17. Marcot, “Berdan Sharpshooters at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine1, 39; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 101.
18. See Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,101–102. Harry Pfanz argued that the morning skirmishing should have left “no doubt that there were Confederates in Spangler’s Woods…Thus the only new information that Berdan’s men could have provided was that the Confederates in some force were moving into the north end of Pitzer’s Woods. Berdan might have assumed more and told a greater tale, but that is all his expedition uncovered and all he could rightly report. He could have seen nothing of Longstreet’s corps, for it was out of his sight. His force might have delayed Wilcox’s brigade in occupying its position on Anderson’s right, but this was a meaningless achievement.… ” The point is that the entire Third Corps leadership“assumed more”—they assumed that the discovery confirmed Confederate movements toward their left. Ironically, although Sickles assumption was based on a discovery of Wilcox instead of Longstreet, the conclusion reached was essentially correct. Confederates were planning an attack on his left.
19. Sickles, “Introduction,” in Lee and Longstreet at High Tide, 23–24.
20. Ibid. Longstreet later that he abandoned secrecy because he believed he may have been seen near Black Horse Tavern by the Union signal station on Little Round Top. “It seemed to me useless, therefore, to delay the troops any longer with the idea of concealing the movement, and the two divisions advanced.” If true, why did Longstreet countermarch his column?. Longstreet, “Lee’s Right Wing at Gettysburg,” Battles and Leaders, 3: 340.
21. OR27/1: 483, 486.
22. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 187–188; OR27/1: 531–532, 558–559; Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, 192.
23. OR27/1: 533; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 10–15.
24. OR27/1: 483, 531, Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 187–189.
25. Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 2: 1194; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,214; Byrne and Weaver, Haskell of Gettysburg, 117; Favill, Diary of a Young Army Officer, 245.
26. Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 3: 1354.
27. Byrne and Weaver, Haskell of Gettysburg,117. It must be said, that despite Haskell’s posturing against non-professional political soldiers, Haskell was an “amateur” himself. Prior to the war, Haskell had been an attorney and fledgling local political candidate in Wisconsin. Perhaps Haskell’s resentment against politicals such as Sickles resulted from the differences in rank. See Byrne and Weaver, 2–16.
28. Rafferty, “Gettysburg,” in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion, 7–8.
29. OR27/1: 581–582.
30. Tremain, Two Days of War, 104.
31. OR27/1: 483; Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns, 101–102; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 10–15.
32. OR27/1: 520, 582; Styple, Our Noble Blood,116; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two,10–15; Jorgensen, The Wheatfield at Gettysburg: A Walking Tour,30–31.
33. Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Rebellion,169–170; Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers,119; Scott, History of the One Hundred and Fifth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers,82; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two,10–15.
34. Imhof, Gettysburg DayTwo, 12–17; Scott, History of the One Hundred and Fifth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers,82; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1: 193.
35. Rafferty, “Gettysburg,” in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion, 6–8, 10–11.
36. McLaws, “Gettysburg,” in SHSP, 7:69–71.
37. OR27/2: 298–299, 308–309.
38. Ibid., 27/2: 318–319.
39. Ibid., 27/2: 358–359. Calef’s battery had been stationed near the Peach Orchard in the morning, and Judson Clark’s battery had also been placed in advance of Cemetery Ridge. It’s plausible that either battery could have been referred to by Lee.
40. Ibid., 27/2: 318–319.
41. Ibid., 27/2: 358–359; Cooksey, “Up The Emmitsburg Road,” Gettysburg Magazine26,50 52. Cooksey notes that too many historians make the mistake of using information that was unavailable to Lee to decipher his plans. The question is less a matter of where the Union line actually was, and more a question of where Lee thoughtthe line was. Anyone who has ever stood in front of the present-day North Carolina monument can see the increasingly deceptive terrain as the Emmitsburg Road winds south. While apparent to modern students, who spend countless hours walking the field and debating the battle, we need to remember that Lee and Longstreet had been on the ground for less than 24 hours when they formulated their July 2 attack.
