James A. Hessler
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5. Fox, New York at Gettysburg, 1:44–45; Trudeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage,332; Toombs, New Jersey Troops, 202.
6. OR27/2: 367–368, 404, 614, 618; Alexander, Military Memoirs,393–394; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign,384; Cooksey, “Around the Flank: Longstreet’s July 2 Attack at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine29, 104–105.
7. OR27/2: 358, 372; Longstreet, “Lee’s Right Wing at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 341; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox,369.
8. Law, “The Struggle for ‘Round Top’, in Battles and Leaders, 3:323; New York at Gettysburg, 1:45, 2:868; Norton, Attack and Defense,255–256; OR27/1: 493, 515–516; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,2: 767; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den,23–24; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign,386.
9. OR27/1: 493, 588; 27/2: 392, 404; Norton, Attack and Defense,256–257; Desjardin, Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine,41; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,1: 36–37, 498; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3:305; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den,22, 135–137; Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns,102–103, 136; Fox, New York at Gettysburg,1:46. Both Hunt and Captain Smith agreed later that Smith’s current battery monument is inaccurately placed. Some historians have traditionally placed Smith between modern-day Sickles Avenue and the so-called “Triangular Field,” but historians Tim Smith and Gary Adelman make a convincing case that Smith’s four guns were actually on the ridge’s crest near the present-day 99th Pennsylvania monument. In a historical sketch of the 99th Pennsylvania, C. H. Fasnacht said that Smith’s battery was to the right of the monument. See Fasnacht, Historical Sketch 99th Pennsylvania, 10.
10. OR27/1: 493, 511, 522, 589; 27/2: 404–405, 407–408; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den, 26–32; Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns,102–103; De Trobriand, Four Years With the Army of the Potomac, 496; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1:36–37.
11. Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns, 104, 139; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den,31; OR27/1: 588–589; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1:36–37.
12. OR27/1: 493, 513, 588–589; 27/2: 393–396; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den,32–35, 38–42; Fasnacht, Historical Sketch 99th Pennsylvania,10; Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns, 105; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg,1:538; Murray, Letters from Gettysburg,86. Smith was able to remove one piece from Houck’s Ridge to prevent its capture.
13. DiNardo, “James Longstreet, the Modern Soldier,” in James Longstreet: The Man, The Soldier, The Controversy, 38; Alexander, Military Memoirs, 395; Wert, General James Longstreet,311.
14. OR27/1: 493, 513, 526–527, 570–571, 577–578; 27/2: 408–409, 414–415, 422; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,1: 117, 374, 498; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den,43–52; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two,68–69, 85; Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses,245, 281; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 1:538; Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns,104–105; Toombs, New Jersey Troops,213–215; Fasnacht, Historical Sketch 99th Pennsylvania,11; Law, “The Struggle for ‘Round Top’, in Battles and Leaders,3:324. Evander Law thought in his Battles and Leadersaccount that it had only taken slightly less than one hour for Devil’s Den to fall.
15. Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns,106–108, 154–155; OR27/1: 526–527, 577–578, 589; 27/2: 416, 424–425; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den,51; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,1:36–37; Toombs, New Jersey Troops, 215.
16. Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 245, 280–281; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den, 24. The 3, 000 to 2, 300 differential does not include any participation by G.T. Anderson’s brigade, which was comparatively minimal. Nor does it include the flank fire of the 17th Maine in the Wheatfield.
17. OR27/1: 116, 592.
18. Ibid., 27/1: 483; Tremain, Two Days of War, 67.
19. OR27/1: 592.
20. Sickles, “Further Recollections of Gettysburg,” in North American Review,266; Ranald Mackenzie to George Meade, March 22, 1864, quoted in Norton, Attack and Defense,292. The fact that Sickles played into his critics’ hands and was forced to address criticism of his inability to occupy Little Round Top is more proof that he realized it was an important position. Mackenzie, for his part, would achieve post-war renown as an Indian fighter in the 4th U.S. Cavalry.
21. Sickles, “Further Recollections of Gettysburg,” in North American Review,266; OR 27/1:600–601; Norton, Attack and Defense,263–264; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,207–208; Woods, “Humphreys’ Division’s Flank March To Little Round Top,” Gettysburg Magazine6, 60–61; Trudeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, 326.
22. Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses,59–60; Norton, Attack and Defense,296; OR27/1: 600–601; Desjardins, Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine,34–36; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps,39–41; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,207–208; Gottfried, Brigades of Gettysburg, 235–241; Raver, “An Investigation Into the Route Taken From Rock Creek to Little Round Top,” Gettysburg Magazine27, 52–64. Sweitzer had an estimated 1423 in his brigade on July 2, but that included approximately 412 men of the 9th Massachusetts infantry, who were on picket duty on the Union right. See Busey and Martin, 60.
23. Law, “The Struggle for ‘Round Top’, in Battles and Leaders,3: 322; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,1: 243–244, 465, 3:1928; OR27/1: 617, 623–624; Norton, Attack and Defense,258–260; Vanderslice, Gettysburg: Then and Now,152–156; Fox, New York at Gettysburg,1:45; Fletcher, Rebel Private: Front and Rear,79; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two,117–118, 120–121; Desjardin, Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine, 42.
24. OR51/1: 201; Tremain, Two Days of War, 76–77.
25. Norton, Attack and Defense,259–260, 310–311; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,1: 243–244, 465, 2: 894–897, 3:1928; OR27/1: 623–624, 651–652; Fox, New York at Gettysburg,1:45; Vanderslice, Gettysburg: Then and Now,152–156; Fletcher, Rebel Private: Front and Rear,79. Col. Kenner Garrard, filing the report for Weed’s brigade, wrote that the brigade (minus the 140th New York) “were led to the right and front some distance, and formed in line in a narrow valley to support a portion of the Third Corps and Watson’s battery, then severely pressed by the enemy. Before becoming engaged, however, orders were received for these regiments to return at double-quick to Round Top ridge, and secure and hold that position.” See OR27/1: 651–652.
26. OR27/1: 593; Sykes statement to Porter Farley, quoted in Norton, Attack and Defense, 294–295.
27. Warren to Porter Farley, July 13, 1872, quoted in Norton, Attack and Defense,310–311; Fletcher, Rebel Private: Front and Rear,80; Vanderslice, Gettysburg: Then and Now,152–156; OR27/2: 415
28. OR27/2: 424–425, 462; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den, 54.
29. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, 346; Norton, Attack and Defense,13; OR 27/1: 617.
30. Norton, Attack and Defense, 295. It is not this author’s intention to debate whether or not Little Round Top was the “key” to the Union cause, as many have written. There were many pivotal moments in this battle. But the actions of many Union and Confederate participants confirm that those present at the battle considered Little Round Top to be a critical position, certainly one worth attacking and defending. See Gary Adelman’s The Myth of Little Round Topfor a full discussion on historically changing interpretations of Little Round Top’s importance.
31. OR27/1: 592–593. While Sykes said in his report that Birney did close to the left as requested, Sykes later said that his report was in error and “Birney did not close the gap I asked him to, near the battery on the left of his line.” See Norton, Attack and Defense, 293–295.
32. OR27/1: 601.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 27/1: 593, 607, 610–611; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two,74–75; Jorgensen, Gettysburg’s Bloody Wheatfield,64–69; Meade, Life and Letters,2:332–335; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers,3: 1672; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two,61–64; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,246. Jorgensen’s conclusion was that Barnes was on Stony Hill in time for Anderson’s initial assault. For an opposing interpretation, Imhof conclude
s, using Tilton’s account, that they clearly did not participate in Anderson’s first assault.
Chapter 10: Gross Neglect or Unaccountable Stupidity
1. OR 27/1: 519–520, 524, 571; De Trobriand, Four Years With the Army of the Potomac, 497; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 53, 65, 69; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The First Day, 140.
2. Jorgensen, “John Haley’s Personal Recollections of the Battle of the Wheatfield,” Gettysburg Magazine 27, 71; OR 27/1: 587; Jorgensen, Gettysburg’s Bloody Wheatfield, 37.
3. OR 27/2: 396–397, 399, 403; 27/1: 522, 881; Jorgensen, The Wheatfield at Gettysburg: A Walking Tour, 7–8; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 69.
4. Oeffinger, A Soldier’s General, 196; McLaws, “Gettysburg,” in SHSP, 7:73; Alexander, Military Memoirs, 395; Law, “The Struggle for ‘Round Top’, in Battles and Leaders, 3: 325; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 370; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 403, 749 (n.104). Coddington thought that a one hour estimate seemed “excessive,” but given the amount of time needed for Law, Robertson, Benning, and Anderson to advance and in some cases make repeated attacks, one hour is probably not too far off of the mark.
