The Siege of Derry 1689

by Richard Doherty

  Before learning of the loss of Culmore, the city’s garrison had had several other adventures to the south of the town while two of its officers had been lost in less than auspicious circumstances. These were commanding officers of regiments, the first of whom to go being Colonel Parker, of the Coleraine Regiment. Parker had been accused of being ‘negligent in bringing off a rear-guard of foot, who were suffering severely by the enemy; for which omission, he was to answer before a court-martial’. Rather than face that court martial, Parker deserted and went over to the Jacobites, creating the suspicion that his negligence might have been due to Jacobite sympathies. Parker left the city on the night of 24–25 April.72 Two days later, on the 27th8, Colonel Thomas Whitney, of Hamilton’s Regiment, faced a court martial at which he was found guilty of charges of ‘having sold flour and horses, belonging to the garrison, to a Captain Darcy, who was considered an enemy’.73 (Darcy had been brought to the city from Scotland before the siege as a prisoner by Captain Hamilton; he had fled from England where he had been a known supporter of James II.)74 Whitney was incarcerated in the city for the remainder of the siege. New commanding officers were appointed in place of the pair: Captain Lance took command of the Coleraine Regiment and Captain Murray took over Hamilton’s.75

  Although the Jacobite artillery had discharged the first shots of the siege on 21 April and fired a considerable bombardment on the 24th, they then seem to have suffered a shortage of ammunition with only some thirty rounds expended between the latter date and 4 May. An ammunition shortage is the only plausible explanation for this dearth of activity, which was hardly the artillery programme of a determined siege. Neither had the Jacobite army shown any inclination to build the entrenchments and parallels necessary to bring the artillery close enough to the walls to do serious damage9 and make a breach through which a storming party might enter the city. This was probably due to a lack of the tools needed for the job. Whatever the reason, things changed in the first days of May.

  The Jacobite artillery had opened fire on the 3rd, wounding two men, one of whom lost an arm and the other a leg.77 That night a party of Jacobite soldiers approached the city walls, close to Butcher’s Gate, and opened fire on the sentries. A company of Williamite soldiers under Major Fitzsimons rushed to the spot and engaged the attackers who then withdrew.78 This may have been intended as a prelude, testing the reactions of the defenders, to the next operation carried out by the besiegers.

  The only area outside the walls from which the Jacobite artillery could carry out conventional siege operations – digging parallels and moving their guns closer to the walls – was on the south side, facing Bishop’s Gate. And it was there that they now began to create a parallel. Lundy had established a defensive outwork that ran between Windmill Hill and the Foyle with the windmill that gave the hill its name as the pivotal feature. (The remains of the windmill may still be seen in the grounds of Lumen Christi College, formerly St Columb’s College.) On the night of 5–6 May an attack by a strong force of Jacobite troops, two regiments according to Ash, under the command of Brigadier-General Ramsey seized the windmill from the defenders. The area was held only lightly by outlying picquets who beat a hasty retreat to the protection of the ravelin at Bishop’s Gate. About 2 o’clock in the morning Jacobite troops approached the ravelin and opened fire at the soldiers on the walls. This led to a general alarm as the entire garrison was ordered out to take up battle stations, but the feared escalade of the walls did not materialize.79

  The construction of a parallel was then begun by the Jacobites. According to one Williamite account,

  By the next morning, the enemy had drawn an entrenchment across the hill, near the situation of the Cassino, from the slob or bog in the west, to the river in the east, raised a battery at the Windmill, and planted guns against the City, which proved to be too small to do any great mischief.80

  How had the Jacobites managed to dig such an entrenchment if they were so short of tools? The answer is provided by Mackenzie who tells us that ‘it was old ditches that they quickly made up’.81 Thus the entrenchment was improvized and had not required a large quantity of tools. But the Jacobites now had a new battery, or gun position, from which, according to Walker, they began a bombardment and ‘endeavoured to annoy our walls; but they were too strong for the guns they used’.82 Walker is correct in that analysis: the range of a demi-culverin, if such were deployed, would not have allowed it to cause serious damage to the walls, but there was the possibility that the besiegers might be able to bring their artillery even closer, thereby presenting a much greater danger to the walls. It was decided to attack the new Jacobite positions. (See Map 5, page 218 for Jacobite positions)