42. Oeffinger, A Soldier’s General, 195–196.
43. OR27/2: 367–368.
44. Ibid., 27/2: 367–368.
45. Ibid., 27/2: 367–368; Oeffinger, A Soldier’s General,195–196; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, 3:118.
46. OR27/2: 375, 429.
47. Ibid., 27/2: 380.
48. Ibid.,27/2: 358–359; Cooksey, “Up The Emmitsburg Road,” Gettysburg Magazine26, 45–48. Cooksey proposed that the Confederates probably believed that the Union line ended along the Emmitsburg Road somewhere between the Rogers and Codori houses. In this scenario, the original plan called for McLaws to deploy in the low ground just south of the Peach Orchard before sweeping up the Emmitsburg Road.
49. OR27/2: 308–309, 318–320, 359.
50. Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3:300.
51. Sauers, Gettysburg: The Meade-Sickles Controversy, 155–156. Sauers seems to have accepted the premise that Lee believed Meade’s line ended on Cemetery Ridge, not on the Emmitsburg Road.
52. Cooksey, “Up The Emmitsburg Road,” Gettysburg Magazine26, 49; Imhof, Gettysburg: Day Two, 17.
53. Longstreet, “Lee’s Right Wing at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3:340–341.
54. McLaws, “Gettysburg,” in SHSP, 7:72; Oeffinger, A Soldier’s General,195–196; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 152–153; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 366–367.
55. OR27/2: 367–368, 372. The report of Major R. C. Maffett of Kershaw’s 3rd South Carolina further confirmed Kershaw’s “swing toward the Peach Orchard” objective.
Chapter 8: Isn’t Your Line Too Much Extended?
1. OR27/3: 1086; Meade, Life and Letters, 2: 71–72.
2. OR27/1: 72.
3. Ibid., 27/1: 467–468; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,253–255; Meade, Life and Letters,2: 181–183; Coughenour, “Assessing the Generalship of George G. Meade During the Gettysburg Campaign,” Gettysburg Magazine28, 34.
4. OR27/1: 467–468; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 253–254.
5. Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 297–301.
6. Sickles, “Further Recollections of Gettysburg,” in North American Review,265.
7. Meade, Life and Letters,2: 72–73; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,168; Toombs, New Jersey Troops, 199; Biddle, “General Meade at Gettysburg,” in The Annals of the War, 211.
8. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 44. Henry Tremain also contributed to the confusion over the chain of events that led up to Sickles being summoned to headquarters at 3:00 p.m. Tremain said that, following Berdan’s reconnaissance, Tremain had been sent to headquarters for yet another status report. In this meeting, Tremain said that the conversation primarily centered on the need for more artillery in the new position. If Tremain is to be believed, then Meade authorized the drawing of artillery from the Artillery Reserve, but incredibly there was no further discussion on why this was needed. Tremain returned to the Peach Orchard, where he now discovered Hood’s division crossing the Emmitsburg Road to the south! Sickles supposedly sent Tremain to headquarters once again, and this time Meade responded by summoning Sickles to headquarters. Tremain returned to Sickles, but to Tremain, Meade’s invitation did not seem urgent, so Sickles declined the request! It was not until two more couriers arrived from Meade that Sickles finally realized that he must report to headquarters. While H
arry Pfanz admits that Tremain is unfortunately the only available source for this remarkable chain of meetings, he seems to have accepted it as the correct series of events. See Tremain, Two Days of War, 54–61 and Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,138–139. In contrast, Edwin Coddington has Sickles completely skipping the 3:00 p.m. meeting. In Coddington’s version, Meade visited the left flank shortly before 4:00 m. to supervise posting of the Fifth Corps and, finally, to inspect Sickles’ position. Meade was stunned to see where Sickles was posted, and summoned him directly on the field. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign,344–345. The version supported by Coddington is consistent with Meade’s Congressional testimony and Meade’s report. Author Bill Hyde, in examining the Congressional testimony, speculates that Meade omitted the particulars of the 3:00 p.m. meeting either because he knew it could be used to portray him as timid and indecisive, or he may have simply forgotten the incident. See Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 107–109. Captain George Meade admitted the meeting in Life and Letters. See Meade, Life and Letters, 2: 72–73.
9. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,44; Meade, Life and Letters,2:72–73; Tremain, Two Days of War, 60–61; Sickles, “Further Recollections of Gettysburg,” in North American Review, 265–266.
10. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 44; Tremain, Two Days of War, 62; Toombs, New Jersey Troops, 195.
11. Meade, Life and Letters,2: 72–73; Trudeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage,320; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 388.
12. Meade, Life and Letters, 2: 72–73; OR27/1: 116.
13. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 108.
14. Meade, Life and Letters, 2:78–79. In James Biddle’s version, Sickles offered to withdraw and Meade replied that the enemy would not allow it. Before he finished the sentence, Longstreet’s artillery opened. See Biddle, “General Meade at Gettysburg,” in The Annals of the War, 211.
15. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 44–45.
16. Ibid. 45.
17. Undated Newspaper Clipping, J. Howard Wert Scrapbook, Battle of Gettysburg, Vol. 3, #34, 7, ACHS; Sickles, “Further Recollections of Gettysburg,” in North American Review,266; Tremain, Two Days of War, 62–63, 104.
18. Meade, Life and Letters, 2:68.
19. Rafferty, “Gettysburg,” in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion, 12. For a thorough defense of Meade’s role, see Downs, “His Left Was Worth a Glance,” in Gettysburg Magazine7, 29–40.
20. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,168; Norton, Attack and Defense of Little Round Top, 308–311; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign,388, 740 (n. 206); Desjardins, Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine, 36.
21. Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, 193; Meade, Life and Letters, 2: 82–83; Woods, “Humphreys’ Division’s Flank March To Little Round Top,” Gettysburg Magazine6, 59.
22. Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, 193–194; Woods, “Humphreys’ Division’s Flank March To Little Round Top,” Gettysburg Magazine6, 60. Humphreys later told an acquaintance that “My official report is of course a lifeless affair, an exact statement of facts which have a certain value, but that which makes the thrilling interest of a battle is the personal incident, and of that I could, if I had leisure, tell a good deal.… ” See Humphreys, 194.
23. Alexander, “The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3: 359–360; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,303; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 72–73, 81.
24. Alexander, “The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 359; Alexander, Military Memoirs, 395.
25. Alexander, Military Memoirs, 395; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,41–44; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,160; Coco, A Concise Guide to the Artillery at Gettysburg,55. Murray’s excellent study of the Peach Orchard artillery fight concludes that Alexander began with only eleven of Henry’s guns and fourteen of Cabell’s deployed. Murray assumes Alexander had a total of fifty-nine at his disposal, a minor discrepancy from Alexander’s own estimate of fifty-four. Given the amount of attention, or lack of, devoted to the July 2 artillery battle, there is frequently a discrepancy in the number of guns that Alexander actually deployed. Alexander wrote in Military Memoirs(395) that he opened with thirty-six guns against the Peach Orchard and ten additional guns “against the enemy’s left.” Several modern studies, such as Greg Coco’s A Concise Guide to the Artillery at Gettysburg(55–56), follow the lead and have Alexander initiate the assault with thirty-six guns (from Cabell’s and his own battalion) and accepts Alexander’s total of fifty-four. The Federal and Confederate primary accounts confirm that there was no, or minimal, Confederate artillery on Barksdale’s front west of the Peach Orchard when the action began. But regardless of the exact numbers, it seems apparent that at no point did Alexander have all of his guns in play.
26. OR27/1: 504, 581–582, 586–587; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,46, 48; Toombs, New Jersey Troops,201; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,2:843; Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns, 101–102.
27. OR27/1: 234–235; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 303–304; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 50.
