B006NTJT4U EBOK

by Jackson, Julian

  By 27 April, Catroux had secured a compromise agreement for the creation of a single North African body, jointly headed by de Gaulle and Giraud. The next problem was where the first meeting between the two generals would take place. Giraud wanted it out of the limelight, in Biskra; de Gaulle insisted on Algiers. He asked an aide: ‘can you imagine Clovis or Joan of Arc going to Biskra?’42 On 5 May, de Gaulle delivered a violent speech in London, denouncing the French administration in North Africa for the hypocrisy of its ‘Republican declarations under the portrait of the Marshal’. Monnet said he was reminded of the negotiating tactics of Hitler; Catroux cabled that the speech had destroyed the ‘web I have patiently constructed’.43 De Gaulle sounded a more conciliatory note in a message on 7 May. The final obstacles were overcome by Macmillan and Monnet who pushed Giraud to give more ground. He agreed to the setting up of a committee jointly chaired by de Gaulle and himself, with seven members, two named by de Gaulle and two by himself, and the other three to be decided subsequently. On 17 May, Giraud handed Catroux a letter confirming that he was ready to allow de Gaulle to come to Algiers. De Gaulle accepted the terms, and left for Algiers on 30 May.

  Because Giraud’s final retreat occurred immediately after the (premature) announcement of the CNR, it is tempting to assume, as Gaullist mythology asserts, that this was the clinching factor.44 In fact, what really brought Giraud round was the diplomacy of Catroux, Macmillan, and Monnet. The letter which Giraud handed to Catroux had been worked on by Macmillan for several days before the CNR announcement. Macmillan barely mentions the CNR in his account of the negotiations, suggesting only that it threatened to complicate matters at the last moment.45 Given Giraud’s poor view of the Resistance, it seems unlikely that the CNR would have impressed him unduly, especially since there was uncertainty about the authenticity of the message announcing it.46 This uncertainty was substantial enough for de Gaulle himself to send Catroux his ‘word of honour’ that the telegram announcing the CNR was authentic.47

  If Giraud allowed himself to be swayed by Macmillan and Monnet, it was because even he was not so obtuse that he could not recognize de Gaulle’s position was improving all the time. There were defections to the Free French from the North African army. More and more figures in France were rallying to de Gaulle. In March 1943, the important Radical politician Henri Queuille arrived in London; in April, he was followed by the Socialist Pierre Viénot. This does not mean, however, that the CNR was entirely irrelevant to de Gaulle’s success. The knowledge that it was in gestation had encouraged de Gaulle to be even more than usually intransigent in his negotiations with Giraud. He told an envoy from Catroux in May: ‘important things are happening in France about which I will inform you when the time comes; you will have to explain them to General Catroux; he will understand, I hope, the reasons why I have been so firm’.48

  De Gaulle’s arrival in Algiers was far from the end of Giraud. In theory he and de Gaulle were now joint heads of the single National Committee of French Liberation (CFLN). In North Africa, Giraud remained more popular than de Gaulle, and he had the support of the Americans. De Gaulle, on the other hand, was close to losing the support of the British. As he was preparing to leave for Algiers, de Gaulle did not know that Churchill, who was in Washington, had finally succumbed to Roosevelt’s anti-Gaullist barrage. On 21 May, Churchill sent a telegram to Eden, suggesting that it was time to break with de Gaulle. Although the British cabinet rejected this idea two days later, Roosevelt had not given up. On 17 June, while de Gaulle was engaged on the next round of his contest with Giraud, Roosevelt informed Eisenhower, in North Africa, that a break with de Gaulle was likely in the coming days.49

  The break never came, and within six months de Gaulle was sole head of the CFLN. This occurred partly because, although Roosevelt’s animus against de Gaulle remained undiminished, the American military commanders on the ground quickly realized Giraud’s inadequacies. Politically Giraud was no match for de Gaulle, and made the fatal mistake of spending most of July in America to discuss the rearmament of France’s troops. On the CFLN, several of Giraud’s nominees shifted their allegiance to de Gaulle. One of the most important defectors was Jean Monnet, whom the Americans later accused of having betrayed de Gaulle. But Monnet, who found de Gaulle’s personal style antipathetic, had merely bowed to reality. The problem was that by trying to make Giraud more politically acceptable, Monnet had undermined his support among Pétainist loyalists, without winning him corresponding support on the left: once he had become a republican, however unconvincingly, Giraud had no raison d’être.