  Walker asserts that he made the decision for this attack. Once again, this is probably a case of his claiming credit for the decision made by someone else. In this instance the decision was more likely that of Henry Baker, who would have recognized immediately the tactics being employed by the attackers; in any event a force of ten men from each company, suggesting a strength of about 1,000, and arrayed in two detachments was sent out to attack the Irish, ‘fearing that the battery might incommode that part of the town nearest to it’.83 Walker commanded one detachment and Jonathan Mitchelburne the other; Adam Murray was also included among the officers, presumably having command of the cavalry. Leaving the city by the Ferry Gate and Bishop’s Gate the two elements united about 150 yards from the latter gate, on ground just below where the nineteenth-century city gaol, a tower of which still stands, was later built. At this point the Williamites formed a line with its left flank on the riverbank.84

  The Williamite attack was then launched. Ramsey’s men held the trench line with infantry while dragoons were posted in the hedges. As the latter were infantry who rode to battle on horseback but dismounted to fight, their deployment was probably designed to provide mobility in the event of an action. In the ensuing engagement the dragoons fell back but it seems that the Jacobite infantry withdrew, leaving the dragoons to hold the trench. This proved an impossible task and the dragoons were also forced to retreat. Many Irish soldiers were killed in the engagement, ‘a desperate action on both sides, although it lasted only for half an hour’, which became known as the battle of Windmill Hill. This developed into a close-quarter encounter with muskets used as clubs, a pattern of fighting for which Irish Jacobite infantry were to become noted; it seems that their opponents also favoured it. Included in the Jacobite dead, which a Jacobite source puts at 150 and a Williamite one at 200 dead with another 300 dying of wounds later, was Brigadier-General Ramsey. The Scot had attempted, without success, to rally his men. A very competent officer, Ramsey was a man the Jacobites could ill afford to lose. Also dead were Captains Fox, Barnwell and Fleming, Lieutenants Kelly and Walsh and Ensigns Kadell and Barnwell. Lord Netterville and Lieutenant-Colonel William Talbot, a son of the late Sir Henry Talbot and a cousin of Tyrconnel, were among the wounded; Netterville and Talbot were taken prisoner, as were several other officers, with Talbot dying some days later. Sir Garrett Aylmer, of Balrath in County Meath, Captain John Brown, a Mayo man, and Thomas Newcomen, described as an adjutant, were also made prisoners. Williamite losses were said ‘to be considerable’ but the exact number was not recorded; only one officer, Lieutenant Douglas, was noted as being killed.85 That evening some Jacobite cavalry returned to the riverbank.86 This was probably a reconnaissance party which withdrew on ‘observing the hedges lined with infantry from the garrison’.

  The injured Jacobite prisoners were brought into the city where their wounds were dressed before they were confined in the home of Thomas Moor, with ‘a guard placed over them’. Otherwise, they were treated honourably ‘as persons of distinction’.87 Such treatment was accorded only to officers who might have prosperous relatives or friends prepared to pay a ransom to obtain their release. Common soldiers would never have received such treatment as their families would have had no means with which to pay a ransom.

