Department issued orders formally reorganizing the Army of the Potomac into three infantry corps. Retained were the Second Corps (still under Hancock), the Fifth Corps (now under Gouverneur Warren), and the Sixth Corps (still under Sedgwick). As expected, Sickles’ Third Corps, along with the First Corps, was dismantled and rolled into the other surviving corps. (The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps had already been sent to the Western Theater.) David Birney’s Third Corps division now became Hancock’s Third Division, while Humphreys’ former division became Hancock’s Fourth Division. Shortly afterward, however, this division was rolled under Birney, to the effect that David Birney essentially had command of the remainder of the old Third Corps. Meade found personal satisfaction at seeing the demise, in his words, “of the smashed up Third Corps.” Sickles and friends had worked overtime in an effort to orchestrate Meade’s ouster, but Meade had survived long enough to axe Sickles’ beloved corps.46
For his part, Birney agreed that the army was now “more compact, fewer poor generals, and now easily handled.” Historicus’ inclusion of the private Birney letter, however, removed any lingering doubts about Birney’s loyalties. Unfortunately for him, Sickles was gone, there would be no return to the Third Corps, Meade was still in command, and Birney now served under one of Meade’s allies. For Birney, the situation could not have been more awkward. He accepted service under Hancock, whom he considered a “very great improvement” over French. Hancock tried to smooth things over by sending Birney the Third Corps colors to keep as their “proper custodian.” Meade also received word that Barnes had a letter from Birney denying any connection with Historicus. In early April, Birney visited Hancock to disclaim “being a partisan of Sickles.” Hancock attempted to intercede with Meade on Birney’s behalf, but Meade replied that he had “heard nothing” to justify an explanation “except what I had seen in the papers about his testimony.”47
Regarding Birney, Meade told his wife, “I don’t consider him a reliable man & think the less I have to do with him the better. There is always an issue… between us about Fredericksburg.” Meade did a
gree to meet with Birney on April 18. According to Meade, Birney “disclaimed ever having entertained unfriendly feelings towards me, or being a partisan of Sickles, and expressed the hope that he would be permitted to serve under me.” Meade “listened to all he had to say, but made no reply, except that I had never heard he had any unfriendly feelings towards me.” Afterward, Birney wrote friends, “I am again on very pleasant terms with Gen. Meade.” Birney described a “quite pleasant” meeting in which he offered to resign, but Meade “assured me of his high regard” and asked that he remain. Quickly changing his loyalties, Birney now boasted that the Second Corps was “now the handsomest, most completely equipped in the army.” It is ironic that Meade had once been viewed as hopelessly outmatched in dealing with Sickles and his political machinery, but now that Dan’s hopes for a return had vanished, his supporters were left to grovel for their survival.48
The fall of the Third Corps began with the heavy casualties it suffered at Chancellorsville, followed by its decimation at Gettysburg. The corps’ death occurred not on a battlefield, but in a series of paper shuffles. “It was a heavy blow to veterans of the old 3rd Corps to sink their identity in another body,” one soldier admitted, “but… there are no troops in the Army of the Potomac who wouldn’t feel proud to fight under Hancock.” Hancock seems to have felt somewhat differently. He complained that the old Third Corps performed picket duty very poorly, and at least one Hancock biographer has uncharitably commented, “In truth, the Third Corps under Sickles had become a slipshod outfit.”49
It is easy for historians to criticize Sickles and the Third Corps, but the organization Hancock inherited was no longer Sickles’. Dan had been gone for nearly nine months. Much of the corps he had led had been killed or maimed on the fields of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Major General William H. French had taken the corps after Sickles, and had fattened its roster with garrison troops, unused to the rigors of campaign life. Sickles’ former officers detested serving under French and accused him, among other things, of being a chronic drunk. Birney wrote privately that French “is drunk every afternoon, lately screeching drunk, jealous of everyone in his command, conceited easily, is a Marylander without any heart in the cause and is only sustained by the West Point guild. He is hated by the corps.” Joseph Carr, a brigade commander under French, claimed that the corps’ demise was assured by French berating Meade in a drunken rage during the Mine Run campaign. De Trobriand complained that near French “a glass and a bottle of whiskey appeared to be on the table en permanence [emphasis in original].” The manner in which French “exercised his new authority was not calculated to render him popular.” Sickles’ Third Corps may have been deficient in military training at the top, but despite its lack of battlefield success at Chancellorsville or Gettysburg, Sickles had at least created a fighting spirit among its veterans. To Regis de Trobriand, the replacements in French’s tenure never represented the real Third Corps, “the veterans of Sickles.” For whatever his battlefield flaws may have been, Sickles was a leader who was beloved by many of his men.50