5. OR 27/2: 367–368, 372; Kershaw, “Kershaw’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3:332–334; Cooksey, “Around the Flank: Longstreet’s July 2 Attack at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine 29, 100–102.
6. OR 27/2: 367; Kershaw, “Kershaw’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3:333–334; Alexander, Military Memoirs, 397.
7. OR 27/1: 881–882, 887, 901; 27/2: 368, 372; Alexander, Military Memoirs, 397; Ames, History of Battery G, 66–67; Kershaw, “Kershaw’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3:334–336; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1:167, 172; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 315–316.
8. OR 27/1: 236, 583–584, 660, 901; Ames, History of Battery G, 73–74; 120th New York file, Robert Brake Collection, USAMHI; Hunt to Bachelder, January 6, 1866, in Ladd, Bachelder Papers, 1:228; Imhof, Gettysburg: Day Two, 147; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 317. Watson’s battlefield tablet (which is incorrectly located due to the postwar development of modern United States Avenue) states that the battery arrived on the field about 4:30 p.m. and first took position north of Little Round Top: “[At] 5:30 moved to the front at the Peach Orchard.” Thompson’s battery is sometimes cited as Ames’ actual replacement (see Georg, The Sherfy Farm and the Battle of Gettysburg, 14 as an example.) Thompson ended up in the Peach Orchard and appears to have been in position for at least an hour before the position collapsed. If Ames’ reported 5:30 p.m. departure time is accurate, his replacement would have been in position for less than one hour when the orchard fell, making Thompson problematic as the replacement. On the other hand, reported times during the Civil War were frequently unreliable. See Murray, E. P. Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard, 97–98, for a discussion on Thompson. Ultimately, Pfanz (317) placed Watson in the orchard; Imhof (147) did not. Thanks to Licensed Battlefield Guide George Newton for alerting this author to the existence of Hunt’s 1866 letter to Bachelder in which Hunt admitted “the error in the position of Watson’s Battery” in Hunt’s report.
9. OR 27/1: 236, 659–660; Sykes to Porter Farley, quoted in Norton, Attack and Defense, 294–295.
10. Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, 170–171, 177–178; Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, 120; OR 27/1: 504–505, 508; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 110.
11. OR 27/1: 483, 520–521; 27/2: 368; Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, 178; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 101–102.
12. De Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, 497–498; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two,
101. Not that de Trobriand’s versions are above scrutiny. Robert Carter, who fought in the 22nd Massachusetts, later wrote that de Trobriand’s accounts were “calculative without further explanation, to mislead any reader of the history of the battle unacquainted with the true facts.” See Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 3: 1671–1672.
13. OR 27/1: 132–133; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1: 172, 3: 1671–1672; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 1: 383, 2: 634; Parker, History of the Twenty-Second Massachusetts, 334–335.
14. OR 27/1: 601.
15. Ibid., 27/1: 607–608. Historians have generally laid the blame completely on Barnes. See Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 102 for example. “Tilton asked General Barnes for permission to withdraw—permission that was immediately granted.” But Tilton’s own report indicates that he was given discretion to determine when best to retreat and that he executed this discretion.
16. Ibid., 27/1: 611.
17. De Trobriand, Four Years With the Army of the Potomac, 498–500; Jorgensen, “John Haley’s Personal Recollections of the Battle of the Wheatfield,” Gettysburg Magazine 27, 71; OR 27/1: 520, 522–523; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 2:849; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 104.
18. OR 27/1: 369, 483; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 2: 1195; Hartwig, “No Troops on the Field Had Done Better,” in The Second Day at Gettysburg, 146.
19. Byrne and Weaver, Haskell of Gettysburg, 120
20. Kershaw, “Kershaw’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3: 335–336; Ladd, Bachelder Papers, 1:472, 2: 1195; Hartwig, “No Troops on the Field Had Done Better,” in The Second Day at Gettysburg, 137–141; Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 241–242; Vanderslice, Gettysburg Then and Now, 159–160.
21. De Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, 500–501; OR 27/1: 522–523; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 109; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 2: 1059; Styple, Our Noble Blood, 116–117.