  In addition to the deat
hs the Jacobites also lost ‘drums, pickaxes, spades, &c.’ and five stands of colours to their foes.88 The loss of colours is always a matter of shame for any unit and no less so for the Jacobites on this occasion. Taking the colours was yet another boost to the morale of the defenders. It is unlikely that these colours were regimental: they probably belonged to companies and there would have been about ten such colours per regiment. Two of the captured colours hang to this day in St Columb’s Cathedral: although the silk has been replaced a number of times, the staffs are original. The colours are in plain gold silk with the fleur de lys of France embroidered in one corner; these suggest that French support for the Jacobites in Ireland was more of a token than a military reality. These two colours were taken by Colonel Mitchelburne who, when he later became governor of the city, presented them to the cathedral.89

  In the aftermath of the battle a short truce was observed to allow the dead to be buried. Walker tells us that he sent a message to Hamilton to request that a Jacobite burial party, under an officer, come forward to carry out the burials. This was done by sending a drummer to the Jacobite camp. However, Walker is quite caustic about the manner in which the Jacobite dead were buried the following morning, this being done ‘in a very careless manner, scarcely covering some of the bodies with earth, [while] others were cast into the ditches’. More respect was shown to Ramsey, who was buried with full military honours in the grounds of the Temple More, now the site of St Columba’s Church, better known as the Long Tower.90 His death was much felt by those who knew him and ‘he was reckoned the best soldier in the army next to Col. Richard Hamilton’.91 Three days later Colonel William Dorrington, who had landed in Ireland with James and who ‘was esteemed a great soldier’, arrived in the Jacobite camp. His arrival was soon known to the defenders of Derry.92

  That truce seems to have been restricted to the area over which the battle of Windmill Hill was fought since that same day Quartermaster Mardock was shot dead on the Church bastion in what was either a negligent discharge by one of the defenders or a stray round; the Jacobites were so far from that bastion that no aimed shot could have killed Mardock, who was hit in the forehead. Elsewhere three of the garrison were killed and another eight wounded in a further skirmish at Pennyburn.93

  The siege was less than three weeks old but the attackers had already lost three senior officers, suffered two humiliating defeats, at Pennyburn and Windmill Hill, and lost several stands of colours. Their sole success to date had been the capture of Culmore Fort, although this was a significant gain that gave them control of the seaward approach to the city. In contrast, Williamite morale had been increased by the clashes at Pennyburn and on Windmill Hill while the loss of Culmore had not yet percolated through to them. Confidence within the walls was high, largely thanks to the leadership of Adam Murray. And the defending troops had even been issued with leather to make shoes. Meanwhile, Baker was conscious of the possibility of enemies within the walls who might ‘work mines in cellars near the walls’ and, with William Mackey, a trusted citizen, searched every cellar close to the walls on the pretext of examining provisions. No evidence of sabotage was found.94

  A third sally by the defenders towards Pennyburn was not as successful as the earlier two. This, involving a thousand troops, was made early on 11 May and it was hoped to catch the enemy still asleep. Some Jacobite gunners were on full alert, however, and opened fire with two artillery pieces. Although no Williamites were killed, the element of surprise was lost which compelled the attackers to withdraw.95

  The situation in north-west Ulster had become a matter of increasing concern in London. On 18 April, the day on which King James rode up to Bishop’s Gate, Captain, later Colonel, Jacob Richards, an engineer officer in King William’s army, and Irish by birth, left London with orders to travel to Chester, where he learned that the first relief fleet had quit Lough Foyle.96 This latest news was not known to the editor of the London Gazette who included a report from Chester, dated 13 April, indicating that

  The Swallow frigate with the regiments under command of Colonel Cunningham set sail out of this river on Wednesday last for Londonderry; Where it’s not doubted, they are by this time arrived.97

  From Chester, Richards went to Liverpool where the news that the relief fleet had not only arrived at Londonderry but had subsequently returned was confirmed. There he also met ‘one Stevens, a messenger from King William, with orders to go to Londonderry and to make his report of that place’.10 Stevens left for Ireland on the 30th. It soon became clear that preparations were in hand to send another relief force. Richards had orders from the Duke of Schomberg, commander of William’s new expeditionary force for Ireland, on 2 May to ‘embark with some regiments to relieve Londonderry, which we hear is now invested with the Irish Catholics, on whom the town has made several sallies and have killed many of them’.98 This was obviously a reference to the first battles at Pennyburn, news of which seems to have travelled extremely quickly as already noted.