  The CFLN increasingly took on the appearance of a provisional government. On 26 August, it was recognized by the British as ‘administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority’. The Americans employed a more restrictive form of words. In September 1943, de Gaulle decided to set up a consultative assembly, made up of former politicians and prominent resisters. This body, which met for the first time on 3 November 1943, further increased de Gaulle’s democratic credentials. On 9 November, the CFLN was reshuffled, and Giraud lost his place on it. It was now headed by de Gaulle alone. Giraud retained command of the army, until this too was taken from him in April 1944. Harold Macmillan commented at the end of 1943: ‘I would suppose that never in the whole history of politics has any man frittered away so large a capital in so short a time.’50

  After Caluire: The Resistance Fights Back

  One result of de Gaulle’s absorption in Algerian affairs was that he had less time to devote to the Resistance, and less need of it. Resistance leaders saw an opportunity to recover some independence. Frenay had not lost hope of getting Moulin replaced. He was anxious to go to London and defend his contacts with the OSS in Berne. When Moulin’s revelation of these had reached London, Passy intervened with the Americans to secure an assurance that future funds for the Resistance would be channelled through a representative of de Gaulle not through Frenay’s emissaries. Hearing this news, Frenay wrote on 24 May to his representatives in Berne that if he could not get the decision rescinded, he would ‘take back my full liberty, which would not of course affect my unconditional rallying to de Gaulle as a symbol’. Meanwhile he asked them to sound out whether the Americans would be ready to continue providing funds in the event of a rupture with de Gaulle.51

  There is still dispute today over how serious Frenay was about the possibility of breaking with de Gaulle.52 Not aware of the extent of Washington’s hostility to de Gaulle, Frenay may well have believed that his attempt to secure extra American funding from the Resistance did not necessarily imply disloyalty to de Gaulle. Impulsive and confrontational at the best of times, Frenay was deeply hurt by what he saw as de Gaulle’s bid to take over the Resistance. This made him liable to violent swings of mood, and his political beliefs remained wayward. Although he had evolved politically since 1940, he was still capable of telling one Northern resister at the end of 1942 that he mistrusted the ‘British, Jewish, and Masonic’ influences around de Gaulle.53 On the other hand, he firmly told the Americans in March that their attempt to build up Giraud as an alternative to de Gaulle was unacceptable because only de Gaulle represented the political aspirations of the Resistance.54 Nonetheless, once the two generals had reached an agreement, Frenay saw an opening for himself. Was it not possible that de Gaulle, forced into cohabitation with Giraud on the CFLN, might have to cede some ground to the Resistance? Frenay suggested to Claude Bourdet that Combat’s slogan should be changed from ‘One sole leader, de Gaulle’ to ‘One sole authority, the CFLN’. He hoped to replace Moulin as intermediary between the Resistance and the new French authority in North Africa.55

  Frenay arrived in London on 18 June to pursue his campaign against Moulin. He was not helped by the antipathy his abrasive personality aroused among other resisters. Copeau reported to d’Astier from France that everyone was relieved by the ‘absence of this poor captain who has put everyone’s back up’. While Frenay was in London plotting the elimi
nation of Moulin, Copeau was plotting the elimination of Frenay with Moulin. Claudius-Petit of Franc-Tireur asked Moulin to do what he could to prevent Frenay ever returning to France.56 In fact, within days of Frenay’s arrival in London, his mission became redundant when news arrived that first Delestraint, and then Moulin himself, had been arrested by the Germans.

  Moulin was arrested on 21 June 1943 at a meeting of resisters at Caluire in the suburbs of Lyons. Within three weeks, he was dead after undergoing terrible torture. Moulin’s arrest is one of the unsolved mysteries of the Resistance, but certainly the conditions which made his betrayal possible were not unrelated to the internal rivalries within the Resistance. The trail which led to Moulin’s arrest went back to March when the Germans obtained Resistance documents about the AS. These documents, which were considered sufficiently important for a summary to be sent to Hitler in person, vastly inflated the forces of the AS. On 28 April, the Gestapo arrested a Combat member called Multon who agreed to work for them. Multon’s treachery resulted in the arrest of 120 resisters, among them Bertie Albrecht on 28 May and Delestraint on 6 June. The arrest of the head of the AS was a terrible blow, and it was to discuss the consequences that Moulin called the Caluire meeting.