22. OR 27/1: 483; Rafferty, “Gettysburg,” in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion, 22–23; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 97; Gottfried, Brigades of Gettysburg, 121–123; Hartwig, “No Troops on the Field Had Done Better,” in The Second Day at Gettysburg, 155–156; Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 241–242; Tagg, The Generals of Gettysburg, 41–42.
23. Tremain, Two Days of War, 81–84; Hartwig, “No Troops on the Field Had Done Better,” The Second Day at Gettysburg, 155–156. Hartwig noted that “such acts can just as well lose battles.”
24. Favill, Diary of a Young Army Officer, 245.
25. OR 27/1: 483.
26. Ibid., 27/1: 394, 396–397; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 115.
27. Favill, Diary of a Young Army Officer, 245–248; De Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, 500; OR 27/1: 398; Coco, AStrange and Blighted Land, 199; Gottfried, Brigades of Gettysburg, 133, 63n.
28. OR 27/1: 400–401; Kershaw, “Kershaw’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3: 335–337; Hartwig, “No Troops on the Field Had Done Better,” in The Second Day at Gettysburg, 159–163; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 2:1141–1143; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 132, 141, 150–151, 154–155, 159–160; Jorgensen, Gettysburg’s Bloody Wheatfield, 104–105.
29. Troop totals are taken from Jorgensen, Gettysburg’s Bloody Wheatfield, 136–142 and Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 241–242, 245.
30. Casualty totals are taken from Jorgensen, Gettysburg’s Bloody Wheatfield, 136–137 and Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 280–282. Kershaw’s totals include some regiments who faced Federal troops in and around the Peach Orchard. Anderson’s totals do not include the 7th Georgia which was detached and suffered only twenty-one casualties out of 377 available for a 5.6% casualty rate. See OR 27/2: 396.
Chapter 11: The Line Before You Must Be Broken
1. McLaws, “Gettysburg,” in SHSP, 7: 72–73; OR 27/2: 430; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 370; Winschel, “Their Supreme Moment: Barksdale’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine 1, 74; Gottfried, Brigades of Gettysburg, 411–412; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 2: 902; Alexander, “The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3:359–360; Alexander, Military Memoirs, 395, 399; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 126.
2. McLaws, “Gettysburg,” in SHSP, 7: 72–74; Winschel, “Their Supreme Moment: Barksdale’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine 1, 74; Gottfried, Brigades of Gettysburg, 412; OR 27/1: 499, 500, 503, 586, 887; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 1:394, 2:606; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1: 480; Haynes, History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire, 179.
3. Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1: 480; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 143; Winschel, “Their Supreme Moment: Barksdale’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine 1, 74; Gottfried, Brigades of Gettysburg, 412.
4. OR 27/1: 498, 502–503, 584,590; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 1: 387, 2: 610–611 ; Toombs, New Jersey Troops, 206–208, 228; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 99–101, 136–137; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1:72–73; Pfanz, Gettysburg The Second Day, 322–323; Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 247; Georg, “The Sherfy Farm and the Battle of Gettysburg,” 14. Kathleen Georg wrote that the 63rd retired “before overwhelming numbers,” which isn’t clear from either their OR or their monument dedication speech. Perhaps the sight of several waves of approaching infantry contributed to their withdrawal. Humphreys said in his report that the 5th New Jersey relieved some of Graham’s pickets who overlapped a portion of Humphreys’ line. It is possible that the 5th’s left took up where the right of the 63rd had ended. But none of this is clear from the 5th New Jersey’s own report. See OR 27/1: 533, 575; Imhof, 47, 139, 141. New Jersey historian Samuel Toombs wrote (1888) that the 5th reported to Humphreys and “was ordered to relieve the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, on picket duty on the Emmetsburg [sic] road.” Toombs recorded that the 5th was subjected to artillery fire for one hour when Barksdale appeared to their left and front. See Toombs, 206–208, 228.
5. OR 27/1: 497, 500, 503; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 1:356, 2:607; Georg, “The Sherfy Farm and the Battle of Gettysburg,” 19; Gottfried, Brigades at Gettysburg, 192.
6. OR 27/1: 498–499; 504–505, 508; Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, 170–171, 177–178; Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, 120; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 110, 143; Bigelow, The Peach Orchard, 11–12; Ladd, Bachelder Papers, 1: 480–481; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 1:394.