28. OR27/1: 900; Ames, History of Battery G,62–63; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 51; Coco, A Concise Guide to the Artillery at Gettysburg, 26.
29. Ames, History of Battery G,64–67; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 52–53.
30. Messent and Courtney, Civil War Letters of Joseph Hopkins Twichell, 248.
31. Bigelow, The Peach Orchard, 11.
32. Ibid., 52; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 58–60.
33. Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,1: 167; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 65–71.
34. OR27/1: 235, 887; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,3: 1788; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 66–67.
35. Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 3: 1788.
36. Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry,169–170; Toombs, New Jersey Troops,205–206; Woods, “Humphreys’ Division’s Flank March to Little Round Top,” Gettysburg Magazine6, 60.
37. OR27/1: 582, 589–590, 900; Alexander, “The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3:359; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 50, 54–55, 57; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 133, 154.
38. Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,55; Alexander, “The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3:359.
39. OR27/1: 235, 582, 887, 900; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1: 167, 2: 844; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 65–67.
40. OR27/1: 498–499, 500, 502, 504, 901; 27/2: 432; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,55–56; Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry,170–174; Charles Graham account, February 16, 1865, Participants File 5, GNMP; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg,1: 356; Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers,121; Scott, History of the One Hundred and Fifth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers,82.
41. Brown, History of the Third Regiment, Excelsior Brigade,104; Rafferty, “Gettysburg,” in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion,23; Campbell, “Remember Harper’s Ferry,” Gettysburg Magazine7, 63.
42. OR27/1: 235, 532, 590, 881, 890; 27/2: 636; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg,2:910; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,1: 607; Toombs, New Jersey Troops,202; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,67–71. Captain Thompson said at the battery’s monument dedication that he actually relieved Ames’ battery, and took the position that Ames had formerly occupied. See Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 2:910.
43. Alexander, “The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at
Gettysburg,” Battles and Leader, 3: 359–360; OR27/2: 375; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,72–77, 81–88. Murray’s study assumes the following Confederate guns were not deployed during the assault itself: McCarthy (two guns), Bachman (four guns), Garden (four guns), Woolfolk (four guns), and Jordan (four guns). Woolfolk and Jordan were, however, later called out of reserve. The Federal totals assume deployments for: Turnbull (six guns), Seeley (six guns), Thompson (six guns), Bucklyn (six guns), Ames (six guns), Hart (four guns), Clark (six guns), Phillips (six guns), Bigelow (six guns), and Smith (four guns).
44. OR27/1: 242; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,88–89. Alexander thought Hood attacked “perhaps” thirty minutes after the artillery began; i.e. about 4:15. See Alexander, Military Memoirs, 395.
Chapter 9: The “Key” of the Battleground
1. New York at Gettysburg, 1:42; Sickles, in “Further Recollections of Gettysburg,” North American Review.
2. From Oates’ “The War Between the Union and the Confederacy,” quoted in Norton, Attack and Defense of Little Round Top,80; New York at Gettysburg,2:868; Jorgensen, “John Haley’s Personal Recollections of the Battle of the Wheatfield,” The Gettysburg Magazine27, 69–70.
3. OR27/1: 202.
4. Hood to Longstreet, June 28, 1875, in SHSP, 4: 148–150; Meade, Life and Letters2:80. Longstreet’s motives in continuing the attack can be interpreted in a number of ways. His persistence with both Hood and McLaws may have simply been a case of his realizing that the afternoon was slipping away. Historian Robert K. Krick, a known Longstreet detractor, attaches more sinister motives to Longstreet’s actions. “To alter it would be to impair the lesson Lee needed to learn.” See Krick, “James Longstreet and the Second Day,”in The Second Day at Gettysburg,75. Porter Alexander wrote that it was unlikely that Hood’s proposal “would have accomplished much9.” Noting that Lee’s exterior line was being stretched beyond its limits, “Had our army been more united and able to follow up the move in force, it might have proved a successful one.” See Alexander, Military Memoirs, 394.
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