  Those present at Caluire included René Hardy, a member of Combat. Hardy had been arrested by the Lyons Gestapo chief Klaus Barbie on 7 June, thanks to information provided by Multon. He was quickly released after interrogation; at Caluire, he managed to escape arrest. This luck seemed too good, and several resisters were convinced that Hardy had betrayed Moulin. Some even tried to kill Hardy by sending him a packet of poisoned jam, which he did not open. After the war, Hardy was tried twice (January 1947 and May 1950), and both times acquitted. The presumption of guilt nonetheless remains strong. Two German reports in the summer of 1943 imply that he was working for the Gestapo, although he may have been playing some double game that backfired. The interesting question, however, is why Hardy was present at Caluire at all. Believing that the purpose of the meeting was to designate a replacement for Delestraint, the Combat leaders wanted to be fully represented in the discussions. For this reason, Hardy was sent (without Moulin’s knowledge) to reinforce the other Combat representative, Henri Aubry. The presence of someone who had been in the hands of the Germans was a breach of elementary security, but the rivalries between the movements, and between the movements and Moulin, caused such precautions to be ignored.57

  When the news of these events reached London, Frenay hoped he might be appointed to replace Delestraint. This was never likely. ‘The ructions he could cause in France surpass the imagination’, commented Georges Boris of the Interior Commissariat.58 Frenay was also denied facilities to leave for Algiers to prevent him causing mischief between de Gaulle and Giraud.59 When he did eventually reach Algiers in August, de Gaulle had consolidated his position. Frenay had little choice but to accept a place on the CFLN four months later, as did d’Astier at the same time.60

  The departure of d’Astier and Frenay from France alleviated tension between the Resistance and de Gaulle. Their replacements, Copeau and Bourdet, were less touchy than the founding fathers. At the same time, they had less reason to complain about outside interference because Moulin’s death had changed the balance of power between the Resistance and London/Algiers. Moulin turned out to be almost irreplaceable. On 7 May, he had warned London that he needed more help: ‘If I were to die, I shall not have had the time to prepare my successors.’ This remark was only too prescient. Moulin’s role was filled provisionally by Claude Bouchinet-Serreulles, who had been sent from London to assist him, and arrived just before his arrest. For two months Serreulles did his best to hold the fort. In August, he was joined by Jacques Bingen of BCRA: Serreulles became interim delegate for the North, and Bingen for the South. Others were sent out to assist them, and instead of Moulin’s almost single-handed operation, a team was taking shape. Moulin had been de Gaulle’s single delegate; now there was ‘the Delegation’. Eventually this was a source of strength, but not in the short term: Bingen and Serruelles only enjoyed provisional status and could not match Moulin’s detailed knowledge of the Resistance.

  The most obvious candidate to fill Moulin’s shoes was Brossolette, and there was discussion in London whether he should be appointed to replace him. Brossolette’s candidature was supported by Passy, but opposed by Boris and Philip of the Interior Commissariat, who argued that it would needlessly antagonize the Resistance. Although Brossolette had posed as the champion of the Resistance against Moulin on the matter of political parties, many leading resisters had reservations about him. He was an alarmingly energetic personality, and, as de Menthon remarked, ‘the movements need a period of calm’.61 The quarrel over Moulin’s replacement raged throughout the summer until in September the decision was taken to appoint the former prefect Émile Bollaert.62 Prefectoral rank was all that Bollaert shared with Moulin. He had been chosen largely as a compromise candidate and had little inside knowledge of the Resistance. Having spent the war in France, he had never met de Gaulle. Brossolette, although having lost the battle to replace Moulin, was instructed to return to France and help Bollaert settle into his new position.

  Brossolette now hoped to become the power behind the throne, and this immediately brought him into conflict with Serreulles and Bingen who had been minding the shop. He had a chance to undermine their position only three days after his return to France when Serreulles’s offices in Paris were raided by the Gestapo. Blaming lax security, Brossolette got Passy to instruct his agents to break off contact with Serreulles and Bingen. The feud between the Interior Commissariat and BCRA was now transposed to France itself. In their reports to London, Bingen and Serreulles described Brossolette as ‘mean, cowardly and discredited’, and his influence as ‘unhealthy, if not indeed nefarious’; Brossolette countered by describing Serreulles as a ‘feeble nullity’.63 The situation became so fraught that both Serreulles and Brossolette were ordered back to London at the end of the year.