  Over the next few days the preparations continued, with four regiments assigned to the relief force, arrangements made for provisions and bakers and brewers kept busy. Major-General Percy Kirke also arrived to take command of the force, which included Cunningham’s and Richards’ regiments; these were now under the command of Colonels George St George and Steuart respectively.99 Percy Kirke already had a formidable, and unpleasant, reputation. A veteran of Tangier, of which he had been governor for two years, he had played a major role in the suppression of the Duke of Monmouth’s rebellion in 1685, and his regiment had earned the ironic soubriquet ‘Kirke’s lambs’ for its brutality; the regiment’s badge was the paschal lamb, apparently part of the arms of Charles II’s queen, Catherine of Braganza.100 That regiment, the Queen’s11 also known as the 1st Tangerines, had served twenty-two years in ‘that lawless but hard-fighting garrison, during which time it escorted its colonel, the notorious Percy Kirke, in his embassy into the interior of Morocco’. Note the use of the adjective ‘notorious’ to describe Kirke, who was also said to be ‘ruthless’.101 A measure of his ruthlessness may be gained from the fact that he had served on the continent with the Duke of Monmouth’s Regiment while that unit was in French pay, but had no compunction in fighting against Monmouth in the latter’s rebellion. This was to be the man responsible for the relief of Derry.

  Stevens returned to Liverpool on 8 May to report that the Protestants of Londonderry continued to hold out and had gained some victories over the Irish; they had also killed a French general and ‘several English men of quality’ and Berwick was reported as wounded, perhaps dead. Kirke called a council of war and ordered Captain Richards to sail for Londonderry to advise ‘the Protestants of the measures taken here for their relief and also order what I should find necessary for the fortifying of Londonderry’.102

  Following the setback at Windmill Hill, the Jacobite command seems to have suspended siege artillery operations in that area and turned the artillery to creating terror within the walls. This proved highly successful, as evidenced by the various accounts of the siege. Living within the city walls that summer must have been a terrifying experience for the remaining citizens and the refugees. This would have been especially so after the end of May when the Jacobites had received additional mortars, weapons that were much more effective for striking terror into the hearts of civilians. (The word mortar comes from a German word, meerthier, meaning sea monster, which goes some way to explaining the weapon’s origin: when Mohammed II was confronted by an enemy fleet during the siege of Constantinople in 1451 he proposed a new weapon that could throw its shot to a great height before plunging down though the decks of the enemy ships. Thus was the mortar born, and although it was not then accurate enough for its first intended purpose it was soon recognized as an ideal weapon for siege warfare and its use spread throughout Europe.)103

  The trajectory of conventional artillery at this time was quite low, and so only those guns emplaced in Stronge’s orchard would have been able easi
ly to fire into the city. In doing so they caused considerable damage and some deaths. They were supported by mortar fire, both by day and night, and this proved both extremely effective and terrifying: on 25 April a mortar round killed an old lady, Mrs Susannah Holding, when a shell struck a house belonging to a Mr Long; this was one of eighteen fired into the city during the night. (Walker described Mrs Holding as ‘an old woman in a garret’ whereas Ash writes that she was an eighty-year-old gentlewoman.) Three other persons also died that day from cannon fire. On the last day of April a cannonball wounded two members of an infantry company marching up Shipquay Street while one of Colonel Mitchelburne’s soldiers was killed whilst on parade outside the walls in the old cow market. This soldier died because he remained standing whereas his companions dropped to the ground to save themselves.104

  Since it was now recognized that the town house in the Diamond was in danger from such fire, ‘the upper part of Shipquay-street was barricadoed to protect it from the enemy’s cannon, stationed in Stronge’s Orchard’. This curtain wall, creating an enceinte, was built with ‘timber, stones and dung’ between Coningham’s and Boyd’s corners.105 Even that precaution, arguably overdue, did not prevent a round from demolishing the town clock. In retribution a Williamite gun, firing across the river from the ramparts, knocked one of the Jacobite cannon from its carriage and killed the gunner.106