  Behind these power struggles, one must never forget that these were people living on their nerves, with the prospect of arrest never far away. Pineau wrote of his second visit to London in January 1943: ‘underground life was exhausting for one’s nerves… One became obsessed by the idea of enjoying for a few weeks a real sensation of liberty.’64 Pineau himself was arrested in May 1943; Brossolette was arrested in February 1944, before he could return to London, and he threw himself from a balcony to avoid succumbing to torture; Bingen was arrested in May 1944, and swallowed cyanide. Bollaert was also arrested, in February 1944, before he had had time to consolidate his authority. The conflicts between de Gaulle’s envoys had not assisted his task, but the view of most Resistance leaders was that he lacked the experience to replace Moulin: ‘a functionary for normal times’ was how one described him.65 After Bollaert’s arrest, Bingen again took over as interim delegate until another permanent replacement, Alexandre Parodi, was named at the end of March 1944. For almost nine months, however, there had been no clear authority at the centre.66

  Serreulles, Bingen, and Bollaert suffered from the additional handicap that they went several months without guidance from Algiers or London. Innumerable telegrams asking for instructions went unanswered. They felt isolated, ignored, and forgotten.67 Communication was slow because correspondence with Algiers had to go via London. But it was not only that decisions were not reaching France; they were not being made at all. Decision-making was complicated by the split between Algiers and London. Although the centre of de Gaulle’s operations was now Algiers, there was still a Free French operation in London. The Interior Commissariat was headed in Algiers by André Philip (and then by d’Astier) and in London by Georges Boris; BCRA was headed in Algiers by Passy, and in London by his deputy, André Manuel. This caused much confusion and made it easy to sabotage decisions one did not like. D’Astier discovered that twenty telegrams sent by Bingen and Serreulles to London had never been passed on to him.68

  If de
Gaulle had intervened decisively, he could doubtless have imposed his will, but he now had other priorities besides the Resistance. The CNR had provided democratic legitimacy at a delicate moment, but now this function was performed by the Algiers Consultative Assembly. He told d’Astier: ‘Your [sic] CNR is getting a bit above itself.’69 De Gaulle was also absorbed by the struggle with Giraud in Algiers. Brossolette, seeing him in August, found him ‘95% preoccupied by governmental problems… and only intermittently thinking about action in France’.70 Similarly, Passy, although doing his best to further Brossolette’s interests, was much preoccupied by his power struggle with the former Vichyite intelligence services in Algiers whose primary loyalty was to Giraud. Not until the end of November was this conflict resolved when the two services were merged to become a single intelligence service (DGSS).

  For a variety of reasons, then, de Gaulle’s authority over the Resistance was weakened after Moulin’s death. One of de Gaulle’s envoys talked of a dangerous ‘void at the centre’, Bingen of ‘total stagnation’.71 The Resistance leaders were quick to seize their opportunity. In the North, control of the AS was taken over by a military committee of the movements headed by Colonel Touny; in the South, the movements appointed General Pierre Dejussieu (Pontcarral), a career officer from Combat, to head the general staff of the AS. Meanwhile the CNR moved to elect a new chairman to replace Moulin. At the end of August, the choice fell upon Georges Bidault, who before 1940 had been a journalist for the Christian Democratic newspaper L’Aube. Bidault was a member of both Combat and the FN, but he had also been close to Moulin, having been appointed by him to run the BIP. These many contacts made him an obvious candidate to head the CNR, acceptable both to the Resistance and the Delegation.72 It was dangerous for the CNR to meet regularly, and after its inaugural meeting it only met twice in plenary session before the Liberation. Decisions like the election of Bidault were taken after a protracted process of consultation of individual members. To circumvent this problem, it was decided in September to set up a permanent CNR Bureau empowered to take executive action between meetings. The Bureau had five members representing respectively the MUR (Copeau), the Northern Co-ordinating Committee (Blocq-Mascart), the unions (Louis Saillant), the FN-PCF (Pierre Villon), and the other political parties (Bidault).